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Abstract	
	The	scholarship	on	Sino-African	relations	has	been	too	pre-occupied	with	China’s	behaviour	and	impact	on	Africa	and	paid	little	attention	to	the	role	played	by	African	actors,	contexts	and	processes	of	governance.	This	thesis	addresses	this	deficiency	through	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 interaction	 between	 Kenyan	 state	 and	 non-state	actors	in	the	relationship	with	China.	In	doing	so,	it	focuses	on	how	such	interactive	relation	is	mobilised	and	negotiated	through	Kenyan	‘agency’,	and	how	it	constitutes	a	means	of	building	national	capacity	in	domestic	as	well	as	foreign	policy,	paving	the	way	for	a	less	dependent	and	more	sustainable	developmental	nation.			The	thesis	adopts	a	state-society	approach	which	combines	macro	(national)-,	meso	(sectoral)-	and	micro-(issue-specific)	 level	dynamics	within	a	single	country	case	study.	 Such	 complex	 and	 differentiated	 design	 helps	 to	 reach	 a	 nuanced	understanding	of	actor	agendas	and	mobilisation	strategies	within	specific	systems	of	governance.	The	cases	are	grouped	into	three	main	sectors,	i.e.	trade,	healthcare	and	education,	cutting	across	trade	and	aid	type	of	engagements	between	a	variety	of	Chinese	and	Kenyan	actors.			Negotiations	are	mainly	characterised	by	strategies	of	contestation	and	cooperation	domestically	and	with	the	Chinese.	Passivity,	contrary	to	the	mainstream	literature,	is	more	rarely	observed.	The	thesis	demonstrates	that	the	factors	that	contribute	to	Kenya’s	control	of	 the	relations	with	China	should	not	be	 identified	 in	 the	state’s	aggregate	power,	or	the	sum	of	state’s	resources,	but	rather	are	situated	within	the	context	 and	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 specific	 negotiations.	 The	 ability	 to	 safeguard	interests	is	then	determined	by	the	ability	of	Kenyan	actors	to	guarantee	conformity	of	specific	negotiation	processes	to	the	prevailing	system	of	norms	and	practices	as	understood	and	legitimised	by	Kenyans.																							
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CHAPTER	1 	
Research	Introduction	and	Design			
1.1 Introduction		China’s	 vastly	 increased	 involvement	 in	 Africa	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 significant	developments	in	the	region	since	the	early	2000s.	The	scholarly	focus	on	the	topic	has,	 more	 often	 than	 not,	 been	 on	 China’s	 foreign	 policy’s	 influence,	 impact,	priorities,	achievements	and	difficulties	 in	Africa.	Less	attention	has	been	paid	to	analysing	 the	 African	 side	 of	 the	 equation:	 beliefs,	 interests,	 resources	 and	structures	that	determine	the	motivations	and	modalities	of	action	in	dealing	with	the	opportunities	and	challenges	that	China	is	presenting.		This	shortcoming	does	not	come	as	a	surprise	if	one	looks	at	how	Africa	has	been	portrayed	in	the	international	relations	literature:	Africans’	leverage	in	negotiating	
with	 external	 forces	 has	 chronically	 been	 neglected,	 depicting	 the	 continent	 as	
dependent	 and	 powerless.	 Similarly,	 Africa’s	 relations	 with	 China	 have	 been	understood	as	heavily	asymmetrical	due	to	China’s	economic	and	political	overall	strengths,	leading	to	assume	that	little	negotiation	willingness	or	ability	was	left	to	Africans.	Even	when	Africans	‘were	attributed’	decisional	power,	it	has	often	been	believed	 that	 if	 they	 could	 choose	 between	Western1	normative	 approaches	 and	China’s	no-strings-attached	win-win	promises,	they	would	undoubtedly	opt	for	the	latter,	based	on	ideological	affinity	and	the	possibility	of	quick	returns.	While	these	conditions	contain	elements	of	 truth,	 it	 is	 about	 time	 that	 the	African	side	of	 the	equation	is	analysed	not	by	studying	the	‘consequences	for	Africa’	of	China’s	arrival,	but	the	reasons	and	modalities	of	Africans’	action.		In	 a	 way,	 the	 thesis	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 simply	 change	 the	 standing	 point	 for	observing	 real	 world	 dynamics,	 to	 invert	 the	 logic	 to	 ask	 ‘What	 is	 the	 influence	African	contexts	and	people	have	on	Sino-African	relations?’	rather	than	continue	asking	 only	 ‘What	 is	 the	 influence	 China	 has?’.	 The	 aim	 is	 thus	 that	 to	 explore	whether	Africans	have	the	willingness	and	ability	to	safeguard	their	interests	in	the	relational	 dynamics	with	 external	 forces,	what	 are	 their	 reasons	 and	modalities,	
                                                1	For	a	good	account	of	the	conceptualization	of	the	West	in	international	relations,	see	J.	O’Hagan,	Conceptualizing	the	West	
in	International	Relations:	From	Spengler	to	Said,	Palgrave,	Houndmills,	2002.			
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how	the	 interactive	relation	between	state	and	non-state	actors	 is	mobilised	and	negotiated,	 and	 how	 it	 constitutes	 a	 strength	 in	 building	 national	 capacity	 in	domestic	 as	well	 as	 foreign	policy.	The	willingness	and	ability	 to	 safeguard	 their	interests,	 i.e.	 ‘agency’,	 is	 articulated	 as	 the	 definition	 and	 determination	 of	governance	processes	vis-à-vis	the	same	processes	being	defined	and	determined	by	external	actors.		By	studying	these	processes,	the	thesis	aims	at	contributing	to	the	 existing	 literature	 on	 Africa	 in	 international	 relations,	 and	more	 specifically	Sino-African	relations,	through	empirical	findings.	To	gather	a	full	picture	of	these	dynamics,	this	thesis	transcends	the	disciplinary	boundaries	that	often	adopt	single	levels	of	analysis.	While	the	literature	on	Sino-African	 relations	 has	 mostly	 understood	 the	 African	 engagements	 with	 China	through	a	dichotomous	lens,	i.e.	state	or	non-state	action,	in	this	thesis	the	author	uses	a	combined	state-society	approach,	believing	that	the	governance	of	particular	issues,	 domestically	 and	with	 external	 actors,	 cannot	 be	 so	 easily	 circumscribed	within	 such	 boundaries.	 As	Mohan	 and	 Lampert	 suggest	 “Chinese	 relations	with	many	 African	 countries	 are	 maturing	 and	 moving	 beyond	 state-to-state	 deals,	implicating	many	more	actors.	So,	the	need	to	move	beyond	statist,	elite	dialogues	is	not	simply	a	theoretical	exercise,	but	one	made	more	pressing	by	this	growing	‘embeddedness’	of	mutual	political	and	economic	ties”2.		Moreover,	 the	 asymmetries	 identified	 between	 China	 and	 African	 countries,	which	presumably	void	the	win-win	discourse	of	its	meaning,	are	often	compared	within	 a	 single	 sector	 without	 taking	 into	 consideration	 the	 wider	 context.	 To	overcome	 this	 problem,	 this	 thesis	 combines	 reasoning	 about	macro-,	meso-	and	
micro-level	dynamics,	national,	 sectoral	and	 issue-specific.	 It	 is	argued	 that	using	such	 three-layered	 approach	 and	 paying	 attention	 to	 the	 specific	 and	 broader	contexts	 simultaneously,	 leverages	 the	strengths	and	weaknesses	 that	a	 country-system	adopts	vis-à-vis	external	forces.	This	is	helpful	for	at	least	two	reasons.		First,	 perpetuating	 the	 discussion	 about	 ‘Africa’	 and	 China,	 often	 adopted	 in	studies	of	multiple	countries,	may	be	producing	inaccurate	depictions	of	real	world	dynamics	 that	 are	 instead	 always,	 inevitably,	 context-dependent.	 While	 it	 is	explained,	in	the	next	chapter,	the	inevitability	of	talking	of	 ‘Africa’	as	a	collective	presence,	mainly	because	the	literature,	historically,	refers	to	it	as	such,	the	aim	of	
                                                2	G.	Mohan	and	B.	Lampert,	 ‘Negotiating	China:	Reinserting	African	Agency	into	China-Africa	Relations’,	African	Affairs,	vol.	112,	no.	446,	2014,	p.	100.	
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the	thesis	is	to	select	one	single	country	and	dig	deep	into	its	processes	of	decision-making.		Second,	by	looking	at	broader	national	contexts,	in	conjunction	with	the	sector	and	issue-specific	contexts,	it	may	be	possible	to	note	that	despite	not	winning	in	the	 same	 ‘discipline’	 as	China,	African	countries	do	gain	 from	 the	 relation.	While	some	sectors	suffer	from	increased	relations	with	China,	others	may	benefit.	Kalu	in	his	 doctoral	 dissertation	 suggests	 that	 “Nigerians	 are	 willing	 to	 experience	 a	continued	trade	deficit	with	China	in	order	to	achieve	other	important	objectives”3.	This	also	relates	to	the	need	of	breaking	down	national	contexts	and	move	beyond	the	widespread	belief	that	African	countries	practice	a	single	type	of	governance,	according	 to	 which	 “states	 and	 public	 services	 operate	 in	 clientelist	 mode,	 the	general	model	is	neopatrimonial	in	nature	and	most	practices	fall	into	what	is	called	the	 informal	 realm” 4 .	 Doing	 so	 does	 not	 aim	 at	 suggesting	 that	 these	 types	 of	governance	mechanisms	are	disappearing,	but	rather	at	establishing	whether	they	are	still	largely	representative	of	actual	governance	dynamics.		Finally,	the	thesis	establishes	that	the	processes	of	governance,	negotiated	across	the	state	and	non-state	realms,	are	a	crucial	site	for	determining	power	distribution	between	Africans	and	external	actors.	The	willingness	and	ability	of	domestic	actors	to	safeguard	their	interests	in	the	relations	with	external	forces	is	the	result	of	these	processes	of	governance	that	are,	in	turn,	shaped	not	by	linear	relations,	but	by	a	complex	 and	 non-static	 blend	 of	 beliefs,	 interests,	 resources	 negotiated	 within	specific	systems	of	governance.				
1.2 Literature	Overview	
 By	locating	this	thesis	in	the	field	of	International	Relations,	the	main	problem	concerns,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 a	 necessary	 disambiguation	 about	 the	 fundamental	
                                                3	N.E.	Kalu,	‘Understanding	Africa’s	China	Policy:	A	Test	of	Dependency	Theory	and	a	Study	of	African	Motivations	in	Increasing	Engagement	with	China’,	PhD	thesis,	University	of	Nebraska-Lincoln,	2012,	p.	1.	4	J.P.	Olivier	de	Sardan,	‘Researching	the	Practical	Norms	of	Real	Governance	in	Africa’,	Africa	Powers	and	Politics	Programme	Discussion	Paper,	no.	5,	Overseas	Development	Institute,	December	2008,	p.	1.	
	 14	
units	of	the	discipline.	The	literature	on	the	African	State5	and	African	Civil	Society6	has	mainly	 focused	on	 the	appropriateness	 of	 applying	western	 concepts	 to	non-western	realities	and	how	such	concepts	have	been	readapted/rejected	by	African	states	and	peoples,	in	the	face	of	both	internal	issues	and	external	forces.	In	other	words,	it	has	been	questioned	whether	the	institutions	of	the	state	and	civil	society	in	Africa	exist	at	all	given	that	the	original	forms	of	associational	space	existent	in	Africa	before	the	advent	of	colonisers	were	significantly	different	in	structure	to	the	western	division	of	powers	between	the	state	and	other	societal	actors.	As	a	consequence	of	these	debates	about	the	units	of	analysis,	the	role	of	African	agents	in	international	relations	has	often	been	underestimated.	Cornelissen,	Cheru	and	Shaw	assert	that	“Africa	is	generally	under-represented	in	the	mainstream	IR	scholarship	emanating	from	the	North	Atlantic	world	and	is	mostly	left	out	of	the	theoretical	 debates	 that	 have	 animated	 this	 scholarship”7.	 This	 is	 grounded	 in	 a	widespread	 belief,	 in	 the	 real	world	 and	 the	 scholarship	 on	Africa,	 that	Africa	 is	marginal,	irrelevant,	powerless	in	the	world’s	global	processes.	The	predominance	of	informal	governance	in	Africa,	consequential	to	the	absence	of	a	proper	division	between	 formal	 state	 apparatuses	 and	 social	 formations	 has	 led	 to	 believe	 that	African	states	“might	be	rather	different	from	the	states	that	typically	inhabit	at	least	‘traditional’	 IR	theory”8	(IRT)	and	because	of	 this,	 they	could	hardly	 fit	 IRT9.	This	normative	 understanding	 of	 political	 dynamics	 overlooked	 the	 historical	trajectories	 and	 the	 complexities	 of	 empirical	 statehood	 without	 realising,	 as	Williams	claims,	that	“African	states	help	to	provide	some	of	what	we	might	call	the	
                                                5	J.F.	Bayart,	The	State	in	Africa.	The	Politics	of	the	Belly,	Longman,	New	York,	1993;	J.F.	Bayart,	‘Africa	in	the	World:	A	History	of	Extraversion’,	African	Affairs,	vol.	99,	no.	395,	2000;	C.	Young,	‘The	End	of	the	Post-Colonial	State	in	Africa?	Reflections	on	Changing	African	Political	Dynamics’,	African	Affairs,	vol.	103,	no.	410,	2004;	L.	J.	Diamond,	J.	Linz	&	S.	M.	Lipset	eds.,	Democracy	
in	Developing	Countries,	Lynne	Rienner,	Boulder,	1988;	D.S.	Rothchild	and	N.	Chazan,	The	Precarious	Balance.	State	and	Society	
in	Africa,	Westview	Press,	Boulder,	1988;	A.	Mbembe,	On	the	Postcolony,	University	of	California	Press,	Berkeley,	2001;	M.	Meredith,	The	State	of	Africa :	A	History	of	the	Continent	since	Independence,	Simon	&	Schuster,	London,	2011.	6	D.	Lewis,	Civil	Society	in	Non-Western	Contexts:	Reflections	on	the	‘usefulness’	of	a	Concept,	Centre	for	Civil	Society,	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	London,	2001;	P.	Chabal	and	J.P.	Daloz,	Africa	Works:	Disorder	as	Political	Instrument,	International	 African	 Institute	 in	 association	with	 James	 Currey,	 Oxford,	 1999;	 J.M.	Makumbe,	 ‘Is	 there	 a	 Civil	 Society	 in	Africa	?’,	International	Affairs,	vol.	74,	no.	2,	April,	1998;	S.	Orvis,	‘Civil	Society	in	Africa	or	African	Civil	Society?’,	Journal	of	
Asian	 and	 African	 Studies,	 vol.	 36,	 no.	 1,	 2001;	 M.	 Bratton,	 Civil	 Society	 and	 Political	 Transition	 in	 Africa,	 Institute	 for	Development	Research	Report	Series,	vol.11,	no.6,	Institute	for	Development	Research,	1994;	M.	Edwards,	‘The	Challenges	of	Civil	Society	in	Africa’,	lecture	given	at	TrustAfrica	[lecture	notes	online],	12	February	2009.	7	S.	Cornelissen,	F.	Cheru	and	T.M.	Shaw,	‘Introduction:	Africa	and	International	Relations	in	the	21st	Century:	Still	Challenging	Theory?’,	 in	 S.	 Cornelissen,	 F.	 Cheru	 and	 T.M.	 Shaw	 eds.,	Africa	 and	 International	 Relations	 in	 the	 21st	 Century,	 Palgrave	Macmillan,	Houndsmill,	2012,	p.	2.	8	D.	Williams,	‘Agency,	African	States	and	IR	Theory’,	paper	presented	to	the	BISA	Annual	Conference,	Manchester,	27-29	April	2011,	p.	3.	9	W.	Brown,	 'Africa	and	 International	Relations:	 a	 comment	on	 IR	 theory,	 anarchy	and	statehood',	Review	of	 International	
Studies,	vol.	32,	no.	1,	2006;	D.	Lemke,	'African	lessons	for	International	Relations	research',	World		Politics,	vol.	56,	no.	1,	2003;	D.	Lemke,	'Intra-national	IR	in	Africa',	Review	of	International	Studies,	vol.	37,	2011;	C.	Clapham,	'Degrees	of	statehood',	Review	
of	International	Studies,	vol.	24,	1998;	Williams,	op.	cit.		
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‘limit	cases’	but	the	broad	issues	that	emerge	are	ones	that	can	be	applied	to	thinking	about	state	agency	in	general”10.	To	include	the	range	of	actors	and	political	formations	that	constitute	politics,	it	is	necessary	to	break	down	assumptions	about	‘difference’.	Hence,	the	governance	of	 domestic	 affairs	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 power	 relations	 between	 the	governing	and	the	governed,	devoid	of	normative	attachments.	It	is	not	about	‘good’	governance,	but	rather	about	‘real’	governance11.	Aspects	of	‘poor’	governance	such	as	corruption,	ethnic	allegiance,	clientelism,	are	considered	in	this	study	as	relevant	as	aspects	of	‘good’	governance,	such	as	accountability,	participation,	the	rule	of	law.	Real	governance,	as	state	by	Olivier	de	Sardan,	“is	composed	of	multiple	dimensions,	some	convergent	and	others	contradictory;	it	is	also	the	product	of	local,	sectoral	and	individual	microdynamics;	and	lastly,	it	faces	on	every	front	a	pluralism	of	forms	of	action”12.	Therefore,	it	is	important	to	look	at	state-society	relations	in	Africa	not	“as	 a	 promised	 agenda	 for	 change”13 	but	 as	 Mamdani	 suggests,	 in	 their	 “actual	formation”	14.	This	means	that	in	defining	state-society	relations,	the	focus	should	be	on	the	broad	range	of	collective	activity	and	norms,	be	they	democratic	or	not,	that	constitute	actual	society15.	
	
1.2.1 Sino-African	Relations	Literature	Similar	to	the	treatment	of	Africa	in	the	broader	field	of	IR,	the	literature	on	Sino-African	relations	has	been	less	concerned	with	Africa	than	it	has	been	with	China.		The	debate	on	Sino-African	relations	has	attracted	scholarly	attention	since	the	Cold	War	 period.	 Snow,	 Filesi	 and	 Duyvendak	 focused	 on	 the	 historical	 ties	 between	China	and	 the	African	continent16;	others	such	as	Yu,	Larkin,	Hevi	and	Hutchison	have	instead	focused	on	China’s	foreign	policy	in	Africa	since	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	to	the	late	1970s,	with	a	view	to	the	ideological	underpinnings	that	still	feature	 in	 nowadays	 relations 17 .	 However,	 it	 is	 only	 since	 the	 late	 1990s	 that	
                                                10	Williams,	op.	cit.,	p.	3.	11	Olivier	de	Sardan,	op.	cit.	12	Olivier	de	Sardan,	op.	cit.,	p.	4.	13 	M.	 Mamdani,	 Citizen	 and	 subject:	 contemporary	 Africa	 and	 the	 legacy	 of	 late	 colonialism,	 Princeton	 University	 Press,	Princeton,	2006,	p.	19.		14	Ibid.	15	Orvis,	op.	cit.,	p.18.	16	See	P.	Snow,	The	Star	Raft:	China’s	Encounter	with	Africa,	Weidenfeld	and	Nicolson,	London,	1988;	T.	Filesi,	China	and	Africa	
in	the	Middle	Ages,	trans.	David	L.	Morison,	Frank	Cass,	London,	1972;	J.	J.	L.	Duyvendak,	China’s	Discovery	of	Africa,	Arthur	Probsthain,	London,	1949.	17	See	G.	Yu,	‘Peking	Versus	Taipei	in	the	World	Arena:	Chinese	Competition	in	Africa’,	Asian	Survey,	vol.	3,	no.9,	1963,	pp.	439-453;	G.	Yu,	‘China’s	Failure	in	Africa’,	Asian	Survey,	vol.	6,	no.	8,	1966,	pp.	461-468;	E.Hevi,	The	Chinese	Communists	and	Africa,	Praeger,	 New	 York,	 1966;	 B.	 D.	 Larkin,	 China	 and	 Africa	 1940-1970:	 The	 Foreign	 Policy	 of	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China	University	of	California	Press,	Berkeley,	1971;	A.	Hutchison,	China’s	Africa	Revolution,	Hutchinson,	London,	1975.	
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scholarly	attention	intensified,	initially	characterised	by	conventional	views	about	the	scope	and	role	of	the	Chinese	presence	in	Africa.	Especially	in	the	first	years	of	engagement	 (ca	2000-2008),	 the	debates	broadly	 relied	on	 journalistic	 accounts,	exacerbating	a	dichotomous	understanding18:	Western	media	 tended	 to	view	 the	development	 with	 scepticism	 and	 wariness 19 ,	 while	 the	 Chinese	 perspective,	observed	 in	 official	 Chinese	 sources,	 was	 often	 characterised	 by	 unbounded	optimism.	In	other	words,	the	relations	were	polarised	as	either	dangerously	neo-colonial	or	optimistically	beneficial	for	African	countries.		As	Alden	suggests	“we	seem	unable	to	escape	our	singular	focus	on	competing	discourses	 claiming	 colonial	 intent	 or	 benign	 purpose	 on	 the	 part	 of	 China	 in	Africa”20 .	 This	 inability	 seems	 to	 be	 due	 to	 an	 urge	 “to	 capture	 ongoing	 global	transformations	and	their	manifestations”	while	they	are	 in	the	process	of	taking	shape.	An	inability	that	is	also	characterised	by	“our	own	biases	and	assumptions,	including	the	ideology	of	difference	that	causes	some	Western	scholars	in	particular	to	exoticize	this	relationship,	or	the	ideology	of	sameness	that	causes	some	Chinese	scholars	to	familiarize	it”21.		Either	way,	the	depiction	of	the	role	played	by	Africans	within	the	relations	was	minimal,	mostly	characterised	by	Africans	being	acted	on.	This	understanding	was	bound	by,	especially	 in	 the	 first	decade	of	 intensified	Sino-African	studies	(2000-2010),	a	disproportionate	propensity	to	understand	China-Africa	relations	in	realist	terms,	focusing	on	strong/weak	power	asymmetries	revolving	around	the	Chinese	extraction	 of	 African	 natural	 resources.	 	 In	 effect,	 the	 narrow	 scholarly	 focus	reflected	 the	 limited	 initial	 approach	 between	 China	 and	 African	 countries,	characterised	 by	 state-to-state	 engagements	 and	 driven,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 by	 a	Chinese	appetite	for	natural	resources,	claimed	to	be	satisfied	unquestioningly	by	Africans.	 In	 this	 initial	phase,	despite	 the	Chinese	proclaimed	win-win	discourse,	fierce	criticism	was	raised	against	China’s	 involvement	with	states	of	all	political	orientations,	including	authoritarian	ones,	and	concerns	were	voiced	regarding	the	benefits	the	relations	would	bring	to	African	societies,	as	opposed	to	African	elites.	In	other	words,	the	win-win	symbolism	seemed	to	be	relevant,	if	at	all,	at	state-to-
                                                18	Also	see	China	Aid	Data	to	understand	the	role	of	the	media	as	the	first	source	of	knowledge	upon	which	many	academic	studies	 draw	 their	 data:	 China	 Aid	 Data,	 ‘Methodology’,	 China	 Aid	 Data	 [website],	<http://china.aiddata.org/content/methodology>.		19	S.	T.	Freeman	ed.,	China,	Africa	and	the	African	Diaspora:	Perspectives,	AASBEA	Publishers,	Washington	DC,	2009.	20	C.	Alden,	 ‘In	Search	of	Gravity’s	Rainbow.	Theoretical	Approaches	and	China-Africa	scholarship’,	paper	presented	at	 the	Making	 Sense	 of	 the	 China-Africa	 Relationship:	 Theoretical	 Approaches	 and	 the	 Politics	 of	 Knowledge	 conference,	 Yale	University,	18-19	November	2013.	21	Ibid.	
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state	 level	 but	 not	 in	 relation	 to	 society.	 Based	 on	 a	 few	 studies	 of,	 mainly,	authoritarian	 African	 countries,	 generalisations	 about	 elites’	 behaviour	 across	Africa	assumed	that	these	last	would	unquestioningly	welcome	China’s	no-strings-attached	 approach,	 as	 opposed	 to	 more	 critical	 perceptions	 rising	 from	 society.	African	 elites	 were	 often	 portrayed	 as	 passive	 watchers	 of	 Chinese	 abuses,	 i.e.	disrespect	 for	 local	rules	and	exploitation	of	 local	resources,	even	in	cases	where	society’s	uneasiness	towards	the	Chinese	was	voiced.		With	time,	academic	debates	around	the	presumably	exploitative	attitude	of	the	Chinese	and	assumed	passivity	of	African	elites	started	to	be	acknowledged.	Alden,	Large	 and	Soares	de	Oliveria	 in	2008	asserted	 that	Beijing	was,	more	 and	more,	finding	 itself	 “at	 odds	 with	 an	 emerging	 consensus	 on	 the	 necessity	 of	 good	governance	within	Africa	itself”	and	that	“the	voices	arguing	for	improvements	in	accountability,	transparency	and	democracy	were	not	just	civil	society	activists	but	some	of	the	top	leaders	of	the	continent,	like	Nigeria’s	former	President	Olusegum	Obasanjo	and	South	Africa’s	Thabo	Mbeki”22.		The	 seemingly	 consistent	 Chinese	 foreign	 policy	 discourse	 on	 win-win	cooperation	started	being	questioned	by	Africans	as	the	practices	of	a	diverse	range	of	Chinese	actors,	not	only	state	actors,	further	exacerbated	the	discussion,	among	societal	groups	as	well	as	international	organisations,	concerning	the	exploitative	nature	of	Chinese	activities.	At	the	same	time,	Chinese	leaders	begun	to	show	signs	of	 awareness	 concerning	 the	 importance	 of	 accounting	 for	 African	 internal	
perceptions	as	well	as	African	governance	dynamics	for	the	success	of	their	initiatives,	thus	paying	attention	not	only	to	formal	institutions	but	also	informal	ones,	not	only	to	state	organs	but	also	to	non-state	entities,	not	only	to	the	pragmatic	aspects	of	the	engagement	but	also	to	the	image	of	China	and	its	reception	in	African	contexts.		Since	the	early	2010s,	the	literature	has	tried	to	make	up	for	its	biases,	providing	more	attention	to	engagements	beyond	natural	resources	extraction	and,	if	limitedly,	to	the	role	played	by	African	people	and	contexts23	in	Sino-African	relations.	This	diversification	 did	 not	 aim	 at	 diminishing	 the	 importance	 that	 natural	 resources	play	 in	 Sino-African	 relations	 or	 the	 prominence	 of	 China.	 However,	 the	 actual	engagements,	increasingly	more	complex	and	diversified,	were	signalling	the	need	to	expand	the	focus	and	include	units	of	analysis	that	had	been,	until	then,	neglected.	
                                                22	C.	Alden,	D.	Large	and	R.	Soares	de	Oliveira	eds.,	China	returns	 to	Africa.	A	 rising	power	and	a	continent	embrace,	Hurst	Publishers,	London,	2008.	p.	21.	23	Kalu,	op.	cit.;	Mohan	&	Lampert,	op.	cit.		
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Studies	on	the	African	elaboration	of	the	Chinese	arrival	started	focusing	on	either	African	elites’	responses	to	the	Chinese	or	civil	society’s	behaviour.	The	content	and	modalities	of	the	relations	between	the	elites	and	societies,	in	light	of	the	generally	new	engagement	with	China,	was	not	problematized,	but	merely	described	as	polar	with	 the	 first	 having	 a	 positive	 attitude	 towards	 the	 Chinese,	 welcoming	 them	without	many	conditions24,	 and	 the	 latter	holding	a	negative	and	cynical	view	of	China’s	presence.				
1.3 Unpacking	the	Research	questions		The	analyses	of	China-Africa	engagements	in	the	international	relations	field	are,	more	often	than	not,	framed	as	analyses	of	Chinese	foreign	policy.	As	noted	above,	African	 actors	 and	 contexts	 involved	 in	 the	 relations	 with	 China	 are	 often	overlooked	 or	 deemed	 passive,	 unable	 and	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	interaction.	 The	 relations	 are	 often	 characterised	 as	 asymmetrical	 with	 the	preponderance	of	power	residing	in	the	hands	of	Chinese	actors	and	structures.	An	increasing	body	of	literature	has	started	paying	attention	to	‘African’	agency25	in	the	recent	 years,	 suggesting	 that	 it	 should	deserve	more	 attention	 than	 it	 had	 so	 far	received.	This	body	is	only	limitedly	addressing	specific	Sino-African	relations	while	enquiring	more	 generally	 about	 African	 agency	 in	 international	 relations26.	 As	 a	consequence,	the	subject	still	needs	a	systematic	investigation	to	be	grounded	on	empirical	observations	so	to	build	a	more	substantial	body	of	literature.		Aiming	at	contributing	to	filling	this	gap,	this	thesis	studies	African	agency	as	the	
indigenous/African	 ownership	 of	 governance	 processes	 within	 Sino-African	relations	 and	 asks:	what	 are	 the	 degree,	 the	 motivations	 and	 modalities	 through	
which	African	ownership	of	governance	processes	is	exerted	in	Sino-African	relations?	The	processes	of	governance	are	a	crucial	site	for	determining	power	distribution	
                                                24 	Africa	 and	 Asia	 Departments	 at	 Georgetown	 University,	 Africa	 and	 China:	 Issues	 and	 Insights,	 Conference	 Report,	Georgetown	University,	7	November	2008.		25	W.	Brown,	‘A	question	of	agency:	Africa	in	international	politics’,	Third	World	Quarterly,	vol.	33,	no.	10,	2012;	W.	Brown	and	S.	Harman	eds.,	African	Agency	and	International	Relations,	Routledge,	Abingdon,	2013;	D.	Neubert	and	C.	Scherer	eds.,	
Agency	and	Changing	World	Views	in	Africa,	Lit	Verlag,	Berlin,	2014;	T.	Shaw,	‘African	Agency?	Africa,	South	Africa	and	the	BRICS’,	International	Politics,	no.	52,	2015;	L.	Whitfield	and	A,	Fraser,	‘Negotiating	Aid:	The	Structural	Conditions	Shaping	the	Negotiating	Strategies	of	African	Governments’,	International	Negotiation,	no,	15,	2010;	P.	Murray-Evans,	‘Regionalism	and	African	agency:	negotiating	an	Economic	Partnership	Agreement	between	the	European	Union	and	SADC-Minus’,	Third	
World	Quarterly,	vol.	36,	no.	10,	2015.		26	A	recent	exception	is	the	edited	volume:	A.	Gadzala	ed.,	Africa	and	China:	how	Africans	and	their	governments	are	shaping	
relations	with	China,	Rowman	and	Littlefield,	London,	2015.	
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between	 Africans	 and	 external	 actors.	 To	 delineate	 what	 agency-as-ownership	means,	it	is	first	necessary	to	explain	how	governance	is	conceived.			
Governance	According	 to	 Rosenau 27 ,	 the	 concept	 of	 governance	 is	 more	 inclusive	 than	government	 as	 it	 embraces	 “governmental	 institutions	 and	 informal,	 non	government	mechanisms	whereby	needs	and	wants	are	 fulfilled”.	He	asserts	 that	governance	is	a	system	of	rules	accepted	by	the	majority28.	This	broadening	of	the	focus	to	the	concept	of	governance	–	instead	of	the	narrower	idea	of	government	–	is	necessary	to	provide	an	accurate	portray	of	actual	Sino-African	relations.		In	fact,	the	willingness	and	ability	to	exert	control	in	processes	of	negotiation	with	external	actors,	depend	on	the	existence	of	a	range	of	actors,	on	their	ideas,	interests,	and	on	the	way	power	and	resources	are	distributed	and	shared	among	them	domestically,	which	can	be	accentuated	in	the	relations	with	external	actors.		To	account	for	such	diverse	elements	of	governance,	this	thesis	does	not	adopt	a	single	 theoretical	 paradigm.	 It	 rather	 asserts	 that	 to	 capture	 the	 complexity	 of	governance	 processes	 unfolding	 across	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	environments,	a	combination	of	theoretical	approaches	is	required.	In	Chapter	2,	the	aspects	 that	 are	 deemed	 relevant,	 for	 this	 thesis,	 of	 the	 realist,	 institutionalist,	constructivist	and	pluralist	theoretical	approaches	will	be	presented.	Though	aware	that	uniting	them	will	inevitably	decrease	their	particular	explanatory	power,	it	is	believed	 that	 together	 they	 can	 provide	 a	 more	 accurate	 depiction	 of	 actual	governance	 dynamics.	 By	 means	 of	 introduction,	 by	 pulling	 together	 relevant	elements	 of	 each	 of	 these	 theoretical	 approaches,	 the	 thesis	 presents	 a	conceptualization	of	governance	that	does	not	place	the	full	explanatory	power	on	individuals	 or	 structures,	 but	 rather	 on	 a	 complex	 intertwining	 of	 the	 two.	 This	conceptualization:	- Identifies	 the	 diversity	 of	 actors	 in	 Sino-African	 relations.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	author	 recognises	 the	 importance	of	 the	State	but	understands	 it	 as	acting	through	 human	 agents,	 in	 a	 non-unitary	 fashion,	 subjected	 to	 social	 and	market	 forces	 whose	 interests	 are	 negotiated	 through	 processes	 of	
                                                27	J.	Rosenau,	‘Governance,	Order	and	Change	in	World	Politics’,	in	J.N.	Rosenau	&	E.O.	Czempiel	eds.,	Governance	without	
Government:	Order	and	Change	in	World	Politics,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge,	1992,	p.	4.	28	Ibid.	
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competition	 and	 cooperation,	 based	 on	 the	 asymmetrical	 availability	 of	resources.		- Recognises	 that	 agents	 identify	 their	 interests	 not	 only	 based	 on	 rational	decisions	but	also	based	on	social	constructs,	i.e.	ideas	and	perceptions.		- Assigns	particular	relevance	to	institutions,	in	particular	in	relation	to	their	dependence	on	historical	paths.		- Recognises	that	governance	is	far	from	being	merely	state-determined,	within	one	country’s	boundaries,	but	is	rather	increasingly	the	consequence	of	the	inclusion	 in	 the	 decision-making	 of	 social	 and	 market	 forces,	 including	multilateral	organisations.		- Finally,	 all	 this	 is	 subjected	 to	 change	 over	 time.	 Even	 though	 path	dependence	finds	significant	space	in	this	conceptualization,	change	is	also	an	important	 element	 of	 Sino-African	 relations,	 determined	 by	 heuristic	approaches	to	interaction,	and	of	Africa’s	relations	with	other	external	forces.			Resulting	from	this	is	an	idea	of	governance	that	is	dynamic,	encompassing	a	wide	range	of	actors	who	have	asymmetrical	access	to	resources	and	power	and	whose	interests	are	negotiated	across	sub-national,	national	and	international	platforms.	A	governance	that	is	constituted	by	a	multitude	of	relationships	that	have	historically	determined	the	formal	and	informal	norms,	procedures,	conventions	of	interaction;	that	 is	 ideationally	 subjectively	 constructed,	 and	 that	 is	 subject	 to	 change.	 It	 is	 a	multi-level	 type	 of	 governance	 according	 to	 which	 decision-making	 norms	 and	institutions	are	forged	at	specific	 levels	and	negotiated	then	with	tiers	above	and	below29.	These	interactions	occur	as	competing	“economic	and	political	forces	seek	the	most	favourable	conditions	for	insertion	into	a	changing	international	order”30.	
	
Ownership	
Ownership	of	 these	complex	governance	processes	 in	 international	relations	 is	contrasted	with	 these	processes	being	defined	and	dominated	 by	 external	 actors,	hence	the	idea	of	agency-as-ownership.	In	other	words,	it	means	the	safeguarding	of	African	interests	(vis-à-vis	the	interests	of	external	actors)	through	the	protection	of	the	decision-making	process.	Africa	remains	a	region	whose	formal	and	informal	
                                                29	N.	Brenner,	New	State	Spaces,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford,	2004.		30	B.	Jessop,	‘The	Crisis	of	the	National	Spatiotemporal	Fix	and	the	Ecological	Dominance	of	Globalising	Capitalism’,	
International	Journal	of	Urban	and	Regional	Research,	Vol.24,	No.2,	2000,	p.343.		
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structures,	 institutions	 and	 norms	 have	 been	 shaped,	 re-shaped,	 contested	 and	challenged	 by	 external	 actors	 to	 an	 unprecedented	 degree.	 Considering	 China’s	relatively	 new	 arrival	 in	 Africa	 and	 its	 proclaimed	 non-interference	 policy,	 it	remains	 fundamental	 to	 understand	 how	 domestic	 capacities	 and	 international	configurations	of	power	interact.		As	 Whitfield	 and	 Fraser	 suggest	 in	 their	 study	 of	 aid	 negotiations	 between	external	actors	as	donors	and	African	recipients,	looking	at	African	‘ownership’	of	governance	processes	in	an	international	relations	context	means	exploring	“how	a	realm	 of	 decision-making	 can	 be	 protected	 from	 external	 influence,	 defending	spaces	in	which	African	agents	can	struggle	amongst	themselves	over	the	nature	of	appropriate	 political	 and	 economic	 processes”31 .	 By	 ownership,	 they	 mean	 the	‘control’	over	the	content	and	modalities	of	governance,	as	opposed	to	these	being	decided	upon	by	external	actors,	advancing	the	idea	that	“loss	of	control	[…]	has	had	a	malign	effect”32.	They	 continue	by	 stating	 that,	 to	one	extreme,	 “the	defense	of	ownership	is	in	effect	a	defense	of	the	sovereign	rights	of	African	states”33.		It	 is	assumed	that	 if	 the	domestic	system	of	governance	 is	safeguarded,	then	the	
interests	of	African	actors	are	also	protected	since	the	domestic	system	of	governance,	
which	regulates	how	power	and	resources	are	shared	among	actors,	serves	as	a	point	
of	 leverage	 over	 acts	 of	 narrow	 self-interest.	 	 It	 is,	 in	 other	words,	 the	product	 of	(continuous)	 negotiations	 over	what	 is	 deemed	 legitimate	 and	 thus	 accepted	 by	indigenous	 stakeholders 34 .	 This	 does	 not,	 however,	 imply	 that	 the	 system	 of	governance	is,	normatively	speaking,	a	morally	correct	one	or	that	procedures	are	bound	by	 legality	and	 formality.	This	 thesis	 is	about	 ‘real’	governance,	not	 ‘good’	governance.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 content	 and	 modalities	 of	 action	 to	 be	safeguarded	can	be	more	or	less	morally	justifiable,	pertaining	to	the	formal	as	well	as	informal	worlds.		Moreover,	safeguarding	the	system	does	not	necessarily	mean	maintaining	it.	It	can	also	mean	revisiting	it	to	make	sure	it	is	suitable	to	face	emerging	opportunities	
                                                31	Whitfield	and	Fraser,	op.	cit.,	p.	343.	32	Ibid.	33	Ibid.	34	For	an	interesting	overview	of	the	literature	on	the	concept	of	‘stakeholder’	and	the	birth	of	‘stakeholder	analysis’	as	a	research	method,	see	R.	Brugha	&	Z.	Varvasovszky,	‘Stakeholder	analysis:	a	review’,	Health	Policy	and	Planning,	vol.15,	no.3,	pp.239-246.	The	paper	suggests	that	stakeholder	analysis	as	a	method	stemmed	out	of	the	organisational	and	management	literature	of	the	1970s	and	1980s.	According	to	the	authors,	the	method	considers	‘policy	actors	[…]	not	only	as	interest	groups	but	also	as	active	or	passive	players	on	the	policy	scene	who	are	also	affected	by	the	policy’.	The	‘policy	scene’	-	called	‘arena’	in	this	thesis	-	is	not	narrowly	associated	with	the	government	but	more	broadly	with	all	those	actors	that,	directly	or	indirectly,	affect	the	policy	and	are	affected	by	it.	The	thesis	will	use	the	term	‘stakeholder’	to	refer	to	actors	affected	by	the	policy-issue	under	study,	and	will	be	used	interchangeably	with	the	term	‘actor/agent’.		
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and	 challenges.	 The	 focus	 on	 the	 system	 of	 governance	 is	 deemed	 extremely	important	 in	 a	 study	 of	 relations	 with	 external	 actors	 as	 it	 is	 considered	 the	synthesis	of	the	structure-agency	interplay	within	a	country,	one	that	is	historically	rooted	in	ideas,	interests,	relationships,	and	so	forth,	and	thus	an	unavoidable	aspect	of	 the	 relations	 with	 external	 forces.	 As	 Long	 notes,	 “all	 forms	 of	 external	intervention	necessarily	enter	the	existing	life-worlds	of	the	individuals	and	social	groups	affected,	and	in	this	way	are	mediated	and	transformed	by	these	same	actors	and	structures”35.		
Negotiating	governance	The	 act	 of	 negotiation	 is	 the	 struggle	 among	 groups	 about	 the	 most	 suitable	pattern	for	governing	a	shared	space,	 i.e.	 the	arena.	This	struggle	 is	what	 is	most	commonly	referred	to	as	politics,	i.e.	what	Harold	Lasswell	defined	‘who	gets	what,	when	and	how’36.		The	 first	 step	 of	 this	 approach	 to	 the	 negotiation	 of	 governance	 is	 the	identification	of	interests	(for	a	comprehensive	discussion	of	interests	see	Chapter	2,	 section	 2.3.2),	 the	 second	 step	 is	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	 whether	 existing	systems	are	suitable	to	negotiate	these	interests	to	the	benefit	of	involved	African	stakeholders,	the	third	and	last	step	is	the	enactment	of	strategies	to	either	bring	the	negotiation	inside	the	accepted	system	of	governance	or	transform	the	latter	to	guarantee	 that	 the	negotiation	 successfully	 safeguards	 interests.	 Three	 scenarios	are	presented.		In	the	first	case,	 if	the	interests	that	emerge	in	the	relations	with	China	can	be	pursued	 through	 negotiations	 within	 an	 existing	 system	 of	 governance	 (‘rooted	governance’),	 then	 ownership	 is	 expressed	 through	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	procedural	norms	(conformity)	that	are	entrenched	in	the	existing	system.	In	other	words,	 China	 is	 required	 to	 abide	by	 existing	norms	of	 conduct.	 This	 procedural	success	vis-à-vis	the	external	actor	may	be,	however,	the	result	of	numerous	acts	of	negotiation/struggle	 among	 domestic	 stakeholders	within	 the	 specific	 system	 of	governance.	This	is	because	systems	of	governance	are,	first	and	foremost,	sites	of	negotiation/struggle	 among	domestic	 actors	 and	only	 at	 a	 second	 stage	 they	 are	sites	of	negotiation	with	external	actors.		
                                                35	N.	Long,	‘From	paradigm	lost	to	paradigm	regained?’,	in	N.	Long	and	A.	Long	eds.,	Battlefields	of	Knowledge:	The	interlocking	
of	theory	and	practice	in	social	research	and	development,	Routledge,	London,	1992,	p.	20.	36	H.D.	Lasswell,	Politics:	Who	Gets	What,	When,	How,	New	York,	1936.		
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In	the	second	case,	if	the	interests	that	emerge	in	the	relations	with	China	cannot	be	pursued	through	existing	systems	of	governance,	then	ownership	is	expressed	through	 the	 identification	of	 the	 shortcomings	 and	 transformation	of	 the	 system	(governance	in-the-making).	In	other	words,	China’s	presence	has	highlighted	gaps	in	 the	 system	of	 governance	 to	 the	 point	 that	 this	 latter,	 through	 its	 entrenched	processes,	 does	 not	 guarantee	 the	 safeguard	 of	 domestic	 interests.	 The	transformation	can	be	spurred	by	contestation	or	by	rational-choice.	The	presence	of	China	is	not	only	perceived	as	negative,	and	thus	something	to	re-act	against,	but	can	 also	 be	 used	 as	 leverage	 to	 achieve	 emerging	 interests,	 thus	 spurring	cooperation-seeking.	It	is	worth	to	point	out	that	‘in-the-making’	refers	to	processes	that	can	also	take	years	to	perfect	the	system	of	governance.		On	top	of	these	first	two	cases,	 it	 is	also	expected	to	find	cases	where	political	expediency	 is	used	 to	bypass	existing	 systems	of	governance	or	where	a	 specific	system	of	 governance	does	not	 exist.	This	 is	 one	of	 the	main	arguments	 in	 Sino-African	relations,	according	to	which	political	and	economic	asymmetries	between	the	Chinese	and	African	actors	often	lead	the	latter	to	bypass	systems	of	governance	to	 strike	 quicker	 deals	 with	 the	 Chinese,	 which	 presumably	 favour	 elites.	Alternatively,	 African	 actors	 are	 believed	 not	 to	 have	 a	 strategy	 or	 structure	 to	negotiate	in	their	best	interests.		One	of	 the	main	aims	of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	understand	how	frequent	 these	 three	strategies	are	in	processes	of	negotiation	and	how	often	they	have	an	impact	on	the	outcome.	Hagmann	and	Péclard	defined	the	first	type	of	governance,	i.e.	rooted,	as	“dominated	 by	 longstanding	 conventions	 on	 how	 and	 by	 whom	 statehood	 is	defined”37,	 the	 last	type	of	governance,	 i.e.	absent,	 is	 instead	defined	as	“lack[ing]	predefined	or	commonly	recognised	procedural	modalities	for	decision	making”38,	and	finally,	in	the	middle,	is	governance	in-the-making	which	is	a	combination	of	the	two	where	a	governance	system	either	does	not	exist	and	is	under	construction,	or	does	exist	but	was	acknowledged	as	inappropriate,	hence	needing	restructuring.			When	external	actors	-	themselves	carriers	of	interests,	norms,	institutions	and	structures	-	enter/join	African	processes	of	governance,	the	domestically	negotiated	interests	and	modi	operandi	may	be	altered	to	the	point	that	not	only	the	processes	
                                                37	T.	Hagmann	and	D.	Péclard,	‘Negotiating	Statehood:	Dynamics	of	Power	and	Domination	in	Africa’,	Development	and	Change,	vol.	41,	no.	4,	2010,	p.	550.	38	Ibid.	
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do	not	unfold	following	the	habitual	route,	but	also	the	nature	of	broader	systems	of	governance	within	which	 they	 take	place	 is	 transformed.	 Studying	 the	processes	helps	thus	understand	why,	how	and	the	extent	to	which	systems	of	governance	are	preserved,	transformed	or	circumvented.	In	this	respect,	it	is	worth	remembering	that	the	outcomes	are	studied	as	an	end,	 in	this	thesis.	They	are	 indicative	of	the	degree	 of	 safeguarding	 of	 interests	 achieved	 through	 negotiations	 conducted	 by	African	 actors	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 means	 to	 achieve	 further	 objectives	 such	 as	“economic	development,	poverty	reduction	or	democratic	governance”39.	Although	these	further	objectives	are	identified	by	stakeholders,	and	often	form	the	basis	of	motivations	to	act,	they	are	not	assessed	per	se.	This	is	because	“the	defense	of	a	national	realm	protected	to	a	large	extent	from	external	influence	is	a	necessary	but	not	sufficient	pre-condition	for	such	developments”	40.				
1.4 Methodology		As	 outlined	 in	 previous	 sections,	 studies	 on	China-Africa	 relations	more	 often	than	not	have	focused	on	China’s	influence,	motivations,	modalities	in	engaging	with	African	 realities,	 while	 lesser	 attention	 has	 been	 paid	 to	 the	 African	 side	 of	 the	equation	to	understand	the	influence	African	practices	and	systems	of	governance	may	have	on	the	outcome	of	the	relations	with	China	as	an	external	actor.		To	study	the	 African	 side	 of	 the	 equation,	 reveal	 the	 details	 of	 negotiations,	 and	 avoid	ungrounded	generalisations	on	China-Africa	relations,	the	author	decided	to	study	a	single	country	while	selecting	different	sectors	of	engagement	with	China.	In	other	words,	 she	 decided	 to	 move	 the	 “comparison	 from	 one	 sector	 to	 another	 while	keeping	the	nation	constant”41.	This	approach	is	expected	to	provide	more	space	for	in-depth	 analysis	 of	 the	 influence	 that	 the	 domestic	 context	 has	 on	 the	 overall	relations	with	China.			
1.4.1 The	sectoral	approach	The	choice	of	focusing	on	one	single	country	allows	for	an	in-depth	study	of	the	tensions	 between	 structures	 and	 agencies	 while	 presumably	 controlling	 the	
                                                39	Whitfield	and	Fraser,	op.	cit.,	p.	343.	40	Ibid.	41	D.	Levi-Faur,	 ‘A	Question	of	Size?	A	Heuristics	for	Stepwise	Comparative	Research	Design’	in	B.	Rihoux	&	H.	Grimm	eds.,	
Innovative	Comparative	Methods	for	Policy	Analysis:	Beyond	the	Quantitative-Qualitative	Divide,	Springer,	New	York,	2006,	p.	47.	
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national	context.	 	The	choice	of	 focusing	on	more	than	one	sector	within	a	single	country	 is	 to	better	understand	the	tension	between	national	and	sectoral/issue-specific	interests.	Looking	beyond	a	unitary	understanding	of	the	national	interest	represents	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 current	 scholarship	 on	 Sino-African	 relations.	African	 agency	 in	 international	 relations	 is	 often	 framed	as	 the	 ability	 of	African	
states	to	‘hold	up	their	national	interests’42.	This	is	problematic	because	agency	does	not	only	mean	state	agency.	While	at	the	international	level	the	role	of	the	state	is	still	predominant	(more	elaboration	on	this	in	the	following	chapter),	when	it	comes	to	specific	domestic	policy	areas,	in	Africa,	as	elsewhere,	the	state	becomes	one	of	many	actors.	Even	more,	within	the	state,	bureaucracies	compete,	not	always	for	a	unified	 ‘national’	 interest.	While	current	accounts	of	African	agency	in	relation	to	China	revolve	around	state-to-state	relations,	which	often	assume	the	relationship	is	asymmetrical,	if	the	engagement	is	approached	from	a	sectoral	perspective,	this	asymmetry	may	be	less	dramatic	(the	preponderance	of	power	residing	with	local	actors	 and	 their	 use	 of	 governance	methods	 through	 formal/informal	 regulatory	regimes).		As	highlighted	by	Levi-Faur,	the	assumption	behind	this	design	is	that	“sectoral	variations	 are	 important”43,	 i.e.	 difference	 within	 a	 country,	 and	 they	 can	 be	 as	important	as	national	variations,	i.e.	differences	between	countries.	This	approach	“emphasises	 the	 autonomous	 political	 characteristics	 of	 distinct	 policy	 sectors,	hence	the	multiplicity	of	political	patterns	in	any	one	country.	Sectors	are	expected	to	be	embodied	in	policy	communities	and	policy	networks	organised	domestically	in	a	regulatory	regime”44.	The	idea	to	develop	a	sectoral	analysis	is	situated	within	a	body	of	literature	that	recognises	that	“actual	modern	states	encompass	dozens	of	institutionally	 distinct	 policy	 sectors	 with	 highly	 diverse	 organisational	architectures” 45 ,	 thus	 aggregating	 patterns	 of	 institutions	 and	 practices	 is	 not	helpful	to	explain	the	balance	of	power	and	interaction	between	state	and	society,	and/or	between	domestic	and	international	actors.	By	disaggregating	the	state	and	social	structures	in	defined	policy	areas,	not	only	vertical	diversity	is	emphasised	(not	 all	 state-society	 relations	 are	 the	 same)	 but	 also	 horizontal	 heterogeneity	emerges	(state	bureaucracies	differ,	so	as	societal	groups).	This	body	of	literature	is,	
                                                42	A.	Fraser,	‘Emerging	Agents	of	Change:	African	and	International	Negotiations’,	paper	presented	to	the	seminar	Emerging	Agents	of	Change?	Africa	in	International	Negotiations,	Chatham	House,	London,	2	February	2011.	43	Levi-Faur,	op.	cit.,	p.	47.	44	Ibid.	45	J.M.	Sellers,	‘State-Society	relations’,	in	M.	Bevir	ed.,	The	SAGE	Handbook	of	Governance,	SAGE	Publications,	London,	2011,	p.	5.	
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however,	 still	 in-the-making	 and	 studies	 adopting	 ‘one-country	 many-sectors’	approaches	are	still	relatively	few.	Sellers	reminds	that	“cross-national	comparative	studies	have	tended	to	focus	on	a	single	domain	of	policy	within	different	countries	[…]	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 consistent	 consequences	 in	 policy	 sectors	 for	 state-society	relations,	and	the	relations	between	sectoral	and	national	institutional	differences	for	state-society	relationships	remain	underexamined	and	undertheorized”46.		There	are	not	comprehensive	studies	of	this	kind	in	the	Sino-Africa	scholarship.	Taylor	argues	that	“it	is	commonplace	in	the	literature	on	external	engagement	with	Africa	to	talk	of	“China”	or	“France,”	and	while	heuristically	this	may	make	sense,	it	does	have	the	potential	effect	of	obfuscating	what	processes	are	unfolding	and	why.	Ontologically,	such	labels	are	problematic	and	it	is	not	plausible	to	speak	of	states	as	monolithic	entities”47.	Similarly,	Alden	recognises	that	“speaking	about	 ‘China–Africa’	 at	 this	 stage	 in	 the	 relationship	 obscures	 as	 much	 as	 it	 illuminates”.	 He	stresses	 the	 importance	 for	 future	 scholars	 to	 “pursue	 an	 agenda	 formed	by	 the	seeking	 of	 a	 heightened	 understanding	 of	 bilateral	 relations,	 a	 closer	 reading	 of	cross-country	 sectoral	 studies,	 and	 deeper	 insights	 into	 communities.	 Digging	deeper	will	expose	this	complexity,	enrich	our	understanding	of	multi-variant	ties	and	relationships,	and	ultimately	move	us	away	from	the	simple	binaries	that	have	characterised	China–Africa	studies	to	date”48.	The	adoption	of	a	sectoral	approach	thus	contributes	to	the	body	of	scholarship.	It	assumes	that	the	‘game’	consists	of	the	recognition	from	both	sides	of	the	existence	of	overlapping	and	differentiated	interests,	which	are	at	times	clearly	evident,	at	other	times	less.	It	is	this	push	and	pull	bargaining	exercise	that	leads	to	negotiating	a	“win-set”49	where	both	parties	gain.	 It	 is	 indeed	 necessary	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 the	 push	 and	 pull	 bargaining	exercise	takes	place	well	beyond	the	national	level.	It	is	at	the	sectoral/issue-specific	level	that	the	process	is	re-negotiated,	through	consultation	and	implementation,	by	the	local	social	environment	that	mediates	interests	and	modalities	of	action50.	It	is	due	to	remind	that	‘sectors’	are	difficult	to	define	fully	within	set	boundaries.	There	 is	 a	 range	 of	 actors	 and	 institutions	 at	 the	 national,	 sub-national	 and	international	 level	 that	 influence	 sectoral	 processes	 and	 outcomes.	 The	 scope	 of	
                                                46	Ibid.,	p.	28.	47	I.	Taylor,	The	International	Relations	of	sub-Saharan	Africa,	Continuum,	New	York,	2010,	p.	19.	48	C.	Alden,	‘China	and	Africa:	The	Relationship	Matures’,	Strategic	Analysis,	vol.	36,	no.	5,	2012,	p.	706.	49	R.D.	Putnam,	‘Diplomacy	and	domestic	politics:	the	logic	of	two-level	games’,	International	Organisation,	vol.	42,	no.	3,	1988,	pp.	427-460.	50	W.M.	Habeeb,	Power	and	Tactics	in	International	Negotiation:	How	Weak	Nations	Bargain	with	Strong	Nations,	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	Baltimore,	1988.		
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sectors	can	also	vary	due	to	the	fact	that	“boundaries	are	determined	by	variables	as	diverse	 as	domestic	policy	priorities,	 international	 interest	 and	 influence,	 and	local	and	national	alliances”51.				
Case	Selection	It	is	important	to	specify	what	is	meant	by	‘case’	in	this	thesis.	Is	Kenya	the	case	of	this	study?	Alternatively,	is	it	rather	the	sectors?	Or	the	specific	issues	presented	under	each	sector?	In	this	stands	the	complexity	of	this	project,	which	is	not	a	typical	single-country	study	where	the	comparative	dimension	often	disappears.		The	cases	under	study	are	the	issues	presented	under	each	sector.	Although	one	in-depth	case-study	per	sector	might	have	probably	provided	more	analytical	depth,	it	 would	 not	 have	 fully	 served	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 thesis,	 which	 is	 to	 provide	 a	comparison	of	 various	 governance	behaviours	within	 a	 single	 country.	 Levi-Faur	attempts	 to	 explain	 how	 to	merge	 the	 case-oriented	 approach	with	 comparative	designs,	referring,	in	particular,	to	the	problem	of	increasing	the	number	of	cases	in	a	case-oriented	approach.	In	King,	Keohane	and	Verba’s	Designing	Social	Inquiry52,	a	number	of	techniques	are	presented	concerning	the	way	to	increase	the	number	of	cases.	This	thesis	adopts	the	one-country	many-sectors	design	according	to	which	the	
main	subject	under	study	remains	governance	processes	vis-à-vis	the	Chinese	and	the	
comparison	 is	 carried	 out	 by	 studying	motivations	 and	modalities	 of	 adherence	 in	
different	cases,	i.e.	 issue-areas.	This	is	done	bearing	in	mind	Ragin’s	definition	of	a	case,	namely	“a	particular	configuration	of	attributes”53.	He	continues:	“the	logic	of	case	 study	 is	 fundamentally	 configurational.	 Different	 parts	 of	 the	 whole	 are	understood	in	relation	to	one	another	and	in	terms	of	the	total	picture	or	package	that	they	form.	The	central	goal	 is	usually	to	show	how	different	 ‘parts’	of	a	case	interconnect	[…]	What	matters	most	is	that	the	investigator	makes	sense	of	multiple	aspects	of	the	case	in	an	encompassing	manner,	using	his	or	her	theory	as	a	guide”54.	Hence,	the	usage	of	different	issue-areas	–	instead	of	a	single	one	–	to	provide	a	more	articulate	picture	of	the	‘whole’,	i.e.	the	national	context.	It	is	argued	that	increasing	the	number	of	issue-areas	under	study	provides	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	how	different	parts	interconnect.		
                                                51	J.	Moncrieffe	and	C.	Luttrell,	An	Analytical	Framework	for	Understanding	the	Political	Economy	of	Sectors	and	Policy	Arenas,	Overseas	Development	Institute,	London,	2005,	p.	13.	52	G.	King,	R.O.	Keohane	and	S.	Verba,	Designing	Social	Inquiry:	Scientific	Inference	in	Qualitative	Research,	Princeton	University	Press,	Princeton,	1994.		53	C.C.	Ragin,	Fuzzy	Set	Social	Science,	University	of	Chicago	Press,	Chicago,	2000,	p.	66.	54	Ibid.,	p.	68.	
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Levi-Faur	reflects	that	the	‘encompassing	manner’	means	that	“the	purpose	of	the	inquiry	 is	 not	 necessarily	 generalisation	 across	 cases” 55 .	 In	 fact,	 this	 study	 did	eventually	 end	 up	 presenting	 methodological	 dilemmas	 concerning	 the	 tension	between	 plurality	 and	 the	 necessity	 to	 generalise	 beyond	 individual	 cases.	 By	studying	 different	 sectors,	 and	 cases	within	 each	 sector,	 the	 approach	 inevitably	exposes	 itself	 to	“important	 implications	for	the	degree	of	control	and	the	nature	and	scope	of	the	generalisation	that	could	be	produced”56.	Being	the	literature	quite	scarce	 in	 this	 field,	 the	 discovery	 of	 these	 implications	 came,	 predominantly,	through	the	author’s	own	efforts.	The	effort	to	show	diversity	was	made	particularly	difficult	by	the	lack	of	available	or	accurate	accounts	of	Kenyan	domestic	debates	and	 actions	 towards	 China-related	 activities.	 Therefore,	 this	 thesis	 is	 strongly	grounded	in	empirical	research	according	to	which	the	selection	of	the	issues	under	study	 mostly	 emerged	 from	 fieldwork	 findings	 and	 not	 from	 pre-determined	decisions.	This	is	mainly	due,	as	better	explained	below,	to	the	fact	that	the	absence	of	relevant	data	did	require	a	preliminary	effort	of	scoping	the	subject	on	the	ground	before	being	able	to	formulate	a	strategy	of	research.		Grounded	research	is	valuable	to	minimise	selection	biases,	but	also	problematic	as	the	cases	are	not	necessarily	selected	following	a	specific	methodological	logic	of	most-similar/most-different.	In	other	words,	the	content	of	the	relationship	as	well	as	 the	 outcome	were	 not	 clear	 before	 having	 conducted	 a	 full	 investigation.	 The	cases	could	thus	not	be	chosen	based	on	their	similarities	or	differences	as	these	were	the	very	subjects	of	investigation	in	the	first	place.	Consequently,	the	research	had	to	be	conducted	to	answer	first	what-type	questions,	i.e.	basic	facts	defining	a	case,	and	only	later	to	answer	how	and	why	questions.	While	methodologically,	and	logically,	 these	steps	can	be	divided,	 the	difficulty	of	 fieldwork	research	does	not	always	allow	for	this	neat	separation,	and	it	forces	the	researcher	to	investigate	the	potential	 relevance	 of	 a	 case	while	 already	 addressing	more	 ‘serious’	 questions.	More	details	about	the	selection	of	specific	issue-areas	and	sectors	can	be	found	in	Chapter	3	(section	3.4.3).		
                                                55	Levi-Faur,	op.	cit.,	p.	54.	56	Ibid.,	p.	46.	
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1.4.2 Kenya	Kenya	 was	 selected	 as	 the	 country	 under	 study.	 The	 choice	 of	 the	 country	occurred	 following	 three	 main	 types	 of	 rationale,	 the	 elaboration	 of	 which	 was	based	on	the	information	available	when	the	research	started	(in	2011):	1)	the	level	of	 governance-sharing	 within	 the	 country;	 2)	 the	 involvement	 in	 relations	 with	China	of	different	types	of	actors,	i.e.	state,	non-state,	private	sector	and	so	forth;	3)	the	lack	of	natural	resources	in	the	country.	This	study	focuses	on	the	period	2002	–	2014,	representing	“democratic	Kenya”57	under	President	Mwai	Kibaki	and,	since	March	2013,	under	President	Uhuru	Kenyatta.	This	period	also	coincides	with	the	creation,	in	2000,	of	the	Forum	on	China-Africa	Cooperation	that	institutionalised	the	engagement	between	China	and	African	countries.		
Governance-sharing	Given	that	the	aim	of	the	study	is	that	to	understand	motivations	and	modalities	of	 engagement	with	China	 leading	 to	ownership	of	 governance	processes,	 and	 in	order	to	move	beyond	a	state-defined	idea	of	agency	toward	external	actors,	it	was	deemed	necessary	selecting	a	country	that	provided	spaces	for	non-state	actors	to	enter	the	public	debate.		Since	the	study	is	based	on	a	single	country,	it	was	believed	ideal	to	select	one	where	such	non-state	participation	in	public	affairs	is	average,	rather	than	particularly	strong	or	weak.	Kenya	ranks	near	the	middle	of	relevant	indexes	of	good	governance,	of	which	the	level	of	public	participation	is	an	indicator,	making	it	a	suitable	case58.		Studying	the	domestic	configuration	of	power	and	how	different	groups	react	to	external	 forces	 is	 timely	 in	 the	 Sino-African	 literature,	 which	 has	 tended	 to	dichotomize	 the	 approach	 to	 China:	 elites	 are	 favouring	 and	 benefiting	 from	 the	Chinese	presence,	while	the	masses	are	resenting	and	suffering	from	it59.	This	focus	has	 led	 scholars	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 behaviour	 of	 African	 actors	 towards	 China	changes	 according	 to	 the	 role	 they	 occupy	 in	 society 60 .	 Elites	 are	 believed	 to	accommodate	 China’s	 interests,	 mainly	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 China	
                                                57	H.	Patroba,	 ‘China	 in	Kenya:	Addressing	Counterfeit	Goods	and	Construction	Sector	 Imbalances’,	China	 in	Africa	Project	Occasional	Paper	n.110,	South	African	Institute	of	International	Affairs,	March,	2012,	p.	6.	58	According	to	the	Ibrahim	Index	of	Good	Governance,	2010.		59	See	D.	M.	Tull,	‘China’s	Engagement	in	Africa:	Scope,	Significance	and	Consequences’,	Journal	of	Modern	African	Studies,	vol.	44,	no.	3,	2006,	pp.	459–479;	C.	Alden,	&	C.	Hughes,	‘Harmony	and	Discord	in	China’s	Africa	Strategy:	Some	Implications	for	Foreign	Policy’,	The	China	Quarterly,	vol.	199,	September,	2009,	pp.	563-584;	I.	Taylor,	‘Sino-African	Relations	and	the	Problem	of	Human	Rights’,	African	Affairs,	vol.	107,	no.	426,	2008,	pp.	63-87;	G.	Mohan	&	M.	Power,	‘Africa,	China	and	the	‘new’	economic	geography	of	development’,	Singapore	Journal	of	Tropical	Geography,	vol.30,	no.1,	2009,	pp.	24-28.	60	See	C.	Alden	and	Y.J.	Park,	‘Upstairs	and	downstairs	dimensions	of	China	and	the	Chinese	in	South	Africa’,	in	U.	Pillay	et	al.	eds.,	State	of	the	nation:	South	Africa	2012-2013,	HSRC,	Pretoria,	2013.	
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seemingly	offers	aid	without	preconditions,	thus	providing	African	leaders	with	a	valid	alternative	to	Western	aid,	which	is	instead	tied	to	normative	conceptions	of	development 61 .	 Alden	 and	 Hughes	 also	 suggest	 that	 African	 elites	 see	 their	interaction	with	the	Chinese	“as	an	opportunity	to	exert	a	new	kind	of	international	leverage	over	the	industrialized	countries”62.	Common	people,	on	the	other	hand,	were	 initially	 thought	 to	 be	 holding	 negative	 perceptions	 towards	 the	 Chinese,	mainly	 due	 to	 poor	 human	 rights63	and	 labour	 standards	 on	 the	workplace,	 job	competition,	poor	quality	of	products	resulting	in	damage	to	consumers.	However,	Mohan	 and	 Lampert	 suggest	 that	 “just	 as	 many	 African	 governments	 have	consciously	 turned	 to	 China	 as	 a	 potential	 partner	 in	 national	 development	 and	regime	 legitimacy,	 African	 citizens	 have	 increasingly	 reached	 out	 to	 China	 as	 a	source	 of	 useful	 resources	 for	 personal	 and	business	 progression”64.	 Even	more,	generalised	conclusions	concerning	the	elites	and	society’s	responses	to	China	may	not	hold	true	in	cases	of	countries	where	the	relations	between	state	and	society	are	more	cooperative.			
Participation	in	the	relations	with	China	A	further	decisive	step	in	the	process	of	selection	took	place	after	a	preliminary	investigation	 on	 the	 countries	 involved	 in	 Sino-African	 meetings,	 especially	meetings	 labelled	 as	 ‘peoples’.	 Participation	 in	 these	 meetings	 was	 a	 condition	deemed	important	as	a	sign	of	wider	(than	the	state)	participation	in	Sino-African	relations.	 The	 selection	was	 based	 on	 a	 survey	 of	meetings’	 attendance65	which	showed	that	Kenyan	actors’	participation	was	the	most	diversified	and	active	(as	organisers)66	together	with	South	Africans.	South	Africa	was	excluded	as	a	suitable	case	for	the	study	because	it	did	not	meet	the	first	requirement,	as	it	ranks	very	high	in	indexes	of	good	governance67	in	Africa.	While	it	would	have	still	been	valuable	to	study	South	African	motivations	and	modalities	of	engagement	with	the	Chinese,	the	
                                                61	Tull,	op.cit.	62	Alden	and	Hughes,	op.cit.		63	Taylor,	2008,	op.cit.		64	Mohan	and	Lampert,	op.	cit.,	p.	100.	65	The	meetings	considered	were:	China-Africa	Civil	Society	Meeting,	2007,	Shanghai;	China-African	Civil	Society	Dialogue,	2008,	Nairobi;	China-Africa	Civil	Society	Forum	on	Peace	and	Development,	June	2010,	Beijing;	China-Africa	People’s	Forum,	August	2011,	Nairobi;	First	China-Africa	Think	Tank	Forum	(CATTF	1),	October	2011,	Hangzhou;	China-Africa	People’s	Forum,	2011,	Nairobi;	China-Africa	Think	Tank	Forum	(CATTF	2),	2012,	Addis	Ababa;	China-Africa	People’s	Forum,	2012,	Suzhou.		66	Meetings’	internal	reports	were	consulted	and	the	following	countries	appeared	to	be	involved:	Angola,	Benin,	Botswana,	Cameroon,	Chad,	Congo-Brazzaville,	DRC,	Ethiopia,	Ghana,	Kenya,	Morocco,	Mozambique,	Namibia,	Nigeria,	Senegal,	Somalia,	South	Africa,	Sudan,	Tanzania,	Uganda,	Zambia,	Zimbabwe.		67	Also	according	to	the	Ibrahim	Index	of	Good	Governance,	2010.		
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case	was	expected	to	potentially	provide	less	of	a	puzzle	in	the	study	of	dynamics	between	governmental	and	societal	agency	or	between	agency	and	structures.		Fieldwork	demonstrated,	however,	that	relying	on	participation	to	the	meetings	as	an	 indicator	of	engagement	does	not	provide	an	accurate	description	of	actual	engagements.	This	was	not	only	because	actual	engagements	are	broader	in	scope	than	those	that	are	officialised	through	formal	meetings,	but	also	because	there	is	a	gap	 in	 how	 the	 Chinese	 and	Kenyans	 understand	 the	 role	 and	meaning	 of	 these	meetings.	All	the	meetings/forums/symposiums,	from	the	most	high-visibility,	i.e.	FOCAC,	to	those	less	so	(such	as	peoples’	forums,	trade	unions	symposiums,	cultural	forums	 and	 so	 forth),	 are	 strategically	 worked	 out	 by	 the	 Chinese	 for	 specific	purposes	 that	 relate	 to	 Chinese	 national	 or	 sectoral	 agendas.	 Kenyan	 actors	 are	
participants	 to	 these	 meetings,	 at	 times	 organisers,	 never	 initiators.	 Their	understanding	of	these	events	is	more	arbitrary	than	structurally	defined	and	part	of	a	continuum.			
Absence	of	natural	resources	Sino-African	relations,	especially	in	the	first	decade,	were	generally	understood	as	revolving	around	interests	 in	natural	resources	with	 little	recognition	of	other	sectors	 of	 involvement,	 including	 those	 heavily	 reliant	 on	 Chinese	 soft	 power	objectives,	 such	 as	 the	media	 and	 education.	 Studying	 a	 country	 like	 Kenya	 also	serves	the	purpose	of	shifting	the	focus	from	a	presumably	skewed	Chinese	interest	in	engaging	with	African	resource-rich	countries	–	which	are	often	associated	with	authoritarian	regimes	–	to	one	where	Chinese	interests	appear	more	diversified.			Considering	 the	 fact	 that	Africa	can,	by	no	means,	be	 taken	as	a	single	unitary	block,	the	choice	of	Kenya	to	explain	the	role	of	domestic	politics	within	the	China-Africa	discourse	does	not	aim	to	be	representative	of	the	whole	continent.	However,	the	dynamics	presented	in	the	following	chapters	may	shed	light	onto	behaviours	between	 the	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 that	 could	 as	 well	 facilitate	 the	understanding	of	Sino-African	dynamics	in	other	countries.		
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1.4.3 Design	and	Data	Collection		Due	to	the	relative	 lack	of	studies	on	Kenya-China	relations	based	on	 in-depth	empirical	 research,	 this	 study	 adopted	 a	 highly	 flexible	 design,	 which	 generally	evolves	 during	 data	 collection 68 	and	 heavily	 relies	 on	 data	 collected	 during	fieldwork.	It	 is	a	theoretically	 informed	empirical	research	based	on	a	qualitative	design.	The	decision	to	use	a	qualitative	design	was	consequential	to	the	nature	of	the	enquiry,	namely	an	interest	in	understanding69	what	lied	behind	the	processes	of	engagement	between	Africans	and	the	Chinese,	the	ideas,	meanings,	motivations	upon	which	the	behaviour	and	decisions	of	actors	depended.	The	author	was	not	interested	in	mere	outcomes,	but	rather	in	procedural	dynamics.	Hence	the	use	of	a	qualitative	approach	appeared	to	be	more	fit70.		Robson	 suggests	 that	 the	 social	 constructivist	 and	 interpretivist	 approaches	 to	research	focus	on	how	the	social	world	is	interpreted	by	those	involved	in	it.	As	a	consequence,	“in	principle	there	are	as	many	realities	as	there	are	participants	–	as	well	as	that	of	the	researcher”71.	To	acquire	these	multiple	perspectives,	researchers	tend	to	use	research	methods	such	as	interviews	and	participant	observation.		Access	to	relevant	data	has	been	a	significant	challenge	inherent	in	the	research.	This	is	not	specific	to	Kenya-China	relations	but	more	generally	applicable	to	China-Africa	relations	as	a	whole72.	Trying	to	track	down	what	happens	on	the	ground	was	not	a	small	deal.	FOCAC	commitments	are	general,	and	bilateral	agreements	are	not	always	 reported	 and	 made	 public.	 The	 data	 concerning	 China’s	 involvement	 in	individual	countries	is	not	easily	accessible;	it	is	scattered	and	difficult	to	retrieve.	Gathering	data	was	not,	 in	other	words,	a	quick	type	of	endeavour.	In	the	case	of	Kenya,	 there	 is	 no	 systematic	 collection	 and	 presentation	 of	 the	 Chinese	involvement	in	the	country.	As	a	consequence,	the	sectoral	breakdown	was	a	good	start	 to	 be	 able	 to	 provide	 an	 accurate	 picture	 vis-à-vis	 more	 general	 national	statistics.		Many	scholars	have	been	reduced	to	using	media	sources,	and	more	specifically	
Xinhua	 reports	 as	 a	 source	 of	 information73.	 Due	 to	 the	 contemporaneity	 of	 the	dynamics	under	study,	the	author	also	often	had	to	rely	on	these.	In	the	absence	of	
                                                68	Robson,	op.	cit.,	p.	75.	69	C.	Robson,	Real	World	Research,	John	Wiley	&	Sons	ltd,	Chichester,	2011,	p.	24.	70	See	Robson,	op.	cit.,	2011,	pp.24-25;	Schwandt,	2007.	71	Robson,	op.	cit.,	p.	24.	72	D.	Bräutigam,	Deborah	Bräutigam	discusses	doing	research	on	China-Africa	relations.	Interviewed	by	The	China	Africa	Project	[online],	10	March	2013.		73	While	Xinhua	is	an	important	media	agency,	it	is	under	China’s	media	censorship	and	often	reports	news	according	to	the	official	government’s	line.		
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academic	studies,	information	from	the	media	was	necessary	to	acknowledge	what	was	happening,	but	 it	was	never	taken	as	a	reliable	source	of	data,	rather	always	triangulated	with	interviews	or	other	type	of	evidence.	This	was	due,	mainly,	to	the	fact	 that	media	reports	 tended	to	exaggerate	 figures	or	events,	probably	to	serve	journalistic	ends,	i.e.	an	appetite	for	breaking	news.		Access	 to	relevant	data	 is	not,	however,	only	a	media	problem.	Moreover,	 it	 is	important	to	mention	that	if	it	were	not	for	the	news	reported	by	the	media,	a	lot	of	what	is	known	would	have	remained	obscure	to	academic	audiences	and	more.	The	heavy	reliance	on	the	media	is	exacerbated	by	a	lack	of	transparency	in	the	release	of	official	statistics	and	reports	by	both	Chinese	and	Kenyan	governments.	 In	the	case	of	Kenya,	the	availability	of	data	depended	largely	on	the	sector	and	the	case	under	 analysis.	 In	 some	 cases,	 statistics	 are	 gathered	 and	 updated	 by	 the	government	and/or	non-state	bodies,	 in	some	others	they	are	not.	In	some	cases,	disclosing	 data	 is	 routine,	 in	 some	 others	 it	 is	 not.	 For	 this	 reason,	 conducting	fieldwork,	especially	under	the	form	of	interviews	but	also	through	the	gathering	of	unpublished	material,	was	 fundamental	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 thesis	 and	 to	bridge	the	many	theoretical	and	empirical	aspects	that	awaited	clarification.		The	 collection	 of	 data	 mainly	 occurred	 through	 interviews,	 collection	 of	unpublished	documents,	open	resources,	and	so	forth.	Though	mostly	qualitative,	quantitative	 data	 were	 used,	 whenever	 possible.	 The	 author	 conducted	 semi-structured	interviews	which	allowed	to	ask	specific	questions	while	leaving	space	for	further	investigation	during	the	interviewing	process.	This	was	crucial	given	that,	at	 times,	 the	 interview	 served	 as	 a	 moment	 to	 first	 clarify	 the	 details	 of	 the	engagement	and	only	then	investigate	motivations	and	modalities.	Therefore,	a	fully	structured	 interview	 would	 have	 reduced	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 investigation,	 which	indeed	took	shape	in	itinere.	Similarly,	conducting	fully	flexible	interviews	was	not	appropriate	as	the	author	was	not	 looking	for	a	flow	of	conscience	but	rather	for	specific	answers.		Initially,	 people	 or	 organisations	 involved	 in	 the	 relations	 under	 investigation	were	identified.	The	author	identified	actors	from	different	sides	so	to	triangulate	the	findings	as	much	as	possible	and	she	used	the	expertise	and	contacts	of	initial	interviewees	to	get	in	touch	with	more	people.	At	times	the	author	specifically	asked	interviewees	to	help	her	get	in	touch	with	other	contacts,	at	others,	the	interviewees	suggested	agents	that	the	author	had	not	imagined	could	have	a	stake	in	the	issue	
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under	study.	Interviewing	very	different	sources	on	the	same	subject	was	the	first	means	of	triangulation.	The	interviews	were	supported,	as	much	as	it	was	possible,	by	written	documents.	These	were	at	times	freely	available	online	or	in	archives,	at	others,	their	consultation	had	to	be	formally	requested.	For	this	type	of	research,	it	would	have	been	appropriate	to	conduct	focus	groups,	so	 to	 bring	 to	 light	 interaction	 dynamics	 among	 different	 groupings.	 However,	realistically,	 this	 was	 not	 feasible.	 Especially	 elite	 interviewees	 often	 had	 to	 be	chased	down	corridors,	even	after	having	set	up	an	appointment.	Maybe	a	way	to	attract	them	to	attend	a	focus	group	could	have	been	to	provide	them	with	a	rather	sizeable	 incentive	 to	 attend,	 but	 this	 act	 resided	 outside	 the	 author’s	 ethical	standards.	It	was	the	author’s	decision,	early	during	fieldwork,	not	to	record	the	interviews.	During	 the	 first	 few	 interviews	 conducted	 she	 asked	 permission	 to	 record	 but	realised	that	 interviewees	were	uncomfortable.	The	topic	of	 this	thesis	was	often	considered	sensitive,	especially	by	elite	contacts.	As	a	consequence,	she	preferred	giving	up	the	recording,	rather	putting	the	effort	in	establishing	trust	and	gathering	data.	Notes	were	taken	to	record,	as	faithfully	as	possible,	expressions	used	by	the	interviewees.		The	 data	 was	 then	 analysed	 in	 two	 phases.	 An	 initial	 one,	 during	 fieldwork:	themes	were	identified	that	allowed	to	expand	and	deepen	the	investigation.	And	a	second	 phase,	 after	 fieldwork,	 when	 a	 more	 complete	 picture	 of	 the	 data	 was	available.	The	data	was	analysed	according	to	the	main	categories	identified	in	the	theoretical	elaboration	of	agency:	actors,	interests,	modalities.	The	analysis	in	the	next	 few	 chapters	 does	 not	 always	 clearly	 separate	 these	 categories,	 which	 is	 a	compromise	that	had	to	be	accepted	to	tell	the	story	as	smoothly	as	possible.		
	
1.4.4 Fieldwork	This	thesis	is	based	on	extensive	fieldwork	in	Kenya.	A	total	of	nine	months	was	spent	on	the	field.	The	work	conducted	in	Kenya	provided	a	necessary	ground	upon	which	 to	 build	 an	 original	 understanding	 of	 the	 issues	 under	 study	 through	 the	collection	 of	 a	 sizeable	 body	 of	 original	 data.	 The	 length	 of	 the	 stay	 was	consequential	 to	 a	 difficult	 research	 environment	 where	 closure	 toward	investigation	made	approaching	the	interviewees,	especially	government	officials,	extremely	slow.	The	time	spent	in	Kenya	not	only	was	necessary	to	collect	data	but	
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also	key	to	identify	new	meanings	associated	with	a	body	of	existing	literature	on	African	states,	societies	and	their	relations	with	each	other	and	with	external	actors,	which	would	have	not	otherwise	been	easily	discovered.	In	other	words,	the	stay	in	Kenya	allowed	 the	 author	 to	 immerse	herself	 in	 a	process	of	 local	production	of	meaning	 that	 is	 not	 only	 significant	 per	 se	 but	 is	 also	 relevant	 inasmuch	 as	 it	represents	a	departure	 from	the	main	bodies	of	 literature	on	the	subject	and	the	theoretical	understanding	linked	to	them.	By	‘local	production	of	meaning’	is	meant	the	ways	in	which	individuals	(Africans/Kenyans	in	this	thesis)	construct	and	make	sense	of	 the	events	around	 them.	This	 ‘meaning’	directly	emerged	 from	 in-depth	interviews	 with	 Kenyans,	 seen	 as	 crucial	 participants	 in	 what	 Robson	 calls	 the	‘construction	 of	 reality’.	 He	 suggests	 that	 “research	 participants	 are	 viewed	 as	helping	to	construct	the	‘reality’	with	the	researchers.	Values	of	the	researcher	and	others	are	assumed	to	exist	and	subjectivity	is	an	integral	part	of	the	research”	74.	In	this	 case,	 the	 researcher,	 a	 Western	 PhD	 candidate	 from	 a	 UK	 university	 but	evidently	 not	 British,	 enquiring	 about	 Kenya’s	 relations	with	 China,	 often	 raised	doubts.	Many	were	the	 instance	 in	which	the	author	was	asked	whether	she	was	part	of	intelligence	organisations.		Moreover,	throughout	the	period	of	fieldwork,	Kenya	was	in	the	midst	of	a	tense	international	 atmosphere	 with	 the	 President,	 Uhuru	 Kenyatta,	 and	 the	 Vice-President,	William	Ruto,	under	trial	at	the	International	Criminal	Court.	The	West	(which	 the	 ICC	was	 representing)	 and	 China,	were	 seen	 as	 opposed:	 the	 former	interfering	with	 Kenya’s	 internal	 affairs,	 and	 the	 latter	 supporting	 the	 country’s	sovereignty.	Consequently,	asking	about	Kenya’s	relations	with	China	was	always	initially	 associated	 with	 the	 ongoing	 ICC	 trial	 and	 the	 consequential	 West/East	divide.	 The	 author,	 due	 to	 her	 origin,	 was	 often	 associated	 with	 a	 pro-Western	approach.	 This	 presented	 not	 few	 challenges	 throughout	 different	 phases,	 i.e.	approaching	 the	 contacts,	 setting	 up	 appointments,	 the	 interview,	 following	 up	when	 necessary.	 One	 of	 the	most	 important,	 and	 challenging,	moments	was	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 interview	 when	 the	 author	 had	 to	 establish	 trust,	 which	 was	necessary	to	make	the	interviewees	comfortable	and	gain	their	attention.			The	 interviewees	were	 informed,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 interview,	 that	 they	would	remain	anonimous	unless	they	would	allow	their	names	to	be	used	in	the	final	thesis.	Although	the	topic	of	this	thesis	is	not	among	the	most	sensitive	in	the	social	
                                                74	Robson,	op.	cit.,	p.	24.	
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sciences,	 the	historical	period	 (President	and	Vice-President	under	 trial)	and	 the	dichotomy	mentioned	above	between	pro-China	and	pro-West	made	 it	necessary	for	the	author	to	be	extra	cautious,	especially	in	regards	to	some	groups,	like	trade	unions.	Interview	were	conducted	by	the	author	who	hired	a	local	assistant	to	be	helped	in	contacting	local	figures	that	were	difficult	to	get	in	touch	with.	While	the	importance	 of	 considering	 national	 and	 subnational	 manifestations	 of	 power-sharing	 is	 acknowledged,	 the	 cases	 selected	 to	 be	 studied	 are	mainly	 set	 in	 the	Nairobi	area	in	Kenya.	This	is	due,	on	the	one	hand,	to	the	fact	that	Ministries,	as	well	as	 headquarters	 of	 companies	 and	major	CSOs,	 are	 based	 in	Nairobi,	 and	on	 the	other	hand,	 due	 to	 feasibility	 limitations.	 In	 the	 first	 case,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	mention	that	a	number	of	projects,	developed	in	cooperation	with	China	in	the	three	sectors	studied,	were	purposely	carried	out	around	Nairobi	due	to	the	much	higher	presence	of	services	and	infrastructure	than	in	other	areas	of	the	country.	Regarding	feasibility	limitations,	when	specific	cases	were	identified	outside	the	Nairobi	area	and	 deemed	 important	 for	 data	 collection,	 interviews	 were	 arranged	 either	 via	phone/email	or	in	person.	Other	cases	outside	the	Nairobi	area	that	were	dismissed	were	either	not	considered	critical	for	the	development	of	the	thesis	or	the	time	and	resources	that	the	author	would	have	had	to	dedicate	to	arranging	travels	were	not	deemed	logical	in	terms	of	cost-benefit	analysis.		Kenya	cannot	be	reduced	to	 the	urban	dynamics	of	a	vibrant	city	 like	Nairobi.	Hence	it	would	be	worth,	in	future	research,	to	focus	on	a	single	sector	and	compare	governance	dynamics	in	urban	and	rural	settings.		The	 argument	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 based	 on	 contemporary	 facts	 with	 an	 eye	 to	processes	that	unfolded	mainly	in	the	past	decade.	Therefore,	it	may,	at	times,	not	fully	show	what	only	the	study	of	long	processes	allows	to	observe.	It	is	nonetheless	of	 value	 to	 present	 a	 snapshot,	 in	 the	 hope	 that	 with	 time	 more	 context	 and	understanding	will	build	around	it.	Where	the	variables	are	many,	and	the	body	of	data	 is	significantly	sizeable	 thus	making	 the	study	not	as	elegant	or	essential	as	many	 other	 theoretical	 works,	 the	 hope	 is	 that	 the	 richness	 of	 details	 will	 be	considered	valuable	enough	to	even	out	the	gap.						
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1.5 Chapters’	Outline	The	thesis	is	divided	into	three	parts.	Part	I	comprise	the	research	design	(this	Chapter)	 and	 the	 positioning	 within	 theoretical	 debates,	 including	 an	 initial	conceptualization	 of	 agency	 (Chapter	 2).	 In	 Chapter	 2	 a	 detailed	 theoretical	approach	 placing	 the	 study	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Africa’s	 interactions	 with	 external	forces	is	presented.		Part	II	of	the	thesis	consists	of	the	sectoral	analysis	and	is	developed	in	Chapters	3	to	6.	Chapter	3	stands	as	a	trait	d’union	between	theory	and	grounded	research.	The	literature	on	agency,	and	the	tension	between	domestic	and	external	interests,	is	here	discussed	with	reference	 to	 the	Kenyan	case.	This	broad	country	study	 is	essential	 for	 situating	 more	 specific	 sectoral	 analyses	 in	 context.	 The	 chapter	concentrates	 on	 how	 historical	 legacies,	 including	 processes	 of	 change,	 and	structural	features	interact	with	actors	and	the	institutions	they	form.	To	do	so,	a	number	 of	 factors	 must	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration 75 :	 historical	 legacies,	institutions	(formal	and	informal),	processes	of	change,	structural	features,	power,	and	ideologies	and	values.		After	 presenting	 the	 broad	 country	 study,	 the	 following	 three	 chapters	 are	dedicated	 to	 a	 more	 fine-grained	 analysis,	 specific	 to	 the	 sector.	 Each	 sector	 is	unpacked	 following	 the	 conceptualization	of	 agency	presented	 in	Chapter	2.	 The	analysis	focuses	on	actors,	their	belief	systems	and	the	resources	they	can	rely	on	to	safeguard	 their	 interests	 in	 the	 relations	 with	 China,	 within	 specific	 systems	 of	governance.	 The	 analysis	 combines	 reasoning	 about	 macro(national)-,	 meso	(sectoral)-	 and	 micro-(issue-specific)	 level	 dynamics.	 The	 chapters	 identify	 the	motivations	and	modalities	 through	which	a	wide	range	of	domestic	actors	exert	control	over	the	relations	with	China.		Chapter	4	 focuses	on	some	of	 the	most	salient	 issues	 in	Sino-African	relations,	namely	trade-related	disputes.	The	rhetoric	of	solidarity,	mutual	benefit,	friendship	that	 the	 Chinese	 tend	 to	 instil	 in	 Africans’	 hearts	 and	 minds	 through	 official	discourses	may	also	be	a	way	to	counterbalance	the	negative	perception	that	has	grown	in	African	contexts	especially	in	relation	to	problems	associated	with	China’s	non-adherence	to	trade	norms.	The	chapter	moves	beyond	known	analyses	of	these	relations,	 that	often	 focus	on	 the	Chinese	misdoings,	 to	unpack	 the	Kenyan	 ‘side’	through	three	cases	identified	by	Kenyans	as	the	most	important:	1)	the	negotiation	
                                                75	Moncrieffe	and	Luttrell,	op.	cit.		
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of	labour	disputes	between	trade	unions	and	Chinese	companies	in	infrastructure;	2)	the	establishment	of	the	Anti-Counterfeits	Agency	in	response	to	the	threat	posed	by	Chinese	products	 to	Kenyan	 intellectual	property	 rights;	3)	 the	negotiation	of	competing	interests	between	Kenyan	wholesalers	and	retailers	in	relation	to	their	respective	 engagements	 with	 China,	 including	 the	 resolution	 of	 the	 protest	 that	occurred	in	August	2012	against	Chinese	small	shop	owners	in	Nairobi.		Chapter	5	focuses	on	Kenyan	responses	to	the	Chinese	involvement	in	Healthcare.	Healthcare	is	a	crucial	sector	for	China’s	public	diplomacy,	and	increasingly	for	the	commercial	 links	revolving	around	 the	distribution	of	 cheap	medical	products	 to	Africa.	 The	 chapter	 explores	 the	motivations	 and	modalities	 of	 Kenyan	 actors	 in	inserting	China	 in	a	 complex	scenario	 regulated	by	 international	 institutions	and	populated	by	traditional	partners	and	India.	Three	cases	were	identified	as	relevant	to	 unpack	 the	 sector	 comprehensively:	 1)	 public	 and	 private	 trade	 in	 health	products;	2)	the	negotiations	revolving	around	the	development	of	infrastructure	for	healthcare	by	the	Chinese;	3)	the	use	of	China	as	a	model	to	develop	traditional	medicine	policy	and	practice.		Chapter	6	focuses	on	Kenyan	responses	to	the	Chinese	involvement	in	Education	and	 Training.	 Similar	 to	Healthcare,	 Education	 is	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 China’s	public	 diplomacy	 in	 Africa.	 The	 chapter	 unpacks	 the	motivations	 and	modalities	according	 to	which	Kenyan	actors	explore	new	areas	 for	 the	development	of	 the	sector,	 through	 the	 engagement	 with	 China.	 Kenyans	 identified	 three	 cases	 as	particularly	relevant:	1)	the	development	of	Technical	and	Vocational	Education	and	Training	 through	 a	 partnership	 with	 China;	 2)	 the	 filtering	 of	 Chinese	 offers	 of	assistance	 for	 the	 development	 of	 human	 resources	 for	 healthcare;	 3)	 the	management	of	the	set-up	of	Confucius	Institutes	in	higher	education	institutions.		In	Part	III	the	author	will	present	and	compare	the	findings	of	empirical	research	while	relating	 them	to	 the	research	questions.	She	will	highlight	 the	relevance	of	such	 findings	 to	 established	 theoretical	 scholarships.	 Chapter	 7	 reviews	 and	compares	the	empirical	findings	presented	in	Part	II.	It	summarises	and	compares	the	 factors	 that,	 in	 the	 Kenyan	 case,	 were	 the	 variables	 that	 produced	 different	responses	to	the	engagement	with	China.	Finally,	Chapter	8	draws	the	conclusions.						
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CHAPTER	2 	
‘African’	Agency:	the	State,	Society	and	the	International	
	
	
2.1 Introduction			This	chapter	looks	at	the	literature	more	in	depth	than	the	previous	chapter	and	explains	 the	 theoretical	 lens	 through	 which	 the	 study	 is	 developed.	 Laying	 the	theoretical	 foundations	 serves	 the	 purpose	 of	 explaining	 how	 Africa	 has	 been	interacting	 with	 the	 broader	 international	 context	 and	 how	 the	 literature	 has	understood	 and	 theorised	 dynamics	 of	 engagement.	 The	 author	 is	 aware	 of	 the	problem	 of	 speaking	 of	 Africa	 undiscerningly.	 Real	 world	 events 76 	and	 the	scholarship	produced	around	them	often	refer	to	Africa	as	a	whole.	While	this	thesis	attempts	to	move	beyond	generalisations	through	a	detailed	study	of	Kenya,	it	is	not	possible	to	isolate	the	study	from	broader	approaches	to	Africa	and	the	literature	emerging	 from	 them.	 There	 are,	 across	 Africa,	 popular	 discourses,	 policies	 and	trajectories	of	development	shaped	both	from	within	and	from	outside	the	continent.	Harrison	suggests	that	there	are	“at	least	three	senses	in	which	speaking	of	‘Africa’	as	a	whole	might	be	justified	in	this	context”	77:	as	a	collection	of	states	with	a	shared	history;	 as	 a	 collective	 international	 actor;	 and	 as	 a	 discursive	 category,	 used,	 in	international	politics	and	policy,	by	Africans	and	outsiders	both	negatively	“through	processes	of	‘othering’”,	and	positively	“through	assertions	of	value	against	imperial	derogations”78.	Locating	this	thesis	within	the	broad	body	of	literature	on	Africa’s	long	history	of	engagements	with	external	presences	is	a	starting	point	to	analyse	empirical	findings	concerning	the	more	recent	relations	with	China.	The	latter	have	been	challenging	scholars	of	different	disciplines	in	the	past	few	years,	especially	those	in	search	for	grand	theories	that	could	explain	China-Africa	engagements79.		The	 structure-agency	 dichotomy	 typical	 of	 international	 relations’	 theoretical	approaches	 is	 considered	 a	 solid	 framework	 to	 understand	 the	 tension	 between	structural	limitations	weighting	on	African	systems	and	the	dynamic	emergence	of	
                                                76	For	 instance,	 in	 the	 case	of	China-Africa,	 the	Forum	on	China	Africa	 cooperation	 is	 an	example	of	how	Chinese	policies	towards	the	continent	are	general	and	not	country	specific.	77	In	Brown,	2012(b),	op.	cit.	78	G.	Harrison,	Neoliberal	Africa.	The	impact	of	global	social	engineering,	Zed	Books,	London	&	New	York,	2010,	pp.	14-16.			79	Alden,	2013,	op.	cit.,	p.	3.		
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a	 diverse	 range	 of	 actors	 in	 Sino-African	 relations.	 The	 Sino-African	 relations’	literature	has	paid	enormous	attention	 to	structural	asymmetries	between	China	and	African	countries,	which	some	argue	are	the	cause	of	China’s	exploitation	of	the	continent	and/or	the	cause	of	Africa’s	submission	to	China.	Notwithstanding	the	fact	that	 in	 aggregate	 terms	 (i.e.	 national	 statistics)	 China	 has	 more	 power	 vis-à-vis	African	states,	paying	attention	to	the	actual	dynamics	of	engagement,	and	agency	in	 particular,	 achieves	 the	 aim	 of	 shedding	 light	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 African	capabilities,	modalities	and	logics	of	engagement	with	China	and	the	international	system 80 .	 It	 is	 expected	 that	 the	 national	 structural	 asymmetry	 becomes	 less	significant	while	the	role	of	Africans	in	determining	the	outcome	of	relations	more	so.	According	to	Taylor	“critically	analysing	the	modalities	of	governance	in	 large	parts	of	[Sub-Saharan	Africa]	SSA	and	how	they	combine	with	external	processes	is	essential	 if	we	wish	 to	 comprehend	diplomatic	practices,	 global	 interactions	 and	broad	 international	 relations	 of	 Africa’s	 elites	 and	 ordinary	 citizens” 81 .	 Alden	suggests	that:			Any	examination	of	the	China-Africa	relationship	would	be	better	served	if	it	were	 at	 least	 guided	 by	 the	 same	 strictures	 that	 already	 are	 evident	 in	 other	relationships—say,	scholarship	that	studies	France-Africa	or	Brazil-Africa.	In	this	regard,	the	centering	on	the	state	and	the	continent	is	understood	to	be	merely	a	‘high	politics’	depiction	of	an	ever-broadening	set	of	stories	cascading	down	from	the	state	to	sub-state	to	societal	levels,	transcending	sovereign	boundaries,	and	spiralling	 outward	 to	 expose	 the	 texture	 of	 contacts	 between	 individuals	 and	communities82.		The	 inclusion	of	domestic-level	explanations	such	as	 the	diversity	of	state	and	non-state	actors	and	their	interdependence	is	what	this	research	aims	at	studying,	intending	 to	 contribute	 not	 only	 to	 Sino-African	 relations	 but	 also	 to	 the	understanding	 of	 African	 countries’	 role	 in	 a	 changing	 scenario	 of	 international	relations.	Acknowledging	the	capabilities	of	African	actors	in	international	relations	is	 not	 done	 “by	 stressing	 a	 voluntaristic,	 panglossian	 view	 of	 agency,	 shorn	 of	structural	constraints	and	historical	specificity,	but	by	requiring	an	account	of	the	
                                                80	Habeeb,	op.cit.		81	Taylor,	op.		cit.,	p.	2.	82	Alden,	2013,	op.	cit.,	p.	2.		
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mutually-constituting	and	changing	relationship	between	agency	and	structure”83.	This	takes	the	analysis	to	acknowledge	that	governance	is	what	links	structure	and	agency.	 Governance	 is	 defined	 as	 social	 coordination	 and	 is	 concerned	with	 the	“nature	of	all	patterns	of	rule”84.		First,	 Africa’s	 position	 in	 international	 relations	 and	 International	 Relations	Theory	(IRT)	is	discussed	by	providing	a	brief	overview	of	theoretical	and	empirical	problems	facing	Africa’s	role	in	IR	through	the	lens	of	the	structure-agency	tension,	with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 state-society	 relations.	 Then	 the	 connection	 between	agency	and	structure	is	presented	through	an	analysis	of	theoretical	debates	in	the	international	 relations	 discipline	 and	 applied	 to	 the	 debates	 on	 Sino-African	relations.	In	doing	so,	actors,	interests	and	systems	of	governance	across	domestic	and	international	contexts	are	unpacked	to	account	for	the	“mutually-constituting	and	changing	relationship	between	agency	and	structure”.	This	brings	to	light	the	importance	 of	 focusing	 not	 only	 on	 realist	 accounts	 of	 international	 relations	according	to	which	explanations	reside	in	the	system-level	and	states	are	treated	as	unitary	actors	exempted	from	domestic	influences.	Rather,	the	necessity	to	look	at	a	 more	 sociological	 understanding	 of	 agency	 is	 acknowledged.	 As	 Mohan	 and	Lampert	suggest	“Chinese	relations	with	many	African	countries	are	maturing	and	moving	beyond	state-to-state	deals,	implicating	many	more	actors.	So,	the	need	to	move	beyond	 statist,	 elite	 dialogues	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 theoretical	 exercise,	 but	 one	made	 more	 pressing	 by	 this	 growing	 ‘embeddedness’	 of	 mutual	 political	 and	economic	 ties”85.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 aspects	 introduced	 in	 Chapter	 1	 of	 the	institutionalist,	constructivist	and	pluralist	theoretical	approaches	are	embedded	in	the	conceptualization	of	governance,	which	is	fully	unpacked	below.			
	
2.2 Africa	in	IR	Since	the	1950s,	when	the	first	sub-Saharan	African	states	gained	independence,	“many	texts	have	focused	on	Africa	and	the	global	system,	but	fewer	have	focused	on	 the	 African	 element	 of	 this	 relationship	 or	 on	 the	 intra-African	 dimension	 to	foreign	policy”86.	Even	more	recently	“studies	have	largely	focused	on	the	actions	
                                                83	Brown,	2012(a),	op.	cit.,	p.	1890.	84	M.	Bevir,	‘Governance	as	Theory,	Practice,	and	Dilemma’,	in	M.	Bevir	ed.,	The	SAGE	Handbook	of	Governance,	SAGE	Publications,	London,	2011.	85	Mohan	and	Lampert,	op.	cit.,	p.	100.	86	S.	Wright,	 ‘The	Changing	Context	 of	African	Foreign	Policies’,	 in	 S.	Wright	 ed.,	African	Foreign	Policies,	Westview	Press,	Boulder,	1999,	p.	1.	
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and	strategies	of	external	actors,	 thus	overlooking	African	agencies	and	the	ways	they	may	co-shape	new	global	relations”87.		The	main	reason	for	the	neglect	of	African	dynamics	in	IRT	has	been	the	portray	of	African	states	as	“fallen	prey	to	an	array	of	destructive	forces	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Cold	War”88	and	of	the	African	continent	as	hopelessly	disconnected	from	the	globalised	 rest	 of	 the	 world.	 According	 to	 this	 view,	 Africans’	 lack	 of	 political	initiative	and	the	structural	asymmetries	between	African	countries	and	external	actors	have	allowed	the	 latter	 to	shape	Africa’s	domestic	as	well	as	 international	relations.	The	predominance	of	informal	governance	in	Africa,	consequential	to	the	absence	 of	 a	 proper	 division	 between	 formal	 state	 apparatuses	 and	 social	formations	has	led	to	believe	that	African	states	“might	be	rather	different	from	the	states	that	typically	inhabit	at	least	‘traditional’	IR	theory”89	and	because	of	this,	they	could	 hardly	 fit	 IRT 90 .	 This	 normative	 understanding	 of	 political	 dynamics	overlooked	the	historical	trajectories	and	the	complexities	of	empirical	statehood	without	realising,	as	Williams	claims,	that	“African	states	help	to	provide	some	of	what	we	might	call	the	‘limit	cases’	but	the	broad	issues	that	emerge	are	ones	that	can	be	applied	to	thinking	about	state	agency	in	general”91.		However,	 even	when	 this	 convergence	between	African	 cases	 and	 the	 general	(Western-produced	and	oriented92)	 literature	 is	acknowledged,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	situate	 the	 agency	 of	 African	 states	 and	 societies	within	 history	 to	 pin	 down	 its	abstract	 meanings	 and	 directly	 link	 them	 to	 the	 structural	 dimensions	 it	 is	permeated	with	and	that	it	constitutes.	According	to	Bayart,	“the	roots	of	the	relative	specificity	of	African	societies	on	which	so	much	stress	is	laid	in	much	writing	about	Africa	 undoubtedly	 lie	 in	 history”	 93 .	 Talking	 about	 agency	 from	 a	 less	geographically-determined	 point	 of	 view,	 Emirbayer	 and	Mische	 claim	 that	 it	 is	“informed	by	the	past	(in	its	habitual	aspect),	but	also	oriented	toward	the	future	(as	 a	 capacity	 to	 imagine	 alternative	 possibilities)	 and	 toward	 the	 present	 (as	 a	capacity	to	contextualize	past	habits	and	future	projects	within	the	contingencies	of	
                                                87	T.	Dietz	et.	al.	eds.,	‘African	Engagements:	on	Whose	Terms?	Africa	Negotiating	an	Emerging	Multipolar	World’,	in	T.	Dietz	et.	al.	eds.,	African	Engagements,	Brill,	Leiden-Boston,	2011,	p.	6.	88	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.cit.,	p.	540.	89	Williams,	op.	cit.,	p.	3.	90	Brown,	2006,	op	cit.;	Lemke,	2003,	op.	cit.;	Lemke,	2011,	op.	cit.;	Clapham,	1998,	op.	cit.;	Williams,	op.	cit.		91	Williams,	op.	cit.,	p.	3.	92	J.	Hill,	‘Beyond	the	Other?	A	Postcolonial	Critique	of	the	Failed	State	Thesis’,	African	Identities,	vol.	3,	no.	2,	2005,	p.	38.	93	J.F.	Bayart,	‘The	State’,	translated	by	A.M.	Berret	from	‘L’Etat’,	in	C.	Coulon	&	D.C.	Martin	eds.,	Les	Afriques	Politiques,	Editions	La	Découverte,	1991,	retrieved	in	T.	Young	ed.,	Readings	in	African	Politics,	The	International	African	Institute,	London,	2003,	p.	40.	
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the	moment)”94.	 In	other	words,	agency	 is	not	only	a	“structurally	embedded	but	also	temporally-embedded	process”95.	It	is	thus	necessary	to	explain	the	historical	trajectories	of	African	domestic	and	international	processes	to	then	understand	the	continent’s	more	recent	relations	with	China.		
While	 IR	 theories	place	great	emphasis	on	 the	role	of	 the	 state,	 I	argue	 that	 the	
analysis	of	state	institutions	must	be	embedded	in	a	broader	understanding	of	state-
society	 relations,	 one	where	 different	 forms	 of	 agency	 are	 identified,	 such	 as	 state	
versus	 non-state,	 leader-dominated	 versus	 bureaucracy-dominated,	 and	 different	
relationships	 between	particular	 agencies	 and	 structures	 are	 acknowledged96.	 This	
necessity	is	not	a	consequence	of	the	“particular	‘nature’	of	the	state	in	Africa,	making	
it	ontologically	different	from	the	state	elsewhere”97	but	rather	of	an	understanding	of	
international	 relations	 as	 constituted	 by	 and	 embedded	 in	 the	 domestic.	 Brown	suggests	 that	 focusing	 on	 various	 forms	 of	 agency	 to	 explain	 Africa’s	 role	 in	international	relations	“is	in	part	an	attempt	to	challenge	narratives	of	Africa	that	present	the	entire	continent	as	perpetual	victim	and	lacking	political	initiative	and	engage	seriously	with	the	more	fine-grain	detail”98.			
2.2.1 Domestically	-	State	and	Society	To	 study	 processes	 of	 governance,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 understand	 the	 relation	between	the	governing	and	the	governed,	and	their	interaction	with	structures	and	institutions.	The	problems	in	studying	African	processes	of	governance	have	both	been	theoretical	and	empirical.	In	theoretical	terms,	it	has	been	questioned	whether	the	 institutions	 of	 the	 state	 and	 civil	 society	 in	 Africa	 exist	 at	 all	 given	 that	 the	original	forms	of	associational	space	existent	on	the	continent	before	the	advent	of	colonisers	were	significantly	different	in	structure	to	the	western	division	of	powers	between	 the	 state	 and	 other	 societal	 actors.	 In	 empirical	 terms,	 the	 presence	 of	informality	in	contexts	of	governance	has	led	to	consider	African	dynamics	as	failed,	rather	 than	 as	 different	 from	 the	 western	 blueprint	 upon	 which	 much	 of	 the	literature	 rests.	 Hill	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 the	 European	 experience	 of	 State,	 the	normative	attributes	stemmed	out	of	this	experience,	and	the	reliance	of	theoretical	
                                                94	M.	Emirbayer	and	A.	Mische,	‘What	is	Agency?’,	American	Journal	of	Sociology,	vol.	103,	no.	4,	1998,	p.	963.	95	Brown,	2012(b),	op.	cit.,	p.	13.	96	W.	Brown,	‘African	agency	in	international	politics:	scope,	analysis	and	theory’,	paper	presented	at	the	ESRC	African	agency	in	international	politics	seminar	New	Directions	in	the	study	of	Africa’s	IR:	perspectives	from	southern	Africa,	Wallenberg	Research	Centre,	Stellenbosch	University,	2-3	November	2011,	p.	13.	97	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	558.	98	Brown,	2012(b),	op.	cit.,	p.	17.	
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prepositions	 on	 this	 particular	 experience	 that	 has	 caused	 other	 experiences	 to	appear	as	inappropriate.	African	states	are	“identified	as	failed	not	by	what	they	are,	but	by	what	they	are	not,	namely,	successful	in	comparison	to	Western	states”99.	Even	though	Africa	“has	no	great	State	tradition	like	that	provided	by	States	in	the	 West,	 Central	 Asia	 or	 the	 Far	 East”	 100 ,	 African	 pre-colonial	 societies	 still	presented	systems	of	shared	governance	between	the	governing	and	the	governed.	Different	indigenous	forms	of	social,	political,	economic	and	legal	institutions	were	based	 upon	 a	 variety	 of	 philosophies	 and	 cultures.	 Goody	 suggests	 that	 “even	political	 formations	 […]	 lacking	 any	 consolidated	 form	 of	 the	 state	 reveal	 ‘some	space	for	manoeuvre	between	the	personal	and	the	public’”101.	Notwithstanding	this,	it	is	impossible	to	deny	the	strong	influence	that	colonialism	has	had	on	the	balance	of	power	sharing	between	different	indigenous	forces.	Africa’s	trajectory	of	political	formation	 is	 then,	 as	 Bayart	 suggests,	 a	 “hybridization	 between	 indigenous	repertoires	of	politics	and	repertories	imported	from	outside	–	a	phenomenon	that	is	necessarily	part	and	parcel	of	the	construction	of	the	State	in	the	‘Third	World’	–	[and	that]	is	occurring	in	Africa	in	unique	conditions”102.	He	continues	arguing	that	“the	contemporary	State	in	Black	Africa	has	a	historicity	of	its	own.	Many	features	of	political	life	in	Africa	south	of	the	Sahara	attest	not	to	its	lack	of	adaptation,	as	is	too	facilely	said,	but,	on	the	contrary,	to	its	rootedness	in	local	societies”103.	In	other	words,	 “statehood	 in	 Africa	 should	 thus	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 emanation	 of	particular	 historic	 types	 of	 African	 modes	 of	 governing” 104 .	 Understanding	governance	relations	in	contemporary	non-western	contexts	means	understanding	“the	relationship	between	social	formations,	the	associations	that	represent	them	and	 the	state”105	and	 it	means	 including	a	range	of	groupings	so	 to	 “gain	a	wider	understanding	of	particular	societies	and	their	relationship	to	their	states”106.		The	historical	and	cultural	aspects	that	underpin	state-society	relations	are	even	more	 evident	 through	 an	 examination	 of	 how	 such	 relations	 are	 accomplished.	Karlstrom	brings	to	light	the	fact	that	“African	sociocultural	arrangements	provide	their	 own	 logic	 of	 sovereign	 accountability,	 their	 own	 public	 spheres,	 their	 own	
                                                99	Hill,	op.cit.,	p.	148.	100	Ibid.	101	C.	M.	Hann	and	E.	Dunn	eds.,	Civil	Society.	Challenging	Western	Models,	Routledge,	London,	1996,	p.	20.	102	Bayart,	2003,	op.cit.,	p.	40.	103	Ibid.	104	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,		p.	542.	105	N.	Kasfir,	‘The	Conventional	Notion	of	Civil	Society:	A	Critique’,	Commonwealth	&	Comparative	Politics,	vol.	36,	no.	2,	1998,	p.	1.	106	Ibid.,	p.	3.	
	 45	
forms	 of	 nongovernmental	 organisation	 and	 association” 107 .	 Therefore,	 it	 is	important	to	look	at	state-society	relations	in	Africa	not	“as	a	promised	agenda	for	change”108	but	as	Mamdani	suggests,	in	their	“actual	formation”	109.	This	means	that	in	 defining	 state-society	 relations,	 the	 focus	 should	 be	 on	 the	 broad	 range	 of	collective	 activity	 and	 norms,	 be	 they	 democratic	 or	 not,	 that	 constitute	 actual	society110.	The	necessity	to	broaden	the	scenario	to	include	not	only	formal	but	also	informal	state-society	 relations,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 better	 explaining	 African	 dynamics,	 led	Chabal	and	Daloz	to	argue	that	“a	proper	understanding	of	the	informalization	of	politics	must	 be	 grounded	 in	 a	more	 resolutely	 sociological	 approach.	 From	 this	viewpoint,	 the	modern	 state	 is	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 process	 by	which	 the	 realm	 of	politics	 is	 gradually	 emancipated	 from	 society	 and	 constituted	 into	 increasingly	autonomous	political	 institutions”111.	However,	 they	continue,	 “the	state	 in	Africa	was	never	properly	institutionalised	because	it	was	never	significantly	emancipated	from	society”112.	In	order	to	fully	appreciate	and	understand	what	‘state’	and	‘society’	mean	in	real	governance,	Migdal	suggests	 to	“break	down	the	undifferentiated	concepts	of	 the	state	–	and	also	of	society	–	to	understand	how	different	elements	in	each	pull	 in	different	 directions,	 leading	 to	 unanticipated	 patterns	 of	 domination	 and	transformation” 113 .	 Ideology,	 policy	 formulation	 and	 implementation	 are	continuously	challenged	by	routine	formal	and	informal	contacts	between	the	top	and	the	bottom.	In	fact,	“while	the	image	of	the	state	implies	a	singular	morality,	one	standard	way,	indeed	right	way,	of	doing	things,	practices	denote	multiple	types	of	performance	and,	possibly,	some	contention	over	what	is	the	right	way	to	act”114.	Migdal	also	suggests	looking	at	a	specific	dimension	of	the	state:	“the	formulation	and	transformation	of	its	goals.	As	the	state	organisation	comes	into	contact	with	various	social	groups,	it	clashes	with	and	accommodates	to	different	moral	orders.	These	engagements,	which	occur	at	numerous	 junctures,	 change	 the	 social	bases	
                                                107	M.	Karlstrom,	‘Civil	society	and	its	presuppositions:	lessons	from	Uganda’,	in	J.L.	Comaroff	&	J.	Comaroff	eds.,	Civil	society	
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and	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 state	 is	 not	 a	 fixed	 ideological	 entity.	 Rather,	 it	embodies	an	ongoing	dynamic,	a	 changing	set	of	goals,	as	 it	engages	other	social	groups”115.		While	this	approach	assigns	great	importance	to	the	domestic	variables	of	agency,	it	 is	 also	 necessary	 to	 consider	 the	 effect	 that	 external	 actors	 may	 have	 on	 the	dynamic	 nature	 of	 state-society	 relations.	 There	 is	 seemingly	 no	 other	 continent	whose	formal	and	informal	institutions	have	been	shaped,	re-shaped,	contested	and	challenged	by	external	actors	than	Africa.	Consequently,	the	issue	of	how	national	capacities	 and	 international	 configurations	 of	 power	 interact	 remains	 a	 central	question	in	how	African	agency	is	understood.				
2.2.2 Internationally	-	Agency	and	dependence	Globalisation	 and	 the	 increasing	 interdependence	 between	 domestic,	international	 and	 transnational	 actors	 continue	 to	 cause	 the	 foreign	 policies	 of	African	 states	 to	 be	 “shaped	 by	 rapidly	 changing	 international	 and	 domestic	environments	to	the	extent	that	it	is	difficult	to	isolate	purely	‘foreign’	policies”116.	History	assigns	a	significant	role	to	African	structures	and	agency	in	the	context	of	politics,	not	only	as	a	consequence	of	colonialism	but	more	generally,	as	the	outcome	of	Africa’s	centuries-long	negotiations	with	the	outside	world.	Bayart	suggests	that	“the	price	of	this	singular	historical	trajectory	was	undoubtedly	to	make	the	sub-continent,	or	at	least	parts	of	it,	dependent,	from	a	very	early	date,	on	civilizations	that	were	materially	more	powerful:	those	of	Mediterranean	Antiquity,	then	later	the	 Arab-Muslim	 world,	 and	 later	 western	 Europe	 as	 it	 gradually	 asserted	supremacy	 from	 the	 fifteenth	 century	 onwards”	117.	 This	was	 often	 linked	 to	 the	imposition,	by	external	actors,	of	visions	of	governance	that	had	mostly	grown	out	of	realities	external	and	extraneous	to	African	contexts,	mainly	Western	ones.		Authors	like	Mbembe	claimed	that	these	peculiarities	fed	an	inability	to	act	on	the	 international	 stage	and	 left	Africa	out	of	 the	world118,	marginalised	by	global	economic	 flows	and	political	dynamics.	On	 the	other	hand,	Bayart	 sustained	 that	Africa	was	always	an	active	participant	on	the	world	stage,	in	the	world,	and	that	“Africans	have	participated	in	the	processes	which	have	led	to	the	insertion	of	their	societies	as	a	dependent	partner	in	the	world	economy	and,	in	the	last	resort,	in	the	
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process	of	 colonisation”119.	Chabal	 and	Daloz120	suggest	 that	 “Africans,	 through	a	dialectic	 of	 structural	 pressures	 and	 their	 own	political	 agency,	 have	 continually	interacted	with	the	world	in	ways	that	encompass	notions	of	progress,	order	and	justice	although	these	concepts	are	defined	in	ways	that	do	not	necessarily	resonate	with	dominant	liberal	approaches”121.	Indeed,	not	only	Africans	have	always	interacted	with	the	world,	but	as	Bayart	argues122,	Africa	has	been	an	active	agent	of	extraversion	strategies,	extraversion	being	“the	creation	and	the	capture	of	a	rent	generated	by	dependency	and	which	functions	 as	 a	 historical	 matrix	 of	 inequality,	 political	 centralization	 and	 social	struggle”123.	He	argues	that	“the	discourse	on	Africa’s	marginality	is	a	nonsense”124.	Africans	 are	 seen	 as	 agents	 and	 contributors	 to	 the	 continent’s	 domestic	 and	international	histories	of	development	and	dominance	rather	than	as	“incapable	of	cultural	 development	 and	 totally	 dependent	 upon	 external	 influences	 (from	 the	West,	the	Near	East	and	Asia)”125.	They	have	participated	by	appropriating	the	state	introduced	by	the	colonial	powers	not	only	“to	the	best	of	what	they	thought	to	be	their	interests”	but	the	state	was	also	“interpreted	by	them	in	the	light	of	their	own	cultural	representations”	126.	Before	World	War	II,	the	scope	of	the	colonial	state’s	authority	was	striking127.	Only	after	World	War	II,	when	there	occurred	a	transfer	of	powers	 from	colonial	elites	 to	 local	 ones,	 the	 voice	 of	 African	 representatives	 effectively	 became	recognised,	political	organisation	tolerated	and	free	expression	accepted128.	A	new	local	administrative	class	started	emerging,	and	educated	Africans	started	claiming	back	political	power	and	 independence	 from	colonisers.	Rising	national	 criticism	throughout	 Africa	 against	 the	 predator	 state	 and	 an	 increasingly	 hostile	international	environment	pushed	for	the	urgent	expansion	of	social	infrastructure.	This	is	the	time	when,	in	order	to	continue	justifying	colonisation,	a	new	discourse	of	 power	 management	 emerged:	 development.	 Colonisers	 supported	 the	development	of	 large	 investment	projects	so	 that	educational	 facilities	as	well	as	
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roads,	 hospitals,	 etc.	 multiplied 129 .	 Young	 Africans	 who	 began	 to	 stand	 out	 in	secondary	schools	and	later	in	universities	started	demanding	for	more	power	and	government	service	was	the	natural	end	object	of	education130.	The	1960s	were	the	years	 of	 independence	 of	 African	 states	 from	 colonisation.	 The	 state	 became	 an	increasingly	strong	institution,	controlling	the	economy	and	social	life.	Throughout	the	following	decade,	the	new	generation	of	Africans	aimed	at	state	expansion	and	Africanization,	especially	in	light	of	the	fact	that	when	sub-Saharan	Africans	fought	for	 independence	 in	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s,	 they	 kept	 their	 masters’	 political	structures	with	a	microscopic	understanding	of	how	these	structures	functioned.	It	is	fundamental	to	bear	in	mind	the	importance	of	the	legacy	of	the	colonial	state	while	analysing	the	characteristics	of	the	post-colonial	one,	as	the	former	defines	the	 latter	 in	 a	 number	 of	 ways.	 	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 a	 strong	 state	 is	 the	 one	emerging	 from	 independence	 movements	 in	 the	 1960s.	 It	 is	 a	 sovereign	 state	characterised	 by	 single-party	 systems,	 nepotism,	 accumulation	 of	 resources	 and	personality	 cult.	 Political	 sovereignty	 was	 achieved	 through	 anti-colonial	mobilisation	and	throughout	Africa	an	assault	on	alien	dominance	took	shape	in	the	form	of	nationalisation	and	indigenization	politics	in	the	late	‘60s,	early	‘70s.	This	was	 also	 the	 apogee	 period	 of	 the	 Cold	 War:	 new	 states	 became	 a	 strategic	battleground	upon	which	the	United	States	and	the	USSR	competed.		Their	way	of	gaining	spheres	of	influence	in	Africa	consisted	of	providing	economic	and	military	aid.		However,	 after	 1973,	 when	 the	 oil	 crisis	 occurred,	 the	 African	 state	 started	getting	 into	 debt	 and	 facing	 international	 hostility.	 In	 the	 1980s	 world	 leaders	started	demanding	a	restoration	of	debts	and	African	states	were	called	in	to	deal	with	their	own	finances.	A	paradigm	shift	occurred	in	development	economics,	with	the	 ‘Washington	 Consensus’	 and	 the	 birth	 of	 Structural	 Adjustment	 Plans	 in	 the	1980s.	 In	 fact,	 “the	 fundamental	 nature	 of	 post-colonial	 arrangements	 was	challenged	economically	and	politically,	through	demands	–	external	and	internal	–	for	market	liberalization	and	democratization”	131.	This	period	was	characterised	by	a	profound	crisis	of	state	structures.	States	were	asked	to	reform	their	economic	policies	by	decreasing	 the	state	control	upon	the	economy.	African	states	started	reducing	their	control	functions,	and	that	is	when	the	creation	of	a	privatised	state	
                                                129	Ibid.	130	Ibid.,	p.	28.		131	Ibid.,	p.	25.	
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occurred,	where	private	actors	occupied	public	 space	 that	 the	 state	 itself	had	no	longer	the	capacity	to	control.	In	 the	 1990s	 “Africa’s	 relations	 with	 the	 outside	 world	 were	 privatised	 […]	through	 the	displacement	 of	 traditional	 state-to-state	 relations	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	processes	of	globalisation”	132.	 	 Such	privatisation	eroded	 the	primary	role	of	 the	state	institution	“in	the	Weberian	sense	of	the	routine	capacity	to	exercise	ultimate	authority	 within	 the	 territorial	 domain	 of	 sovereignty”	 and	 “opened	 space	 for	 a	multitude	of	actors”133.	New	figures	of	power	emerged	such	as	“informal	 traders,	smugglers,	 warlords,	 arms	 traffickers,	 youth	 militia,	 local	 associations	 (‘civil	society’),	 women’s	 organisations,	 religious	 groups,	 refugees” 134 .	 These	 groups	increasingly	 operated	 with	 varying	 degrees	 of	 autonomy,	 interacting	 with	 state	agents,	 international	 agencies,	 donor	 representatives	 and	 the	 non-governmental	sector135.	 Foreign	donors	 started	by-passing	 the	 state	 to	provide	 support	 to	 civil	society	 organisations	 directly.	 However,	 the	 latter	 soon	 became	 a	 state	manipulation	so	to	obtain	external	resources	and	circumvent	the	limits	imposed	by	western	donors.		As	Khadiagala	and	Lyons	claim,	“the	process	of	the	deinstitutionalisation	of	the	state	and	the	related	privatisation	of	diplomacy	has	placed	African	foreign	policies	in	 a	 profound	 crisis	 of	 consistency	 and	 direction.	 Realist	 assumptions	 of	 state-centeredness	 are	 shamed	 by	 the	 spectre	 of	 the	 African	 state	 weighed	 down	 by	various	internal	actors	and	increasingly	unable	to	compete	with	internal	challengers	in	the	foreign	policy	arena”	136.	Moreover,	“the	problematique	of	aid	conditionality	has	 accelerated	 the	 process	 of	 creating	 dual	 structures	 of	 power.	 […]	 African	political	 societies	 are	 duplicated	 between,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	 pays	 legal,	 a	 legal	structure	which	is	the	focus	of	attention	for	multilateral	donors	and	Western	states,	and	on	the	other	hand,	a	pays	reel	where	real	power	is	wielded”137.	Informal	politics	and	 parallel	 economies	 became	 part	 of	 the	 processes	 of	 globalisation.	 As	 a	consequence,	“it	is	no	longer	a	question	of	whether	foreign	policy	is	the	preserve	of	the	 president	 or	 the	 foreign	 minister	 but	 of	 whether	 any	 organised	 body	 is	 in	charge”138.		
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Understanding	the	complexities	of	African	state	and	non-state	actors’	interaction	with	each	other	and	with	the	external	world	has	profound	implications	for	China-Africa	relations.	China’s	initial	state-centric	focus	did	not	seem	to	acknowledge	the	importance	of	more	complex	domestic	systems	in	which	power	is	not	the	domain	of	one	but	a	diversity	of	actors.			
2.2.3 The	emergence	of	the	South	The	 introduction	 of	 new	 players	 in	 Africa’s	 international	 relations	 since	 the	2000s	has	raised	issues	concerning	geopolitical,	economic,	and	normative	aspects	of	Africa’s	relations	with	the	world.	Emerging	powers	have	created	a	parallel	system	of	international	relations,	in	which	regional	and	international	institutions	have	been	created,	and	new	forms	of	negotiation	patterns	successfully	entered	the	world	stage,	without	the	need	for	Western	intermediaries	that	have	controlled	the	international	arena	 until	 now.	 Far	 from	 stating	 that	Western	 countries	 play	 a	 limited	 role	 in	Africa’s	 economic,	 social	 and	 political	 spheres,	 the	 fast-paced	 entry	 of	 Southern	actors	has	symbolised	a	change	in	the	West’s	role	as	intermediary	and,	even	more	importantly,	has	started	representing	an	alternative	for	African	players.	In	fact,	“with	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	the	world	seemed	to	move	from	a	bipolar	system	to	a	unipolar	world	in	which	the	neoliberal	West	globally	imposes	its	laws.	However,	during	the	last	decade,	it	has	been	acknowledged	that	other	actors,	such	as	 China,	 India	 and	 Brazil,	 have	 become	 increasingly	 influential,	 creating	multipolarity	 at	 the	 global	 level”139.	 The	 BRICS	 (Brazil,	 Russia,	 India,	 China	 and	South	Africa)	group	of	emerging	economies	and	the	IBSA	(India,	Brazil	and	South	Africa)	 group	 of	 emerging	 democracies	 represent	 two	 of	 the	 most	 increasingly	influential	groups	of	states,	emerging	in	global	economic	and	political	affairs.		Their	idea	of	world	exchanges	is	based	on	“a	rapid	deepening		of		interconnectivity		within		the	developing	 	world—in	 	 flows	 	of	 	goods,	money,	 	people	 	and	 	 ideas—that	 	 is		surprisingly		autonomous		from		Western		control,	resulting	in	the	development	of	a	new,	parallel	international	system,	with	its	own	distinctive	set	of	rules,	institutions	and	currencies	of	power”140.		
                                                139	Dietz	et	al.,	op.cit.,	p.	2;	see	also:	DIE,	 ‘Unstable	multipolarity?	China’s	and	India’s	challenges	for	global	governance’,	DIE	Briefing	Paper,	German	Development	Institute,	Bonn,	2006;	D.	Dollar,	 ‘Asian	century	or	multi-polar	century?’,	World	Bank	Policy	Research	Working	Paper	4174,	The	World	Bank,	Washington,	2007;	J.	Clegg,	China’s	global	strategy.	Toward	a	multipolar	
world,	Pluto	Press,	London,	2009.	140	N.	Barma,	E.	Ratner	and	S.	Weber,	‘A	World	Without	the	West’,	The	National	Interest,	no.	90,	July/August,	2007,	p.	27.	
	 51	
This	 increasing	 multi-polarity	 of	 international	 relations	 –	 consequence	 of	 a	changing	 world	 order	 –	 has	 heightened	 the	 perception	 that	 Africa	 has	 renewed	theoretical	utility	to	scholars	of	International	Relations	Theory	(IRT).	Some	still	see	Africa	as	subdued	and	explain	the	continent’s	new	engagement	with	 its	Southern	partners	as	“extractive	and	exploitative”	where	the	“new	actors	(more	so	in	the	case	of	China	 considered	as	 the	 ‘yellow	peril’	 in	Western	academic	discourse)	are	 the	‘new	imperial’	powers	and	[…]	such	engagement	merely	perpetuates	the	continent	as	a	primary	exporter	of	renewable	and	non-renewable	resources”141.	Others	argue	that	it	is	necessary	to	set	aside	the	belief	that	“Africa	is	just	a	space	in	which	external	forces	operate”	because	this	inevitably	“obscures	the	intricacies	and	differences	of	expressions	of	power	in	international	negotiation	and	political	processes,	and	places	too	 deterministic	 an	 emphasis	 on	 structural	 forces”142.	 This	 focus	 in	 turn	 “binds	Africa’s	 international	 relations	 into	 a	 narrow	 and	 predetermined	 position	 as	 the	recipient	of	international	affairs	rather	than	an	active	player”143.	The	 change	 in	 the	 international	 context	 with	 a	 shift	 to	multipolarity	 and	 the	emergence	of	southern	powers	is	a	significant	historical	element	that	has	arguably	made	space	for	African	actors	to	be	more	assertive	in	their	relations	with	the	outside	world	 at	 both	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 level.	 Zondi	 argues	 that	 “the	 growth	 of	multilateralism	in	an	increasingly	multipolar	world	with	the	rise	of	China	and	India	to	challenge	the	north-Atlantic	axis	has	had	a	positive	effect	on	Africa’s	participation	in	 global	 affairs” 144 .	 According	 to	 other	 studies	 on	 aid-receiving	 African	governments,	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 global	 shift	 has	 also	 been	 felt	 on	 bilateral	 aid	relations,	enhancing	the	scope	for	African	bargaining,	enabling	some	states	to	take	much	tougher	stances	towards	Western	donors145.			
China	Among	Southern	actors,	China	has	undoubtedly	received	unchallenged	attention	by	the	media	and	scholarly	debates.	A	widening	trend	of	arguments	supports	the	idea	that	China	and	the	West	are	now	competing	against	each	other	in	Africa,	ending	
                                                141	R.	Modi	ed.,	South	South	Cooperation.	Africa	on	the	Centre	Stage,	Palgrave	McMillan,	Houndmills,	2011,	p.	12.	142	S.	Harman	and	W.	Brown,	 ‘In	From	the	Margins?	The	Changing	Place	of	Africa	 in	 International	Relations’,	 International	
Affairs,	vol.	89,	no.1,	2013,	p.	86.	143	Ibid.	144	Brown,	2012(b);	see	also:	S.		Zondi,	S,	‘Africa	in	Multilateral	Negotiations:	A	Critique	of	African	Common	Positions',	paper	presented	 to	 the	 seminar	 Emerging	 Agents	 of	 Change?	 Africa	 in	 International	 Negotiations,	 Chatham	 House,	 London,	 3	February	2011.	145	S.	 Grimm	 et	 al.	 eds.,	Coordinating	 China	 and	DAC	Development	 Partners:	 Challenges	 to	 the	 Aid	 Architecture	 in	 Rwanda,	German	Development	Institute,	Bonn,	2010;	L.	Whitfield	ed.,	The	Politics	of	Aid.	African	Strategies	 for	Dealing	with	Donors,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford,	2008.	
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the	decades-long	Western	supremacy.	This	competition,	it	is	argued,	it	is	first	and	foremost	 for	 natural	 resources 146 .	 However,	 while	 “Western	 investment	 is	concentrated	 in	 African	 countries	 with	 better	 property	 rights	 and	 rule	 of	 law,	Chinese	 [outbound	 foreign	 direct	 investment]	 ODI	 is	 indifferent	 to	 the	 property	rights/rule	of	law	environment”147.	Besides	natural	resources’	extraction,	Western	and	Chinese	activities	often	 tend	 to	complement	rather	 that	compete	 in	 terms	of	investment	as	well	as	development	projects.	Where	the	West	mainly	has	aimed	at	promoting	good	governance,	human	rights,	the	rule	of	law,	Chinese	activities	have	focused	on	 the	development	 of	 infrastructure	 and	business	 links,	 aiming	 at	 non-interfering	 in	 other	 countries’	 internal	 affairs.	 The	 western	 ‘civilizing-mission’	approach	characterised	by	conditions-based	cooperation	activities	is	confronted	by	a	Chinese	win-win	business	strategy	built	upon,	seemingly,	no-condition	pillars	and	‘mutuality’.	 These	 approaches	 stem	 from	 opposing	 views	 of	 one’s	 own	 role	 in	international	 relations	 and	as	 such	 seem	 to	be	perceived	by	Africans.	With	 time,	however,	the	seemingly	consistent	foreign	policy	discourse	on	win-win	cooperation	started	being	questioned	by	Africans	as	the	practices	of	a	diverse	range	of	Chinese	actors	further	exacerbated	the	discussion	among	societal	actors,	bureaucrats	as	well	as	 international	 organisations,	 concerning	 the	 exploitative	 nature	 of	 Chinese	activities,	 often	 deemed	 either	 disrespectful	 of	 local	 rules	 or	 not	 particularly	advantageous	for	local	needs.		Despite	the	preponderance	of	a	material	and	power-based	foreign	policy,	China’s	belief	that	no	standard	values	should	be	applied	to	different	socio-cultural	contexts	is	 the	very	 foundation	upon	which	China’s	 foreign	policy	approach	 is	based.	This	approach	finds	its	roots	in	the	five	principles	of	peaceful	coexistence	outlined	during	the	1955	Bandung	Conference.	These	principles	(equality,	trust,	sovereignty,	mutual	benefit	and	non-interference)	have	been	elaborated	in	response	to	China’s	colonial	past	and	its	developing	country	status.	In	fact,	China	is	still	a	recipient	country	of	aid,	and	as	such,	it	argues	it	is	better	positioned	to	know	how	to	meet	development	goals,	namely	through	the	elaboration	of	a	system	that	suits	each	context	specifically.	More	recently,	Chinese	President	Hu	Jintao	revived	the	concepts	of	“harmonious	society”	and	“harmonious	world”,	which	are	based	on	Confucian	values.	Confucianism’s	core	values	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 harmony	 and	 order	 established	 through	
                                                		147	W.	Chen,	D.	Dollar	and	H.	Tang,	 ‘How	Similar	Is	Chinese	Investment	in	Africa	to	the	West’s?’,	Order	from	Chaos:	Foreign	
Policy	in	a	Troubles	World	[blog	post],	The	Brookings	Institution,	18	August	2015.	
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rigorous	superior-subordinate	relationships	according	to	which	social	power	was	mainly	 placed	 “in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 older,	 more	 conservative	 segments	 of	 the	population”148.	With	the	advent	of	Maoism,	“the	[Chinese	Communist	Party]	CCP	spent	its	first	three	decades	in	power	trying	to	extirpate	every	root	and	branch	of	Confucianism	that	 it	 regarded	as	a	 feudal	and	 reactionary	worldview	hindering	progress”149.	A	major	shift	occurred,	with	the	State	becoming	more	and	more	willing	to	“penetrate	society	and	re-create	it	in	its	own	image”150.	Revolutionary	ideology	played	a	very	significant	role	 in	 this	period.	However,	as	 the	post-Mao	period	came,	 the	role	of	ideology	notably	receded	in	everyday	life	as	well	as	in	the	government’s	work.	Yet,	certain	 ideological	 elements	 remain	 and	exert	 influence	on	political	 rhetoric	 and	policy-making.	This	has	been	referred	to,	in	political	science	vocabulary,	as	informal	ideology,	mainly	meaning	political	thought	with	a	cultural	dimension151.	The	use	and	elevation	of	the	importance	of	traditional	values	intend	to	“soften	the	social	impact	of	economic	development	on	the	citizenry	at	large”152.	These	aspects	of	China’s	history	contribute	to	the	intricacy	of	Chinese	domestic	as	well	as	foreign	policy.	In	particular,	“the	revitalization	of	the	great	Sage	and	his	teaching	 occurred	 at	 a	 juncture	 when	 China	 was	 entering	 a	 new	 phase	 in	 its	development.	 The	 reiteration	 of	 harmony	 (and	 order)—the	 essence	 of	Confucianism—constitutes	a	policy	revision	with	regard	to	the	direction	of	China’s	economic	reforms,	begun	more	than	a	quarter	of	a	century	ago”153.	There	are	several	advantages	 for	 the	 government	 to	 promote	 Confucian	 values:	 “domestically,	 the	affirmation	of	harmony	is	meant	to	reflect	the	ruling	party’s	concern	for	all	classes	[…]	it	is	an	implicit	recognition	that	things	are	not	so	harmonious;	but	unlike	Maoist	days,	 the	conflicts	must	be	resolved	peacefully,	not	 through	violent	class	conflict.	Internationally	 the	 call	 for	 peace	 and	 harmony	 is	 meant	 to	 disarm	 fears	 about	China’s	rise”154.	This,	in	particular,	helps	the	government	to	orchestrate	the	search	for	morality	within	society.	Rather	than	allowing	the	moral	vacuum	to	be	“filled	by	Christian	 sects,	 Falun	 Gong,	 and	 extreme	 forms	 of	 nationalism”	 which	 are	
                                                148	Ibid.,	p.	8.	149	D.	Bell,	China’s	New	Confucianism:	politics	and	everyday	 life	 in	a	changing	society,	Princeton	University	Press,	Princeton,	2008,	p.	10.	150	Y.	Huang	and	D.L.	Yang,	‘Bureaucratic	Capacity	and	State-Society	Relations	in	China’,	Journal	of	Chinese	Political	Science,	vol.	7,	issue	1,	March,	2002,	p.	19.	151	X.	Guo	‘Repackaging	Confucius:	PRC	Public	Diplomacy	and	the	Rise	of	Soft	Power’,	Asia	Paper,	Institute	for	Security	and	Development	Policy,	January	2008,	p.	8.	152	Ibid.	153	Ibid.,	p.	12.	154	Bell,	op.cit.,	p.	9.	
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considered	 threats	 to	 “the	 hard-won	 peace	 and	 stability	 that	 underpins	 the	country’s	 development”,	 the	 government	 has	 encouraged	 “the	 revival	 of	 China’s	most	 venerable	 political	 tradition:	 Confucianism.	 Like	most	 ideologies,	 however,	Confucianism	can	be	a	double-edged	sword”155.	The	current	lack	of	meritocracy	and	the	 corruption	 scandals	 involving	 the	 CCP	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 much-needed	transformation	that	the	political	system	in	China	should	face.		“Reform	and	opening”,	as	well	as	the	information	revolution	have	decreased	state	control	 over	 society.	 	 This	 environment	 “has	 contributed	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 non-governmental	organisations	(NGOs)	in	China	[…]	Of	course,	Chinese	NGOs	continue	to	operate	under	severe	political	restrictions.	Organisations	such	as	religious	groups	and	free	labour	unions	are	banned.	Registration	and	approval	processes	are	unduly	burdensome.	However,	despite	these	adverse	conditions,	China	has	seen	the	growth	of	 (underground)	 religious	 groups	 and	 small	 independent	 labour	unions”156.	Not	being	 unitary,	 the	 state	 structure	 is	 also	 increasingly	 exposed	 to	 the	 changes	mentioned	above.	As	a	consequence,	“the	national	state	administration	is	no	longer	tightly	 disciplined.	 Local	 officials	 negotiate	 their	 relations	 with	 the	 higher	authorities	and,	at	times,	with	the	citizenry	as	well”157.		This	 domestic	 “softening”	 has	 led	 China	 “to	 accept	 political	 diversity	 from	 a	baseline	of	not	overtly	dictating	 to	others”,	 in	 contrast	 to	 “the	Maoist	 impulse	 to	export	world	 revolution”	158.	 The	White	Paper	 on	China’s	Africa	Policy,	 issued	 in	2006,	“provides	the	moral	basis	of	its	expressions	of	power	in	Africa	by	asserting	that	Chinese	foreign	policy	will,	unlike	the	West,	be	guided	by	principles	that	ensure	that	 the	 relationship	will	 not	 devolve	 into	 one	 of	 exploitation”159.	 The	 paradigm	promotes	 home-made	 remedies	 rather	 than	 a	 standard	 set	 of	 prescriptions.	 It	 is	founded	 upon	 the	 following	 cornerstones:	 sincerity,	 equality,	 mutual	 benefit,	solidarity	and	joint	development.	Notwithstanding	this,	as	Armony	and	Strauss	note	“beneath	the	polite	construct	of	formal	relations,	China	is	rife	with	principal-agent	problems,	 bureaucratic	 infighting,	 and	 ‘national’	 state-owned	 enterprises	 in	
                                                155	Ibid.,	p.	8.	156	M.	Pei,	‘Changing	State-Society	Relations	in	China’,	paper	presented	to	the	Euro	China	Forum,	China	Europe	International	Business	School,	<http://www.ceibs.edu/ase/Documents/EuroChinaForum/minxin.htm>.		157	K.	Lieberthal,	Governing	China:	from	Revolution	Through	Reform,	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	New	York,	2004,	p.	300.	158 	C.	 Alden	 and	 D.	 Large,	 ‘China’s	 Exceptionalism	 and	 the	 Challenges	 of	 Delivering	 Difference	 in	 Africa’,	 Journal	 of	
Contemporary	China,	vol.	20,	no.	68,	2011,	p.	28.	159	Ibid.,	p.	29.	
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untrammelled	pursuit	of	profit	and	influence	often	to	the	detriment	of	China’s	wider	reputation”160.		Gurtov	suggests	that	“We	should	understand	China’s	developing	world	policies	in	essentially	 domestic	 terms	 –	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 as	 a	 source	 of	 support	 for	 China’s	sovereignty	 and	 internal	 security”	 161 .	 Chinese	 leaders	 “have	 conducted	 foreign	policy	in	ways	that	seek	to	maintain	control	over	the	pace,	methods,	and	strategy	of	economic	development	and	political	change.	The	foreign	policy	dimension	of	that	determination	 has	 consistently	 been	 to	 avoid	 dependence	 and	 […]	 protect	 and	promote	China’s	socialist	development	and	thus	its	security	and	recognition	of	its	important	place	in	the	world”162.		China	 has,	 however,	 been	 experiencing	 a	 learning	 curve	 in	 relation	 to	 its	engagement	 with	 Africa,	 even	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 application	 of	 principles	 as	rooted	and	dear	as	those	mentioned	above.	In	2004	China	signed	the	UN	High-Level	Panel	on	Threats,	Challenges,	and	Change	that	released	an	influential	policy	report	entitled	 A	 More	 Secure	 World:	 Our	 Shared	 Responsibility,	 which	 endorsed	 the	Responsibility	 to	 Protect	 (R2P)	 concept.	 While	 ‘pre-2004	 non-interference’	 was	quite	rigid,	 ‘post-2004	non-interference’	became	more	flexible163.	Bell	argues	that	“if	China	affects	the	rest	of	 the	world,	how	can	 it	ask	the	rest	of	 the	world	not	to	interfere	with	its	own	internal	affairs?	Faced	with	such	concerns,	China	has	begun	to	play	a	more	responsible	and	cooperative	role	in	international	affairs”164.		Few	 studies	 have	 seriously	 looked	 at	 the	 contribution	of	Africans	 and	African	contexts	in	the	change	China	is	experiencing165.		
	
	
2.3 Conceptualizing	Agency			Conceptualizing	 ‘agency-as-ownership’	 is	 an	 effort	 deemed	 necessary	 as	 a	theoretical	exercise	but	even	more	as	a	starting	point	for	empirical	demonstrations.	
                                                160	A.C.	Armony	and	J.C.	Strauss	‘From	Going	Out	(zou	chuqu)	to	Arriving	In	(desembarco):	Constructing	a	New	Field	of	Inquiry	in	China-Latin	America	Interactions’	in	J.C.	Strauss	&	A.C.	Armony	eds.,	From	the	Great	Wall	to	the	New	World:	China	and	Latin	
America	in	the	21st	Century,	The	China	Quarterly	Special	Issues,	New	Series,	no	11,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012,	p.	4.	161	M.	Gurtov,	‘Changing	Perspectives	and	Policies’,	in	L.	Dittmer	and	G.T.	Yu	eds.,	China,	the	Developing	World,	and	the	New	
Global	Dynamic,	Lynne	Rienner	Publishers,	Boulder,	2010,	p.	24.	162	Ibid.,	pp.	14-15.	163	Z.	Pang,	‘Playing	by	'The	Rules':	Is	China	a	Partner	or	Ward?’,	Spiegel	Online	International,	17	October	2008.		http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/playing-by-the-rules-is-china-a-partner-or-ward-a-584758.html		164	Bell,	op.cit.,	p.	22.	165	See	L.	Corkin,	Uncovering	African	Agency:	Angola’s	Management	of	China’s	Credit	Lines,	Ashgate	Publishing,	Surrey,	UK,	2013;	Gadzala,	2015,	op.cit.			
	 56	
In	the	previous	chapter	the	concept	of	ownership	was	introduced,	characterising	it	as	 the	 definition	 and	 domination	 of	 governance	 processes,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	safeguarding	of	the	systems	of	governance	of	a	country.			
Blending	theories	To	conceptualise	agency	in	governance	processes,	as	mentioned	in	Chapter	1,	it	is	fundamental	to	ascertain	what	‘governance’	is	about.	The	approach	here	used	is	not	to	rely	on	a	single	theoretical	account	of	governance,	but	rather	pull	together	elements	 from	a	 few	 theoretical	 approaches.	 This	 is	 done	with	 the	 belief	 that	 to	capture	 real	world	 events,	 the	 discipline	 of	 IR	 does	 not	 provide	 ready-made	 all-encompassing	theoretical	solutions,	but	rather	needs	a	blending	of	multiple	theories.	IR	as	a	discipline	is,	historically,	derivative	and	multidisciplinary166,	it	is	thus	upon	this	basis	that	the	blending	approach	used	in	this	thesis	is	built.		The	 realist	 approach	 contributes	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	 governance	 by	emphasising	 the	 centrality	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 self-interest	 in	international	 relations.	 It	 is	 a	 starting	 point	 in	 the	 scholarship	 to	 conceptualise	agency	in	asymmetrical	conditions.	However,	it	does	not	leave	space	for	ideas,	civil	society,	institutions	and	transnational	forces.	The	theory	is	particularly	relevant	in	Sino-African	 relations.	 These,	 as	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 were	 initially	 broadly	structured	and	understood	as	state-to-state	affairs.	According	to	this	approach,	the	asymmetry	between	China	and	African	countries	places	the	former	in	a	position	of	prevalence	 over	 the	 latter.	However,	 as	 explained	 above,	 this	method,	while	 still	significant	 to	 explain	 the	 importance	 of	 sovereignty	 and,	 presumably,	 the	 non-interference	approach	promoted	by	China	and	commended	by	African	countries,	is	not	 sufficient	 to	 understand	 processes	 of	 governance	 that	 increasingly	 include	actors	beyond	the	state.		The	 institutionalist	 approach	 theorises	 how	 “formal	 or	 informal	 procedures,	routines,	 norms	 and	 conventions	 embedded	 in	 the	 organisational	 structure	 or	political	 economy”167	define	behaviour.	According	 to	 them,	 institutions	 represent	the	 “principal	 factor	 structuring	 collective	 behaviour	 and	 generating	 distinctive	outcomes”168.	 Institutionalism	 emphasises	 path	 dependence	 according	 to	 which	
                                                166	For	a	historical	account	see	J.M.	Hobson,	‘Comparative	Politics	and	International	Relations’,	in	T.	Landman	&	N.	Robinson	eds.,	The	SAGE	Handbook	of	Comparative	Politics,	SAGE	Publications,	London,	2009.	167	P.A.	Hall	and	R.	Taylor,	‘Political	Science	and	the	Three	New	Institutionalisms’,	Political	Studies,	vol.	44,	no.	5,	1996,	p.	936.	168	Ibid.,	p.	937.		
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“the	 contextual	 features	 of	 a	 given	 situation	 often	 inherited	 from	 the	 past” 169	mediate	the	effects	of	other	variables	at	play.	Institutions	are	the	most	significant	of	these	 contextual	 features170.	 This	 paradigm	 suggests	 that	 global	 interactions	 are	legitimised	through	institutions,	which	are	not	only	formal	but	also	informal	sets	of	interdependent	 relations	 between	 states,	 societies,	markets,	 transnational	 forces	and	 so	 forth171.	 This	 paradigm	 is	 very	 relevant	 to	 this	 thesis,	 although	 its	main	limitation	is	an	inability	to	account	for	change,	as	reliant	as	it	is	on	path	dependence,	and	to	provide	proper	space	to	individual	agents.			Constructivism,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 provides	 a	 subjective	 dimension	 to	governance,	focusing	on	the	social	construction	of	identities,	ideas	and	interests	(see	the	section	below	on	Repertoires).	This	 is	of	particular	 importance	as	 the	 theory	acknowledges	that	 interests	and	actions	gain	meaning	and	value,	 in	other	words,	they	become	relevant,	only	as	a	consequence	of	social	constructs172.	This	element	is	a	key	one	in	Sino-African	relations.	On	the	one	hand,	discourses	such	as	mutuality,	solidarity,	equality	are	grounded	in	a	perception	of	shared	historical	paths	and	ideas	of	international	relations.	On	the	other	hand,	real	world	dynamics	have	shed	light	on	relatively	different	social,	political	and	economic	cultures.			Finally,	the	pluralist	approach	moves	beyond	state-centred173	conceptualizations	of	 governance	 to	 include	 civil	 society,	 market	 agents,	 transnational	 social	movements174,	and	it	breaks	down	the	state	into	multiple	bureaucracies.	O’Brien	et.	al. 175 	talk	 of	 complex	 multilateralism	 to	 explain	 how	 transnational	 groups	increasingly	 shape	 governance	 by	 defining	 global	 institutions176 .	 This	 is,	 again,	particularly	 relevant	 in	 this	 thesis	 for	 at	 least	 two	 main	 reasons:	 Sino-African	relations,	 though	 often	 portrayed	 as	 isolated	 from	 other	 global	 dynamics,	 are	necessarily	deeply	entrenched	to	them.	Secondly,	China	and	African	countries	have	increasingly	acknowledged	that	a	wider	range	of	actors	contributes	to	Sino-African	relations.	These	interactions,	often	out	of	the	state	control,	have	given	impetus	to	
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processes	 of	 adaptation,	 re-organisation,	 rejection	 on	 both	 Chinese	 and	 African	sides,	challenging	existing	beliefs,	norms,	institutions.		By	pulling	 together	 relevant	 elements	 of	 each	 of	 these	 theoretical	 approaches	presented	above,	the	author	presents	a	conceptualization	of	agency	that	does	not	place	 the	 full	 explanatory	 power	 on	 individuals	 or	 structures,	 but	 rather	 on	 a	complex	intertwining	of	the	two.	This	conceptualization:	- Identifies	 the	 actors	 in	 Sino-African	 relations.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 author	recognises	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 State	 in	 Sino-African	 relations	 but	 she	understands	 it	 as	 acting	 through	 human	 agents,	 in	 a	 non-unitary	 fashion,	subjected	to	social	and	market	forces	whose	interests	are	negotiated	through	processes	 of	 competition	 and	 cooperation,	 based	 on	 the	 asymmetrical	availability	of	resources.		- Recognises	that	governance	is	far	from	being	merely	state-determined,	within	one	country’s	boundaries,	but	is	rather	increasingly	the	consequence	of	the	inclusion	 in	 the	 decision-making	 of	 social	 and	 market	 forces,	 including	multilateral	organisations.		- Recognises	 that	 agents	 identify	 their	 interests	 not	 only	 based	 on	 rational	decisions	but	also	based	on	social	constructs,	i.e.	repertoires	and	perceptions.		- Assigns	 particular	 relevance	 to	 institutions,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 their	dependence	on	historical	paths.	These	institutions	constitute	the	systems	of	governance	that	inform	mobilisation	strategies.		- Finally,	 all	 this	 is	 subjected	 to	 change	over	 time.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	path	dependence	finds	significant	space	in	this	conceptualization,	change	is	also	an	important	 element	 of	 Sino-African	 relations,	 as	 determined	 by	 heuristic	approaches	to	interaction,	and	of	Africa’s	relations	with	other	external	forces.			The	 actual	 processes	 of	 governance	 are	 a	 synthesis	 of	 these	 theoretical	approaches	where	 the	 share	of	 theoretical	 preponderance	 changes	 in	 relation	 to	specific	issues,	at	specific	times.	According	to	these	elements,	agency-as-ownership	of	the	governance	processes	with	the	Chinese	is	constituted	by	the	willingness	and	
ability	to	safeguard	African	interests.	The	willingness	to	exert	control,	i.e.	safeguard	interests,	in	the	negotiations	with	China,	in	other	words,	the	motivation	to	do	so,	is	strictly	related	to	the	 interests	 that	any	given	actor	perceives	to	be	affected	 in	 its	relations	with	China.	Actors	are,	however,	conceptualised	not	limitedly	as	bundles	
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of	interests	and	capacities,	but	also	as	constituted	by	the	ideas	and	memories	of	the	communities	from	which	they	emerge177,	which	in	turn	contribute	to	shaping	their	interests.		These	 interests	 can	 be	 consistent	 among	 a	 range	 of	 national	 actors	 vis-à-vis	external	forces,	but	they	can	also	be	divergent	giving	rise	to	domestic	confrontation.	The	willingness	to	safeguard	the	domestic	system	of	governance,	is,	in	other	words,	negotiated	domestically	across	state	and	non-state	entities	as	well	as	across	state	bureaucracies.	Studying	the	willingness	of	African	actors	to	define	and	determine	the	relations	with	China	is	important	given	the	widespread	belief	in	the	literature	that	‘China	acts,	Africa	follows’.		The	 ability	 of	 agents	 to	 exert	 control	 in	 the	 relations	 with	 China	 is,	 in	 turn,	dependent	on	the	resources	they	have	at	their	disposal	(human,	financial)	as	well	as	the	suitability	of	the	structures	and	institutions	that	regulate	any	given	policy-area,	i.e.	whether	the	system	of	governance	is	suitable	to	guarantee	the	safeguard	of	the	specific	interests	that	emerge	in	the	relations	with	China.	As	with	the	willingness,	the	 ability	 of	African	 actors	 in	negotiating	with	China	has	often	been	 considered	reduced,	mainly	as	a	consequence	of	financial	and	organisational	asymmetry.		According	 to	 this	conceptualization,	 the	governance	process	 is	a	 function	of	 the	
interplay	between	ideas,	interests,	resources	and	structures,	institutions,	norms	within	
which	 they	 engage/operate.	As	mentioned	 in	 the	previous	 chapter,	 the	 system	of	governance	is	the	synthesis	of	the	structure-agency	interplay	within	a	country,	one	that	 defines	 and	 is	 defined	 by	 ideas,	 interests,	 relationships,	 but	 also	 structures,	institutions,	norms,	and	thus	an	unavoidable	aspect	of	the	relations	with	external	forces.		This	 conceptualization	 of	 agency	 allows	 to	 “circumvent	 the	 crude	individualist/structuralist	dichotomy”178.	In	other	words,	the	focus	is	neither	fully	on	 individuals,	 nor	 on	 the	 structures	 within	 which	 they	 operate.	 It	 is	 rather	understood	 as	 a	 continuous	 interplay	 between	 the	 two.	 The	 elements	 of	 agency	unpacked	below	aim	to	respond	to	the	main	research	questions,	namely	what	are	the	motivations	and	modalities	through	which	African	agents	exert	ownership	in	the	interaction	 with	 the	 Chinese.	 Unpacking	 these	 two	 aspects	 provides	 a	 basis	 to	understand	the	degree	of	ownership	that	is	exerted.	In	fact,	it	is	not	a	quantitative	
                                                177	Whitfield	and	Fraser,	op.	cit.,	p.	344.	178	C.	Wight,	‘They	Shoot	Dead	Horses	Don’t	They?	Locating	Agency	in	the	Agent–Structure	Problematique’,	European	Journal	
of	International	Relations,	vol.	5,	no.	1,	1999,	p.	134.	
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approach	to	the	relationships	that	enlightens	the	outcome	but	rather	a	qualitative	one	that	digs	into	the	motivations	and	modalities	of	action,	i.e.	processes.	Similarly	to	what	Alden	and	Ammon	say	with	respect	to	FPA,	focusing	on	the	process,	rather	than	 the	 outcomes,	 means	 accepting	 that	 “closer	 scrutiny	 of	 the	 actors,	 their	motivations,	 the	 structures	 of	 decision	 making	 and	 the	 broader	 context	 within	which	 foreign	 policy	 choices	 are	 formulated	 would	 provide	 greater	 analytical	purchase”179.	To	understand	motivations,	what	 is	 looked	at	are	the	beliefs/repertoires	upon	which	 agents	 rely	 to	 articulate	 their	 interests,	 and	 the	 interests	 themselves,	understood	as	layered	across	different	levels,	namely	national,	sectoral,	and	issue-specific.	 To	 understand	modalities,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	what	 is	 looked	 at	 are	 the	resources	 available	 to	 actors	 and	 how	 these	 are	mobilised	 according	 to	 existing	systems	 of	 governance.	 This	 depiction	 of	 ownership	 assumes	 that	 the	 system	 of	governance	that	regulates	how	interests	and	resources	are	negotiated	among	actors	serves	as	a	point	of	leverage	over	acts	of	narrow	self-interest.	It	does	not,	however,	imply	that	the	system	of	governance	is,	normatively	speaking,	a	morally	correct	one	or	that	procedures	are	bound	by	legality	and	formality.	Domestic	actors	move	along	national	 and	 international	 environments	 to	 negotiate	 preferred	 outcomes.	 These	preferred	 outcomes	 are	 not	 intended	 to	 be,	 normatively	 speaking,	 good	 or	emancipatory.	 They	 can	 also	 be	 aimed	 at	 perpetuating	 existing	 dependency,	criminal	behaviour	and	so	forth180.	The	sections	below	 first	conceptualize	 ‘actors’,	 then	move	 to	explain	 the	 three	steps	 introduced	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 that	 are	 necessary	 to	 study	 agency-as-ownership,	namely	the	identification	of	interests,	the	acknowledgement	of	whether	
existing	systems	of	governance	are	suitable	to	negotiate	these	interests	to	the	benefit	
of	 involved	 African	 stakeholders,	 and	 the	 enactment	 of	 strategies	 to	 bring	 the	
negotiation	 inside	 the	 accepted	 system	 of	 governance,	 transform	 the	 latter	 to	
guarantee	 that	 the	 negotiation	 successfully	 safeguards	 interests,	 or	 not	 safeguard	
interests	at	all.				
                                                179	C.	Alden	and	A.	Ammon,	Foreign	policy	analysis:	new	approaches,	Routledge,	Abingdon,	2012,	p.	1.	180	Murray-Evans,	op.cit.	
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2.3.1 Actors	Barry	Buzan	suggests	that	the	agential	dimension	of	agents	is	the	“faculty	or	state	of	acting	or	exerting	power”181.	Wight,	in	providing	a	critique	of	Buzan’s	definition,	suggests	 that	his	definition	 is	more	valid	 for	 the	natural	 sciences	 than	 the	 social	sciences.	 He	 continues	 by	 asserting	 that	 “what	 sets	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 boundaries	between	the	social	world	and	the	natural	world	are	the	dual	notions	of	meaning	and	intentionality”	and	both	are	“properties	best	reserved	for	agents”182.		Wight	argues	that	agency	has	a	‘tripartite	character’.	The	first	dimension,	agency1,	is	characterised	by	a	deeply	individual,	‘self’	dimension	of	human	agents.	It	is	“in	the	‘freedom	of	subjectivity’	that	agency	is	located	[…]	This	recognition	of	‘self’	does	not	mean	 a	 denial	 of	 the	 role	 played	 by	 social	 and	 cultural	 factors	 in	 determining	behaviour	[…]	But	even	as	I	acknowledge	my	own	dependency	on	a	social	universe	which	 always	 presents	 itself	 in	 conceptualized	 form,	 this	 conceptualization	 is	dependent	on	a	subject	capable	of	reflecting	upon,	and	constantly	renegotiating,	the	forces	of	construction”183.	This	first	dimension,	in	other	words,	is	characterised	by	the	 “human	 qualities	 of	 reflexivity	 and	 creativity”.	 The	 notions	 of	 meaning	 and	intentionality	 are	 not	 sufficient	 to	 explain	 agency	 “for	 social	 agents	 are	 always	differentially	empowered	to	act	in	terms	of	their	social	positioning”184.	This	second	character	of	agency,	agency2,	takes	into	consideration	the	socio-cultural	background	within	which	 agents	 are	 born.	 In	 a	way,	 agency2	precedes	 agency1,	 as	 the	 social	groups	one	is	born	into	deeply	affect	the	potential	of	one’s	own	ability	to	act.	The	third	dimension,	agency3,	refers	to	the	‘roles’	agents	inhabit	in	any	specific	context	of	 agency2.	The	 three	dimensions	are	 co-constituted,	 and	Wight	 argues	 that	 they	allow	to	“circumvent	the	crude	individualist/structuralist	dichotomy”185.	As	Brown	suggests,	this	approach	suggests	that	“there	are	neither	simply	free	individuals,	nor	script-defined	role	performance,	but	both	roles	and	subjectivity	shaped	 in	extent	and	content	by,	and	operating	within,	a	specific	social	context”186.	This	is	probably	the	most	important	aspect	of	the	thesis,	i.e.	the	emphasis	on	the	social	context	and	the	realisation	that	agents	do	not	act,	as	individuals	and	role-players,	independently	of	the	context	(the	context	is	better	defined	below	as	arena).	
                                                181	B.	Buzan,	C.	Jones	and	R.	Little	eds.,	The	Logic	of	Anarchy:	Neorealism	to	Structural	Realism,	Columbia	University	Press,	New	York,	1993,	p.	103.	182	Wight,	op.	cit.,	p.	126.	183	Ibid.,	p.	130.	184	Ibid.,	p.	132.	185	Ibid.,	p.	134.		186	Brown,	2012(a),	p.	1895.	
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The	 main	 problem	 with	 Wight’s	 tripartite	 approach	 is	 his	 understanding	 of	political	action	as	a	domain	of	official	statehood.	Despite	the	initial	focus	on	state-to-state	relations,	Sino-African	engagements	have	been	expanding	their	scope	and	increasing	attention	is	granted	to	the	effects	of	encounters	beyond	the	state	level.	
For	this	reason	it	is	important	to	use	a	theoretical	framework	of	analysis	that	allows	
the	inclusion	of	not	only	state	actors,	their	interests	and	the	structures	of,	presumably,	
formal	 interaction,	 but	 also	 non-state	 actors,	 their	 interests	 and	 structures	 of	
negotiation	 that,	 at	 times,	 move	 beyond	 formality	 to	 include	 informal	 spaces	 and	
processes.	The	author	argues	that	the	interests	that	emerge	are	constituted	by	both	
the	beliefs	held	by	actors	and	the	position	occupied	in	society.		
	
State	and	non-state	agencies	Hagmann	 and	 Péclard’s	 framework,	 better	 explained	 below,	 helps	 to	 move	beyond	 the	 state	 so	 to	 include	 a	 variety	 of	 actors,	many	 of	whom	 reside	 outside	formal	political	structures,	and	to	understand	“how	local,	national	and	transnational	actors	 forge	and	remake	 the	 state	 through	processes	of	negotiation,	 contestation	and	 bricolage” 187 .	 Acknowledging	 this	 social	 diversity	 in	 socio-political	 and	economic	negotiations	is	important	in	a	study	such	as	this,	of	multi-layered	domestic	interaction	with	external	actors.	As	Long	notes,	“all	forms	of	external	intervention	necessarily	 enter	 the	 existing	 life-worlds	 of	 the	 individuals	 and	 social	 groups	affected,	and	in	this	way	are	mediated	and	transformed	by	these	same	actors	and	structures”188 .	 This	 is	 especially	 relevant	 in	 the	 study	 of	 Sino-African	 relations	where,	 by	 often	 not	 taking	 into	 consideration	 African	 actors	 and	 contexts,	 it	 is	assumed	 that	 the	 Chinese	 side	 of	 the	 equation	 embodies	 the	 entire	 explanatory	realm	and	that	the	interaction	with	Africans	does	not	transform	it.		Despite	 the	 attention	 to	multi-level	phenomena	and	a	wider	understanding	of	agency,	 Hagmann	 and	 Péclard’s	 ‘analytic	 of	 statehood’	 still	 focuses	 on	 ‘state	domination’ 189 .	 After	 all,	 discussing	 agency	 in	 international	 relations	 means	discussing,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state.	 This	 is	mainly	 related	 to	 the	importance	of	sovereignty	in	international	relations.		Although	undeniably,	agency	is	exercised	at	multiple	levels,	 it	would	be	reductionist	to	assert	that	state	agents	
                                                187	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	544.	188	Long,	op.	cit.,	p.	20.	189	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	544.	
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and	 non-state	 actors	 have	 the	 same	 kind	 of	 power	 in	 international	 relations.	Maintaining	the	importance	of	the	state,	Brown	suggests	that:			 it	is	international	processes	of	mutual	recognition	of	sovereignty	that	define	the	membership	of	 the	 international	 ‘club’	 of	 states	 in	 the	 first	place	and	as	 a	result	the	very	rights	to	attendance	and	participation	in	the	varied	multilateral	forums	and	bilateral	relations	[…]	Indeed,	it	is	as	recognised	leaders	(and	hence	‘representative’)	of	the	state,	that	leaders	are	able	to	claim	a	right	to	speak	for	and	on	behalf	of	a	particular	country.	And	sovereign	authority	confers	on	state	agents	an	ability	to	recognise	or	not,	give	legitimacy	or	not,	to	other	actors190.			He	 continues	 by	 concluding	 that	 “states	 are	 different	 and	 they	 matter	 in	 a	different	 way	 from	 non-state	 agencies.	 Not	 that	 the	 latter	 are	 unimportant,	 but	appeals	 to	 the	 importance	of	 civil	 society	 actors	whether	 in	peace-building	or	 in	international	negotiations	cannot	obscure	the	centrality	of	state-based	agencies	in	the	 political	 realm”. 191 	Notwithstanding	 this,	 “sovereignty	 itself	 is	 inherently	relational	 in	both	 its	 internal	and	external	aspects,	meaning	 that	 state	actors	are	never	 divorced	 in	 a	 substantive	 sense	 from	 non-state	 actors”.192	An	 even	 bigger	problem	concerns	how	far	states	can	be	said	to	‘act’.	This	is	by	no	means	unique	to	Africa	although	Williams	argues	that	what	is	different	about	African	state	agency	is	the	extent	to	which	state	agency	is	subjected	to	greater	external	scrutiny	than	other	states	 in	 the	 international	 system 193 .	 Wendt	 suggests	 that	 states	 cannot	 be	considered	‘persons’194,	as	“it	is	not	the	state	which	acts:	it	is	always	specific	sets	of	politicians	 and	 state	 officials	 located	 in	 specific	 parts	 of	 the	 state	 system” 195 .	According	 to	 Brown	 then	 states	 “only	 enact	 their	 agency	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 acting	through	human	agents”196.		The	 literature	on	Foreign	Policy	Analysis	 (FPA)	provides	 a	 good	 approach	 for	understanding	the	interconnectedness	of	diverse	agency	types	and	their	mutually	constituting	 relevance	 at	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 level.	 This	 branch	 of	 IR	investigates	 the	 decision-making	 process,	 individual	 decision	 makers	 and	
                                                190	Brown.,	2011,	op.	cit.,	p.	13.	191	Ibid.,	p.	14	192	Brown,	2012(b),	op.	cit.,	p.	17.	193	Williams,	op.	cit.,	p.	18.	194	A.	Wendt.,	‘The	Agent-Structure	Problem	in	International	Relations	Theory’,	International	Organisation,	vol.	41,	no.	3,	1987,	p.	359.	195	B.	Jessop,	State	Theory:	Putting	Capitalist	States	in	their	Place,	Polity	Press,	Cambridge,	1990,	p.	367.	196	Brown,	2012(b),	op.	cit.,	p.	8.	
	 64	
conditions	that	affect	the	outcomes	of	foreign	policies.	Alden	and	Ammon	note	that	“by	adopting	this	approach,	FPA	is	necessarily	concerned	not	only	with	the	actors	involved	in	the	state’s	formal	decision-making	apparatus,	but	also	with	the	variety	of	sub-national	sources	of	influence	upon	state	foreign	policy.	Moreover,	in	seeking	to	provide	a	fuller	explanation	for	foreign	policy	choice,	scholars	have	had	to	take	account	of	the	boundaries	between	the	state’s	internal	or	domestic	environment	and	the	external	environment”197.		Acknowledging	that	a	range	of	actors	exercise	agency	in	processes	of	governance	means	 understanding	 the	 relational	 concept	 of	 power	 sharing	 between	 the	governing	and	the	governed.	In	other	words,	it	is	necessary	to	look	at	state-society	relations	as	well	as	“the	intrinsic	characteristics	of	government	bureaucracies	and	how	 these	 relate	 to	 other	 forms	 of	 power”198 .	 State-society	 approaches	 mostly	understand	 patterns	 of	 domination	 and	 social	 change	 as	 deriving	 from	 the	interactive	effects	of	state	and	social	structures.	The	approach	rejects	perspectives	that	 understand	 patterns	 of	 domination	 and	 change	 as	 fuelled	 mainly	 by	government	 policies	 and	 structure	 or,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 those	 that	 see	 such	patterns	as	dictated	by	certain	social	formations.	In	other	words,	it	acknowledges	that	the	substance	of	politics	is	“to	be	found	in	the	myriad	networks	which	link	the	various	 levels	 of	 power,	 from	 top	 to	 bottom”199.	 According	 to	Migdal	 states	 are	deeply	embedded	in	social	forces200	and	Bierschenk	and	Olivier	de	Sardan	highlight	how	multiple	 “power	 poles”201	have	 substituted	 a	 narrow	 focus	 on	 formal	 state	actors	and	institutions.	A	wide	range	of	actors,	state	officials	and	non-state	actors	are	involved	in	‘doing	the	state’202,	both	in	cooperation	and	in	competition	with	the	state203.		Such	diversity	gives	rise	to	ever-changing	competing	interests.	In	fact,	“while	the	image	of	the	state	implies	a	singular	morality,	one	standard	way,	indeed	right	way,	of	doing	things,	practices	denote	multiple	types	of	performance	and,	possibly,	some	contention	 over	what	 is	 the	 right	way	 to	 act”204.	Migdal	 suggests	 a	 focus	 on	 the	
                                                197	Alden	&	Ammon,	op.	cit.,	p.	1.	198	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	545.	199	Ibid.,	p.	2.	200	J.S.	Migdal,	Strong	Societies	and	Weak	States:	State-Society	Relations	and	State	Capabilities	 in	the	Third	World,	Princeton	University	Press,	Princeton,	1998.	201	K.	Arnaut	&	C.K.	Højbjerg,	‘Gouvernance	et	ethnographie	en	temps	de	crise:	De	l’étude	des	ordres	émergents	dans	l’Afrique	entre	guerre	et	paix’	Politique	africaine,	vol.	111,	2008,	p.20.	202	J.	S.	Migdal	and	K.	Schlichte,	‘Rethinking	the	State’,	in	K.	Schlichte	ed.,	The	Dynamics	of	States	-	The	Formation	and	Crises	of	
State	Domination,	Ashgate,	Aldershot-Burlington,	2005,	pp.14-15.	203	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	543.	204	J.S.	Migdal,	State	in	Society:	Studying	how	States	and	Societies	constitute	one	another,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge,	2001,	p.	19.	
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dynamic	nature	of	state-society	relations,	underlining	how	“as	the	state	organisation	comes	into	contact	with	various	social	groups,	it	clashes	with	and	accommodates	to	different	moral	 orders.	 These	 engagements,	which	 occur	 at	 numerous	 junctures,	change	the	social	bases	and	the	aims	of	the	state.	As	a	consequence,	it	is	not	useful	to	 conceive	 the	state	as	a	 fixed	 ideological	entity,	 rather,	 it	 embodies	an	ongoing	dynamic,	a	changing	set	of	goals,	as	it	engages	other	social	groups”205.	In	analysing	state	and	society	as	empirical	subjects,	“we	find	tremendous	variation	in	ideas	about	good	government,	virtue	and	responsibility”206.		Actors	can	then	be	categorised	as	national	states	(executives),	state-based	actors	(the	 bureaucracies),	 and	 non-state	 actors,	 ranging	 from	 the	 private	 sector	 to	professional	 associations,	 trade	 unions,	 educational	 institutions	 and	much	more.	Hagmann	 and	 Péclard	 importantly	 bring	 into	 the	 discussion	 about	 ‘actors’	 the	“resources	that	individuals	and	organised	interest	groups	have	at	their	disposal	and	the	competing	repertoires	that	they	mobilise	in	their	interactions”207.	Resources	are	material	 assets	 whereas	 repertoires	 are	 symbolic	 elements,	 such	 as	 norms,	discourses	and	ideas	used	to	further	interests.	They	are	at	the	basis	of	the	ability	and	motivation	to	negotiate	domestically	and	internationally.	Internationally,	however,	the	 literature	 on	 Africa,	 as	 explained	 above,	 has	 questioned	 the	willingness	 and	ability	 of	 African	 actors	 to	 mobilise	 ideas	 and	 resources	 to	 fulfil	 their	 interests	through	 specific	 systems	 of	 governance.	 It	 is	 then	 particularly	 important	 to	acknowledge	 that	 domestic	 preferences	 are	 not	 important	 because	 they	 are	objective	facts,	but	because	they	have	social	meanings	attributed	by	specific	actors	to	 specific	 circumstances208.	 These	meanings	 originate	 from	 a	 complex	 blend	 of	history,	ideas,	norms209.		
Repertoires	Agents	do	not	identify	their	preferences	simply	with	reference	to	their	interests	or	through	rational	calculation,	based	on	the	resources	from	which	they	can	draw	upon.	They	mostly	rely	on	 ideas	and	memories210,	based	on	history,	 identity	and	discourse211	which	 in	 turn	 create	 individual	 spheres	of	decision	making	 that	 can	
                                                205	Ibid.	206	Hann	and	Dunn	eds.,	op.cit.,	p.	20.	207	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	547.	208	A.	Wendt,	Social	Theory	of	International	Politics,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge,	1999.		209	Ibid.	210	Whitfield	and	Fraser,	op.	cit.,	p.	344.	211	D.J.	Galbreath,	A.	Lasas	and	J.W.	Lamoreaux,	Continuity	and	Change	in	the	Baltic	Sea	Region:	Comparing	Foreign	Policies	
(On	the	Boundary	of	Two	Worlds),	Rodopi,	Amsterdam-New	York,	2008.	p.16.		
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impact	the	broader	context	within	which	they	act212.	Hagmann	and	Péclard	call	this	mix	 of	 ideas	 and	memories,	 repertoires.	 Actors	 “master	 symbolic	 repertoires	 to	further	 their	 interests,	 to	mobilise	popular	support,	and	 to	give	meaning	 to	 their	actions” 213 .	 Repertoires	 are	 used	 to	 “defend	 and	 to	 challenge	 existing	 types	 of	statehood	and	power	relations”214.		This	 symbolic	 realm	 in	 Africa	 involves	 references	 to	 ‘good	 governance’,	‘democracy’	 as	well	 as	 anti-western	 ideologies,	 ethno-politically	 defined	 types	 of	citizenship,	 and	 so	 forth.	With	 the	 arrival	 of	 China,	 the	 range	 of	 repertoires	 has	widened.	 The	 repertoires	 that	 emerge	 in	 Sino-African	 relations	 are	 generally	twofold:	one	consists	 in	framing	the	relations	under	the	South-South	cooperation	label,	 defining	 them	 through	 concepts	 of	 mutuality,	 equality,	 solidarity,	 non-interference,	 economic	 development.	 The	 other	 is	 the	 opposite,	 framing	 the	relations	 with	 China	 as	 damaging	 for	 locals	 and	 counter-productive,	 mainly	disrespectful	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 rights,	 drawing	 on	 the	 discontent	 of	populations	towards	the	Chinese	presence.		Especially	in	a	study	like	this	one	where	social,	political	and	economic	cultures	meet,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	give	 space	 to	 the	different	 symbolic	 repertoires	upon	which	norms	of	conduct	are	based,	to	better	capture	the	relations.	Sino-African	relations	have	particularly	struggled	to	figure	out	whether	different	repertoires	such	as	the	‘economic	development’	pushed	forward	by	China	and	the	‘democratic	governance’	pushed	 forward	 by	 Western	 countries	 can	 co-exist	 and	 be	 blended	 in	 African	contexts.			
Resources	The	study	of	resources	is	an	important	one	in	Sino-African	relations	where	the	economic	asymmetry	between	China	and	most	African	countries	is	often	perceived	as	a	reason	for	asymmetrical	outcomes.	Resources	refer	to	“the	material	bases	of	collective	action;	they	include	tangible	and	intangible	assets	such	as	bureaucratic	capacities,	organisational	skills,	finance	and	ability	to	mobilise	funding,	knowledge	and	technical	expertise”215	etc.	At	least	two	aspects	need	to	be	considered:	resources	change	with	time	and	not	all	actors	have	equal	resources	leading	thus	to	competition	
                                                212	Alden&Ammon,	op.	cit.,	p.	65.	213	Hagmann	and	Péclard.	p.	547.	214	Ibid.	215	Ibid.	
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(between	 the	 state	 and	 society216,	 but	 also	 internally	 to	 each	 of	 them217).	 These	aspects	 apply	 to	 both	 the	 domestic	 context,	 and	 the	 international	 dimension.	 In	other	 words,	 resource	 allocation	 and	 availability	 vary	 domestically	 based	 on	differing	priorities	(i.e.	national,	sectoral,	sub-sectoral,	personal),	but	they	also	vary	depending	 on	 the	 specific	 relations	 with	 external	 partners.	 They	 vary	 based	 on	preferences,	which	are	subjected	to	temporal,	spatial	and	political	variations218.		Domestically,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 not	 all	 actors	 have	 equal	resources	at	their	disposal.	Resources	form	the	major	basis	of	power	and,	as	Olivier	de	Sardan	put	it,	there	are	at	least	two	kinds	of	power,	“the	power	everybody	has	and	the	power	only	some	people	have”219.	The	executive	and	high-level	bureaucrats	have	access	to	a	wider	pool	of	resources	than	lower	 level	bureaucrats	or	societal	groups,	thus	creating	a	power	imbalance.	However,	in	most	cases,	the	mobilisation	of	 the	 resources	 available	 to	 the	 former	 is	 scrutinised	 by	 complex	 systems	 of	governance	that	reduce	the	power	asymmetry	between	the	top	and	the	bottom.	This	is	truer	“in	environments	of	peace	and	stability	than	in	conflictive	regions,	where	the	 foreign	 policy	 elite	 tends	 to	 exclude	 domestic	 interests	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 the	survival	of	the	state”220.		However,	looking	at	financial	capabilities	should	not	be	the	only	way	to	look	at	resources.	 An	 analysis	 of	 human	 resources	 often	 lacks	 in	 Sino-African	 relations	where	 studies	 focus,	more	 often	 than	 not,	 on	 structural	 and	 financial	 resources.	Nonetheless,	 focusing	 on	 human	 resources	 may	 reveal	 specific	 capacities	 that	emerge	in	negotiations,	and	that	contribute	to	the	shaping	of	outcomes.			
2.3.2 Layered	interests	When	discussing	 agency	 in	 Sino-African	 relations,	 often	 the	 question	 revolves	around	the	ability	of	a	State	to	pursue	its	national	interests.	Not	surprisingly,	with	time,	it	has	become	clear	that	Sino-African	relations	are	populated	by	a	multiplicity	of	interests,	well	beyond	those	officially	advanced,	as	diverse	as	the	range	of	actors	that	embody	them.	Interests	are	shaped	by	Wight’s	tripartite	agents,	i.e.	agents	that	have	 a	 personality	 and	 ‘freedom	 of	 subjectivity’,	 which	 is	 shaped	 by	 the	 social	context	in	which	they	were	born	and	raised,	and	which	is	bound	by	the	position	the	
                                                216	M.	Bratton,	‘Beyond	the	State:	Civil	Society	and	Associational	Life	in	Africa’,	World	Politics,	vol.	41,	no.3,	1989,	p.	408.	217	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	545.	218	Ibid.	219	Olivier	de	Sardan,	op.	cit.,	p.	186.	220	D.	Flemes	and	S.E.	Lobell,	‘Contested	leadership	in	international	relation’,	International	Politics,	vol.	52,	2015,	p.	143.	
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agent	occupies	in	society221.	One	of	the	purposes	of	the	sectoral	approach	adopted	in	this	study	is	the	understanding	of	competing	interests	within	the	national	context.	These	are	expected	to	vary	depending	not	only	on	the	context	of	the	specific	issue	under	study,	and	thus	specific	actors	involved,	but	also	on	the	positions	that	these	actors	occupy	in	that	context,	and	the	relations	among	each	other.		Sino-African	 debates	 rest	 upon	 a	 general	 critique	 that	 African	 countries	 have	‘turned	 East’	 adopting	 country-wide	 approaches	 toward	 China	 thanks	 to	 its	proclaimed	non-interference	policy	and	lack	of	political	conditions222.	This	type	of	critique	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 fear	 that	 the	 unconditional	 support	 of	 China	 for	 African	economic	development	has	compromised	the	democratic	journey	of	many	African	countries.	However,	assuming	that	interests	are	unitary	and	that	they	emerge	out	of	state	agents	only,	wipes	out	the	complexities	of	country-systems	and	does	not	take	into	 account	 the	profoundly	 different	 priorities	 that	 different	 issue-areas	 occupy	within	 the	 national	 context	 and	 in	 relation	 to	 external	 presences.	 In	 actual	governance,	macro	policy	orientations	(for	instance,	the	Look	East	policy	in	Kenya)	meet	microcosmos	where	they	do	not	necessarily	result	as	appealing	as	they	do	at	the	national	level.	In	other	words,	while	it	is	important	to	recognise	the	existence	of	national	 agendas,	 it	 is	 also	necessary	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 they	break	down	 into	multiple	agendas	at	sectoral	and	issue-specific	levels.	This	acknowledgement	leads	to	talk	of	layered	interests:	the	national,	the	sectoral	and	the	issue-specific.	Through	a	 study	 of	 how	 these	 interests	 are	 connected	 and	 safeguarded	 it	 is	 possible	 to	determine	whether	the	African	countries’	engagement	with	China	is	part	of	broader	national	 developmental	 frameworks	 or	 rather	 responds	 to	 isolated,	 narrow	interests.	This	is,	in	turn,	a	key	moment	in	the	study	of	agency-as-ownership,	as	it	allows	 to	 assess	 whether	 the	 systems	 of	 governance	 guarantee	 to	 leverage	 the	achievement	of	narrow	self-interests	 to	 the	benefit	of	broader	national	 interests.	Sectoral	 interests	are	 important	as	a	 link	between	the	national	and	 issue-specific	levels	as	they	help	identify	how	different	sectors	occupy	priorities	within	a	single	national	system.	In	the	relations	with	external	forces,	sectoral	interests	are	the	ones	that	 help	 identify	 whether	 issue-specific	 interests	 are	 in	 line	 with	 development	agendas	or	are	rather	randomly	expressed.		
                                                221	Wight,	op.	cit.,	pp.	126-134.	222	See	Mohan	&	Power,	2009,	op.cit.;	M.	Tan-Mullins,	G.	Mohan,	M.	Power,	‘Redefining	‘Aid’	in	the	China–Africa	Context’,	
Development	and	Change,	vol.41,	no.	5,	2010.			
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Beyond	the	domestic	level,	China’s	interests	in	Africa	have	often	been	framed	in	sectoral	 terms.	 FOCAC	 documents	 contain	 commitments	 to	 develop	 education,	healthcare,	political	relations	and	so	 forth.	Sectoral	patterns	have	been	 identified	that	generally	focus	on	broad	commitments	by	the	Chinese	to	contribute	to	Africa’s	development	 in	 that	 specific	 sector.	 However,	 because	 China’s	 commitments	 are	generally	Africa-wide	rather	than	country-specific,	 it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	Chinese	sectoral	preferences	align	with	Kenyan	sectoral	priorities.	Layered	interests	apply	to	African	contexts,	as	much	as	they	apply	to	the	Chinese.		It	 is	 important	 to	acknowledge	 this,	 in	Sino-African	relations,	 as	 it	 reinforces	 the	recent	 turn	 in	 the	Sino-African	 scholarship	 toward	 comprehensive	 studies	of	 the	complexity	 of	 Chinese	 foreign	 policy	 management,	 i.e.	 the	 fact	 that	 despite	 the	willingness	to	state-control	the	relations,	implementation	proves	to	be	much	more	diversified.	 Studies	 of	 Chinese	 practices	 in	 Africa	 have	 revealed	 discrepancies	between	the	national	rhetorical	discourse	of	mutuality,	win-win	and	so	forth,	and	the	implementation	practices	of	SOEs,	private	actors,	migrants,	whose	interests	do	not	always	align	with	China’s	discourses.	The	 following	 chapters	 are	 fully	 aimed	 at	 exposing	 this.	 Chapter	 3	 focuses	 on	Kenyan	national	interests,	rooted	in	a	long	historical	journey	toward	constitutional	democracy,	 and	 linked	 to	 regional	 and	 global	 integration	 efforts.	 These	 interests	constitute	the	bedrock	against	which	sectoral	agendas	take	shape	and	against	which	specific	issues	are	negotiated	domestically	and	internationally	(Chapters	4,	5	and	6).			
2.3.3 Systems	of	Governance	–	Negotiation	Arenas		The	 systems	 of	 governance	 are	 a	 key	 element	 of	 this	 thesis	 as	 they	 are	 the	synthesis	of	the	structure-agency	blend.	Hagman	and	Péclard	call	them	negotiation	arenas,	 i.e.	 the	 “political	 space	 in	 which	 relations	 of	 power	 and	 authority	 are	vested”223.	Negotiation	 arenas	 “have	 spatial,	 social	 and	 temporal	 dimensions	 […]	which	need	to	be	traced	empirically	on	a	case	by	case	basis”224.	Different	actors	and	stakeholders	contribute	to	the	creation	and	consolidation	of	norms,	institutions	and	structures	 that	 form	 an	 arena,	 which	 is	 historically	 determined,	path	 dependent.	‘Negotiation	arenas’	and	 ‘negotiation	tables’	(more	fully	described	below)	are	the	places	 where	 negotiation	 processes	 are	 observed.	 Negotiation	 arenas	 host	 “a	
                                                223	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	551.	224	Ibid.,	p.	550.	
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varying	number	of	actors,	some	of	which	are	recognised	as	participants	of	formal	decision	 making	 at	 the	 negotiation	 table	 (typically	 ‘big	 men’,	 politicians,	businessmen,	diplomats,	but	also	religious	 leaders,	NGO	representatives,	military	commanders,	etc.)	and	others	who	have	been	denied	access	to	the	negotiation	table	(typically	minority	groups,	women,	groups	with	a	lower	socio-economic	status)”225.		The	definition	of	 arenas,	 in	 other	words,	 refers	 to	 the	norms,	 institutions	 and	structures	through	which	governance	takes	place.	Through	the	study	of	modalities	of	governance	(unpacked	below),	it	is	possible	to	identify	whether	the	relations	with	China	occur	within	existing	systems	of	governance,	if	they	do	outside	of	them,	when	African	actors	deem	the	systems	adequate	to	negotiate	with	China	and	when	they	deem	them	non-fit.	This	thesis,	in	a	way,	tests	whether	the	argument	put	forward	by	Clapham	in	2006	holds.	He	asserted	that	“China’s	appearance	[in	Africa],	however	dramatic,	fits	into	patterns	that	have	been	long-established,	and	that	Africans	have	historically	absorbed	and	adapted.	There	is,	I	believe,	every	prospect	that	China	will	conform	 to	 those	 patterns,	 rather	 than	 transforming	 them”226 .	 Importantly,	 the	patterns	Clapham	refers	to	are	highly	influenced	by	external	actors	and	structures.	Especially	 in	 particular	 sectors	 the	 existence	 of	 international	 institutions	 and	structures	has	been,	especially	in	Africa,	a	major	element	determining	how	national	governance	takes	place.		In	 a	 sectoral	 study	 like	 this,	 it	 is	 of	 particular	 importance	 to	 highlight	 that	negotiating	 arenas	 and	 tables	 vary	 significantly	 domestically	 depending	 on	 the	sector	or	issue-area	under	study.	As	previously	mentioned	negotiation	arenas	“have	spatial,	social	and	temporal	dimensions	[…]	which	need	to	be	traced	empirically	on	a	 case	 by	 case	 basis”227.	Mainly,	 the	 concern	 in	 the	 following	 chapters	 is	 that	 to	identify	what	are	the	existing	arenas/tables	of	negotiation	and	whether	the	relations	with	the	Chinese	are	enacted	within	existing	patterns	or	outside	of	them.				
2.3.4 Modalities	According	to	the	conceptualization	put	forward	so	far,	 the	modalities	of	action	vis-à-vis	 the	 Chinese	 are	 expected	 to	 depend	 on	 the	 suitability	 of	 the	 arenas	 to	safeguard	 interests.	 There	 is	 a	 general	 tone	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 Sino-African	relations	 according	 to	which	 having	 ‘agency’	means	 being	 able	 to	 reject	 Chinese	
                                                225	Ibid.,	p.	551.	226	C.	Clapham,	‘Fitting	China	In’,	Brenthurst	Discussion	Paper	no.	8,	The	Brenhurst	Foundation,	2006,	p.	2.	227	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	550.	
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terms	and	conditions228,	as	if	all	Chinese	initiatives	in	Africa	were	about	conflicts	of	interest	and	rejecting	them	was,	normatively	speaking,	the	right	thing	to	do.	This	idea	 was	 often	 consequential	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	 Sino-African	 relations	 as	mainly	 conducted	 by	 the	 elites	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 populations,	 portrayed	 as	impotent.	Therefore,	rejecting	the	Chinese	equalled	to	using	agential	power	to	reject	authoritarian	approaches	to	development229.	In	this	study,	I	adopt	a	more	nuanced	approach	according	to	which	having	agency	does	not	equal	to	rejecting	the	Chinese,	assuming	that	their	arrival	is	synonymous	with	exploitation,	challenges,	and	so	forth.	Rather,	agency	is	here	seen	as	the	ability	to	shape	and	maintain	preferences	at	the	negotiation	table,	be	they	in	line	or	not	with	the	Chinese	priorities.	This	agency,	as	better	 explained	 below,	 is	 not	 only	 in	 the	 form	 of	 contestation	 by	 social	 groups	against	 elites	 but	 also	 cooperation	 with	 each	 other	 and	 with	 the	 Chinese.	 To	emphasise	this,	the	section	below	suggests	focusing,	 in	empirical	analyses,	on	the	initiator	of	the	relations,	which	is	not	expected	only	to	be	acting	in	re-action	mode,	but	 also	 pro-action	 and	 passive	 modes.	 In	 a	 recent	 article	 exploring	 trade	negotiations,	Murray-Evans	also	suggests	that:		 The	 conflation	 of	 agency	 (an	 ontological	 presupposition)	 with	 resistance	(empirical	claims)	potentially	obscures	the	variety	of	different	positions	taken	up	by	African	agents	in	international	trade	negotiations	and	other	interactions	with	the	outside	world.	If	we	can	only	observe	African	agency	when	it	is	expressed	as	opposition	to	external	forces,	we	may	miss,	 for	example,	those	instances	when	African	 agents	 agree	with	 or	 contribute	 to	 dominant	 ideas	 or	 cooperate	with	other	international	actors230.			
Initiator	To	identify	and	explain	mobilisation	strategies,	it	is	important	to	put	emphasis	on	the	 distinctiveness,	 and	 yet	 connectedness,	 of	 the	 national	 agenda,	 sectoral	 and	issue-specific	 interests.	This	tension	is	particularly	relevant	when	the	interests	of	domestic	state	organs	and	social	structures	are	not	particularly	aligned	and	what	is	
                                                228	See	Murray-Evans,	op.	cit.;	Mohan	and	Lampert,	2014,	op.cit.;	B.	Lampert	&	G.	Mohan,	‘Making	Space	for	African	Agency	in	China-Africa	Engagements:	Ghanaian	and	Nigerian	Patrons	Shaping	Chinese	Enterprise’,	in	A.	W.	Gadzala	(ed.),	Africa	and	
China:	How	Africans	and	Their	Governments	are	Shaping	Relations	with	China,	Rowman	&	Littlefield,	Lanham,	2015.		229	See	E.	Mawdsley,	‘China	and	Africa:	Emerging	Challenges	to	the	Geographies	of	Power’,	Geography	Compass,	vol.	1,	no.	3,	2007.		230	Murray-Evans,	op.	cit.,	p.	1847.		
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observed	 is	 a	 constant	 adaptation	 to	 fulfil	 both	 the	 national	 and	 international	interests.	One	way	to	look	at	how	these	three	groups	of	interests	interplay	is	to	look	at	 the	motivations	according	to	which	actors	 initiate	 the	relation	with	China,	and	compare	 it	 to	 broader	 sectoral	 and	 national	 interests.	 The	 types	 of	 behaviour	expected	are:	contestation,	cooperation,	passivity.		Contestation	 is	 a	 re-action,	 expected	 in	 cases	 where	 Chinese	 actors/activities	challenge	Kenyan	existing	interests/values,	norms	or	frameworks	of	operation	and	provoke	 a	 reaction	 to	 control	 such	 change.	 Flemes	 and	 Wehner	 suggest	 that	“strategies	of	contestation	can	be	driven	by	historical	experiences	of	conflict,	and	also	by	their	legacies”231.	Cooperation	is	a	pro-active	behaviour.	Even	when	apparent	tensions	are	not	observed	with	China	and	between	the	government	and	society,	it	is	interesting	 to	study	 the	domestic	conformation	 in	such	contexts	 to	compare	 it	 to	cases	contestation.	Pro-active	behaviour	emerges	in	cases	where	a	calculated	choice	is	made	by	the	actors	involved	in	the	issue	at	stake	to	include	Chinese	actors	for	the	implementation	 of	 specific	 policies	 or	 projects.	 Finally,	 passivity	 is	 a	 behaviour	according	to	which	no	particular	agency/control	over	the	relationship	with	China	is	shown.	Neither	the	content	of	the	relations	nor	the	modality	are	actively	defined	to	safeguard	Kenyan	interests.	China	is	left	to	operate	unchallenged.			
Negotiation	Tables	The	negotiation	table	represents	“a	formalized	setting	where	contending	social	groups	decide	upon	key	aspects	of	statehood	over	a	given	period	of	time.	A	wide	range	of	negotiation	tables	exists,	from	diplomatic	conferences	involving	heads	of	states,	through	donor	consultations	between	international	financial	institutions	and	local	NGOs,	to	meetings	by	customary	chiefs	under	the	village	tree”232.	‘Negotiation	tables’	 vary	 significantly	 from	 case	 to	 case	 so	 that	 the	 range	 of	 actors	 that	 can	potentially	sit	around	them	is	vast.	In	other	words,	they	are	the	settings	where	the	actual	 negotiations	 take	 place,	 characterised	 by	 the	 inclusion	 or	 exclusion	 of	stakeholders,	 at	 times	 according	 to	 existing	 systems	 of	 governance,	 at	 times	irrespective	 of	 them.	While	 arenas	 are	 harder	 to	 alter,	 tables	 of	 negotiation	 can,	more	easily,	be	subjected	to	short-term	interests	and	politicisation.		
                                                231	D.	Flemes	&	L.	Wehner,	‘Drivers	of	strategic	contestation:	The	case	of	South	America’,	International	Politics,	vol.	52,	no.	2,	2015,	p.166.		232	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	551.	
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Sino-African	relations	are	 imbued	with	concerns	that	the	economic	and	power	asymmetry	between	African	countries	and	the	Chinese	 lead	the	executives	of	 the	former	to	bypass	domestic	systems	of	governance	in	order	to	strike	deals	with	the	latter.	This	can	be	measured	by	contrasting	announced	developmental	agendas	and	actual	project	development.	The	assumption	is	that	agendas	are	broadly	negotiated	across	 arenas,	 and	 thus	 take	 into	 consideration	 different	 stakeholders’	 needs.	Project	development,	on	the	other	hand,	may	be	more	subjected	to	one-off	needs.	The	study	of	tables	of	negotiation	and	their	conformity	to	the	broader	negotiation	arena	is	significant	to	understand	whether	established	norms	and	procedures	are	maintained	or	bypassed.	It	is	also	important	as	it	helps	to	understand	whether	these	behaviours	are	sector-defined	or	rather	sector-irrelevant.				
2.4 Conclusions	All	 the	 elements	 of	 agency	 just	 briefly	 introduced	 have	 gained	 an	 increasing	significance	in	Sino-African	relations	as	a	testimony	of	the	importance	that	agency	has	come	to	occupy	in	these	engagements.	The	actors	 involved	have	 increased	in	number	 and	 type,	 internationally	 as	 well	 as	 domestically	 (in	 China	 and	 African	countries),	ranging	from	traders,	to	athletes,	from	doctors	to	peace-keepers,	from	ministerial	bureaucrats	in	charge	of	specific	Sino-Africa	programmes	to	academics	and	 so	 forth.	 The	 repertoires	 used,	 i.e.	 discourses,	 have	 been	 fine-tuned	 as	 the	relations	evolved.	An	example	is	the	increased	use	of	soft	power	by	China	in	African	contexts	or	the	 ‘Look	East’	discourse	employed	by	Kenyan	state	leaders	since	the	early	2000s.	The	resources	at	their	disposal	have	experienced	processes	of	change,	as	the	importance	of	some	issues	increased	while	that	of	others	decreased.	Systems	of	governance,	i.e.	arenas,	have	been	challenged,	domestically	and	internationally,	not	without	uproars	in	many	instances,	that	have,	in	turn,	caused	a	diversification	of	modalities	of	action.		As	Mosley	et	al.	pointed	out	negotiation	strategies	and	logics	are	“bound	to	change	significantly,	not	least	as	a	result	of	the	fact	that	after	years	of	experience	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 bargaining	 table	 figure	 out	ways	 to	 neutralize	 each	other’s	 strategies”	233.	 Sino-African	 relations,	 despite	 their	 fast-paced	nature,	 still	
                                                233Whitfield	and	Fraser,	op.	cit.,	p.	345;	see	also:		Referring	to	the	following	work:	P.	Mosley,	J.	Harrigan	and	J.	Toye,	Aid	and	
Power:	The	World	Bank	and	Policy-Based	Lending,	vol.	1,	Routledge,	London,	1991.			
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seem	to	require	time	for	each	side	to	study	and	understand	the	other.	The	following	chapters	are	an	attempt	to	put	the	elements	of	agency	in	context.																																							
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CHAPTER	3 	
Kenya:	domestic	politics	and	the	international	dimension	
since	2002			
3.1 Introduction	This	chapter	stands	as	a	trait	d’union	between	general	theoretical	elaborations	of	agency	 and	 grounded	 research.	 It	 represents	 the	 first	 step	 of	 the	 analytical	framework	 and	 aims	 to	 provide	 a	 broad	 country-study	 before	 undertaking	 the	second	 step,	 i.e.	 sectoral	 analyses.	 An	 extensive	 country-study	 is	 essential	 for	situating	 specific	 sectoral	 analyses	 in	 context,	 i.e.	 identifying	what	 is	 the	 level	 of	importance/priority	each	sector	has	vis-à-vis	the	others,	within	the	national	context.		Referring	 back	 to	 the	 elements	 of	 agency	presented	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 this	 section	introduces	the	actors	(including	an	overview	of	the	resources	and	repertoires	they	draw	upon),	the	interests	at	stake,	domestically	and	in	relation	to	external	actors,	the	arena	(the	broad	national	system	of	governance)	and	tables	of	negotiation	(i.e.	negotiation	 forums,	 meetings,	 etc.).	 It	 does	 so	 by	 concentrating	 first	 on	 how	historical	 legacies,	 including	 processes	 of	 change,	 and	 structural	 features	 have	interacted	with	the	actors	and	the	institutions	they	form234,	through	a	domestic	and	international	 lens.	 Fifty	 years	 after	 independence	 from	 British	 rule,	 Kenya’s	relations	with	external	actors	still	play	a	vital	role	not	only	in	the	country’s	foreign	policy	but	also	in	the	domestic	arena.	Notwithstanding	this,	the	relation	between	the	state	and	social	forces	should	first	be	considered	not	as	a	colonial	creation	but	as	one	 emerging	 out	 of	 an	 existing	 group	 of	 people	 with	 specific	 societal	characteristics235	that	 have	 led	 a	 country	with	 42	 ethnic	 groups	 to	 conceive	 and	adopt,	in	2010,	one	of	the	most	forward	people-centered	constitutions	in	Africa.		Second,	 it	 concentrates	 on	 how	 China	 has	 been	 inserted	 into	 the	 picture,	diplomatically,	 economically	 and	 socially.	 The	 engagement	 of	 China	 in	 Kenya	increased	considerably	in	the	past	few	years,	making	Kenya	not	only	a	major	base	for	Chinese	operations	in	Africa	but	arguably	one	of	the	most	important	in	terms	of	
                                                234	Moncrieffe	and	Luttrell,	op.	cit.		235	C.	Hornsby,	Kenya.	A	History	Since	Independence,	I.B.	Tauris,	London,	2012,	p.	1.	
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strategic,	diplomatic	presence236.	Although	corruption	is	identified	as	a	risk,	Kenya	is	 also	 viewed	 as	 a	 politically	 and	 economically	 stable	 country,	 where	 human	resources	are	comparatively	more	available	and	skilled	than	in	many	other	African	countries	 and	where	 the	 service	 sector	 is	 developed	 enough	 to	 provide	 Chinese	businesses	and	activities	with	 the	necessary	support	 to	establish	 themselves	and	grow237.	Kenya	is	also	deemed	a	haven	within	the	politically	unstable	Horn	of	Africa	and	thus	strategic	for	security	operations238.		Despite	 the	 fast-paced	 expansion	 of	 Chinese	 activities	 in	 the	 country	 since	President	Kibaki	was	elected	 in	2002,	 the	Chinese	presence	 in	 the	 ‘darling	of	 the	West’	-	diplomatically,	socially	and	economically	–	is	still	marginal	when	compared	to	 the	 long-standing	Western	 one.	 The	 Kibaki	 government	 significantly	 reduced	dependence	on	Western	donor	aid,	with	the	country	being	increasingly	funded	by	internally	generated	resources	such	as	 increased	 tax	 revenue	collection	and	new	ties	 with	 China239.	 However,	 the	 rooted	Western	 presence	 and	 India	 remain	 an	essential	element:	1)	in	Kenya,	2)	in	the	analysis	of	Kenya’s	engagement	with	China,	3)	and	in	the	analysis	of	China’s	interests	in	engaging	with	the	country.	While	the	sections	below	provide	a	general	historical	background,	the	focus	is	on	‘democratic’	Kenya,	since	the	Kibaki	government	took	seat	in	2002,	and	through	the	first	year	of	Uhuru	Kenyatta’s	rule.				
3.2 Domestically:	between	the	state	and	society		
3.2.1 Background	Kenya,	vis-à-vis	most	countries	in	Africa,	managed	to	“avoid	military	rule,	social	instability,	warlordism,	mass	murder	or	social	collapse”	due	to	a	number	of	reasons	including	 “inherited	 social	 and	 economic	 structures”	 as	 well	 as	 direct	 external	influence	and	the	absence	of	“strategic	minerals”240.	The	territory	that	now	forms	Kenya	was	home,	well	before	colonial	rule,	to	at	least	42	separate	ethnic	groups	for	which,	“beyond	a	certain	state	of	linguistic	and	cultural	affinity,	[…]	no	further	ethnic	
                                                236	Nairobi	hosts	Africa’s	regional	headquarters	of	the	main	Chinese	media	houses	for	print,	TV	and	radio.	The	country	is	second	only	to	South	Africa	for	the	number	of	Confucius	Institutes	established.	Nairobi	also	hosts	the	headquarters	of	major	regional	and	international	organisations	(UN),	as	well	as	civil	society	and	the	private	sector.		237	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	(UNCTAD),	An	investment	guide	to	Kenya	Opportunities	and	
Conditions	2012,	United	Nations,	New	York,	2012.	p.	iii.		238	Ibid.		239	J.	Ng’etich,	‘Was	Uhuru’s	trip	to	China	a	coded	message	to	the	‘cold’	West?’,	Standard	Digital,	25	August	2013.	240	Hornsby,	op.	cit.,	p.	5.	
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identification	can	be	expected”241.	Nonetheless,	traditionally	“almost	all	of	Kenya’s	ethnic	 groups	 were	 characterised	 by	 what	 has	 become	 known	 as	 ‘egalitarian-segmentarian’	 structures	 in	 contrast	 to	 more	 hierarchical	 forms	 of	 social	 and	political	organisation”242.	This	entrenched	and	peculiar	feature	of	ethnicity	in	Kenya,	in	conjunction	with	the	absence	of	any	predominant	groups,	may	have	contributed	to	 laying	 the	 foundations	 for	 social	democracy	and,	mostly,	peaceful	 coexistence.	While	“ethnic	identities	are	not	incompatible	with	a	‘national’	one	referring	to	the	wider	and	international	setting,	the	mobilisation	of	these	sentiments	is,	however,	a	situational	one	and	depends	on	the	patterns	of	competition	in	the	overall	politico-economic	context”243.		While	 it	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 fully	 explore	 the	 links	 between	ethnicity,	politics	and	the	economy,	it	 is	 important	to	provide	a	brief	overview	as	these	 linkages	 come	 to	matter	 also	 in	 the	 relations	with	 China.	 The	 fragmented	ethnic	composition	of	the	country	has	led	to	competition	in	the	appropriation	and	control	of	resources	via	economic,	social	and	political	strives,	where	the	state	and	society	have	learnt	to	engage	each	other	through	contestation	but	seldom	violent	conflict.	The	post-election	crisis	in	2008,	however,	challenged	the	image	of	Kenya	internally	 and	 internationally	 as	 an	 “icon,	 a	 bastion	 of	 political	 stability	 and	economic	prosperity	in	Africa.	It	surprised	many	that	this	icon	would	go	up	in	flames	so	fast”244.	Kanyinga	suggests	that	“analyses	of	what	went	wrong	with	Kenya	tend	to	 gloss	 over	 the	 land	 question	 and	 ethnicity	 as	 factors	 behind	 the	 violence.	 Yet	ethnicity	and	the	manner	in	which	the	land	question	in	the	former	white	highlands	and	especially	 in	 the	Rift	Valley	 region	has	been	addressed	 throughout	 the	post-colonial	period	played	an	important	role	in	the	post-2007	election	violence”245.		Right	after	independence	“two	major	political	parties	were formed	along	ethno-regional	lines:	[Kenya	African	National	Union]	KANU represented	numerically	large	Kikuyu	 and Luo	 communities,	 while	 [Kenya	 African	 Democratic	 Union]	KADU represented	numerically	smaller	groups who	were	worried	 that	 the	 large	groups would	 dominate	 them	 after	 independence”246 .	 Jomo	 Kenyatta,	 leader	 of	
                                                241	D.	Berg-Schlosser,	‘Ethnicity,	Social	Classes	and	the	Political	Process	in	Kenya’,	in	W.O.	Oyugi	ed.,	Politics	and	
Administration	in	East	Africa,	East	African	Educational	Publishers,	Nairobi,	1994,	p.	248.	242	Ibid.,	p.	249.	243	Berg-Schlosser,	op.	cit.,	p.	254.	244	K.	Kanyinga,	‘The	legacy	of	the	white	highlands:	Land	rights,	ethnicity	and	the	post-2007	election	violence	in	Kenya’,	Journal	
of	Contemporary	African	Studies,	vol.	27,	no.	3,	2009,	p.	325.		245	Ibid.	246	D.	Booth	et	al.,	East	African	prospects:	an	update	on	the	political	economy	of	Kenya,	Rwanda,	Tanzania	and	Uganda,	Overseas	Development	Institute,	London,	2014,	p.	13.	
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KANU	and	first	president	of	Kenya,	inherited	the	British	administrative	boundaries,	and	the	crisis	associated	with	the	white	highlands247.	Instead	of	settling	the	crisis,	Kenyatta	 “skewed	 the	 system	 further	 under	 an	 imperial	 presidency” 248 .	 In	rewarding	 his	 Kikuyu	 ethnic	 group	 to	 consolidate	 power	 “the	 ruling	 party	 […]	enticed	 the	 opposition	with	material	 interests	 –	 land.	 This	 enabled	 the	Kenyatta	government	to	begin	centralisation	of	power	with	limited	opposition.	In	time,	the	government	 began	 to	 amend	 the	 constitution	 to	 provide	 for	 a	 centralised	executive”249.	 This	 exacerbated	 inequality	 between	 the	 Kikuyu	 and	 other	 ethnic	groups250,	 especially	 in	 the	Rift	Valley	area,	originally	 controlled	by	Kalenjin	and	Maasai	ethnic	groups.	The	Kikuyu	remained	‘outsiders’	and	as	such	were	perceived	during	the	2007-2008	post-election	violence251.		Moi,	 a	 Kalenjin,	 took	 power	 in	 1978,	 arguably	 “diverting	 socio-economic	entitlements	such	as	infrastructure	development	(roads,	education	and	healthcare	provision)	 to	 his	 Rift	 Valley	 region”252.	 The	 links	 between	 business	 and	 political	elites	started	changing,	with	the	Kikuyu	being	excluded	and	the	Kalenjin	intensifying	relations	 with	 Kenyan	 Asians,	 altering	 the	 structure	 of	 economic	 and	 political	power253.	Opposition	rose	against	the	slogan	‘It	is	our	turn	to	eat’254,	and	repression	started	against	any	critics.	In	the	1990s	“internal	and	external	pressure	to	reform	led	to	the	reintroduction	of	multiparty	elections”	and	in	2002	“opposition	parties	united	under	one	presidential	candidate,	Mwai	Kibaki,	who	was	“overwhelmingly	elected	on	a	platform	to	correct	the	horizontal	inequalities	between	ethnic	groups,	reduce	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 president,	 address	 historical	 injustices,	 including	 land	injustices,	punish	large-scale	corruption	and	improve	the	economy”255.	
                                                247	The	crisis	concerned	the	ownership	of	an	area	of	Kenya	that	was	called,	during	the	colonial	period,	‘white’	highlands	(so	defined	because	a	considerable	number	of	white	colons	settled	there	thanks	to	favorable	climate	and	soil).	The	land	was	divided	by	colonisers	upon	arrival	and	expropriated	from	indigenous	groups,	i.e.	Kalenjin	and	Masaai.	This	redefinition	of	land	ownership	was	not	only	never	redressed	but	was	also	exacerbated	in	the	post-colonial	period	by	ruling	parties,	and	it	is	argued	to	be	one	of	the	causes	of	the	2007	post-election	violence.	See	Kanyinga,	2007,	op.cit;	J.O.	Oucho,	‘Undercurrents	of	Post-Election	Violence	in	Kenya:	Issues	in	the	Long-Term	Agenda’,	in	K.	Kanyinga	and	D.	Okello	eds.,	Tensions	and	Reversals	
in	democratic	transitions:	the	Kenya	2007	general	elections,	Society	for	International	Development	(SID)	and	Institute	for	Development	Studies	(IDS),	University	of	Nairobi,	2010,	p.	498.	248	E.	Njoki	Wamai,	‘Mediating	Kenya’s	Post-Election	Violence:	From	a	Peace-Making	to	a	Constitutional	Moment’,	in	G.R.	Murunga,	D.	Okello	and	A.	Sjögren	eds.,	Kenya:	The	Struggle	for	a	New	Constitutional	Order,	Zed	Books	and	The	Nordic	Africa	Institute,	London	and	Sweden,	2014,	p.	68.	249	Booth	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.	13.	250	Njoki	Wamai,	op.	cit.,	p.	68;	also	see:	D.	Okello	and	M.J.	Gitau,	Readings	on	Inequality:	Sectoral	dynamics	and	perspectives,	Society	for	International	Development,	Nairobi,	2007;	F.	Stewart,	‘Horizontal	inequalities	in	Kenya	and	the	political	disturbances	of	2008:	some	implications	for	aid	policy’,	Journal	of	Conflict,	Security	and	Development,	2010,	vol.	10,	no.	1.	251	Ibid.	252	Ibid.,	p.	69;	also	see:	R.	Ajulu,	‘Politicised	ethnicity,	competitive	politics	and	conflict	in	Kenya:	a	historical	perspective’,	
African	Studies,	2002,	vol.	61,	no.	2.		253	Booth	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.	14.	254	Njoki	Wamai,	op.	cit.,	p.	69.	255	Ibid.	
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With	 Kibaki	 “some	 significant	 reordering	 of	 relationships	 began	 to	 occur”256.	Kibaki’s	focus	was,	in	domestic	and	foreign	policies,	revolving	around	the	recovery	of	the	economy,	and	while	he	succeeded	in	increasing	the	growth	rate	of	GDP,	from	0.6	per	cent	to	7	per	cent	between	2003	and	2007257,	he	“failed	to	respond	to	the	political	aspirations	of	Kenyans,	such	as	delivering	a	new	constitutional	order	that	would	punish	 large-scale	corruption,	 limit	presidential	powers	and	reduce	ethnic	and	regional	inequalities”258.	As	a	consequence,	“political	leaders	from	outside	the	president’s	 Kikuyu	 community	 felt	 excluded” 259 .	 However,	 his	 laissez-faire	approach	 for	 economic	 development	 provided	 “space	 for	 people	 to	 engage	 in	economic	 activities	 without	 major	 restrictions.	 The	 government	 also	 began	 to	undertake	 major	 infrastructural	 programmes,	 such	 as	 building	 new	 roads	 and	rehabilitating	existing	ones.	The	recovery	of	the	economy	provided	an	opportunity	for	 all:	 ‘even	 those	without	 political	 connection	 and	 influence	 got	 a	 share	 of	 the	expanding	economy	because	Kibaki’s	approach	opened	the	market	to	everyone’”260.	Kibaki	had	received	support	from	the	West	that	“backed	his	campaign	on	account	of	the	promise	to	fight	corruption”.	However,	when	corruption	scandals	emerged	and	“the	donors	questioned	the	track	record	of	the	government	in	fighting	corruption”,	relations	with	the	West	deteriorated	and	the	government	started	looking	at	China	and	India	for	grants	and	loans261.	While	a	more	accurate	account	of	the	‘Look	East’	approach	is	presented	below,	by	means	of	introduction	it	is	important	to	mention	that	 the	 ‘Look	 East’	 shift	 was	 not	 only	 a	 political	 decision	 but	 also	 one	 directly	related	to	the	interests	of	business	groups	supporting	the	Kibaki	government.	This	relationship	was	profoundly	challenged	after	2008,	when	Kibaki	signed,	after	the	Annan-led	 international	mediation	 following	 the	post-election	violence,	a	sharing	power	agreement	with	Raila	Odinga,	 leader	of	 the	Orange	Democratic	Movement	(ODM).	Each	leader	had	links	with	different	segments	of	the	business	community	but	 “power	 sharing	 imposed	 certain	 constraints	 on	 linkage	between	politics	 and	business”262.		
                                                256	Booth	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.	13.	257	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	Kenya	Vision	2030:	A	globally	competitive	and	prosperous	Kenya,	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2007,	p.	3.	258	Njoki	Wamai,	op.	cit.,	p.	69;	also	see:	G.R.	Murunga	and	S.	W.	Nasong’o,	‘Bent	on	self-destruction:	the	Kibaki	regime	in	Kenya’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	African	Studies,	vol.	24,	no.1,	2006;	G.	Prunier,	‘Kenya:	roots	of	crisis’,	openDemocracy,	7	January	2008.		259	Booth	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.	14.	260	Ibid.,	p.	17.	261	Ibid.,	p.	18.	262	Ibid.,	p.	19.	
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The	 post-election	 violence,	 and	 the	 subsequent	 mediation	 and	 negotiation	between	 Kibaki	 together	 with	 his	 Party	 of	 National	 Unity	 (PNU),	 and	 Odinga	together	with	 his	 Orange	 Democratic	Movement	 (ODM)	 provided	 a	 “transitional	moment”	and	“a	constitutional	moment	for	antagonists	to	reorder	the	governance	structures	 through	 the	 introduction	of	a	new	constitution”263.	According	 to	Njoki	Wamai,	 a	 “constitutional	 moment	 arises	 when	 all	 previous	 forces	 against	 the	constitution-making	process	 converge	 to	deliver	 a	 constitution”264.	 In	Kenya,	 the	mediation	 led	 by	 the	 former	 UN	 Secretary	 General	 Kofi	 Annan,	 “orchestrated	 a	constitutional	 moment	 by	 ensuring	 that	 Kenyan	 political	 leaders	 accepted	 a	constitutional	 amendment	 that	 allowed	 for	 power-sharing,	 guaranteeing	 support	for	a	new	constitution”265.	The	Kenyan	mediation	process	was	a	uniquely	successful	story	 of	 international	 mediation 266 	which	 led	 to	 the	 promulgation	 of	 a	 new	constitution	 in	 August	 2010.	 This	 constitution	 addressed	 the	 root	 causes	 of	 the	conflict	 that	 culminated	 in	 the	 2007/2008	 post-election	 violence.	 It	 did	 so	 “by	introducing	affirmative	action	in	resource	distribution	to	address	ethnic,	gender	and	geographic	inequality;	by	enhancing	the	rule	of	law	by	reducing	the	powers	of	the	executive	and	strengthening	accountability	institutions	such	as	parliament	and	the	judiciary;	and	by	reducing	the	powers	of	the	president	and	the	central	government	by	introducing	devolution	and	encouraging	public	participation	in	governance”267.	Although	there	have	been	setbacks	against	it	since	its	promulgation,	mainly	due	to	the	 “absence	of	mechanisms	 to	ensure	 full	 compliance	with	 the	provisions	of	 the	promulgated	constitution”268,	the	transformation	that	started	during	the	mediation	led	by	Annan	was	a	turning	point	in	Kenya’s	journey	of	development,	including	the	management	of	ethnic	disparities,	which	became	even	more	evident	in	the	following	years	with	the	election	of	Uhuru	Kenyatta	and	William	Ruto.		With	the	election	of	the	Jubilee	alliance	in	March	2013,	the	two	leaders,	Kenyatta	and	Ruto,	were	under	the	obligation	to	compose	the	cabinet	and	appoint	principal	secretaries	according	to	the	requirements	of	the	new	constitution,	which	had	been	passed	 in	 2010.	 Because	 of	 these	 requirements	 and	 for	 “wanting	 to	 be	 seen	 as	different	 from	 the	 coalition	 government	 of	Kibaki	 and	Raila,	 they	 took	 charge	 of	interviewing	 candidates	 for	 the	posts	of	Cabinet	Secretaries	 in	person.	 In	a	 clear	
                                                263	Njoki	Wamai,	op.	cit.,	p.	66.	264	Ibid.,	p.	75.		265	Ibid.,	p.	76.	266	For	a	comprehensive	account,	see	Murunga,	Okello	and	Sjögren,	op.	cit.	267	Njoki	Wamai,	op.	cit.,	p.	67.	268	Ibid.,	p.	76.	
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break	 with	 tradition,	 they	 briefed	 the	 media	 on	 the	 progress	 made	 with	interviews” 269 .	 The	 Public	 Service	 Commission	 dealt	 with	 the	 recruitment	 of	Principal	Secretaries	and	the	Parliament	“also	had	to	vet	them	before	the	president	could	make	appointments”270.	This,	however,	does	not	suggest	that	“there	was	no	political	patronage	influencing	these	new	appointments”271.	However,	internal	unity	between	 Uhuru	 and	 Ruto,	 which	 was	 consequential,	 among	 other	 things,	 to	 the	ability	of	leaders	to	show	the	people	respect	for	accountability,	was	crucial	for	two	leaders	that	were	facing	indictment	at	the	International	Criminal	Court.		Even	 though	 the	 “intermingling	of	political	 and	economic	power	 in	Kenya	has	always	 been	 intense”,	 the	 Jubilee	 government	may	 currently	 be	 going	 through	 a	relative	shift.	According	to	the	ODI	report	“by	Kenyan	standards,	the	president	and	his	deputy	do	not	have	many	people	to	whom	they	owe	financial	loyalty.	This	is	not	to	imply	that	they	are	free	of	obligations	to	the	leaders	of	different	communities	of	interest	that	supported	their	campaigns”	but	rather	that	the	“government	is	able	to	approach	the	business	community	from	a	relatively	independent	point	of	view”.	One	of	the	reasons	may	be	that	Uhuru	Kenyatta’s	campaign	was	heavily	financed	by	his	family,	 rather	 than	 business	 elites,	 and	 “he	 does	 not	 owe	 thanks	 to	 anyone”272.	Evidence	of	the	relatively	new	approach	of	the	executive	toward	business	elites	may	also	be	the	“proportion	on	‘new	faces’	in	business	forums”,	of	a	younger	generation	compared	to	those	around	Kibaki’s	two	terms	of	government273.	The	Jubilee	alliance,	so	far,	despite	being	a	coalition	within	which	the	interests	of	each	leader	respond	to	different	 ethnic	 and	business	 audiences,	 “has	 shown	 signs	 of	 unusual	 coherence,	partly	on	grounds	of	expediency,	thanks	to	the	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	indictments”274	(more	on	the	ICC	trial	is	explained	below).		The	alliance	has	been,	 for	the	first	two	years	and	a	half	of	mandate275,	sharing	power	equally.	This	has	had	to	do,	first	and	foremost,	with	the	need	to	fight	against	the	ICC	indictments	using	a	joint	approach.	While	the	new	government	seems	to	be	business	friendly,	it	has	not	been	working	with	an	equal	commitment	to	improving	governance.			
                                                269	Booth	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.	21	270	Ibid.	271	Ibid.	272Ibid.,	p.	25	referring	to	an	interview	with	an	investigative	journalist.	273	Ibid.,	p.	25.	274	Ibid.,	p.	viii.	275At	the	time	when	the	thesis	was	submitted.	
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Social	participation:	the	road	to	constitutional	reform	The	 non-governmental	 sector	 in	 Kenya	 has	 played	 a	major	 role	 in	 the	 socio-economic	development	of	 the	country	since	 the	colonial	period.	Lind	and	Howell	suggest	that	“Kenyan	civil	society	was	shaped	greatly	by	state	building	processes	begun	 during	 colonialism	 and	 continuing	 in	 the	 period	 of	 industrialisation	 after	independence	in	1963.	These	processes	led	to	the	formation	of	modern	forms	of	civil	society	such	as	trade	unions,	NGOs	and	professional	societies,	setting	the	stage	for	external	engagement	with	civil	society”276.	Gaps	in	the	ability	of	the	Kenyan	state	to	effectively	manage	issues	ranging	from	healthcare	to	education	have	resulted	in	civil	society,	often	supported	by	external	actors,	becoming	increasingly	active	in	filling	the	 void	 left	 by	 the	 state.	 Lind	 and	 Howell	 argue	 that	 “the	 Kenyan	 experience	demonstrates	that	the	NGO	sector	has	since	the	1980s	emerged	as	a	major	player	in	the	design	and	implementation	of	projects	as	well	as	the	actual	provision	of	basic	needs	services	to	the	disadvantaged	groups	both	in	the	rural	and	urban	areas”	277.		Since	 the	 early	 1990s,	 civil	 society	 groups	played	 a	 critical	 role278	in	 the	 path	towards	the	new	constitution	that	was	adopted	via	a	referendum	in	August	2010.	Despite	 the	Moi	 regime	 being	 extremely	 oppressive	 towards	 critics,	 civil	 society	continued	carving	out	spaces	within	the	political	realm,	and	in	1999	the	Parliament	enacted	the	Constitution	of	Kenya	Review	Act,	which	established	the	Constitution	of	Kenya	Review	Commission	(CKRC),	appointed	to	gather	views	from	Kenyans	and	provide	 recommendations	 to	 parliament.	 The	 leading	 CSOs	 active	 on	 the	constitutional	 reform	front	voiced	concerns	about	 the	Parliament-led	review	and	the	 lack	of	provisions	 for	broader	participation.	They	argued	 that	 the	parliament	“was	 not	 representative	 of	 all	 the	 voices	 of	 Kenya,	 and	 they	 demanded	 an	 all-inclusive	process	to	culminate	in	a	national	conference.	Their	mantra	was	a	‘people-driven’	constitutional	review	process”279.	The	People’s	Commission	of	Kenya	(PCK)	was	created	by	the	Catholic,	Hindu,	Muslim	and	Protestant	clergy,	thus	initiating	a	“parallel	constitutional	review	process”280.	When	the	CKRC	and	the	PCK	were	finally	
                                                276	J.	Lind	and	J.	Howell,	‘Aid,	Civil	Society	and	the	State	in	Kenya	since	9/11’,	LSE	Non-Governmental	Public	Action	Programme	Working	Paper,	no.	21,	5	June	2008.	277	Ibid.,	p.	6.	278	Nasong’o,	2014,	op.	cit.,	p.	100.	Also	see:	P.	Kennedy	and	L.	Bieniek,	Moving	Forward	with	Constitutional	Reform	in	Kenya:	
A	Report	of	the	CSIS	Africa	Program,	Centre	for	Strategic	and	International	Studies	(CSIS),	Washington,	2010;	G.	Maingi,	‘The	Kenyan	constitutional	reform	process:	a	case	study	of	FIDA	Kenya	in	securing	women’s	rights’,	Feminist	Africa,	2012,	vol.	15;	M.	Vliet,	W.	Wahiu	and	A.	Magolowondo,	Constitutional	Reform	Processes	and	Political	Parties:	Principles	for	practice,	Centre	for	Multiparty	Democracy	and	Centre	for	African	Studies,	Leiden,	2012.	279	Nasong’o,	2014,	op.	cit.,	p.	105.	280	Ibid.	
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merged	 under	 the	 chairing	 of	 Professor	 Yash	 Pal	 Ghai,	 the	 constitutional	 review	process	started,	in	2000.		The	intertwining	of	state-society	took	a	new	shape	as	the	2002	general	elections	approached,	and	even	more	with	the	National	Rainbow	Coalition	(NARC)	coming	to	power281.	Civil	society	strongly	supported	KANU’s	opposition	in	the	run	up	to	the	2002	elections.	Kanyinga	suggests	that	“the	defeat	of	the	KANU	in	the	2002	elections	can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 inputs	 and	work	 by	 civil	 society	 organisations”282.	 The	election	marked	the	“consolidation	of	democratic	processes	stretching	back	over	a	decade	[…]	The	democratic	triumphalism	of	2002	marked	the	opening	of	political	space	and	a	shift	in	relations	between	the	state	and	civil	society”283.	However,	while	this,	on	the	one	hand,	was	good	to	end	repression	and	open	up	the	political	arena,	on	the	other	it	was	considered	counterproductive:	the	close	links	between	CSOs	and	the	opposition,	once	the	latter	took	power,	turned	the	former	into	weaker	actors,	especially	in	their	watchdog	role284.	In	fact,	after	the	2002	NARC	election,	leaders	of	civil	 society	 organisations	 increasingly	 assumed	 governmental	 positions,	 even	“occupying	powerful	positions”	in	the	newly	elected	NARC	government285.		However,	as	previously	discussed	at	 the	 theoretical	 level,	Kenyan	civil	 society,	not	 differently	 from	 civil	 society	 elsewhere,	 is	 the	 realm	 of	 ‘contradictory	possibilities’286,	characterised	by	a	‘bifurcated	nature’287,	presenting	‘two	faces’288.	In	other	words,	“Kenyan	civil	society	is	replete	with	actors	of	varied	persuasions	and	multiple	 motivations.	 Whereas	 many	 actors	 within	 civil	 society	 were	 genuinely	committed	to	the	political	reform	agenda	for	the	sake	of	advancing	democracy	and	good	governance,	quite	a	number	of	others	saw	political	activism	for	reform	as	a	gateway	to	power,	wealth	and	privilege”289.	While	the	‘two	faces’	of	civil	society	in	Kenya	 are	 still	 present,	 with	 “some	well-endowed	 CSOs	 [that]	 choose	 to	 remain	politically	obtuse,	thereby	debunking	the	optimistic	scholarly	perspective	that	CSOs	
                                                281	For	an	overview	of	the	shifting	role	of	state-society	relations	in	the	late	1990s,	early	2000s	–	particularly	in	relation	to	aid	–	see	J.	Lind	&	J.	Howell,	‘Counter-terrorism	and	the	politics	of	aid:	civil	society	responses	in	Kenya’,	Development	and	
Change,	vol.	41,	no.	2,	2010.		282	K.	Kanyinga,	‘Civil	Society	Formations	in	Kenya:	A	Growing	Role	in	Development	and	Democracy’,	in	D.	Okello	ed.,	Civil	
Society	in	the	Third	Republic,	The	National	Council	of	NGOs,	Nairobi,	2004,	p.	23.	283Lind	and	Howell,	op.	cit.,	2008,	p.	2.	284	Nasong’o,	2014,	op.	cit.,	p.	106.	285	Booth	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.	15.	286	Nasong’o,	2014,	op.	cit.,	p.	109.	Also	see:	M.	Mamdani,	‘A	critique	of	the	state	and	civil	society	paradigm	in	Africanist	studies’,	in	M.	Mamdani	and	E.	Wamba-dia-Wamba	eds.,	African	Studies	in	Social	Movements	and	Democracy,	CODESRIA,	Dakar,	1995.	287	Nasong’o,	2014,	op.	cit.,	p.	109.	288	Ibid.,	pp.	109-110.	Also	see:	S.N.	Ndegwa,	The	Two	Faces	of	Civil	Society:	NGOs	and	politics	in	Africa,	Kumarian	Press,	West	Hartford,	1996.	289	Nasong’o,	2014,	op.	cit.,	pp.	109-110.	Also	see:	Murunga	and	Nasong’o,	op.	cit;	S.W.	Nasong’o,	‘Constitutional	reform	and	the	crisis	of	democratization	in	Kenya’	in	D.	Branch,	N.	Cheeseman	and	L.	Gardner	eds.,	Our	Turn	to	Eat:	Politics	in	Kenya	
since	1950,	Verlag,	Berlin,	2010,	p.	231.	
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constitute	an	unmitigated	bastion	of	liberty	and	are	steadfast	crusaders	for	political	reform	and	democratisation	[…]	even	CSOs	that	commit	themselves	to	the	struggle	for	political	 reform	display	 contradictory	 tendencies	with	 regard	 to	 the	 interests	and	motivations	 of	 actors	 therein”290.	 However,	 while	 civil	 society	 in	 the	 1990s	“reflected	a	narrow,	relatively	elite	network	based	primarily	in	Nairobi”,	thanks	to	the	developments	of	 the	2000s	and	 the	energy	gained	after	 the	2007-2008	post-election	violence,	 the	new	cohort	of	civil	society	advocates	“is	 transforming	what	was	once	focused	on	the	elite	into	a	more	representative	and	extended	civil	society.	Although	largely	dependent	on	international	support	and	funding,	Kenyan	CSOs	act	as	an	important	alternative	power	within	the	space	between	local	communities	and	government”291.	According	 to	Kanyinga	as	of	now	“civil	society	 in	Kenya	 includes	development	Non-Governmental	Organisations	(NGOs),	Community	Based	Organisations	(CBOs),	women	groups,	self-help	groups,	religious	groups,	trade	unions,	professional	trade	associations,	as	well	as	social	economic	or	market-based	associations.	The	concept	also	includes	human	rights	advocacy	groups,	social-cultural	organisations	and	a	vast	array	 of	 social	 movements” 292 .	 The	 way	 these	 groups	 operate	 is	 significantly	diversified293.	 Major	 distinctions	 include:	 local	 versus	 national	 scope;	 registered	under	 specific	 laws,	 or	 as	 trusts	 and	 foundations	 or	 still	 with	 the	 Provincial	Administration	 of	 the	 Department	 of	 Culture	 and	 Social	 Services;	 formal	(structurally	 organised)	 versus	 informal	 (smaller	 groups	 regulated	 by	 rules	 and	practices);	 their	 scope	 can	 range	 from	 service	 delivery	 to	 the	 articulation	 of	members’	interests.	This	associational	life	is	all	the	more	present	now,	in	a	country,		whose	economy	“no	longer	relies	on	the	state;	the	multi	party	democracy	is	here	to	stay	and	presidential	demands	provoke	as	much	resistance	as	obedience”294.		In	terms	of	political	presence,	even	if	institutionalised	political	parties	are	lacking,	the	Parliament	“seems	to	exert	pressure	on	other	organs	of	government.	Sometimes	this	is	in	a	manner	suggestive	of	Parliament	being	a	force	for	change”295.	However,	even	 where	 committees296 	conduct	 investigations	 concerning	 public	 bodies	 and	recommend	 prosecutions,	 “there	 are	 no	 known	 instances	 of	 anyone	 being	
                                                290	Nasong’o,	2014,	op.	cit.,	pp.	109-110.	291	Ibid.,	p.	112.	292	Kanyinga,	op.	cit.,	p.	9.	293	Lind	and	Howell,	op.	cit.	294	Hornsby,	op.	cit.,	p.	7.	295	Booth	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.	27.	296	Parliamentary	groups,	of	which	some	have	specific	mandates	to	monitor	public	accounts.	
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prosecuted	successfully	on	account	of	the	recommendations	of	the	committee.	The	executive	 has	 the	 final	 word	 on	 such	 prosecutions	 and	 therefore	 nothing	 really	happens”297.	With	the	new	constitution,	however,	this	trend	may	be	bound	to	invert	trajectory	as	 the	work	of	 committees	 is	 increasingly	met	by	a	more	 independent	judiciary.	In	fact,	especially	after	the	new	constitution	was	passed,	setbacks	against	it	have	been	met	“with	vigorous	resistance	from	Kenyans,	resistance	that	confirmed	that	the	many	years	spent	negotiating	the	new	constitution	had	introduced	into	the	Kenyan	body	politic	a	fresh	civic	sensitivity	against	rule	by	presidential	fiat”298.			
The	new	Constitution	The	issue	of	where	rights	reside:	“individuals	in	the	liberal	democratic	citizenship	model,	as	the	state	formally	espoused,	or	ethnic	communities	or	collectives”299	is	a	fundamental	 constant	 in	 Kenya’s	 socio-political	 evolution.	 This	 rights-based	discourse	 has	 come	 even	 more	 to	 light	 since	 the	 early	 2000s	 with	 the	 first	democratic	elections	and	later	with	the	approval	of	the	new	Constitution	in	2010,	which	has	a	far-reaching	bill	of	rights.	Within	the	new	Constitution,	the	devolution	of	government	powers	has	come	into	effect.	Counties	can	make	their	decisions	on	issues	that	concern	them	directly.	The	county	assembly	represents	a	type	of	county-parliament,	which	 has	 its	 government	 that	 is	 directly	 accountable	 to	 the	 people.	According	 to	 the	 Constitution,	 “the	 devolved	 government	 is	 primarily	 geared	towards	achieving	two	main	objectives:	involve	the	people	in	governance	and	allow	better	 supervision	 and	 implementation	 of	 policies	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level.	 The	devolved	 government	 consists	 of	 47	 counties.	 Every	 county	 government	 shall	further	decentralize	its	services	and	coordinate	its	functions	in	order	to	efficiently	serve	the	interests	of	the	people	of	Kenya	at	the	local	levels”300.	In	other	words,	the	new	constitution	provides	for	enhanced	public	participation	in	governance	and	stronger	checks	and	balances.	It	replaced	the	1969	Constitution,	which	 in	 turn	 had	 replaced	 the	 1963	 Independence	 Constitution.	 Since	 2010,	“Kenyans	 have	 been	 looking	 to	 the	 new	 constitution	 as	 a	 key	 to	 improving	governance.	The	constitution	has	created	several	new	centres	of	power	in	the	quest	to	reduce	the	powers	of	the	executive.	One	is	the	judiciary”301.	The	Chief	Justice	and	
                                                297	Booth	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	pp.	27-28.	298	Murunga	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.	ix.		299	Ibid.,	p.	8.	300	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	Constitution	of	Kenya,	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	August	2010.		301	Booth	et	al,	op.	cit.,	p.	28.	
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new	judges	were	recruited	through	open	processes,	increasing	public	confidence	in	the	institution	and	in	some	cases	“the	judiciary	started	by	making	judgements	that	demonstrated	 independence	 from	 the	 executive” 302 .	 As	 with	 most	 other	 public	bodies	 –	 and	 private	 organisations	 too	 –	 the	 judiciary	 is	 not	 unilaterally	 acting	constitutionally.	 The	 desire	 for	 constitutionalism	 varies,	 imbuing	 the	 change	process	 with	 “a	 persisting	 struggle	 between	 the	 status	 quo	 and	 progressive	elements”	303.	This	applies	to	the	bureaucracy	as	well	as	to	civil	society.			
Development:	the	Economic	Recovery	Strategy	and	Kenya	Vision	2030	Since	 the	 democratic	 elections	 of	 2002,	 development	 plans	 have	 played	 a	significant	role	in	the	country’s	growth.	The	government’s	blueprint	for	the	2003-2007	period,	the	Economic	Recovery	Strategy	for	Wealth	and	Employment	Creation,	was	 in	 line	 with	 the	 NARC’s	 party	 manifesto.	 Similarly,	 Kenya	 Vision	 2030	 was	launched	by	the	coalition	government	in	2008	and	is	being	continued,	through	the	Medium-Term	Plan	II	(2013-2017),	by	the	Jubilee	government	whose	manifesto	has	three	pillars:	Unity,	Economy	and	Openness.		Kenya	Vision	2030	is	“a	national	long-term	development	blueprint	[…]	that	aims	to	transform	Kenya	into	a	newly	industrializing,	middle-income	country	providing	a	high	quality	of	life	to	all	its	citizens	by	2030	in	a	clean	and	secure	environment”,	developed	 through	 "an	 all-inclusive	 and	 participatory	 stakeholder	 consultative	process,	 involving	 Kenyans	 from	 all	 parts	 of	 the	 country" 304 .	 According	 to	 the	pledges	made	in	2008	for	Kenya	Vision	2030,	priority	areas	include:	1. Economic	Pillar:	“six	priority	sectors	that	make	up	the	larger	part	of	Kenya’s	GDP	(57%)	 and	 provide	 for	 nearly	 half	 of	 the	 country’s	 total	 formal	 employment:	tourism,	 agriculture,	 wholesale	 and	 retail	 trade,	 manufacturing	 IT	 enabled	services	(previously	known	as	business	process	off-shoring),	financial	services”	305	and	infrastructure306.	2. Social	 Pillar:	 “a	 cross-section	 of	 human	 and	 social	 welfare	 projects	 and	programmes,	specifically:	education	and	training,	health,	environment,		housing	and	urbanisation,	gender,	children	and	social	development,	youth	and	sports”307	
                                                302	Ibid.	303	Ibid.	304	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	‘Kenya	Vision	2030,	The	Vision’,	Kenya	Vision	2030,	[website].			305	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	‘Kenya	Vision	2030,	Economic	Pillar’,	Kenya	Vision	2030,	[website].	306	Ibid.	307	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	‘Kenya	Vision	2030,	Social	Pillar’,	Kenya	Vision	2030,	[website].	
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with	the	aim	of	“investing	in	the	people	of	Kenya	in	order	to	improve	the	quality	of	life	for	all	Kenyans”	3. Political	 Pillar:	 	 “transformation	 of	 Kenya’s	 political	 governance	 across	 five	strategic	 areas:	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 –	 the	 Kenya	 Constitution	 2010;	 electoral	 and	political	 processes;	 democracy	 and	 public	 service	 delivery;	 transparency	 and	accountability;	security,	peace	building	and	conflict	management”	with	the	aim	of	“moving	to	the	future	as	one	nation	envision[ing]	a	democratic	system	that	is	issue	based,	people	centred,	results	oriented	and	is	accountable	to	the	public”.		Most	 issues,	 from	economic	 to	governance,	 find	a	priority	plan	outlined	 in	 the	blueprint	 documents.	 This	 is	 particularly	 important	 in	 the	 study	 of	 Kenya-China	relations	 because	 relations	 with	 China,	 across	 Africa,	 are	 often	 believed	 to	 be	established	to	benefit	the	elites’	interests	to	the	detriment	of	the	population.	As	most	cases	will	show	in	the	sectoral	analyses	carried	out	in	the	next	three	chapters,	the	initiatives	undertaken	with	China	in	the	sectors	analysed	are	part	of	pre-established	development	plans.	These	development	plans	have	not	been	the	prerogative	of	the	executive	(hence	the	importance	of	a	layered	interests	approach	to	study	specific	issues).	An	interviewee	commented	on	the	implementation	of	Kenya	Vision	2030	by	highlighting	the	importance	of	the	private	sector	and	Non-State	Actors	(NSAs)	for	agenda	 setting	 and	 implementation.	 He	 states	 that	 “75%	 of	 Kenya	 Vision	 2030	comes	from	the	private	sector	and	NSAs.	We	have	a	Public	Private	Partnership	(PPP)	bill	that	provides	a	way	of	engaging.	If	you	go	to	rural	constituencies,	most	of	the	government	 work	 is	 done	 by	 NSAs,	 often	 faith-based.	 The	 government	 should	definitely	overlook	and	ensure	quality	but	implementation	is	done	by	NSAs.	NSAs	are	seen	as	partners	in	development”308.	In	particular,	the	PPP	initiative	is	a	major	step	 in	 the	 government’s	 recognition	 of	 significant	 shortcomings	 in	 its	 ability	 to	provide	citizens	with	basic	public	infrastructure	(including	power,	roads,	rail,	sea	and	 airports)	 and	 services	 (including	 water,	 health	 and	 sanitation) 309 .	 The	involvement	of	NSAs,	 i.e.	 investors,	domestic	and	 international,	was	considered	a	way	to	bypass	the	financial	constraints	that	the	government	had	experienced	as	the	primary	provider	of	such	infrastructure	and	services310.			
                                                308	Interview	with	an	executive	at	Kenya	Vision	2030,	Nairobi,	2014-03-12.	309	Public	Private	Partnership	Unit,	‘Legal	&	Regulatory	Framework’,	Public	Private	Partnership	Unit,	[website].	310	Ibid.	
	 88	
Kenya,	like	many	other	countries,	while	still	heavily	reliant,	especially	in	sectors	like	 healthcare,	 on	 Overseas	 Development	 Assistance	 (ODA),	 has	 also	 been	increasingly	relying	on	domestic	resource	mobilisation	to	 fund	its	developmental	path311.	This	may	become	even	more	significant	in	the	years	to	come	as	the	country	crossed	the	threshold,	in	2014,	from	a	Low-Income-Country	to	a	(Lower)	Middle-Income-Country312.			 	
3.3 International		
	While	domestic	dynamics	played	a	key	role	in	Kenyan	post-colonial	journey,	these	have	been,	more	so	than	not,	deeply	connected	with	the	international.			
3.3.1 Background	Hornsby	writes	that	“history	records	that	it	has	been	the	culture	of	Kenyans	to	resist	domination,	oppression	and	exploitation”313.	The	forms	of	this	resistance	have	ranged	from	non-violent	constitutional	forms	to	violent	armed	struggle.	While	the	former	has	been	the	most	embraced	option,	the	latter	is	most	strikingly	exemplified	in	 the	Mau	Mau	War	 of	 Independence	 –	 among	Africa’s	most	 violent.	 Coming	 to	terms	 with	 its	 colonial	 legacy	 “was	 one	 of	 the	 major	 tasks”	 facing	 the	 newly	independent	government	of	Kenya314.	Gordon	argues	that	Kenya	responded	to	its	colonial	 legacy	 via	 a	 “reorganisational	 model”	 rather	 than	 accommodation	 or	transformation.	Reorganisation	“recognises	and	accepts	structural	dependence	on	the	global	economy;	at	the	same	time,	it	involves	attempts	to	reform	both	domestic	structures	and	diversify	and	improve	one’s	position	in	the	international	order.	This	approach	views	continuing	participation	in	the	international	order	as	opening	up	possibilities	 for	 improving	 bargaining	 power	within	 it”315.	 In	 political	 terms,	 the	legacies	of	colonial	rule	and	narrowly	defined	regional	issues	dominated	the	agenda	of	Kenya’s	foreign	policy	in	the	years	between	independence	and	the	mid-1970s316.	
                                                311	S.	Lewis	and	L.	Kerr,	Who	Pays	for	Progress?	The	Role	of	Domestic	Resource	Mobilisation	and	Development	Assistance	in	
Financing	Health.	A	Case	Study	from	Kenya,	RESULTS	UK,	2015,	p.	9.	312	World	Bank,	‘Kenya:	A	Bigger,	Better	Economy’,	The	World	Bank	[website],	30	September	2014,	<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/09/30/kenya-a-bigger-better-economy>.	313	W.	Mutunga,	Constitution-Making	from	the	Middle:	Civil	Society	and	Transition	Politics	in	Kenya,	1992-1997,	Sareat	and	Mwengo,	Nairobi	and	Harare,	1999,	p.	1.	314	D.F.	Gordon,	‘Foreign	Relations	Dilemmas	of	Independence	and	Development’,	in	J.D.Barkan	ed.,	Politics	and	Public	Policy	
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Kenya’s	 foreign	 policy	 during	 that	 period	 “has	 been	 described	 as	 one	 of	 ‘quiet	diplomacy’,	cautious	and	pragmatic	in	its	articulation”317.	At	independence	Kenya’s	economy	 was	 dominated	 by	 “non-Africans	 –	 European	 farmers,	 Asian	 traders,	foreign	 companies,	 and	 local	 European	 businessmen”.	 The	 external	 economy,	including	 trade	 and	 foreign	 assistance,	was	 “closely	 intertwined	with	 the	 former	colonial	power,	Great	Britain”318.		A	 number	 of	 external	 influences	 have	 been	 ever	 present	 in	 Kenya’s	 political	economy	since	the	colonial	era	and	“the	external	forces	that	have	had	most	impact	on	the	country’s	economic	and	political	structures	include	bilateral	and	multilateral	donor	 agencies	 and	 states,	 as	well	 as	 foreign	 investors”319.	 Hornsby	 argues	 that	“there	was	always	a	strong	relationship	between	Kenya	and	foreign	governments,	and	the	British	played	the	role	of	patron	and	guardian	uncle	to	Kenya	for	the	first	decade	of	its	independence.	As	the	influence	of	the	UK	diminished	in	the	1970s,	it	was	replaced	by	the	United	States	as	a	more	powerful	but	less	reliable	patron	[…]	By	 the	mid-1990s,	 the	debate	over	Kenya’s	 dependence	on	 foreign	 interests	had	shifted	 to	 the	 ‘tyranny’	 of	 the	 international	 financial	 institutions”320.	The	patron-client	 relation 321 	that	 characterised	 Kenya’s	 engagement	 with	 external	 actors	during	and	after	colonial	 times	started	taking	new	shape	when,	as	a	result	of	 the	general	collapse	of	the	state	system	in	Africa,	donor	agencies	started,	in	the	1990s,	bypassing	African	 states,	while	 channelling	 funds	 for	 development	 to	NGOs.	 It	 is	against	this	scenario	that	Kenyan	modern	civil	society	boomed,	“shaped	greatly	by	state	building	processes	begun	during	colonialism	and	continuing	in	the	period	of	industrialisation	after	independence	in	1963.	These	processes	led	to	the	formation	of	 modern	 forms	 of	 civil	 society	 such	 as	 trade	 unions,	 NGOs	 and	 professional	societies,	setting	the	stage	for	external	engagement	with	civil	society”322.		Historically	 “Kenya	 has	 been	 in	 a	 dependent	 relationship	 with	 Western	governments	 and	 international	 institutions:	 militarily,	 financially,	 economically,	technologically	and	culturally.	The	hand	of	Western	powers,	donors	and	NGOs	can	be	seen	in	every	aspect	of	Kenya’s	politics,	economics	and	society,	encouraging	some	types	of	 change	and	discouraging	others”323.	More	recently,	however,	 the	 “Kibaki	
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government	demonstrated	a	new	will	to	reduce	Kenya’s	dependency	on	Western	aid	[…]	A	pro-capitalist	Kikuyu-led	government	proved	more	hostile	 to	 foreign	funds	and	 interventions	 and	more	willing	 to	 challenge	 the	 unfettered	market	 than	 the	skeptical	Moi”324.	 President	Kibaki’s	 regime	 significantly	 reduced	dependence	on	Western	 donor	 aid,	 with	 the	 country	 being	 increasingly	 funded	 by	 internally	generated	 resources	 such	 as	 increased	 tax	 revenue	 collection	 and	 new	 ties	with	China.325			
Mwai	Kibaki:	‘Look	East’	During	President	Kibaki’s	government,	Kenya’s	foreign	policy	underwent	a	major	shift.	As	mentioned	above,	the	Kibaki	government	turned	to	China326	and	India	when	western	 donors	 –	who	 supported	NARC	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 elections	 –	 started	questioning	the	government’s	seriousness	to	address	corruption.	As	the	ODI	report	highlights,	two	groups	of	politicians,	highly	intertwined	with	business	elites,	“had	a	hand	in	the	move	towards	the	East”327.	The	Hurlingham	group,	formed	of	politicians	coming	from	the	Mount	Kenya	region	-	Kibaki’s	home	and	electoral	bedrock	–	and	business	elites,	urged	the	President	“‘to	look	[e]ast	and	get	support	from	China	on	[the]	argument	that	China	would	give	grants	and	loans	without	strings	attached	and	without	criticising	the	government	over	governance	issues’328”.	At	the	same	time,	moving	to	China	was	a	strategy	to	undermine	the	power	of	the	Muthaiga	group	that,	instead,	“had	grown	by	trading	with	companies	in	the	West.	They	had	invested	in	multinational	 corporations	 and	 were	 therefore	 keen	 to	 preserve	 government	relations	with	the	West”329.	The	two	groups,	whose	members	were	equally	close	to	Kibaki,	were	rival	in	“influencing	business	or	economic	decisions”330.		However,	 when	 in	 2008	 Kibaki	 signed	 the	 agreement	 to	 establish	 a	 coalition	government	with	Raila	Odinga	–	who	became	Prime	Minister	–	 the	 linkages	with	business	 elites	 were	 altered.	 Business	 elites	 around	 Raila	 “were	 not	 as	 well	entrenched	in	business	as	those	around	Kibaki”	and	were	interested	in	beginning	
                                                324	Ibid.,	p.	810.	325	Ng’etich,	op.	cit.	326	This	time	coincided	with	China’s	‘Go	Out	strategy’	initiated	in	the	late	1990s	and	continued	under	the	Hu	Jintao-Wen	Jiabao	leadership.	China	joined	the	World	Trade	Organisation	in	2001,	and	later	started	to	actively	and	consistently	promote	engagement	with	the	outside	world,	at	governmental	as	well	as	business	level	through	the	encouragement	of	Chinese	investments	overseas.		327	Booth	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	referring	to	the	interview	with	an	investigative	journalist	working	with	one	of	the	daily	papers	(Oct	2013),	p.	18.	328	Ibid.	329	Ibid.	330	Ibid.		
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investments	rather	than	already	being	solid	investors.	However,	beyond	the	support	from	 non-Kikuyu	 business	 leaders,	 Raila	 also	 received	 backing	 from	 powerful	Kenyan	Asians.	Kenyan	Asians	seemingly	“prefer	a	non-Kikuyu	president	because	Kikuyu	 business	 elites	 are	 their	 competitors	 in	 various	 sectors” 331 .	 Similarly,	because	 of	 Kenyan	 Asians’	 strong	 connections	 with	 India	 (for	 sourcing,	manufacturing	 etc.),	 they	 may	 be	 not	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 involvement	 of	 Chinese	businesses,	seen	as	competitors.	This	is	particularly	evident	in	the	analyses	of	some	issues	in	the	next	chapters,	especially	in	infrastructure	and	pharmaceuticals.		Within	 this	scenario,	 corruption	scandals	 involving	business	groups	as	well	as	political	figures	siding	with	either	Kibaki	or	Raila,	emerged	showing	an	ever	more	complex	network	of	business-politics	 linkages.	The	benefits	of	patronage	became	more	 scattered	 as	 the	 government	 lacked	 internal	 cohesion	 leading,	 at	 times,	 to	policy	gridlock.	At	the	same	time,	corruption	scandals	weakened	some	groups,	and	with	Kibaki’s	interests	to	China	and	infrastructural	projects,	new	business	elites	and	new	sectors	started	emerging332.				
Uhuru	Kenyatta:	the	ICC	trial	Uhuru	Kenyatta	is	arguably	following	in	the	footsteps	of	Kibaki	in	‘looking	East’333.	However,	the	role	that	China	has	had,	for	him,	is	more	personally	significant,	due	to	his	indictment	by	the	International	Criminal	Court,	where	he	was	being	prosecuted	for	alleged	crimes	committed	during	the	2007-2008	election/post-election	violence.	The	 2013	 elections	 were	 preceded	 by	 threat-like	 announcements	 by	 Western	countries	concerning	the	potential	effects	for	the	country	as	a	whole	if	Kenyatta	and	Ruto,	at	the	time	prosecuted,	were	to	be	elected.	This	exacerbated	the	difficulties	that	Kenya	had	already	started	having	with	the	West,	its	traditional	trading	partner,	to	the	point	that	the	strengthening	of	the	‘Look	East’	policy	is	considered	“in	part	a	reaction	to	the	international	support	for	the	ICC”334.		Soon	 after	 the	 elections	 in	 March	 2013,	 the	 tensions	 with	 western	 countries	surrounding	President	Kenyatta	and	Vice-President	Ruto	were	heightened	by	two	episodes:	Obama’s	visit	to	Africa,	during	which	Kenya	was	bypassed,	and	the	cold	reception	by	 the	British	prime	minister	of	Kenyatta	at	 the	Somalia	Conference	 in	May.	These	two	events	“were	seen	as	humiliating	and	those	around	the	president	
                                                331	Ibid.,	p.	20.	332	Ibid.,	p.	19.	333	Ng’etich,	op.	cit.	334	Booth	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.	33.	
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quickly	crafted	a	new	agenda	to	intensify	contacts	with	the	East”335.	In	August	2013,	Kenyatta	made	state	visits	 to	Russia	and	China.	 In	China,	his	delegation	signed	a	number	of	agreements	amounting	to	$5	billion	in	investments	in	a	number	of	sectors.	However,	while	these	occurrences	were	partly	politically-motivated,	the	Kenyatta-Ruto	government	seemed,	since	the	beginning,	intentioned	to	steer	Kenya	to	greater	independence	 at	 the	 global	 diplomatic	 arena”336 ,	 partnering	 with	 whoever	 was	willing	to	work	with	Kenyans	to	generate	economic	opportunities337.	An	official	at	a	Ministry	summarised	this	by	stating	that	“there	is	a	lot	of	politics	between	the	East	and	the	West.	Kenya	mainly	got	support	from	the	West	after	independence.	Now	it’s	non-aligned	but	it	has	a	clear	position.	What	matters	is	the	country’s	interests	rather	than	aligning	with	someone.	The	interest	is	not	whether	we	look	east	or	west,	but	rather	how	we	look	at	ourselves.	We	don’t	care	where	we	get	support	from,	whether	it’s	from	China,	Russia,	the	US	or	Britain,	provided	it’s	in	our	interests.”338			
3.4 Kenya-China:	actors,	stakes	and	negotiations?		
	Kenya-China	 relations	must	 be	 contextualised	 not	 only	 in	 relation	 to	 Kenya’s	historical	 links	with	the	West,	but	also	within	China-Africa	relations.	Research	on	Kenya-China	 relations	 has	 been	 relatively	 limited,	 especially	 when	 compared	 to	research	conducted	on	China’s	relations	with	resource-rich	countries.	Being	Kenya	a	 resource-poor	 country	 “China’s	 economic	 interests	 […]	 so	 far	 have	 been	predominantly	outside	 the	much-hyped	area	of	 its	voracious	appetite	 for	African	natural	resources”339,	says	Chege,	UNDP	advisor	to	Kenya’s	Ministry	of	Planning	and	National	Development.	Although	explorations	of	oil	wells	were	conducted	by	China	National	Offshore	Oil	Company	(CNOOC),	no	positive	results	were	achieved	and	the	company	quit	 in	2010340.	 This	notwithstanding,	 it	 is	worth	pointing	out	 that	 the	significant	involvement	of	China	in	infrastructural	development	projects	in	Kenya	should	be	connected	to	the	necessity	of	providing	routes	to	resources.	Opinions	on	China’s	presumed	long-term	interests	in	Kenya	range	from	considering	its	interests	
                                                335	Ibid.,	p.	23.	 	336	Kenya	Yearbook	Editorial	Board,	Kenya	Yearbook	2013/2014,	Celebrating	Kenya’s	50	Years	of	Independence,	Kenya	Yearbook	Editorial	Board,	Nairobi,	2014,	p.	568.	337	Booth	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.	23.	338	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Human	Resources	Development	Department,	Nairobi.	2014-11-18.	339	M.	Chege,	Economic	Relations	Between	China	and	Kenya,	1963-2007,	Centre	for	Strategic	and	International	Studies,	Washington,	2008,	p.	35.	340	Ibid.	
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“no	different	from	those	of	its	Western	and	African	competitors”341,	focusing	mainly	on	the	development	of	trade	links,	the	investment	in	construction,	and	tourism,	to	more	strategic	insights	according	to	which	China	is	trying	to	get	access	to	Kenya	well	knowing	that	Kenya	has	been	for	decades	the	“darling”	of	the	West,	proposing	itself	as	an	option	not	only	 in	economic	 terms,	but	also	socio-culturally	and	politically.	Chinese	public	and	private,	big,	medium	and	small	enterprises	have	invested	in	a	number	 of,	 seemingly,	 resource-unrelated	 projects 342 	spread	 across	 multiple	sectors	 ranging	 from	 infrastructure	 to	 trade	 –	 particularly	 in	 the	manufacturing	sector	–	tourism,	health,	education,	IT	services,	financial	services	and	the	media343.		Although	the	focus	of	this	study	is	on	Kenyan	agency,	it	is	necessary	to	at	least	mention	 that	 the	 Chinese	 community	 is	 diversified	 and	 less	 cohesive	 than	 often	assumed.	 Fieldwork	 reveals	 that,	 similarly	 to	 cases	 in	 other	 African	 countries,	competition	among	the	Chinese	is	fierce,	accompanied	by	distrust	toward	each	other	and	 fear	of	being	 cheated	by	other	Chinese.	As	a	 consequence,	Chinese	nationals	tend	 to	 avoid	 interaction	 with	 each	 other.	 This	 disaggregation	 is	 identified	 as	counterproductive	by	the	Economic	and	Commercial	Counsellor	Office	of	the	PRC	because	 it	 inhibits	 companies,	 especially	 State-Owned	 Enterprises	 (SOEs),	 from	responding	in	a	coherent	way	to	local	criticism	concerning	labour	standards,	rules	within	 their	 sector	 of	 operation	 and	 so	 forth 344 .	 Therefore,	 the	 Economic	 and	Commercial	 Counsellor	Office	 has	 requested	 SOEs	 in	 the	 infrastructure	 sector	 to	create	an	association,	 the	Kenya-China	Economic	and	Trade	Association,	 to	share	concerns	about	similar	issues	and	show	a	joint	approach	to	Kenyan	counterparts.	There	are	also	associations	of	non-SOEs	enterprises	aimed	at	providing	mediation	support	ranging	from	organising	events	with	 local	 institutions	so	to	help	Chinese	nationals	better	understand	the	local	context,	to	providing	legal	support	for	Chinese	nationals	etc.	(see	Chapter	4	for	more	on	these	associations).			Kenyan	leaders	consider	the	relations	with	China	as	particularly	beneficial	for	the	fulfilment	 of	 Kenya	 Vision	 2030	 goals,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 so-called	infrastructure	 ‘enablers’,	 projects	without	which	 further	developments	 could	not	
                                                341	Ibid.	342	In	the	case	of	infrastructure,	it	is	frequently	argued	that	the	infrastructure	projects	China	invests	in	are	necessary	for	the	transport	of	extracted	raw	materials/natural	resources	to	easier	points	of	access,	i.e.	ports.			343	Data	retrieval	on	past	and	present	projects	is	particularly	challenging	despite	the	recent	creation	of	a	database,	AidData	China,	which	gathers	a	good	deal	of	information	regarding	projects	undertaken	by	China	over	the	world.	The	methodology	used	to	create	the	database	–	mainly	newspaper	sources	–	has	been	highly	criticised	and	it	leads	to	treat	the	source	as	partially	reliable.	See	D.	Brautigam,	‘AidData:	Why	it	is	not	Wikipedia’,	China	in	Africa:	The	Real	Story	[blog	post],	2	May	2013.		344	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Chinese	Economic	and	Commercial	Counsellor’s	Office,	Nairobi,	2013-11-18.		
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take	place.	Interviewees	have	confirmed	that	while	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	International	Trade,	and	the	Ministry	of	Finance	have	a	centralized	command	of	the	 country’s	 engagement	 with	 China	 at	 the	 high-levels,	 i.e.	 steering	 national	priorities,	they	heavily	rely	on	sectoral	stakeholders,	from	ministries	to	the	private	sector,	who	are	in	charge	of	formulating	and	implementing	policies.	In	May	2014,	during	the	visit	of	Chinese	Premier	Li	Keqiang	to	Kenya,	President	Uhuru	Kenyatta	stressed	the	need	to	set	up	a	Bilateral	Advisory	Council	(BAC),	aimed	at	acting	as	the	institution	in	charge	of	centralising	the	implementation,	monitoring	and	evaluation	of	the	projects/initiatives	agreed	upon	so	far.	In	his	speech,	he	stated:	“we	agreed	on	the	urgency	of	convening	a	Bilateral	Advisory	Council.	When	adopted,	the	council	will	provide	an	 ideal	 forum	for	constant	and	 fruitful	engagement	at	every	 level	–	most	 especially	 in	 the	 implementation,	monitoring	 and	 evaluation	of	 the	 various	initiatives	and	agreements	we	have	concluded	so	far.”345	On	 top	 of	 high-level	 engagements,	 the	 Sino-African	 discourse	 on	 people-centeredness	has	found	a	vibrant	ground	in	Kenya.	Nairobi	has	become	the	hub	of	Chinese	diplomacy	on	the	continent,	with	Africa’s	only	Xinhua	regional	office,	the	first	 ever	 CCTV	 news	 production	 centre	 outside	 China	 and	 the	 establishment,	 in	2005,	of	the	very	first	Confucius	Institute	(CI)	set	up	in	Africa	–	followed	by	other	three	Institutes	that	make	Kenya	second	only	to	South	Africa	for	the	number	of	CIs	per	country	on	the	continent.		Despite	this	involvement	of	non-state	actors,	points	of	 view	 concerning	 the	 impact	 that	 the	 Chinese	 modus	 operandi	 could	 have	 on	Kenya’s	 democratizing	 process	 are	 quite	 diversified,	 ranging	 from	 fears	 that	domestic	 corruption	 and	 lack	 of	 transparency	 in	 governance	 will	 worsen,	 to	confidence	that	China’s	backwardness	in	state-society	relations	can	not	drag	back	a	country	such	as	Kenya,	where	 freedoms	have	been	 fought	and	negotiated	among	groups	at	all	levels	for	such	an	extended	period346.	Below	 a	 breakdown	 of	 the	 relations,	 divided	 into	 three	 main	 sections:	 1)	diplomacy	 and	 ideology,	 2)	 social	 interaction,	 3)	 trade,	 aid	 and	 investment.	 This	background	is	fundamental	for	providing	a	context	to	the	specific	sectoral	analyses	presented	 in	 the	 following	 chapters.	 By	 means	 of	 introduction,	 the	 following	sections	 present	 how	Kenya’s	 interests	 are	 framed	 in	 light	 of	 Chinese	 and	 other	
                                                345	U.	Kenyatta,	‘President	Kenyatta	SPEECH	on	the	Visit	by	Chinese	Premier	Li	Kequing’,	Kenya	Today,	10	May	2014.	346	Murunga	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.	ix.	
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foreign	 actors’	 interests.	 The	 sectoral	 analyses	 instead	 will	 move	 beyond	 the	national	level	to	look	more	closely	at	actors,	interests	and	negotiation	dynamics.			
3.4.1 Diplomacy	and	ideology		China-Kenya	 diplomatic	 relations	 started	 in	 1963.	 Contrary	 to	 many	 other	African	countries	whose	relations	with	China	have	been	based	on	mutual	friendship	since	 the	 years	 of	 independence,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 common	 ideological	revolutionary	 struggles	 against	 the	 West,	 Kenya’s	 relation	 with	 China	 took	 a	different	 trajectory.	 When	 in	 1964	 Chinese	 premier	 Zhou	 Enlai	 praised	 the	“excellent	revolutionary	situation	in	Africa”,	 the	Kenyatta’s	government	promptly	replied	that	“the	Chinese	premier’s	expectations	did	not	apply	to	Kenya,	as	it	had	already	completed	 its	anticolonial	 revolution	 in	 the	previous	decade”347.	 In	1965	“Kenya	adopted	Sessional	Paper	No.	10	of	1965	on	African	Socialism	that	influenced	a	‘Look	West’	policy	and	a	capitalist	path	of	development.	And	the	Chinese	dream	was	itself	still	mired	in	the	post-1949	Communist	Revolution	politics”348.	In	1966-1967	relations	between	the	two	deteriorated	and	went	into	a	stalemate	for	about	a	decade,	 the	 reasons	 being	 not	 only	 KANU’s	 right	 wing	 resistance	 to	 a	 leftist	inclination	 towards	 China’s	 revolutionary	 agenda,	 but	 also	 “machinations	 from	Western	intelligence	operatives	in	Nairobi”349.	Relations	between	China	and	Kenya	started	re-opening	up	with	the	first	visit	 to	China	by	President	Moi	 in	1980,	only	after	both	Mao	Zedong	and	Jomo	Kenyatta	had	exited	the	scene.	It	is	indeed	“in	the	wake	of	Deng	Xiaoping’s	‘four	modernizations’	that	hostility	gradually	mutated	into	a	fruitful	phase	of	interaction	between	China	and	Kenya”350.	However,	 like	 most	 African	 countries,	 the	 relations	 with	 China	 became	diplomatically,	 economically	 and	 socially	more	 relevant	 in	 the	 early	 2000s.	 This	period	 also	 coincides	 with	 the	 creation,	 in	 2000,	 of	 the	 Forum	 on	 China-Africa	Cooperation	 that	 institutionalised	 the	 engagement	 between	 China	 and	 African	countries.	 As	 soon	 as	 Kibaki	 was	 elected	 in	 2002,	 “he	 expressed	 to	 hold	 great	account	 of	 the	 relations	 with	 China,	 willing	 to	 further	 deepen	 and	 expand	 the	friendly	cooperation	between	the	two	countries”351.	As	mentioned	above,	the	‘Look	East’	 policy	was	 the	 fruit	 of	 internal	machinations	 but	 also	 of	 a	 general	 urge	 to	
                                                347	Chege,	op.	cit.,	p.	21.	348	P.	Kagwanja,	‘Why	China’s	‘soft	power’	approach	appeals	to	Kenya’,	Daily	Nation,	10	May	2014.	349	Chege,	op.	cit.,	p.	20.	350	Ibid.,	p.	19.	351	J.	Onjala,	A	Scoping	Study	on	China-Africa	Economic	Relations:	The	Case	of	Kenya,	Institute	for	Development	Studies,	University	of	Nairobi,	2008,	p.	4.	
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revamp	the	economy	and	of	the	need	to	become	less	diplomatically	dependent	on	the	West.	The	Kenya	Yearbook	2014	 reports	 that	 “never	 since	 the	early	years	of	Kenya’s	Independence	was	Nairobi’s	diplomatic	circuit	lively	and	full	of	public	and	private	 intricate	diplomatic	wooing	and	courtship	drama	and	dance	between	 the	Western-bloc	envoys	and	the	Chinese	diplomats,	officials,	economic-cum-business	leaders	as	was	witnessed	between	2003-2007”352.			Even	more,	 the	election	of	Uhuru	Kenyatta,	 seen	as	disadvantageous	 from	 the	West,	mainly	due	 to	 the	pending	criminal	 investigation	at	 the	 ICC,	has	raised	 the	issue	of	Kenya	being	courted	by	East	and	West	alike.	Mr	Fraser,	former	United	States	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	 for	African	Affairs	commented	that	“the	geo-strategic	environment	has	changed	entirely	and	particularly	(in	favour	of)	China.	The	Chinese	have	changed	the	playing	field	(and)	if	the	US,	the	UK	and	Europeans	don’t	want	to	deal	 with	 Uhuru	 Kenyatta,	 he	 has	 another	 option” 353 .	 A	 Member	 of	 the	 UK	Parliament	also	expressed	concerns	during	a	special	session	on	Kenya	held	in	2012:	“the	 presence	 of	 China	 in	 Kenya	 is	 obvious.	 They	 are	 active	 everywhere	 in	 the	country,	and	they	are	in	every	country	in	Africa.	They	are	a	major	influence	in	the	continent,	and	we	do	not	want	to	lose	our	influence	in	any	part	of	Africa,	especially	not	in	Kenya,	to	other	countries”354.		
Social	interaction:	the	‘peoples’	When	 it	 started	 becoming	 clear	 that	 the	 social	 effects	 of	 China’s	 increased	presence	in	Africa	had	to	be	tackled	to	avoid	social	unrest	–	feared	to	impact	upon	the	 implementation	 of	 projects/initiatives	 and	 consequentially	 the	 fulfilment	 of	interests	 –	 Kenya	was	 among	 the	 first	 countries	 on	 the	 continent	 to	 be	 actively	involved,	considered	an	important	base	for	the	development	of	Chinese	soft	power	on	the	continent.	While	people’s	 forums	started	being	institutionalised,	the	social	interaction	in	Kenya	between	Kenyan	and	Chinese	actors	is	more	complex	than	the	issue-areas	covered	 in	 the	 forums	as	 the	 following	chapters	will	show.	There	are	then	two	distinct	approaches	through	which	social	groups	from	the	two	countries	interact.	 One	 revolves	 around	 day	 to	 day	 engagements	 which	 impact	 the	 real	governance	 of	 an	 issue	 between	 Kenyan	 and	 Chinese	 stakeholders.	 The	 other	revolves	 around	 strategized	 encounters	 that	 are	 part	 of	 a	 symbolic	 type	 of	
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governance,	 one	 that	 is	 institutionalised,	 that	 received	 funds	 for	 the	 set	 up	 of	associations	 or	meetings	 and	 serves	 the	 purpose	 of	 guaranteeing	 a	 space,	 albeit	government-controlled,	to	the	peoples,	in	Sino-African	relations.		Kenyan	 trade	 unions,	 business	 associations,	 schools,	 traditional	 medicine	practitioners,	 and	more,	 engage	with	 Chinese	 actors	 navigating	 through	 existing	domestic	 governance	 systems	 to	 guarantee	 social	 participation	 in	 Kenya-China	affairs.	However,	these	forms	of	peoples’	involvement	in	Kenya-China	relations	are	only	partially	recognised	by	Chinese	stakeholders,	depending	on	 their	 interest	 in	doing	 so,	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 deal	with	 social	 groups.	 Symbolic	 people-to-people	interactions,	on	 the	other	hand,	 reports	a	Chinese	diplomat,	 “are	 initiated	by	 the	government	and	the	funds	come	from	the	government,	but	the	organisations	that	carry	 out	 the	 plan	 is	 universities,	 local	 institutions,	 NGOs”355.	 Interviewees	 have	reported	 that	 these	 interactions	 are	 not	 necessarily	 in	 areas	 that	 are	 deemed	relevant	by	Kenyan	social	stakeholders	in	their	engagement	with	Chinese	ones	but	are	identified	as	salient	by	the	Chinese	government.			It	seems	that	there	are	thus	two	types	of	peoples’	engagements.	One	from	above,	orchestrated	by	the	Chinese	government	and	officially	recognised,	controlled	and	strategic,	and	one	from	below,	governed	by	the	myriad	social	groups	that	engage	with	China	 on	 a	 daily	 basis	 and	with	whom	Chinese	 companies,	 traders,	 etc.	 are	requested	to	deal	with.	In	the	first	case	the	relations	are	people-to-people,	meaning	social	 groups	 from	 the	 Chinese	 and	 African	 side	 interact.	 These	 interactions	 are	generally	 financially	 supported	by	 the	Chinese	government	and	aim	at	providing	opportunities	for	social	groups	to	meet.	These	objectives	are,	however,	profoundly	disconnected	from	the	second	type	of	peoples’	engagement,	from	below.	This	is,	in	fact,	 a	 non-orchestrated	 kind	 of	 dynamic,	 often	 emerging	 out	 of	 problems	encountered	by	African	social	groups	in	engaging	with	Chinese	actors.	These	groups	range	from	trade	unions	to	human	rights	associations,	from	security	organisations	to	educational	bodies,	they	often	have	less	financial	resources	than	the	former	and	their	ability	to	negotiate	with	the	Chinese	depends	on	domestic	governance	systems	more	than	anything	else.		In	a	 sense,	while	 the	 former	 type	aims	at	 increasing	 the	 legitimacy	of	Chinese	operations	in	Africa,	the	latter	forms	the	much	wider	grounds	from	which	such	aims	
                                                355Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Embassy	of	the	PRC,	Culture	Department,	Nairobi,	2013-10-08.	
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originate.	While	the	next	three	chapters	are	dedicated	to	unpacking	‘real’	relations,	those	from	below,	the	next	section	introduces	the	relations	orchestrated	from	above.				
The	peoples’	forums	A	number	of	‘peoples’	forums356	were	held	since	2007	when	the	first	China-Africa	Civil	 Society	 Meeting	 was	 held	 in	 Shanghai.	 Before	 2011	 these	 meetings	 were	welcomed	with	caution	by	the	Chinese	government	and	were	mostly	organised	by	think-tanks	and	non-governmental	organisations	although	there	was	also	generally	a	significant	attendance	by	government	officers.	A	central	theme	of	FOCAC	2009	was	the	 strengthening	 of	 civil	 society	 links	 between	 China	 and	Africa,	 to	 parallel	 the	governmental	and	business	connections	already	made.	The	2009	FOCAC	meeting	showed	that	Beijing	was	aware	of	the	importance	of	the	civil	society	dimension	to	the	China-Africa	engagement,	and	realised	that	a	truly	'win-win'	relationship	must	be	 people-centred.	 However,	 in	 2009,	 the	 International	 Institute	 for	 Strategic	Studies	(IISS)	reported	that	“while	the	need	for	greater	direct	engagement	has	been	recognised	at	the	higher	levels	of	officialdom,	change	on	the	ground	is	still	at	a	very	early	 stage” 357 .	 The	 strong	 presence	 of	 governmental	 actors	 during	 people-to-people	forums	raised	concerns	about	the	real	purpose	of	these	meetings,	and	the	grievances	arising	 from	actual	encounters	seemed	to	show	a	disconnect	between	formal	tables	of	negotiation	and	real	ones.		These	forums,	it	is	necessary	to	point	out,	were	only	marginally	representative	of	
actual	interactions	among	social	groups,	which	were	already	more	diversified	and	complex.	 The	 forums	 were	 tackling	 issues	 that	 China	 perceived	 as	 relevant 358 .	Labour	issues	for	instance	(see	Chapter	4),	were	still	not	a	priority	at	the	high	levels	despite	 already	 being	 an	 important	 matter	 on	 the	 ground.	 In	 the	 2009	 FOCAC	Implementation	Plan	it	 is	reported	that:	“with	the	encouragement	and	support	of	both	sides,	the	sub-forums	under	the	framework	of	FOCAC359	have	made	enormous	progress.	Sub-forums	on	agriculture,	science	and	technology,	law,	financing,	culture,	
                                                356	Heinrich	Böll	Stiftung-East	&	Horn	of	Africa,	China-Africa	Civil	Society	Dialogue,	Heinrich	Böll	Stiftung,	Nairobi,	2008;	Civil	Society	Meeting,	Nairobi,	2009;	China	Africa	Civil	Society	Forum	on	Peace	and	Development,	Beijing,	2-4	June	2010;	CODESRIA-FOCAC	Meeting,	Nairobi,	2011;	China-Africa	People’s	Forum,	Nairobi,	2011;	China-Africa	Think	Tank	Forum,	Hangzhou,	2011;	Tackling	Insecurity	in	the	Horn	of	Africa,	Nairobi,	2012.	357	S.	Raine,	China’s	African	Challenges,	Routledge	for	The	International	Institute	for	Strategic	Studies,	London,	2009,	p.	172.	358	Interview	with	major	representatives	of	CSOs	in	Kenya.		359	China-Africa	Youth	Festival,	Namibia,	2009;	FOCAC	Women’s	Forum,	Cairo	and	FOCAC	Women’s	Forum	Declaration,	2009;	3rd	China-Africa	Youth	Festival,	Beijing,	2009;	The	China-Africa	Scientific	and	Technological	Cooperation	Roundtable,	Egypt,	2009;	3rd	Conference	of	Chinese	and	African	Entrepreneurs,	2009;	The	China-Africa	Agricultural	Cooperation	Forum,	Beijing,	2010;	China-Africa	People’s	Forum,	Nairobi,	2011;	FOCAC	Think	tanks	Forum,	Hangzhou,	2011;	2nd	China-Africa	People’s	Forum,	Suzhou,	2012;	4th	Conference	of	Chinese	and	African	Entrepreneurs,	2012;	FOCAC	Cultural	Ministers’	Forum,	2012;	FOCAC	Culture	Forum;	FOCAC	Science	and	Technology	Forum;	China-Africa	Cultural	Heritage	Preservation	Roundtable;	3rd	China-Africa	People’s	Forum,	Khartoum,	2014.	
	 99	
think	tanks,	youth,	people-to-people	exchanges	and	women	have	been	set	up,	some	of	which	have	been	institutionalised.	These	sub-forums	have	broadened	the	scope,	enriched	the	substance,	and	enhanced	the	vigour	of	China-Africa	cooperation.”360	As	put	 by	 an	 interviewee	 at	 the	 Chinese	 Embassy	 in	 Nairobi,	 these	 initiatives	 “are	initiated	 by	 the	 government	 and	 the	 funds	 come	 from	 the	 government,	 but	 the	organisations	that	carry	out	the	plan	is	universities,	local	institutions,	NGOs”361.	In	other	 words,	 the	 ‘peoples’	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 decide	 how	 to	 conduct	 the	relations	but	not	what	relations	to	prioritise.	As	a	consequence	of	the	control	over	funding,	a	number	of	initiatives	proposed	by	China	are	not	appreciated	by	Kenyans	who	do	not	see	any	value	attached.	In	other	words,	while	Kenyans	have	been	active	in	 raising	 concerns	 through	domestic	 channels	 (at	 times	echoed	by	 international	organisations),	 they	 have	 not,	 broadly	 speaking,	 been	 active	 in	 suggesting	 the	creation	of	international	platforms	to	discuss	issues	concerning	their	involvement	with	 the	 Chinese.	 Not,	 at	 least,	 in	 the	 same	way	 the	 Chinese	 do,	 via	 tailor-made	forums.	At	the	same	time,	as	fieldwork	showed,	these	people-to-people	interactions,	albeit	controlled,	are	an	effort	to	foster	dialogue,	an	initiative	that,	if	it	were	not	for	the	funds	of	the	Chinese	government,	would	not	easily	take	shape.	The	first	officially	recognised	China-Africa	People’s	Forum	was	held	in	Nairobi	in	2011.	This,	 compared	 to	previous	ones,	was	more	 important	as	 it	 symbolised	an	official	acknowledgement,	at	the	high-levels	in	China	and	African	countries,	of	the	importance	of	the	‘peoples’	to	the	relationships,	not	only	in	specific	sectors,	but	as	a	whole.	Many,	in	Africa	and	the	West	had	seen	the	non-participation	of	civil	society	to	Sino-African	engagements	as	a	frightening	aspect	of	the	relationship,	potentially	impacting	upon	decades-long	democratisation	efforts.	Importantly,	interviews	with	major	civil	society	representatives	involved	in	the	first	peoples’	forums	pointed	out	that	the	requests	to	run	these	forums	always	came	from	China.	There	was,	in	other	words,	limited	effort	on	the	African	side,	to	pro-actively	engage	with	China362.	This	did	not	mean	that	social	uneasiness363	toward	the	presence	of	China	was	lacking	or	that	it	was	not	demonstrated	across	the	continent.	But	rather	that	it	did	not	manifest	itself	in	an	organised	form	neither	nationally	or	continentally.	Little	is	known	about	these	 meetings	 and	 the	 role	 they	 play	 for	 governmental	 agenda	 setting	 and	implementation	 activities,	 if	 any.	 These	 events	 seem	 to	 be	more	 relevant	 at	 the	
                                                360	Implementation	of	FOCAC	2009.	361	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Embassy	of	the	PRC,	Culture	Department,	Nairobi,	2013-10-08.	362	Interview	with	major	representative	of	CSOs	in	Kenya.		363	I	refer	to	‘social	uneasiness’	because	these	forums	were	initially	created	to	respond	to	existing	discontent.		
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symbolic	level	than	as	platforms	of	real	governance.		The	events	are	also	generally	aimed	at	addressing	issues	at	the	continental	level,	which	may	be	a	problem	given	the	extreme	diversity	of	contexts	and	levels	of	development.	For	instance,	one	of	the	latest	addition	to	the	 list	of	people’s	 forums	was,	 in	2014,	the	China-Africa	Trade	Unions	High	Level	Symposium,	which	‘was	attended	by	representatives	and	experts	of	Chinese	and	African	trade	unions,	enterprises,	governments	as	well	as	the	UN’s	International	Labour	Organisation,	in	an	attempt	to	brainstorm,	share	experiences,	and	find	the	best	implementation	plan’364.	While	labour	relations,	in	particular	the	treatment	of	workers	by	Chinese	companies	in	Africa,	was	one	of	the	earliest	(since	the	 beginning	 of	 the	 2000s)	major	 points	 of	 friction	 between	 China	 and	 African	countries,	the	issue	had	not	benefited	from	direct	high-level	attention.	Soft	power	instruments	have	been	increasingly	used	to	soften	negative	sentiments,	also	–	and	maybe	foremost	–	in	relation	to	labour	issues,	but	no	meetings	had	been	convened	under	 the	 China-Africa	 forums’	 heading.	 Labour	 issues	 are	 explored	 in	 the	 next	chapter	 and	 show,	 among	 other	 aspects,	 the	 disconnect	 between	 the	 priorities	identified	by	the	people	and	those	identified	by	high-politics.		As	far	as	it	concerns	Kenya,	during	the	first	official	China-Africa	People’s	Forum,	held	in	Nairobi,	in	August	2011,	attended	by	governmental	actors	as	much	as	non-governmental	ones,	Kalonzo	Musyoka,	then	Vice-President	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	emphasised	the	 importance	that	accountability	and	transparency	have	gained	for	Kenyans.	His	opening	speech365	showed	a	duality	of	discourses	used:	on	the	one	side,	the	 formal	 language	 that	 characterises	 Sino-African	 discourses	 has	 been	 used,	stressing	the	fact	that	“China	is	a	true	friend	of	Africa”,	Kenya	is	adopting	the	“very	principled	position	to	support	the	One	China	Policy”	and	finally	remarking	that	the	“forum	 will	 make	 a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 a	 true	 and	 mutually	 beneficial	friendship	between	China	and	Africa”.	However,	on	the	other	side,	H.E.	Musyoka	also	talked	of	the	Kenyan	“government	commitment	to	ensure	healthy	and	vibrant	civil	society	that	is	able	to	mobilise	citizens’	participation	in	all	aspects	of	development”,	a	commitment	that	is	based	on	Kenya’s	recognition	of	“civil	society	as	partners	in	national	 development,	 partner	 to	 the	 delivery	 of	 the	 [Millennium	 Development	Goals]	MDGs	 and	Kenya’s	 Vision	 2030”.	 He	 continued	 by	 underlying	 that	 a	 legal	framework	 regulates	 this	 commitment,	 and	 that	 Kenya’s	 constitution	 “grants	
                                                364	All-China	Federation	of	Trade	Unions,	‘China-Africa	Trade	Unions	High	Level	Seminar’,	tr.	Maddalena	Procopio,	The	China	
Africa	Project,	27	May	2014.	365	S.K.	Musyoka,	Speech	included	in	the	Report	on	China-Kenya	NGOs	Forum,	Draft,	Rapporteur’s	Report,	Kenya	NGOs	Coordination	Board,	Nairobi,	August	2011.	
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elaborate	 civil	 liberties	 and	 freedoms	 that	 provide	 civil	 society	 with	 unique	opportunities	 to	make	 contributions	 to	 national	 development”.	 He	 concluded	 by	stating	 that	 it	 is	 “imperative	 that	 in	 the	exercise	and	 the	enjoyment	of	 individual	rights	and	freedoms	we	also	recognise	and	respect	other	people’s	freedoms.	Civil	liberties	do	not	preclude	us	from	our	responsibility	to	observe	other	laws	as	well	as	remain	accountable	to	each	other”.	This	 supports	 not	 only	 the	 idea	 of	 Kenya	 being	 aware	 of	 the	 availability	 of	different	options	but	also	of	 its	 renewed	confidence	 in	expressing	views	 that	are	often	deemed	contrasting	in	the	literature	and	by	the	media,	namely	the	coexistence	of	socio-political	and	economic	rights	and	freedoms	with	the	China-led	fast	paced	development	of	economic	relations.	In	the	words	of	former	Kenyan	Prime	Minister	Odinga,	pronounced	right	after	the	Fifth	FOCAC	held	in	Beijing	in	2012,	“China	is	not	exploiting	Africa	but	assisting	Africa's	transformation,	which	is	creating	a	win-win	situation	 and	will	 not	 block	 cooperation	 between	Africa	 and	 other	 countries”366.	Denise	 Kodhe,	 Head	 of	 the	 pan-African	 think	 tank	 Institute	 for	 Democracy	 and	Leadership	 in	 Africa	 suggests	 that	 it’s	 not	 a	matter	 of	 "replicat[ing]	 the	 Chinese	model	as	whole	in	Africa”,	but	to	adopt	its	method	to	“learn	from	Europe,	Japan	and	Malaysia	and	pick	lessons	that	are	good	and	are	applicable	in	the	continent"367.	
	
3.4.2 Aid,	trade,	investment		The	engagement	of	Kenya	with	China	in	aid,	trade	and	investment	 is	scattered	across	 sectors:	 infrastructure,	 healthcare,	 education,	 trade,	 tourism,	 culture	 and	more.	 The	 United	 Nations	 Conference	 on	 Trade	 and	 Development	 (UNCTAD)	identifies	six	main	reasons	for	investors	to	consider	Kenya368,	and	interviews	with	the	 Chinese	 Economic	 and	 Commercial	 Counsellor’s	 Office	 as	 well	 as	 Chinese	enterprises	confirm	that	these	are	the	main	advantages	identified	for	investing	in	the	country,	sometimes	vis-à-vis	others	in	the	region:	1)	Diversified	and	established	economy	 with	 strong	 business	 sector;	 2)	 Opportunities	 in	 agriculture	 and	horticulture,	tourism,	mining,	power	generation,	Information	and	Communications	Technologies	(ICTs),	manufacturing	and	acquisition	of	state-owned	enterprises;	3)	Economic	centre	of	the	East	Africa	Community	comprising	138	million	people	and	a	GDP	of	US$	138	million;	4)	International	air	and	sea	gateway	to	the	region;	5)	Strong	
                                                366	‘Africa-China	cooperation	not	exclusive	but	win-win,	says	Kenya's	PM’,	Embassy	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	in	the	Republic	of	Kenya	via	Xinhua,	23	July	2012.		367	‘China	political	system	offers	lessons	for	Africa’,	Xinhua	via	ChinaDaily,	24	April	2013.		368	UNCTAD,	2012,	op.	cit.,	p.	iii.		
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reform	gains	to	encourage	investment:	coherent	vision	for	economic	development,	regular	meetings	between	government	leaders	and	investors,	new	framework	for	public-private	partnerships,	reinforced	investment	authority;	6)	New	constitution	with	greater	separation	of	powers	to	maintain	broad-based	political	stability.	There	are	differences,	however,	in	how	aid,	trade	and	investment	activities	are	conceived	and	carried	out	by	Kenyans	and	by	external	actors.	Within	this	context,	a	clarification	is	due	concerning	the	understanding	and	definition	of	development	by	China	and	the	West.	For	China,	development	is	based	upon	economic	drivers	and	the	belief	 that	 economic	 rights	 come	 before	 other	 social	 and	 political	 rights.	 This	translates	 in	 great	 financial	 commitments,	 characterised	 by	 a	 relatively	 scant	attention	to	issues	such	as	the	environment,	labour	rights,	transparency	and	so	forth.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Western	 ideas	 of	 development	 have	 become	 increasingly	characterised	 by	 less	 copious	 financial	 commitments,	 while	 placing	 particular	emphasis	 on	 ‘good’	 governance,	 for	 long	 seen	 as	 a	 pre-requisite	 to	 economic	development.	In	this	context,	“the	loans	that	China	is	advancing	to	Kenya	are	more	expensive	than	those	the	West	has	been	giving.	Moreover	‘the	West	has	been	giving	grants	for	development	of	various	sectors	and	this	is	not	replaceable	with	the	loans	from	China’”369.	While	FOCAC	commitments	boast	a	high	number	of	projects	being	undertaken	throughout	Africa,	breaking	down	this	block	of	information	was	a	complex	challenge.	Not	only	it	is	hard	to	retrieve	information	on	the	actors	involved	and	the	issues	at	stake	but	 also	on	 the	processes	of	negotiation.	A	 thorough	 study	of	China-Kenya	relations	 was	 published	 in	 2008	 by	 the	 Centre	 for	 Strategic	 and	 International	Studies.	 The	 study	 was	 conducted	 for	 the	 Centre	 by	 UNDP	 advisor	 to	 Kenya’s	Ministry	 of	 Planning	 and	National	 Development	 to	 examine	 the	 perceptions	 and	impact	of	China's	engagement	in	Kenya.	The	report	argues	that	the	Chinese-Kenyan	relationship	has,	by-and-large,	been	mutually	beneficial	contrary	to	a	widespread	belief	 that	 “often	 depicts	 African	 economies	 under	 threat	 of	malevolent	 Chinese	investment	strategies	and	a	flood	of	cheap	manufactured	goods”370.	Chege	argues	that	“Kenya’s	competent	technocratic	cadre	and	business	sector	have	thus	far	been	able	to	manage	the	relationship	to	Kenya’s	benefit”371.	He	brings	to	light	“the	power	of	agency,	demonstrating	that	African	states	are	indeed	capable	of	making	choices	
                                                369	Ibid.	370	Chege,	op.	cit.	371	Ibid.	 	
	 103	
that	benefit	them	in	the	intensified	phase	of	trade	and	investment	in	cooperation	with	China”372.	While	the	‘flooding’	of	cheap	manufactured	goods	from	China	has	not	exempted	Kenya	(see	Chapter	4),	this	thesis	reveals	that	Kenyan	actors	have	indeed	been	capable	of	making	choices.			
Aid	According	 to	 the	 World	 Health	 Organisation	 (WHO)	 the	 fact	 that	 since	2008/2009	Kenya	has	been	experiencing	an	increase	in	aid	assistance,	which	had	previously	been	 inconsistent,	 is	 “not	 just	 a	 result	 of	 resumption	of	 support	 from	existing	partners,	but	also	a	reflection	of	 increasing	support	 from	non-traditional	sources	of	aid,	such	as	China,	and	other	emerging	economies”373.		A	clarification	is	due	concerning	the	concept	of	aid/assistance.	The	“absence	of	common	definitions	and	consistent	data	has	led	many	analysts	to	draw	[…]	‘apples-to-dragon	fruits’	comparisons	between	Western	and	non-Western	‘aid’”374.	Dreher	et.	al.	differentiate	between	Overseas	Development	Assistance	(ODA),	i.e.	‘aid’	in	the	strictest	sense	of	the	term,	which	is	generally	“more	concessional	than	other	types	of	official	financing”,	thus	expected	to	be	used	to	“buy	political	 influence	abroad”,	and	Other	Official	Flows	(OOF)	which	are	“less	concessional	forms	of	official	support	[…]	provided	on	closer-to-market-terms”	and	thus	expected	to	“primarily	advance	the	economic	 interests	of	 state	 sponsors”375.	They	claim	 that	 the	 first	 type	 is	not	“predominantly	motivated	by	natural	resource	acquisition	interests.	Nor	does	China	seem	to	take	into	account	the	institutional	quality	or	regime	type	of	potential	aid	recipient	countries	when	allocating	its	ODA	budget”376	thus	supporting	the	Chinese	government	claim	that	 it	does	not	 interfere	 in	other	nations’	 internal	affairs.	The	authors	continue	by	stating	 that	 the	 findings	suggest	 that	 “Chinese	aid	allocation	practices	are	not	too	dissimilar	from	those	of	Western	donors”377.	By	contrast,	they	point	out	 that	OOFs	are	associated	with	natural	 resource	 interests	 and	 that	 they	should	 not	 be	 associated	with	 ‘aid’.	 Due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency	 from	 China	concerning	 the	 release	 of	 data	 about	 its	 overseas	 development	 activities,	 any	comparison	and	account	of	Kenya’s	receipt	of	assistance	will	have	to	be	taken	with	
                                                372	Ibid.,	p.	19.	373	World	Health	Organisation,	Country	Cooperation	Strategy	at	a	glance,	World	Health	Organisation,	Geneva,	2014,	p.	1.	374	A.	Dreher	et	al.,	‘Apples	and	Dragon	Fruits:	The	Determinants	of	Aid	and	Other	Forms	of	State	Financing	from	China	to	Africa’,	Working	paper	no.	15,	AidData,	2015,	p.	6.	375	Ibid.	376	Ibid.,	p.	19.	377	Ibid.	
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caution,	and	with	 the	awareness	 that	 the	 inferences	drawn	may	be	only	partially	correct.		Chege	 reminds	 that	 “Kenya	 is	 not	 as	 aid-dependent	 as	 most	 of	 its	 African	neighbours,	 the	 government	 is	 still	 determined	 to	 increase	 both	 the	 volume	 of	concessional	development	aid	and	its	absorptive	capacity	for	it,	to	supplement	local	investment,	and	FDI”378.	However,	assistance	remains	significant	 in	some	sectors,	healthcare	being	one,	with	development	partners	funding	a	substantial	proportion	of	 resources	 for	 activities	 such	 as	 HIV/AIDS,	 education,	 and	 water	 supply379 .	 A	number	 of	 mechanisms	 have	 been	 put	 in	 place	 since	 the	 early	 2000s	 for	 the	coordination	 of	 assistance	 efforts,	 following,	 in	 particular,	 the	 Rome	 and	 Paris	Declarations	on	aid	effectiveness	and	the	Accra	Agenda	for	Action	(2008).	With	the	aim	of	enhancing	Kenyan	ownership	of	aid	coordination,	harmonising	Kenyan	and	donors’	 aid	 delivery	 procedures,	 eliminating	 duplication	 and	 enhancing	 cost	effectiveness,	in	2004	the	Harmonization,	Alignment	and	Coordination	Group	(HAC)	was	 established	 under	 UNDP	 management,	 soon	 reaching	 a	 membership	 of	 17	donors.	One	of	the	major	initiatives	of	the	group	was	the	creation	of	the	Kenya	Joint	Assistance	 Strategy	 2007-2012,	 aimed	 at	 replacing	 individual	 donor	 assistance	strategies380.		To	 date	 China,	 together	with	 “emerging	 non-OECD	 bilateral	 partners,	 vertical	funds,	 foundations,	 and	 international	 NGOs”	 is	 working	 independently	 of	 this	framework381.	According	to	King,	“China	is	not	at	ease	with	the	discourse	of	aid,	or	of	being	seen	as	a	member	of	the	donor	club;	it	much	prefers	to	present	itself	as	the	largest	 developing	 country	 helping	 the	 continent	 with	 the	 largest	 number	 of	developing	 countries,	 to	 the	 best	 of	 its	 ability,	 in	 South–South	 cooperation.	 It	 is,	therefore,	hesitant	about	being	drawn	into	donor	coordination	and	harmonisation	activities”382.	However,	King	also	points	out	that	China’s	“shift	from	‘cooperation’	to	‘aid’	reflects	a	sense	of	moving	from	being	‘first	among	equals’	in	the	non-aligned	states	 and	 in	 the	 earlier	 period	 of	 opening	 up,	 to	 being	 now	 an	 emergent	
                                                378	Chege,	op.	cit.	p.	29		379	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	Kenya	Joint	Assistance	Strategy	2007-2012,	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2007,	p.	16.	380	F.	Mwega,	‘A	Case	Study	of	Aid	Effectiveness	in	Kenya:	Volatility	and	Fragmentation	of	Foreign	Aid,	with	a	Focus	on	Health’,	The	Brookings	Global	Economy	and	Development,	Working	Paper	no.	8,	January,	2009,	p.	24.	381	Government	of	Kenya,	op.	cit.	2007(a),	p.	17;	Interview	with	an	executive	at	Kenya	Vision	2030,	Social	Pillar	Department,	Nairobi,	2014-10-06.		382	K.	King,	‘China’s	cooperation	in	education	and	training	with	Kenya:	A	different	model?’,	International	Journal	of	
Educational	Development,	vol.	30,	no.	5,	September,	2010,	pp.	488-496.	p.	490.	
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superpower”383.	This	is	also	linked	to	China’s	claims	to	be	providing	assistance	in	response	mode	 as	 if	 the	 type	 and	modality	were	 to	 be	 largely	 decided	 upon	 by	recipient	 countries.	 Interviewees	 in	 Kenya	 suggested	 on	multiple	 occasions	 that	China’s	emphasis	on	the	provision	of	assistance	in	response	mode	is	only	a	partial	truth384.	As	Dreher	et.	al.	suggest	in	their	recent	piece,	China	has	demonstrated	that	it	uses	assistance	according	to	two	main	objectives:	commercial	and	political,	both	responding	to	specific	Chinese	needs.		Infrastructure	 is	 the	 sector	 to	 which	 China	 allocates	 the	 largest	 share	 of	assistance385,	both	concessional	 loans	and	grant	aid,	and	at	 the	same	 time,	 it	has	been	 an	 area	 of	 limited	 intervention	 by	 traditional	 partners	 in	 Kenya.	 Due	 to	transparency	shortcomings	concerning	China’s	–	and	Kenya’s	–	release	of	data,	it	is	hard	 to	 estimate	 the	 exact	 share	 or	 amount	 of	 aid	 allocated	 to	 different	 sectors	disbursed	annually	and	even	less	how	much	of	that	is	destined	to	Kenya.	In	2009	it	was	estimated	that	China	“probably	disbursed	aid	of	about	$3.1	billion	(gross),	with	Africa	 receiving	 45.7	 percent	 or	 about	 $1.4	 billion”386.	 In	 2014	 China	 released	 a	White	Paper	on	aid	and	stated	that	between	2010-2012	$14.41	billion	of	aid	was	disbursed	globally	of	which	Africa	received	51,8%387.		Within	this	scenario,	Chege	reminds	that	China	has	offered	various	development	aid	 to	 Kenya	 including	 package	 deals	 projects	 and	 humanitarian	 aid 388 .	 Most	recently,	 during	 the	 famine	 that	 struck	 the	 larger	Horn	 of	 Africa,	 China	 donated	foodstuff	 worth	 KES	2	 billion	 to	 Kenya 389 .	 According	 to	 Patroba	 “Chinese	development	aid	 to	Kenya	supports	 infrastructure	development;	 improvement	of	education	 standards,	 both	 academic	 and	 technical;	 human	 relief	 and	 tariff	exemptions.	 Other	 areas	 of	 assistance	 include	 the	 modernisation	 of	 power	distribution;	rural	electrification,	water;	renovation	of	sports	facilities;	provision	of	anti-malaria	drugs;	construction	of	a	malaria	research	centre	and	the	modernisation	of	international	airports	in	Kenya390.”391	
                                                383	K.	King,	China’s	Aid	and	Soft	Power	in	Africa:	The	Case	of	the	Education	and	Training,	Boydell	&	Brewer,	Rochester,	2013.	p.	7.	384	Interviews	with	stakeholders	negotiating	aid	from	China.	385	D.	Brautigam,	‘U.S.	and	Chinese	efforts	in	Africa	in	Global	Health	and	Foreign	Aid:	Objectives,	Impact	and	Potential	Conflicts	of	Interest’,	in	Centre	for	Strategic	and	International	Studies,	China’s	Emerging	Global	Health	and	Foreign	
Engagement	in	Africa,	Centre	for	Strategic	and	International	Studies,	Washington,	2011,	p.	3.	386	Ibid.		387	Government	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	China’s	Foreign	Aid,	Government	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	Beijing,	2014.	388	Chege,	op.	cit.,	pp.	29-31.	389	P.	Magara,	‘Yes,	thank	China	for	food	aid,	but	learn	from	her’,	The	Standard	Online,	12	September	2011.	390	Onjala,	op.	cit.	391	Patroba,	op.	cit.,	p.	12.		
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China’s	aid	scenario	also	includes	what	a	source	at	the	Economic	and	Commercial	Counsellor	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(PRC)	to	Kenya	defines	“privatisation	of	aid”.	More	accurately	this	type	of	assistance	comes	in	the	form	of	Corporate	Social	Responsibility	(CSR)	projects	carried	out	by	Chinese	companies	–	often	and	mostly	state-owned	enterprises	–	with	partial	financial	support	from	the	Chinese	state392.	For	 instance,	 the	 projects	 undertaken	 by	 state-owned	 infrastructure	 companies	have	tended	to	be	small	in	nature	and	range	from	the	construction	of	schools,	like	the	one	in	Mathare	Slum,	just	off	Thika	Highway393,	to	the	provision	of	humanitarian	assistance	 such	 as	 food	 during	 the	 2008	 famine	 in	 northern	 Kenya 394 .	 Other	companies	 like	 pharmaceutical	 Beijing	 Holley-Cotec	 and	 telecommunications	Huawei	have	engaged	in	CSR	projects	in	Kenya	investing	considerable	amounts.	For	instance,	Holley-Cotec	in	2006	provided	Ksh	3.5	million	worth	of	scholarships	to	the	College	of	Health	Sciences,	University	of	Nairobi.	This	was	the	first	donation	done	by	the	company	outside	China,	which	pledged	to	continue	the	donation	for	at	least	a	period	of	five	years395.			
Trade	The	trade	balance	between	Kenya	and	China	in	2013	was	significantly	skewed	towards	China	with	Kenya	importing	$3.22	billion	from	China,	equivalent	to	20%	of	its	 total	 imports	 but	 only	 exporting	 $50.6	 million,	 equal	 to	 0.97%	 of	 its	 total	exports396.	The	main	origin	of	imported	products	is	Asian,	taking	up	more	than	50%	(India	25%,	China	20%,	Japan	5.6%)	while	the	main	export	destination	for	Kenya	is	Africa,	where	it	exports	$2.17	billion,	almost	40%	of	its	total	exports,	with	the	East	African	 region	 receiving	more	 than	 30%	of	 Kenya’s	 total	 exports397.	 The	 second	export	destination	for	Kenya	is	Europe,	where	it	exports	$1.7	billion,	 followed	by	Asia,	$850	million	and	North	America,	$464	million398.			Between	1980	and	1993	the	imbalance	between	the	two	countries	was	much	less	significant.	It	was	after	1995	that	imports	from	China	started	skyrocketing.	In	1995	
                                                392	Interviews.	393	The	re-habilitation	of	the	school	was	a	way	to	give	‘something	back’	to	a	community	whose	life	had	been	disrupted	by	the	development	of	Thika	Highway.	It	was	meant	to	be	a	gesture	to	improve	the	image	of	the	Chinese.	However,	the	re-hab	project	was	very	limited	and	it	did	not	seem	to	have	a	particularly	positive	impact	on	locals	–	who	were	expecting	a	more	comprehensive	type	of	re-habilitation	(such	as	the	creation	of	public	toilets)	rather	than	the	mere	provision	of	brick	walls	to	the	school.		394	Interviews	with	Chinese	companies	involved.	395	University	of	Nairobi,	‘World	Class	Excellence:	Our	Inspiration,	UoN	Receives	Scholarships’,	Varsity	Focus,	University	of	Nairobi,	December	2006,	pp.	21-22.	396	A.J.G.	Simoes	and	C.A.	Hidalgo,	‘Kenya	Country	Profile’,	The	Observatory	of	Economic	Complexity	[website],	<http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/ken/>.			397	Ibid.	398	Ibid.	
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“imports	from	China	amounted	to	five-fold	their	1989	value”399.	According	to	Chege	the	rapid	increase	in	Kenya’s	imports	from	China	(or	elsewhere)	in	the	second	half	of	 the	 1990s	 “did	 not	 originate	 from	 rising	 incomes	 in	 Kenya” 400 .	 It	 was	 the	consequence	of	a	confluence	of	Kenya’s	domestic	economic	liberalization	in	1994,	supported	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 International	 Monetary	 Fund,	 and	 China’s	industrial	modernization.	The	first	“made	it	possible	for	Kenyan	firms	and	citizens	to	 purchase	 foreign	 currency	 to	 import	 goods	 at	 lower	 real	 prices	 than	 before	because	 the	 reform	 program	 had	 also	 reduced	 external	 tariffs,	 substantially”,	whereas	 the	 second	 provided	 “products	 that	 Kenyans	 (and	 Kenyan	 industries)	desired	at	more	competitive	prices	than	other	suppliers,	 including	those	based	in	Kenya”401.	Kenya’s	imports	from	China	started	diversifying	and	“for	the	first	time,	Kenyan	firms	and	individual	traders	began	travelling	to	Dubai	and	then	eastward	to	Hong	 Kong	 and	mainland	 China	 to	 obtain	 products	 directly	 rather	 than	 through	intermediaries	like	the	old	state	trading	corporations”402.	Currently,	Kenya	imports	from	China	machines	(23%	of	all	imports	from	China)	such	as	telephones,	electric	tools,	 batteries,	 computers;	 textiles	 (19%);	 metals	 (13%);	 plastics	 and	 rubbers	(9.1%);	 transportation	 (6.4%),	 such	 as	 motorcycles,	 vehicle	 parts	 etc.:	 chemical	products	(5.7%)	such	as	drugs403.		Two	of	the	most	important	aspects	of	trade	between	Kenya	and	China	are:	1)	the	influx	 of	 counterfeit	 products	 since	 the	mid-1990s	 and	 the	measures	 adopted	 to	contrast	 the	 phenomenon;	 2)	 the	 perceived	 negative	 impact	 that	 the	 arrival	 of	Chinese	goods	has	caused	not	only	among	manufacturers	but	also	wholesalers	and	retailers.	These	issues	are	explored	in	Chapter	4.				
FDI	Between	the	late	1990s	and	mid-2000s,	most	of	the	investment	that	drove	the	economic	 growth	 attributed	 to	 Kibaki’s	 economic	 reform	 programme	 was	domestic404.	Chege	suggests	that	“foreign	direct	 investment	(FDI)	 inflows,	 though	growing	 exponentially	 by	 2007,	 were	 modest	 in	 comparison	 to	 local	 capital	formation”405.	Statistics	are	not	readily	available	as	Kenya	started	compiling	surveys	
                                                399	Chege,	op.	cit.,	p.	24.	400	Ibid.,	p.	25.	401	Ibid.	402	Ibid.	403	Simoes	and	Hidalgo,	op.	cit.		404	Chege,	op.	cit.,	p.	26.	405	Ibid.	
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providing	capital	flows	information	only	in	the	late	2000s,	starting	with	a	reference	period	of	2007-2008.	Since	2013	the	Foreign	Investment	Survey	has	been	compiled	annually.		In	2012,	“countries	within	the	EU	accounted	for	the	bulk	of	FDI	inflows	followed	by	countries	from	the	Far	East	contributing	36.0	per	cent	and	31.9	per	cent	of	the	total	FDI	inflows”406.	In	2013,	however,	“there	was	a	reverse	in	the	trend	with	Far	East	countries	contributing	the	bulk	of	the	flows	followed	by	EU	with	a	share	of	38.6	per	 cent	 and	 16.6	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 total	 FDI	 inflows,	 respectively” 407 .	 This	 was	presumably	also	linked	to	problems	such	as	the	financial	crisis	in	Europe	and	the	climate	of	 instability	 in	Kenya	after	the	terrorist	attack	at	the	Westgate	Shopping	Mall	in	Nairobi	where	more	than	a	150	people	died.		The	 Kenya	 Investment	 Authority	 (KenInvest)	 reports	 that	 there	 is	 “no	domination	 of	 Foreign	 Direct	 Investment	 [in	 Kenya]	 from	 the	 Chinese”.	 The	authority	 says	 that	 it	 is	 pursuing	 amendments	 to	 existing	 legislation	 that	would	allow	 for	 greater	 vetting	 of	 investors	 in	 the	 country	 while	 protecting	 certain	industries	from	foreigners.	KenInvest	Managing	Director	states	that:	“through	the	reviews	 we	 are	 proposing	 to	 develop	 a	 negative	 list	 that	 will	 preclude	 some	investment	areas	for	local	investors	only”408.	In	Chapter	4,	the	link	between	small	traders	 and	 investors	 in	 tackled	 shedding	 light	 on	 how	 the	 Kenya	 Investment	Authority	 has	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 arrival	 of	 China	 has	 exacerbated	 the	inadequacy	of	the	existing	system	of	governance	to	safeguarding	Kenyan	interests.			
3.4.3 The	sectors	of	analysis	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	2,	domestic	preferences	are	not	important	because	they	are	 objective	 facts,	 but	 because	 they	 have	 social	meanings	 attributed	 by	 specific	actors	to	specific	circumstances409.	As	a	consequence,	the	‘relevance’	of	a	sector,	sub-sector,	issue-area	is	such	because	it	is	perceived	so	by	actors	at	a	specific	point	in	time.	 The	 idea	 to	 develop	 a	 sectoral	 analysis	 is	 well	 situated	 within	 a	 body	 of	literature	 that	 recognises	 that	 “actual	 modern	 states	 encompass	 dozens	 of	institutionally	 distinct	 policy	 sectors	 with	 highly	 diverse	 organisational	architectures”410	and	thus	aggregating	patterns	of	institutions	and	practices	is	not	
                                                406	Kenya	National	Bureau	of	Statistics,	Foreign	Investment	Survey	2015,	Kenya	National	Bureau	of	Statistics,	Nairobi,	2015,	p.	16.	407	Ibid.	408	M.	Muthoki,	‘Economic	ties	with	Africa	top	agenda	of	China’s	new	president’,	Africa	Review,	24	March	2013.	409	Wendt,	1999,	op.	cit.		410	Sellers,	op.	cit.,	p.	129.	
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helpful	 to	 explain	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 and	 interaction	 between	 domestic	 and	international	 stakeholders.	 By	 disaggregating	 the	 state	 and	 social	 structures	 in	defined	policy	areas,	not	only	vertical	diversity	 is	emphasised	but	also	horizontal	heterogeneity	 emerges.	 Practices	 of	 governance	 have	 changed	 in	 Kenya	 as	 a	consequence	 of	 democratic	 reform	and	 constitutional	 changes	 (devolution,	more	openness	 towards	 associational	 life,	 etc.),	 and	 externally,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 political	tensions	(the	Kibaki	era,	‘Look	East’	policy,	crowned	by	the	ICC	trials),	giving	rise	to	shifting	 patterns	 of	 power	 sharing	 between	 state	 and	 society.	 Bureaucratic	apparatuses	are	different	in	terms	of	objectives,	autonomy	and	the	scope	of	policy	tools,	and	as	consequence	their	capacity	to	respond	to	foreign-triggered	pressures.	Focusing	 on	 sectors	 also	 serves	 the	 purpose	 of	 identifying	 differences	 for	 state-society	relations	across	sectoral	and	national	institutions411.		The	relevance	of	the	sector,	for	Kenya,	is	measured	based	on	policy	frameworks,	in	particular	Kenya	Vision	2030.	These	provide	the	national	context	within	which	interests	are	prioritised.	However,	in	an	attempt	to	study	‘real’	governance,	the	sub-sectors	chosen	to	be	studied	do	not	only	respond	to	national	but	also	issue-specific	interests.	 Similarly,	 they	 do	 reflect	 not	 only	 state	 preferences,	 but	 also	 the	preferences	of	other	stakeholders	such	as	civil	society	groups	and	the	private	sector.	Hence	the	importance	of	a	layered	interests	approach,	as	conceptualised	in	Chapter	2.		Although	infrastructure	was	not	selected	as	a	stand-alone	sector,	aspects	linked	to	it	are	unpacked	through	the	three	chosen	sectors.	In	Chapter	4	(Trade),	aspects	associated	with	the	development	of	infrastructure	are	looked	at	from	a	labour	rights	perspective	 through	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 interaction	 between	 Kenyan	 domestic	institutions	 (trade	unions,	 the	Ministry	of	Labour	and	 the	 Judiciary)	and	Chinese	companies.	 In	 Chapter	 5	 (Healthcare)	 it	 is	 looked	 at	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	loans/grants’	negotiation	and	management	for	the	construction	of	infrastructure	for	health,	namely	hospitals	and	the	Malaria	Centre.	Finally,	in	Chapter	6	(Education)	it	is	 touched	 upon	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 education	 and	 training	 of	 human	resources	mainly	in	the	context	of	industrial	production	development.		The	cases	were	not	identified	only	as	a	consequence	of	their	relevance	in	policy	documents/for	stakeholders.	Some	cases	were	deemed	important	by	the	researcher,	mostly	 because	 the	Kenyan	 context/dynamics	 did	not	 seem	 to	 fit	 general	 China-
                                                411	Ibid.,	p.	136.	
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Africa	patterns.	It	was	thus	deemed	interesting	to	reveal	if,	in	reality,	Kenya	did	not	fit,	and	if	so,	why	and	how.																																																	
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CHAPTER	4 	
Kenya-China	trade	practices:	labour	issues	and	‘unfair’	
competition	
		
4.1 The	context		Trade-related	problems	triggered	by	the	Chinese	increased/expanded	activities	in	 Africa	 have	 been	 among	 the	 most	 discussed	 topics	 on	 China-Africa	 relations.	Perceptions	 of	 Chinese	 companies	 exploiting	 the	 local	 work	 force	 and	 Chinese	entrepreneurs	 stealing	 business	 to	 locals	 have	 fuelled	 debates	 in	 the	 media,	academia	as	well	as	among	stakeholders	sometimes	leading	to	protests	and	killings	in	countries	as	different	as	Zambia,	Namibia412,	Lesotho413,	Kenya414	and	more.		In	turn,	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 solidarity,	 mutual	 benefit,	 friendship	 that	 the	 Chinese	government	has	gradually	started	promoting	from	the	‘bottom’,	through	people-to-people	 engagements	 and	 soft	 power	 instruments,	 has	 been	 seen	 as	 a	 way	 to	counterbalance	 the	 negative	 perception	 that	 has	 grown	 in	 African	 contexts,	especially	in	relation	to	labour-related	and	trade-related	issues.	These	re-actions	to	the	Chinese	presence	have	led	to	generalisations	concerning	the	inability	of	African	states	to	safeguard	their	domestic	space	and	their	people’s	interests	in	the	relations	with	 the	 Chinese.	 As	 Giese	 points	 out,	 especially	 in	 media	 reports	 “it	 is	 power	differentials,	 competition,	 tension	 and	 conflict	 between	 disempowered	 African	locals	and	(at	least	economically)	powerful	Chinese	–	the	latter	as	exoticized	as	alien	“others”	–	that	are	often	the	focus	of	attention”415.	Studies	have	mostly	focused	on	capturing	the	‘perceptions’	of	Africans416,	rather	than	understanding	 their	motivations	and	modalities	of	action	 to	safeguard	 their	interests	in	the	relations	with	the	Chinese.	It	is	undeniable	that	the	arrival	of	Chinese	companies	and	the	entrance	of	Chinese	products	in	Kenya,	like	in	most	other	African	countries,	has	been	pro-actively	carried	out	by	Chinese	actors	–	at	least	in	the	first	phases	 –	 who	 were	 encouraged	 by	 the	 Chinese	 Go	 Out	 policy	 to	 invest	 abroad.	
                                                412	A.	Yaw	Baah	and	H.	Jauch	eds.,	Chinese	Investments	in	Africa:	A	Labour	Perspective,	African	Labour	Research	Network,	May	2009.	413	‘Lesotho:	Anti-Chinese	resentment	flares’,	IRIN,	24	January	2008.	414	Interviews.	415	K.	Giese,	‘Perceptions,	Practices	and	Adaptations:	Understanding	Chinese–African	Interactions	in	Africa’,	Journal	of	
Current	Chinese	Affairs,	vol.	43,	no.	1,	2014,	p.	3.	416	Giese,	2014.	
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However,	 this	 should	 not	 be	 automatically	 associated	 with	 an	 unwillingness	 or	inability	on	the	Kenyan	side,	to	negotiate	the	relations	to	protect	their	interests.	The	aim	of	the	chapter	is	to	use	trade	trends	as	a	starting	point	to	analyse	Kenyan	motivations	and	modalities	in	negotiating	the,	relatively	new,	entrance	of	Chinese	investors,	 entrepreneurs	 and	 products.	 The	 analysis	 of	 this	 process	 implies	understanding	 the	 meaning	 that	 Chinese	 goods/activities	 have	 taken	 on	 for	different	Kenyan	stakeholders	(in	particular,	in	relations	to	their	interests)	and	the	rationale	 behind	 the	 actions	 taken.	 In	 Kenya,	 the	 presence	 of	 China	 in	 trade	 is	distributed	 along	 the	 socio-economic	 ladder,	 ranging	 from	 mega-infrastructural	projects	 brokered	 by	 the	 executive,	 to	 middle-sized	 businesses	 importing	 from	China	 for	wholesale	 distribution,	 to	 small	 shops	 retailing	 Chinese	 products.	 As	 a	consequence,	the	interests	at	stake	are	likely	to	vary	considerably	within	the	country,	
giving	rise	to	competition	among	national	actors	even	before	that	with	the	Chinese.	The	layered-interests	approach	conceptualised	in	Chapter	2	then	becomes	a	crucial	tool	to	unpack	the	relations.		This	chapter	focuses	on	revealing	the	processes	of	interaction	between	state	and	non-state	actors	when	it	comes	to	negotiating	and	safeguarding	Kenyan	interests	in	the	context	of	commercial	engagements	with	the	Chinese.		The	analysis	looks	at	the	environment	within	which	these	relational	processes	unfold	so	to	contextualise	the	arrival	of	the	Chinese	better.	Compared	to	the	next	two	chapters,	this	one	is	harder	to	fit	in	a	specific	sectoral	box.	The	three	cases	selected	represent	the	most	common	
opportunities	and	challenges	Kenyan	actors	are	facing	in	the	commercial	engagement	
with	China,	where	China	is	seen	as	a	force	hindering	development	but	also	a	partner	
in	 development.	 The	 cases	 concern:	 labour	 disputes	 negotiated	 between	 Kenyan	trade	 unions	 and	 Chinese	 companies;	 the	 identification	 of	 gaps	 in	 the	 system	protecting	Kenyan	intellectual	property	rights,	increasingly	damaged	by	the	import	of	counterfeit	items	made	in	China;	the	negotiation	of	competing	interests	between	Kenyan	wholesalers	and	retailers	in	relation	to	their	respective	engagements	with	China,	including	the	resolution	of	the	protest	that	occurred	in	August	2012	against	Chinese	small	shop	owners	in	Nairobi.			
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4.1.1 China-Africa	labour	issues	and	‘unfair’	competition	 	Reactions	 to	 Chinese	 trade	 and	 investment	 activities	 in	 Africa	 have	 been	diversified	with	some	groups	highly	valuing	the	new(er)	set	of	actors	while	others	strongly	opposing	them.	Studies	on	these	reactions	have	focused	on	how	Chinese	companies	have	exploited	the	local	(African)	labour	force	and	how	they	have	tended	to	employ	Chinese	workers	vis-à-vis	local	ones417.	Similarly,	in	the	case	of	trade	of	fast-moving	goods,	the	studies	have	focused	on	how	the	entry	of	Chinese	products	in	national/local	contexts	has	caused	economic	damage	to	local	manufacturers	and	traders.		However,	 these	 specific	 issues	 have	 only	marginally	 been	 tackled	 on	 broader	official	 platforms.	 For	 instance,	 the	 China-Africa	 Trade	 Unions	 High-Level	Symposium	was	held	for	the	first	time	in	2014.	It	was	organised	by	the	All-China	Federation	of	Trade	Unions	whose	General	Secretary	commented:	“this	Seminar	is	a	new	attempt	for	Chinese	trade	unions	to	conform	to	the	new	requirements	and	expectations	by	African	trade	unions,	and	to	serve	the	Chinese	enterprises	“going	out”	 strategy.	 It	 is	 also	 about	 Chinese	 and	 African	 trade	 unions	 enriching	 the	cooperation	content	and	innovating	the	forms	of	cooperation	to	promote	the	overall	friendly	 relations	 between	 China	 and	 Africa”418 .	 The	 officialization	 of	 the	 trade	unions’	engagement	was	an	adjustment	to	fill	a	gap	concerning	labour	issues.		In	the	case	of	trade	of	fast-moving	goods,	which	have	given	rise	to	debates	about	unfair	competition	by	the	Chinese,	institutionalised	meetings	have	mostly	revolved	around	 the	 economic	 dimension	 of	 these	 relations	 rather	 than	 the	 social	consequences	 associated	 with	 them	 or	 the	 strategies	 of	 interaction	 devised	 by	African	actors.	As	mentioned	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	conscious	creation,	by	the	Chinese	government,	of	people-to-people	events	has	been	consequential,	to	a	great	extent,	 to	 the	 discontent	 that	 Chinese	 trade	 practices	 have	 caused	 in	 Africa.	 As	previously	pointed	out,	these	events	are	not	conceived	to	find	pathways	to	improve	‘actual’	 dynamics	 of	 engagement	 but	 are	 rather,	 largely,	 public	 relations	platforms419.			
                                                417	Yaw	Baah	and	Jauch	eds.,	op.	cit.	418	All-China	Federation	of	Trade	Unions,	op.	cit.		419	This	is	not	too	dissimilar	from	the	practices	of	the	ACFTU	within	China,	where	the	Federation	has	not	managed	to	successfully	tackle	the	challenges	that	rapid	economic	reforms	have	raised	(thanks	to	Prof.	Howell	and	Dr.	Large	for	advising	me	to	consider	the	domestic	and	international	similaries	of	ACFTU’s	practices).		
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4.1.2 Kenya-China	relations		In	Kenya	Vision	2030’s	first	five-year	plan,	“the	trade	sector	was	identified	as	one	of	the	key	engines	of	the	economy	due	to	its	immense	contribution	to	Kenya’s	GDP	and	employment	creation	through	trade	(exports	and	imports)	and	investments”420.	China	is	seen	as	a	key	partner	in	the	achievement	of	Kenya	Vision	2030,	in	particular	for	 the	 development	 of	 enablers	 such	 as	 infrastructure,	 mainly	 roads,	 railways,	ports421.	As	showed	in	the	previous	chapter,	in	the	past	ten	years	China	has	invested	in	Kenya	both	 in	 terms	of	FDI	and	trade	 flow.	However,	while	Chinese	 initiatives	have	provided	opportunities,	they	have	also	created	challenges	for	Kenyan	state	and	non-state	 actors	 to	 exercise	 or	 strengthen	 control	 over	 the	 modalities	 and	motivations	 of	 engagement.	 The	 arrival	 of	 China’s	 products	 and	 companies	 has	given	rise	to	a	wide	variety	of	interests	on	the	Kenyan	side.	Therefore,	it	is	crucial	to	study	 the	 relations,	 by	 differentiating	 actors’	 interests	 and	 the	 systems	 of	governance	within	which	they	are	negotiated.			
4.2 Kenya’s	responses	The	interaction	between	Kenyan	stakeholders	in	the	commercial	sector	vis-à-vis	China	mainly	revolves	around	re-acting	to	the	new	player	within	a	national	context	that	 is	 largely	 defined	 and	 legitimised	 by	 Kenyan	 stakeholders.	 In	 other	 words,	Kenyan	 formal	 and	 informal	 behaviour	 constitutes	 a	 system	 of	 governance	characterised	by	significant	interactions	with	foreign	actors,	and	yet	strong	domestic	
control	over	 such	 interactions.	This	 is	 set	against	a	changing	economic	 landscape,	which	 has	 been	 trotting	 since	 the	 mid-1990s,	 and	 even	 more	 since	 the	 2000s,	toward	 industrial	 development.	 The	 interaction	 between	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 and	society	 in	 the	 trade	 and	 investment	 sector	 mainly	 revolves	 around	 tackling	
challenges	raised	by	the	entry	of	China	in	Kenya	under	different	forms.	Sometimes	these	challenges	are	pro-actively	 ‘caused’	by	segments	of	 the	Kenyan	population,	such	as	Kenyan	traders	importing	counterfeit	items	made	in	China,	thus	enhancing	a	 national	 division	 of	 interests	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 external	 actor.	 In	 other	 cases,	however,	the	challenges	are	mainly	‘brought	in’	by	Chinese	actors.		The	 cases	 selected	 reveal	 that	 the	 engagement	 with	 China	 cannot	 easily	 be	labelled	as	beneficial	or	detrimental	as	such	conclusions	largely	depend	on	the	actor	
                                                420	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	Kenya	Vision	2030,	Second	Medium	Term	Plan	2013-2017,	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2013,	p.	54.		421	Interview	with	an	executive	at	Kenya	Vision	2030,	Nairobi,	2014-03-12.			
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at	 stake.	 In	 this	 sector,	 more	 than	 in	 the	 next	 two,	 domestic	 variations	 in	 the	understanding	of	China’s	arrival	are	significant.	China	is	thus	seen	as	a	partner	in	development	 but	 also	 a	 force	 hindering	 development.	 The	 instances	where	 such	tension	between	benefits	and	disadvantages	have	been	identified	as	most	significant	by	the	stakeholders	involved	are:	1. The	 problems	 encountered	 by	 Kenyan	 trade	 unions	 as	 well	 as	 employers’	federations	and	state	structures	in	making	Chinese	companies	comply	with	the	law.	 The	 study	 mainly	 looks	 at	 the	 interaction	 between	 trade	 unions,	 the	Federation	of	Kenya	Employers,	the	Ministry	of	Labour	as	well	as	the	judiciary	(embodied,	in	this	case,	by	the	Industrial	Court).	2. Products	made	in	China	imported	to	Kenya	and	their	quality.	In	particular,	the	focus	 is	 on	 counterfeit	 goods	 and	 the	 measures	 adopted	 to	 curb	 the	phenomenon.	Such	actions	have	given	birth	to	a	brand	new	law	and	a	brand	new	agency	in	charge	of	dealing	with	counterfeits.	The	actors	involved	were	mainly	the	 Kenya	 Association	 of	 Manufacturers,	 the	 Parliament,	 a	 number	 of	 state	institutions	that	later	formed	the	Anti-Counterfeits	Agency	and	the	Presidency.		3. The	 competition	 between	 Kenyan	 and	 Chinese	 small	 traders	 in	 Nairobi.	 The	study	 focuses	 on	 the	 Kenya	 Association	 of	 Manufacturers,	 the	 Kenya	 Export	Promotion	Council	and	their	interaction	with	local	authorities	such	as	the	City	Council	and	Chinese	state	and	non-state	actors.		The	aim	of	the	chapter	is	to	reveal	the	actors	involved,	and	study	their	behaviour,	if	the	interaction	between	them	matters	to	the	solution	of	the	perceived	problem,	and	 if	 so,	 how.	As	 an	 interviewee	 reminded,	 referring	 to	 the	 challenge	 posed	 by	counterfeit	 goods	 in	Kenya,	 “our	 focus	 is	 on	 the	process,	 not	 the	 source”422.	 The	process	referred	to	the	interaction	of	a	number	of	Kenyan	stakeholders	to	make	sure	the	entry	and	diffusion	of	counterfeits	are	curbed	while	the	source	referred	to	China,	i.e.	the	country	of	origin	of	most	counterfeit	goods	entering	Kenya	(see	section	2.2	below).	 Similarly,	 in	 the	 other	 cases,	 this	 chapter	 analyses	 different	 types	 of	
interaction	 dynamics	 –	 processes	 –	 in	 relation	 to	 issues	 that	 are	 perceived	consequential	 to	 the	Chinese	 entry	 in	 the	 sector	 –	 source	 –	 focusing	 on	 how	 the	process	is	dealt	with	rather	than	on	the	origin	of	the	problem.	The	breakdown	that	
                                                422	Kenya	Institute	for	Public	Policy	Research	and	Analysis	(KIPPRA),	Kenya	Economic	Report	2013:	Creating	an	Enabling	
Environment	for	Stimulating	Investment	for	Competitive	and	Sustainable	Counties,	Nairobi,	2013.			
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follows	shows	how	Kenyan	actors	move	across	formal	and	informal	structures	for	the	 achievement	 of	 interests	 and	 negotiate	 tailor-made	 solutions,	 some	 more	generalisable	than	others.			
4.2.1 Labour	relations/disputes	The	choice	to	focus	on	labour	relations	was	dictated	by	the	need	to	understand	in	depth	 an	 aspect	 of	 Sino-African	 relations	 that	 is	 often	 under	 the	 spotlight:	 the	unlawful	treatment	of	workers	by	Chinese	companies	in	Africa.	Complaints	by	locals	are	no	exception	in	Kenya	where	Chinese	companies,	especially	in	the	infrastructure	sector,	have	become	predominant	 in	the	past	5-10	years.	 In	 line	with	the	general	argument	of	the	thesis,	the	analysis	below	focuses	on	how	Kenyan	actors	deal	with	such	complaints	–	rather	than	investigating	how	Chinese	companies	treat	workers.	It	is	important	to	remind	that	Chinese	companies	are	not	the	only	ones	breaching	the	 law	 in	 Kenya	 –	 other	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 companies	 are	 found	 guilty	 too.	However,	it	is	explained	below	in	what	areas	Chinese	companies	have	been	singled	out	by	Kenyan	stakeholders	and	why.			
Trade	Unionism	in	Kenya	Kenya’s	trade	unionism	is	of	early	date,	and	as	put	by	the	Central	Organisation	of	Trade	Unions,	it	is	“a	child	of	economic,	social	and	political	strives”423.	It	originated	in	the	1940s	out	of	grievances	concerning	the	discrimination	of	Africans	based	on	unequal	 treatment	compared	 to	 the	whites.	By	 the	 late	1940s	a	number	of	 trade	unions	had	been	formed,	and	in	1952	the	first	national	federation	of	trade	unions	was	set	up:	the	Kenya	Federation	of	Registered	Trade	Unions	(KFRTU).	It	was	not	a	trade	 union	 itself	 but	 an	 umbrella	 organisation	 affiliated	 with	 the	 International	Confederation	of	Free	Trade	Unions.	In	the	same	year,	1952,	one	of	Africa’s	bloodiest	struggles	against	colonial	rule	unfolded	in	Kenya:	the	Mau	Mau	rebellion,	also	called	Kenya	 Emergency.	 A	 number	 of	 trade	 unions’	 leaders	 were	 arrested	 during	 the	Emergency	 and	 Tom	 Mboya,	 charismatic	 leader	 and	 key	 figure	 in	 the	 struggle	against	colonialism	as	well	as	in	the	formation	of	the	Kenyan	Africa	National	Union	(KANU),	became	the	General	Secretary	of	the	KFRTU.	In	the	1950s	and	1960s,	trade	unions	contributed	significantly	to	the	fight	for	freedom	thus	becoming	advocates	
                                                423	Central	Organisation	of	Trade	Unions	(COTU)-Kenya,	‘Historical	Background	of	the	Trade	Union	Movement	in	Kenya’,	
COTU	[website],	<http://www.cotu-kenya.org/site-page/historical-background>.	
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not	only	for	the	rights	of	workers	but	also	for	the	fight	against	colonialism	and	the	inequalities	linked	to	it.	In	1955	KFRTU	changed	its	name	to	Kenya	Federation	of	Labour,	which	was	de-registered	in	1965	after	conflicts	took	place	with	a	splinter	umbrella	union,	the	Kenya	African	Workers	Congress,	leading	to	the	death	of	three	trade	unionists	and	a	high	number	of	injured.	These	two	bodies	were	replaced	by	the	Central	Organisation	of	Trade	Unions	(COTU),	which	now	represents,	through	the	affiliate	unions,	about	1.5	million	workers	in	Kenya424.	Since	then	“trade	unions	have	continued	 to	be	 strong	 institutions	 influencing	various	government	policies	through	social	dialogue.	As	agents	of	social	justice,	COTU(K)	continued	to	champion	for	the	rights	of	not	only	workers	but	Kenyans	as	a	whole,	and	this	was	evident	when	COTU(K)	 was	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 the	 change	 process	 that	 ushered	 in	 the	 NARC	Coalition	Government	in	2002”425.	Studies	on	trade	unions	in	Kenya	do	not	seem	to	be	diffused,	exception	made	for	those	 on	 the	 period	 of	 the	 1950s-1960s,	 it	 is	 thus	 hard	 to	 ascertain	 the	 level	 of	independence	they	enjoy	from	the	government,	especially	the	Ministry	of	Labour.	What	 is	 evident	 is	 that	 the	 2010	Constitution	 provides	 for	more	 space	 for	 trade	unions,	in	particular	Section	41.2	(c-d)	states	that:	“Every	worker	has	the	right	to	form,	join	or	participate	in	the	activities	and	programmes	of	a	trade	union,	and	to	go	on	 strike”	 and	 Section	 41.5	 “Every	 trade	 union,	 employers’	 organisation	 and	employer	 has	 the	 right	 to	 engage	 in	 collective	 bargaining”,	 rights	 that	 were	 not	granted	before.	This	change	“has	led	to	a	fresh	vibrancy	in	trade	unionism”	as	can	be	observed	by	the	unprecedented	series	of	strikes	and	other	 forms	of	 industrial	action	by	disgruntled	employees	in	different	sectors	that	took	place	in	2012426.		Contemporary	disputes	with	the	government	mainly	revolve	around	wages	and,	to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 around	 the	 registration	of	 unions	or	negotiations	 for	Contract	Bargaining	 Agreements	 (CBAs).	 The	 Central	 Organisation	 of	 Trade	Unions	 is	 the	umbrella	 body	 under	 which	 most	 Kenyan	 trade	 unions	 are	 registered.	 As	 an	umbrella	 organisation,	 it	 does	 not	 negotiate	 directly	 with	 companies	 but	 rather	pivots	between	trade	unions	on	one	side	and	the	government	on	the	other.			
	
	
                                                424	Kenya	Yearbook	2014,	op.	cit.,	p.	542.		425	COTU,	op.	cit.	 	426	Kenya	Yearbook	2014,	op.	cit.,	p.	542.	
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Kenya-China	Official	Relations	Kenya-China	trade	unions	have	had	links	since	the	1990s427.	These	relations	have	mainly	 taken	 place	 between	 umbrella	 organisations,	 namely	 Kenya’s	 Central	Organisation	 of	 Trade	 Unions	 and	 China’s	 All-China	 Federation	 of	 Trade	 Unions	(ACFTU).	According	to	a	senior	officer	at	COTU,	relations	with	the	Chinese	started	increasing	after	“2005	when	they	were	trying	to	get	into	ILO	and	were	looking	for	votes”428.	According	 to	COTU,	 in	 that	period	 formal	 relations	between	Kenya	and	China	increased,	in	the	form	of	“high-level	meetings	aimed	at	establishing	relations”.	The	exchanges	were	mainly	between	COTU	and	ACFTU	and	although	the	Chinese	government	started	sponsoring,	on	a	yearly	basis	since	2005,	representatives	of	five	Kenyan	trade	unions	to	go	to	China	for	workshops	and	training,	COTU	suggests	that	“it	 is	not	 the	trade	unions	that	go	but	rather	members	of	 the	Board	of	COTU	and	general	 secretaries”429	of	 trade	unions,	who	merely	cover	an	 institutional	 role.	 In	other	words,	 the	 actual	 interaction	 does	 not	 take	 place	 between	 operative	 trade	unionists,	but	rather	among	high-level	officers	and	umbrella	organisations.	According	to	sources	once	the	delegates	arrive	in	China	“there's	one	or	two	days	of	meetings	on	China	and	then	we	visit	factories	and	they	show	how	they	operate.	To	us	it	is	not	very	useful,	they	have	a	controlled	economy,	collective	bargaining	is	a	state	 function.	 But	 they	 invite	 us	 and	 pay	 the	 costs.” 430 	Despite	 Kenyan	 trade	unionism	being	more	sophisticated	than	the	Chinese,	interviewees	report	that	“we	are	interested	in	understanding	the	way	they	operate.	Here	trade	unions	are	very	powerful,	 they	create	 investments	 in	hotels.	When	 they	go	 there	 they	come	back	with	 ideas	and	then	the	info	 is	passed	to	the	trade	union	leadership.	They	report	how	 they	 do	 things	 back	 there,	 their	 laws,	 their	 collective	 bargaining	 and	 we	compare	whether	Chinese	companies	here	are	doing	the	same”431.		Beyond	 the	 visits	 to	 China,	 ACFTU	 has	 provided	 COTU	with	 tools	 to	 increase	capacity	 building	 of	 trade	 unions	 in	 Kenya.	 For	 instance,	 in	 2003	 the	 All-China	Federation	of	Trade	Unions	donated	a	batch	of	computers	to	COTU	to	help	the	latter	improve	 its	 capacity	 in	 information	 technology 432 .	 Secretary	 General	 of	 COTU,	Francis	Atwoli,	stated	that	the	computers	donated	by	ACFTU	together	with	COTU's	contribution	of	two	computers	would	be	used	to	launch	a	computer	training	centre	
                                                427	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Central	Organisation	of	Trade	Unions,	Nairobi,	2014-01-27.	428	Ibid.		429	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Central	Organisation	of	Trade	Unions,	Nairobi,	2014-09-17.	430	Ibid.	431	Ibid.	432	‘China,	Kenya	Trade	Unions	Enhance	Ties’,	People	Daily,	8	January	2003.	
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at	the	Tom	Mboya	Labour	College	in	Kenya's	western	city	of	Kisumu	to	train	labour	movement	personnel.	In	2012	ACFTU	donated	USD	100,000	to	COTU	towards	COTU	and	 its	 affiliated	 trade	 unions’	 capacity	 building	 programme.	 The	 donation	 was	aimed	at	Kenya’s	top	trade	union	leaders.	Through	a	capacity	building	programme	at	 Tom	 Mboya	 Labour	 College,	 the	 leaders	 would	 equip	 themselves	 with	 “the	necessary	tools	to	confront	both	employers	and	government	with	facts	as	far	as	the	plight	of	workers	 is	 concerned”433.	According	 to	 a	 senior	officer	 at	COTU,	 “COTU	asked	 for	 the	 donation.	We	 designed	 our	 own	 programme	with	 it,	 and	we	 train	leaders	in	capacity	building,	governance”.	The	programme,	however,	does	not	seem	to	be	designed	 to	 learn	about	 specific	 challenges	posed	by	Chinese	companies	 in	Kenya.	A	COTU	senior	officer	suggests	that	due	to	the	Chinese	involvement	in	‘anti-social	 behaviour’	 in	 Kenya,	 such	 as	 poaching,	 “donating	 is	 a	 way	 for	 them	 of	attracting	 looking	 East	 rather	 than	 West”.	 However,	 Kenyan	 trade	 unions	 are	generally	not	aware	of/engaged	in	COTU-ACFTU	relations.	Consequently,	they	are	unable	 to	relate	 the	donations	of	computers	 (used	at	COTU	headquarters)	or	 the	capacity	 building	 programme	 to	 China’s	 soft	 power	 strategy.	 This	 helps	 to	understand	 the	 gap	 between	 formal	 relations	 and	 actual	 relations:	 COTU	 is	perceived	to	advance	high	political	interests	while	operative	trade	unions	promote	the	interests	of	workers.			The	 focus	 of	 the	 following	 section	 is	 on	 analysing	 the	 interaction	 between	 an	operative	 trade	 union	 and	 COTU,	 Chinese	 firms	 and	 the	Ministry	 of	 Labour.	 The	trade	union	selected	is	involved	in	protecting	workers	in	the	infrastructure	sector.	It	will	be	referred	to	as	Trade	Union	(TU)434.	The	decision	to	focus	on	disputes	in	the	infrastructure	sector	is	due	to	their	relevance	not	only	to	Kenya-China	relations	but	also,	more	broadly,	to	Sino-African	relations.	The	Chinese	presence,	especially	in	the	building	and	construction	sector	in	Kenya	has	significantly	increased	in	the	past	ten	years	and	has	become	predominant	not	only	in	the	development	of	mega-projects	but	also	in	real	estate	and	smaller	infrastructural	projects.	Trade	unions	in	building	and	 construction	 are	 the	 ones	 whose	members	 have	 been	most	 affected	 by	 the	Chinese	presence435.			
	
                                                433	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Central	Organisation	of	Trade	Unions,	Nairobi,	2014-09-17.	434	The	ethical	logic	behind	the	decision	to	anonymise	the	union	can	be	found	in	Chapter	1,	Methodology	section.		435	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Central	Organisation	of	Trade	Unions,	Nairobi,	2014-09-17.	
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Labour	Disputes	and	Negotiations	According	to	TU	and	COTU,	the	main	problems	for	trade	unions	(in	building	and	construction)	in	negotiating	with	Chinese	companies	concern	the	lack	of	willingness	by	Chinese	companies	to	recognise	labour	unions	and	the	lack	of	willingness	to	sign	
Contract	 Bargaining	 Agreements	 (CBAs).	 This	 stance	 originates	 mainly	 from	differences	 in	 employment	 environments436	in	 Kenya	 and	 China.	While	 in	 Kenya	industrial	 relations	are	oriented	 towards	workers’	 rights	and	welfare,	unions	are	vocal	and	legally	protected,	in	China	they	are	a	function	of	the	state,	geared	towards	production	and	delivery,	at	the	expense	of	freedom	and	rights.			
Recognition	TU	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2014	 had	 13	 cases	 open	 with	 Chinese	 companies	 over	recognition	issues437.	The	recognition	agreement	stipulated	between	a	trade	union	and	a	company	is	compulsory	by	law	when	50+1%	employees	of	the	given	company	are	members	of	a	union.	It	is	common	habit	for	local	and	foreign	companies	working	in	building	and	construction	to	register	with	one	of	the	three	employers’	associations	present	 in	 Kenya.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 they	 automatically	 recognise	 the	 legal	environment,	including	the	need	to	negotiate	a	CBA	with	a	trade	union,	implying	in	turn	 recognition	 of	 the	 latter.	 Even	 when	 the	 companies	 do	 not	 register	 with	employers’	associations,	there	is	a	widespread	understanding	by	foreign	companies,	let	alone	local	ones,	of	the	norms	regulating	the	sector:	the	role	of	the	unions	is	not	questioned	(the	enforcement	of	CBAs	is	less	straightforward	and	will	be	addressed	in	the	following	section).	However,	Chinese	companies	have	not	registered	with	any	employers’	 association,	 and	 “they	 say	 they	 are	 not	 bound	 by	 that	 recognition	agreement”438.	Registering	with	an	association	is	voluntary,	not	compulsory,	but	the	Ministry	 of	 Labour	 advises	 both	 local	 and	 foreign	 contractors	 to	 join	 one	 as	 the	associations	 provide	 more	 protection.	 Employers’	 associations	 (in	 building	 and	construction),	argue	that	they	are	“chasing	the	Chinese	contractors”439	to	register,	as	this	can	only	make	Chinese	companies	feel	increasingly	integrated	into	the	local	environment	and	aware	of	rules	and	regulations,	but	instead,	“they	have	their	own	association	of	 contractors	 in	Kenya”440,	 i.e.	 the	Kenya-China	Economic	and	Trade	
                                                436	See	also	Chapter	6,	TVET	case.	437	Interview	with	an	officer	at	a	Trade	Union,	Nairobi,	2014-11-13.	438	Ibid.	439	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Kenya	Association	of	Building	and	Engineering	Consultants	(KABCEC),	Nairobi,	2014-09-14.	440	Interview	with	the	Roads	and	Civil	Engineering	Contractors	Association	(RACECA),	Nairobi,	2014-09-16.	
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Association.	 The	 Association	 was	 set	 up	 by	 major	 Chinese	 infrastructure	 State	Owned	 Enterprises	 in	 Kenya,	 following	 a	 request	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Economic	 and	Commercial	 Counsellor’s	 Office	 of	 the	 PRC.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 association	 was	 to	guarantee	more	cohesion	among	Chinese	large	infrastructure	companies,	especially	in	 their	 relations	 with	 Kenyan	 institutions,	 and	 to	 increase	 corporate	 social	responsibility,	which	was	seen,	in	turn,	as	fundamental	to	improve	the	reputation	of	the	 companies	 within	 the	 local	 communities 441 .	 	 Large	 Chinese	 infrastructure	companies	are,	reportedly,	fiercely	competing	against	each	other	in	Kenya,	rather	than	against	local	or	other	foreign	companies.	As	a	consequence,	the	creation	of	an	association	 was	 also	 seen	 as	 a	 measure	 to	 boost	 cooperation	 and	 decrease	competitiveness	among	them.	However,	senior	officers	from	the	companies	suggest	that	amalgamation	is	tough,	both	internally	among	the	companies,	and	externally	with	Kenyan	authorities	and	institutions442.	The	Association	is	wholly	independent	of	Kenyan	institutions	and	has	no	relations	with	the	Federation	of	Kenya	Employers	(FKE)	or	the	three	sectoral	(infrastructure)	federations.		This	 lack	of	 internal	cohesiveness	and	adaptability	 to	 the	 local	environment	 is	reflected	in	the	relations	with	trade	unions.	Some	Chinese	companies	have	started	recognising	trade	unions,	while	others	are	still	struggling.	According	to	TU,	“not	all	of	 them	 create	 problems,	 it	 depends	 on	 the	 company”443.	 The	 seven	 recognition	agreements	that	TU	has	achieved	to	sign	with	major	Chinese	companies	(out	of	at	least	20	open	disputes),	have	come	only	after	strikes,	reconciliation	attempts	by	the	Ministry	of	Labour,	and	an	order	issued	by	the	Industrial	Court.	These	steps	are	part	of	the	standard	procedure,	but	they	are	generally	taken	to	force	a	company	to	sign	a	CBA	or	enforce	it,	not	to	force	it	to	recognise	the	unions.	According	to	TU,	asking	a	company	to	sign	for	recognition	means	“going	back.	Our	aim	as	a	trade	union	is	a	CBA”	but	with	the	Chinese	“asking	them	to	sign	for	recognition	is	what	we	do	to	be	safe.	If	they	do	not	sign,	we	go	to	the	Industrial	Court”444.	TU,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Labour	 and	 COTU	 believe	 that	 the	 Chinese	 behaviour	originates	from	a	different	labour	relations	environment	in	China,	where	unions	are	not	 particularly	 significant,	 and	 the	 rights	 of	 workers	 are	 less	 important	 than	productivity.	Despite	acknowledging	 the	differences	 in	national	 contexts,	Kenyan	actors	 do	 not	 justify	 the	 Chinese	misbehaviour	 in	 their	 country	 and	 reflect	 that	
                                                441	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Chinese	Economic	and	Commercial	Counsellor’s	Office,	Nairobi,	2013-11-18.	442	Interviews	with	senior	officers	at	big	Chinese	infrastructure	companies	in	Kenya.		 	443	Interview	with	an	officer	at	a	Trade	Union,	Nairobi,	2014-11-13.	444	Ibid.	
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“when	you	go	to	somebody’s	house,	the	prudent	thing	to	do	would	be	to	know	what’s	expected”445.	On	top	of	this,	despite	the	existence	in	Kenya	of	legal	instruments	for	the	 protection	 of	 workers’	 rights,	 interviewees	 reported	 a	 number	 of	 obstacles	encountered	throughout	the	process	of	negotiation.	These	barriers	originated	not	only	from	the	Chinese	lack	of	willingness	to	abide	by	the	rules	but	also	from	within	
the	Kenyan	bureaucracy.		For	instance,	in	the	case	of	Synohydro,	the	company	was	uncooperative	and	did	not	wish	to	recognise	the	union.	TU	organised	strikes	in	2010446	mobilising	workers	working	for	Sinohydro	in	5/6	projects	across	the	country.	The	strike	lasted	for	five	days	after	which	TU	filed	the	case	to	the	Industrial	Court,	and	the	judge	ordered	a	referendum.	Even	though	73%	of	Sinohydro	employees	were	members	of	TU,	thus	legitimising	recognition,	the	judge	ruled	against	the	case.	According	to	a	source,	this	was	because	the	Chinese	company	allegedly	bribed	the	judge,	already	known	for	his	lack	of	integrity.	TU	filed	another	case,	which	was	ruled	by	a	different	judge	and	the	company	was	eventually	ordered	to	recognise	the	union.		A	peculiar	case,	as	defined	by	TU,	concerning	recognition	is	that	with	China	Road	and	 Bridge	 Corporation	 (CRBC).	 The	 company	 is	 among	 the	 best	 performing	 in	terms	of	CBA	enforcement.	Even	though	recognition,	CBA	signing	and	enforcement	were	all	achieved	after	protracted	court	battles,	the	company	was	one	of	the	first	to	sign	recognition,	agree	on	CBAs,	renew	and	enforce	them.	A	number	of	CBAs	have	been	signed	between	TU	and	CRBC	in	the	past	since	the	mid-2000s.	However,	when	the	 company	 started	 the	 Nairobi-Mombasa	 Standard	 Gauge	 Railway	 project,	 the	management	 refused	 to	 recognise	 TU.	 According	 to	 TU,	 the	 reason	 the	 company	opposed	to	recognising	the	union	was	that	a	different	CRBC	management	group	was	in	charge	of	the	project	and	argued	not	to	have	links	with	the	management	that	had	been	running	CRBC	projects	in	the	country	before	then.	This	led	the	union	to	ask	the	allegedly	 new	 management	 to	 sign	 a	 new	 recognition	 agreement,	 which	 was	eventually	achieved	through	strikes	and	dialogue,	rather	than	court	battles,	as	the	union	felt	that	“for	the	benefit	of	the	workers,	we	decided	that	it	was	not	worth	to	go	to	court	just	to	say	they	are	one	single	company”447.	However,	this	implied	that	the	parties	had	to	sign	a	new	CBA.	According	to	TU,	this	was	a	strategic	move	from	the	Chinese.	The	then	running	CBA	(CBA1a)	was	due	to	expire	after	a	few	months.	
                                                445Interview	with	an	executive	and	officers	at	the	Ministry	of	Labour,	Industrial	Relations	Office,	Nairobi,	2014-11-19.	446	‘Kenya	:	China	SINOHYDRO	Corp.	ordered	by	court	to	negotiate	CBA	with	Kenya	Building	Union’,	Building	and	Wood	Workers	International	[website],	8	October	2010,	<http://www.bwint.org/default.asp?index=3002>.		447	Interview	with	an	officer	at	a	Trade	Union,	Nairobi,	2014-11-13.	
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Generally,	when	a	CBA	is	renewed	(CBA1b),	the	minimum	wage	rate	is	increased.	By	signing	a	brand-new	CBA	(CBA2),	the	minimum	wage	agreed	upon	resulted	higher	than	that	agreed	upon	in	the	old	CBA	(CBA1a),	but	lower	than	the	one	that	would	have	been	negotiated	in	the	renewal	of	the	CBA	(CBA1b).	Other	Chinese	companies	used	this	method	of	negotiation,	and	 it	was	reportedly	something	that	had	never	happened	in	Kenya.		While,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 an	 existing	 legal	 framework	 channels	 the	 type	 of	interaction	 between	 the	 union,	 Chinese	 companies	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Labour,	obstacles	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 framework	 arise	 from	 both	 Kenyan	 and	Chinese	 contexts.	 To	 understand	 the	 relations	 more	 comprehensively,	 below	 a	breakdown	of	the	negotiation	processes	for	the	agreement	of	CBAs.			
Contract	Bargaining	Agreements	All	the	companies	operating	in	Kenya	are	expected	to	be	signing	CBAs	with	trade	unions,	which	are	agreements	regulating	the	relation	between	the	employer	and	the	employees	concerning	wages,	working	hours,	health	and	safety,	and	so	forth.	They	are	structured	in	accordance	with	Kenya’s	law	and	negotiations	take	place	between	the	 Kenya	 Federation	 of	 Employers,	 or	 sectoral	 employers’	 federations,	 and	 the	trade	 unions.	Once	 the	 CBA	 is	 signed,	 it	 becomes	 law,	 and	 it	 is	 registered	 at	 the	Ministry	of	Labour.		The	signing	of	such	agreement	is	common	practice	in	Kenya	by	local	and	foreign	firms.	 Although	 Chinese	 infrastructure	 companies	mainly	 arrived	 in	 Kenya	 after	Kibaki’s	shift	to	the	East,	in	the	early/mid-2000s,	most	CBAs	were	signed	by	Chinese	companies	 only	 after	 2010.	 While	 this	 coincides	 with	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 new	constitution	 in	 Kenya,	 and	 with	 increased	 guarantees	 for	 civil	 society,	 legal	frameworks	 protecting	workers’	 rights	 and	 the	 right	 to	 bargain	 collectively	 pre-dated	 the	 2010	 constitution.	 The	 Chinese	 lack	 of	 compliance	 with	 the	 law	 both	regarding	signing	the	CBA	and	the	content	of	labour	relations	(equal	pay,	minimum	wage,	health	and	safety,	etc.),	has	fuelled	labour	rights	advocates’	criticism	against	Chinese	companies.	This	 is	not	uncommon	 in	 the	rest	of	Africa.	 In	 fact,	when	the	International	 Trade	 Unions	 Confederation-Africa	 (ITUC-Africa)	 pushed	 African	trade	union	leaders	to	carry	out	a	study	in	10	countries,	 it	was	to	show	trends	in	Chinese	 companies’	 behaviour	 in	 labour	 negotiations.	 According	 to	 COTU	 “the	outcome	awakened	the	Chinese.	The	report	demonstrated	how	they	mistreat	local	
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workers.	For	instance,	in	Malawi,	they	used	the	excuse	of	the	language	barrier	for	not	signing	CBAs,	so	they	started	translating	labour	laws	in	Chinese”448.		In	Kenya,	issues	with	Chinese	companies	concerning	CBAs	revolve	around	wage	disparity	between	Chinese	and	local	employees,	minimum	wage,	health	and	safety,	overtime,	 medical	 protection 449 .	 Similarly	 to	 issues	 of	 recognition,	 Chinese	companies	have	tended	not	to	sign	a	CBA	unless	they	are	forced	to	do	so.	In	a	number	of	cases,	after	the	negotiation	process	was	initiated,	the	hostility	of	the	company	to	interact	led	to	not	only	orders	being	issued	by	the	Industrial	Court	but	also	to	the	arrest	 of	 the	 company’s	managing	 director,	who	was	 then	 forcibly	 conducted	 to	court	by	 the	police	 to	agree	on	 the	CBA.	As	with	 ‘recognition’,	 the	significance	of	CBAs	is	virtually	meaningless	to	Chinese	companies.	They	attempt	to	bypass	the	law,	and,	by	doing	so,	 they	devise	 tactics	 that	 fall	beyond	commonly	shared	norms	of	conduct.	 For	 instance,	 Jiangxi	 International,	 after	 court	 battles	with	TU,	 signed	 a	recognition	agreement.	However,	in	negotiating	a	CBA,	the	company	requested	to	negotiate	CBAs	based	on	specific	projects	rather	than	understanding	that	a	CBA	is	generally	agreed	at	the	company	level,	and	lays	general	conditions	that	apply	to	all	projects	carried	out	by	that	company.	Negotiating	specific	projects	is	not	common	practice	 in	 Kenya,	 so	 after	 a	 number	 of	 negotiation	 attempts	 through	which	 TU	asked	the	company	to	sign	a	CBA	covering	all	projects,	the	union	filed	a	complaint	with	the	Industrial	Court.		Signing	a	CBA	is,	however,	only	a	first	step	to	improving	labour	relations	as	formal	compliance	often	does	not	equal	to	implementation	compliance.	TU	stated	that	the	enforcement	of	CBAs	has	proved	to	be	difficult	to	achieve	even	with	some	local,	and	a	few	foreign,	companies,	though	among	Chinese	companies	it	has	been	widespread.	In	 comparison,	 local	 companies	 are	 “small	 time	 companies.	 They	 are	 one	 man	companies.	They	do	not	obey	out	of	ignorance	or	because	they	did	not	receive	good	legal	advice.	But	the	Chinese	companies	are	multinationals”450.	The	Chinese	lack	of	adaptation	to	the	local	environment	has	been	fought	against	but	also	defended	by	Kenyan	actors.	There	have	been	instances	of	threats	towards	trade	 unions	 visiting	 construction	 sites	 by	 police	 officers	 and	 security	 forces	engaged	by	the	company,	or	accompanying	local	government	officials.	A	source	at	TU	declared	 that	 “even	when	meetings	were	 taking	place,	 instead	of	meeting	 the	
                                                448	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Central	Organisation	of	Trade	Unions,	Nairobi,	2014-01-27.		449	Interview	with	an	officer	at	a	Trade	Union,	Nairobi,	2014-03-21.	450	Interview	with	an	officer	at	a	Trade	Union,	Nairobi,	2014-11-13.	
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managers	 of	 the	 company,	 there	 were	 Kenyan	 government	 people.	 This	 never	happened	 before.	 There	 were	 the	 district	 officer	 and	 district	 commissioner	 to	negotiate	with	us”451.	The	Ministry	of	Labour	commented	by	specifying	that	labour	
officers	must	be	the	third	party	in	the	negotiation	process	(together	with	companies	or	employers’	associations	representing	them,	and	the	trade	union),	not	county	or	
district	commissioners/officers452,	who	in	turn	represent	the	national	government.	Even	more,	the	presence	of	accompanying	police	officers,	aimed	at	intimidating	the	Union,	was	strongly	rejected	by	the	latter.	TU	reports:	“I	was	addressing	the	workers	telling	them	they	had	rights	and	the	OCPD	whispers	not	to	incite	people.	So	I	said	to	him	‘Im	telling	people	they	must	be	paid’.	Then	we	said	we	do	not	want	people	of	the	administration	in	our	meetings	and	we	left.	We	went	back	the	following	day,	and	they	didn’t	 come”453.	 According	 to	TU,	 this	 behaviour	 by	Kenyan	 administrators,	especially	when	it	comes	to	Chinese-run	projects	“is	very	common.	Now	with	the	railway	especially”454.			
Bypassing	negotiation	tables,	safeguarding	the	system	of	governance	While	the	lack	of	understanding	of	the	local	environment	by	the	Chinese	and	the	difficulties	in	communicating	with	them	are	highlighted	by	TU	and	the	Ministry	of	Labour,	what	is	most	perceived	as	unacceptable	by	both	is	the	interference	of	the	Kenyan	government	 in	 the	negotiation	process.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	Ministry	of	Labour	suggests	 that	 the	situation	 in	 the	counties	 is	 still	 chaotic	after	devolution	came	 into	 effect.	 Therefore,	 there	 are	 only	 32	 district	 labour	 officers	 for	 47	counties455.	Because	of	this	“admin	people	are	the	first	ones	to	go.	At	the	same	time,	because	of	ignorance	the	police	go,	they	do	not	know	what	is	happening	and	take	advantage”456.	 However,	 they	 add	 that	 “the	 unions	 are	 not	 the	most	 civil	 actors	often”457.	On	the	other	hand,	the	TU	suggests	that	the	tight	links	between	the	Kenyan	and	Chinese	executives	are	so	far-reaching	–	down	to	the	local	governments	-	that	commissioners	under	the	Office	of	the	President	tend	to	defend	Chinese	companies.	
                                                451	Ibid.			452	The	national/county	hierarchy	is	complex	and	creates	“confusion	which	gives	space	to	interference”	(Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Kenya	Building	Construction	Timber	Furniture	&	Trade's	Employees	Union,	Nairobi,	2014-11-13).	The	country	has	the	Ministry	of	Labour	at	the	national	level	where	the	Labour	Commissioner	sits.	There	are	then	47	counties	and	for	each	county	there	is	a	County	Labour	Officer.	Each	county	has	a	varying	number	of	districts,	coordinated,	at	the	county	level,	by	the	District	Labour	Officer.	Each	district	has	a	Labour	Officer.	At	the	district	level,	there	is	a	District	Commissioner,	who	is	the	central	government	representative	and	is	in	charge	of	administering	various	ministry	representatives	at	the	district	level,	including	the	District	Labour	Officer.				453	Interview	with	an	officer	at	a	Trade	Union,	Nairobi,	2014-11-13.	454	Ibid.	455	Interview	with	an	executive	and	officers	at	the	Ministry	of	Labour,	Industrial	Relations	Office,	Nairobi,	2014-11-19.	456	Ibid.	457	Ibid.	
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The	Ministry	 of	 Labour	 also	 states	 that	 the	 interference	 by	 government	 officials	seems	to	suggest	the	willingness	to	“try	to	keep	the	face	of	the	government”458.	This	is	 perceived	 as	 linked	 to	 the	 bilateral	 nature	 of	 infrastructure	 agreements.	 The	negotiations	for	these	agreements	often	exclude	TU	and	the	Ministry	of	Labour	as	they	take	place	at	the	executive	level.	According	to	the	Ministry	of	Labour,	“when	the	government	negotiates,	labour	issues	are	not	given	prominence	[…]	they	tend	to	increase	the	costs	if	not	addressed	immediately	[…]	the	negotiations	should	be	all	inclusive	in	the	initial	stages”459.	TU	reports	that	the	workers’	perception	of	the	local	government	has	led	to	protests	with	workers	shouting	at	commissioners	“you	have	eaten	[taken	bribes],	go	away”460.	These	dynamics	emphasise	how	disaggregated	the	interests	can	be	within	the	Kenyan	government	(i.e.	Ministry	of	Labour	at	the	local	and	national	levels,	the	Office	of	the	President,	etc.)	and	across	the	policy	arena.		When	asked	whether	China’s	strong	relations	with	the	Kenyan	government	could	pose	a	threat	to	the	existence	or	the	functioning	of	trade	unions	in	Kenya,	the	unions	responded	that	that	is	not	possible	because	“in	Kenya,	there	is	an	established	strong	law.	On	issues	of	rights,	Kenyans	are	more	educated.	For	the	Chinese,	it	is	not	easy	to	 deny	 Kenyans	 rights	 and	 keep	 them	 quiet”.	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 fact	 that	Chinese	companies	are	now	increasingly	signing	CBAs461.	Of	all	the	various	Chinese	companies	 in	 the	 building	 and	 construction	 sector,	 according	 to	 TU,	 CRBC	 is	“starting	 to	 behave	 better”462 ,	 a	 CBA	 was	 signed,	 and	 it	 is	 being	 implemented.	However,	 thinking	 that	 other	 Chinese	 companies	may	 emulate	 this	 behaviour	 is	quite	 unrealistic,	 as	 they	 are	 competitors463.	 On	 top	 of	 this,	 strategic	 actions	 by	Chinese	 companies,	 such	 as	 claiming	 to	 have	 different	 branches	 operating	distinctively,	have	pushed	TU	to	negotiate	second	best	options,	i.e.	new	CBAs.	This	is,	in	turn,	linked	to	a	more	general	understanding	of	the	meaning	of	labour	laws	and	rights,	and	feeds	into	a	broader	debate	concerning	the	impact	a	state-centric	country	such	 as	 China	may	 have	 in	 a	 country	 like	 Kenya	 whose	 liberal	 approach	 is	 still	consolidating.	The	Ministry	of	Labour	suggested:	“we	have	more	progressive	labour	laws,	but	we	have	to	change	to	meet	the	level	of	production	that	this	country	wants	
                                                458	Ibid.	459	Ibid.	460	Interview	with	an	officer	at	a	Trade	Union,	Nairobi,	2014-11-13.		461	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Central	Organisation	of	Trade	Unions,	Nairobi,	2014-01-27.	462	Interview	with	an	officer	at	a	Trade	Union,	Nairobi,	2014-11-13.	463	Ibid.		
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to	achieve	under	Vision	2030.	Without,	though,	going	below	the	minimum	like	the	Chinese	try	to	do”464.		The	 issues	 raised	by	Chinese	 companies	 concerning	 recognition	and	CBAs	are	regulated	by	the	law,	and	are	solved	with	the	law	between	Kenyan	actors,	according	to	 the	official	 system	of	governance	regulating	 labour	disputes.	Nonetheless,	 two	deviations	bring	the	relations	with	the	Chinese	temporarily	outside	of	the	system.	First,	the	Chinese	are	not	taking	part	in	the	associational	life	formalised	by	the	arena,	providing	thus	a	moment	of	escape	from	the	locally	determined	norms	of	conduct.	Second,	 Kenyan	 unofficial,	 parallel	 governance	 dynamics,	 i.e.	 the	 bypassing	 of	legitimate	 negotiation	 tables	 through	 the	 interference	 of	 government	 officials	 in	negotiations,	also	play	a	role,	and	impact,	if	partially,	the	outcome	of	negotiations.	While	 corruption	 shows	 individuals’	 greediness,	 a	 more	 articulate	 scenario	 is	presented	 by	 the	 unofficial	 interference	 of	 government	 officials	 in	 negotiation	processes.	This	seems	 to	suggest	 that	 there	 is	an	 interest,	at	 the	higher	 levels,	 to	mediate	 between	 the	 interests	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 unions	 and	 the	 requests	 of	Chinese	companies.	This	may	be	a	consequence	of	the	belief	that	national	interests	(in	this	case	the	development	of	infrastructure	as	an	enabler	for	the	achievement	of	Kenya	Vision	2030	goals)	would	be	compromised	if	either	side,	the	union	and/or	the	Chinese	companies,	achieved	a	level	of	discontent	such	as	to	hinder	the	work	of	the	companies.				
4.2.2 Counterfeits	In	 Kenya	 Vision	 2030	 there	 is	 an	 emphasis	 on	 innovation	 and	 how	 it	 can	 drive	economic	growth.	One	of	the	factors	inhibiting	innovation	in	the	country	is	the	entry	of	counterfeits.	This	case’s	timeline	stretches	beyond	that	used	in	this	thesis	(2003-2014).	Nonetheless,	it	is	considered	highly	relevant	to	show	the	dynamics	between	the	state	apparatus	and	organised	civil	society	in	Kenya.	Not	least	important	is	that	the	main	structural	changes	occurred	after	2004	(well	within	the	time	frame	of	the	thesis)	and	the	legitimation	of	a	process	that	lasted	over	20	years	occurred,	finally,	in	 2008	 with	 the	 passing	 of	 the	 Anti-Counterfeits	 Act	 by	 Parliament	 and	 the	establishment	 of	 the	 Anti-Counterfeits	 Agency.	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 analysis	 that	follows	(as	a	reflection	of	the	entire	thesis)	is	not	to	elaborate	on	the	extent	to	which	
                                                464	Interview	with	an	executive	and	officers	at	the	Ministry	of	Labour,	Industrial	Relations	Office,	Nairobi,	2014-11-19.	
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the	creation	of	an	Anti-Counterfeits	Agency	 is	effective	to	curb	the	counterfeiting	phenomenon	 in	 Kenya,	 but	 rather	 how	 the	 state	 apparatus	 and	 civil	 society	recognised	and	tackled	the	problem	and	interacted	to	negotiate,	so	to	craft	outcomes	to	the	satisfaction	of	various	stakeholders’	interests.	The	focus	is	thus	on	the	process	more	 than	 the	 outcome	 or	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 such	 outcome.	 Having	 said	 this,	following	the	creation	of	the	Agency,	the	challenges	posed	by	counterfeit	products	did	 not	 end.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 section	 that	 follows	will	 also	 provide	 evidence	 and	comment	on	different	initiatives	initiated	by	various	stakeholders.	
	
The	creation	of	ACA	In	1986,	Sessional	Paper	N.1	 ‘Economic	Management	 for	Renewed	Growth’465,	indicated	that	the	Kenyan	government	was	going	to	liberalise	the	economy.	Kenya	signed	its	first	Structural	Adjustment	Loan	with	the	World	Bank	in	1980,	which	was	based	upon	the	pledge	that	the	country	would	adopt	“more	liberal	trade	and	interest	regimes	as	well	as	a	more	outward-oriented	industrial	policy”466.	The	country	had	experienced	 a	 decade	 of	 closure,	 starting	 in	 the	 early	 1970s,	 in	 response	 to	 “a	balance	of	payment	crisis	in	1970-1971,	which	was	exacerbated	by	the	first	oil	shock	two	 years	 later”467 .	 This	 period	 allowed	 Kenya	 to	 diversify	 the	 development	 of	industrial	sectors,	such	as	plastics,	pharmaceuticals,	vehicles,	but	 left	 the	country	isolated	from	global	trade,	with	both	imports	and	exports	steadily	shrinking468.	In	the	1990s	the	economy	finally	became	liberalised	and	while	it	brought	advantages	it	 also	 “created	 a	 lot	 of	 problems	 for	 the	 country.	 Now	 that	 the	 economy	 was	liberalised,	 anyone	 could	 bring	 in	 stuff” 469 .	 The	 imported	 products’	 origin	 was	mainly	Far	Eastern	and	some	of	the	goods	that	were	brought	in	were	counterfeits.	The	 trading	 pattern	 that	 was	 observed	 between	 Kenya	 and	 the	 Far	 East	 was:	Kenyans	going	 to	China	with	a	 sample	of	a	product	and	 then	returning	 to	Kenya	bringing	in	goods	and	distributing	them	through	hawkers470.	There	was	an	increase	in	street	 traders	and	hawkers,	mostly	of	Kenyan	origin471.	Competition	 increased	especially	 because	 the	prices	 of	 imported	 goods	were	much	 lower	 than	made	 in	
                                                465	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	‘Economic	Management	for	Renewed	Growth’,	Sessional	Paper	no.1,	Nairobi,	1986.		466	G.	Gertz,	‘Kenya’s	Trade	Liberalization	of	the	1980s	and	1990s:	Policies,	Impacts,	and	Implications’,	background	paper	for	this	report:	E.	Zepeda	et.al.,	‘The	Impact	of	the	Doha	Round	on	Kenya’,	Carnegie	Endowment	for	International	Peace,	Washington,	2009,	p.3.		467	ibid.,	p.2.	468	ibid.,	p.3.	469	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Anti-Counterfeits	Agency,	Nairobi,	2014-02-26.	470	Ibid.	471	Ibid.	
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Kenya	ones	and	the	reason	 for	 this	price	difference	was	that	 the	 imported	goods	were	substandard	and	counterfeit472.	The	number	of	seizures	increased	significantly	and	as	figures	for	local	manufacturers	started	going	down,	they	started	complaining	about	 unfair	 competition	 due	 to	 sub-standards	 and	 counterfeits.	 	 The	 Kenya	Association	 of	 Manufacturers 473 	raised	 the	 flag:	 “people	 didn’t	 know	 about	counterfeits,	 they	 were	 just	 complaining	 that	 the	 market	 was	 being	 eroded	 by	something.	We	didn’t	know	what	animal	was	eroding.	Our	members	found	products	on	the	market	that	they	couldn’t	trace	to	the	manufacturer”474.	Customs	 oversaw	 checking	 goods	 at	 ports	 of	 entry,	 and	 the	 Kenya	 Bureau	 of	Standards	was	responsible	of	regulating.	An	ACA	senior	officer	mentioned	that	“it	became	more	and	more	evident	that	the	regulations	in	place	were	no	more	adequate	and,	as	a	consequence,	 the	other	bodies	charged	with	control	authority	were	not	effective	in	carrying	out	their	duties.	For	instance,	Customs	at	that	time	were	more	concerned	with	 the	 collection	of	 revenue	 rather	 than	control	of	 goods.	An	Act	of	Parliament	was	necessary”475.	According	to	KAM,	“multiple	enforcement	agencies	filed	a	case	to	the	court	to	say	that	it	was	counterfeits.	But	the	judge	ruled	that	they	were	 not	mandated	 to	 enforce	 against	 counterfeits.	 The	 Revenue	 Authority	 and	KEBS	lost	the	case.”476	The	government	and	other	stakeholders	came	together	to	discuss	how	to	stop	the	entry	of	counterfeits	and	sub-standards,	and	an	interim	measure	was	agreed	upon,	namely	to	go	through	the	existing	Kenyan	law	so	to	find	the	gaps	and	identify	the	sections	that	could	be	modified	to	suit	the	actual	situation.	The	laws	examined	were:	Weights	 and	 measure	 Act,	 Trade	 Descriptions	 Act,	 Standards	 Act,	 Custom	 and	exercise	Act.	The	 Trade	 Descriptions	 Act	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 the	 most	 appropriate	 as	 in	 its	provisions	there	was	a	section	on	trademarks	and	the	fact	that	their	misuse	leads	to	consumers’	 deceit.	 This	 was	 the	 closest	 legal	 mention	 to	 the	 protection	 against	counterfeits.	While	a	national	committee	was	being	set	up	to	look	at	a	new	law,	the	Trade	 Descriptions	 Act	 was	 used	 extensively	 for	 the	 enforcement	 of	 anti-counterfeiting.	
                                                472	Such	as	in	the	case	of	ball	pen	company	Haco	Tiger	that	was	imitated	and	copies	were	brought	into	Kenya.		473	A	business	membership	association.		474	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Kenya	Association	of	Manufacturers,	Anti-Counterfeits	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-09-19.	475	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Anti-Counterfeits	Agency,	Nairobi,	2014-02-26.	476	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Kenya	Association	of	Manufacturers,	Anti-Counterfeits	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-09-19.	
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The	national	committee	was	composed	of	highly	placed	people	mostly	from	the	government	but	also	from	non-state	organisations:	1 Anti-dumping	Standing	Committee	2 Kenya	Association	of	Manufacturers	(KAM)	3 Kenya	Bureau	of	Standards	(KEBS)	4 Kenya	Industrial	Property	Institute	(KIPI)	5 Federation	of	Kenya	Employers	(FKE)	6 Kenya	National	Chamber	of	Commerce	and	Industry	(KNCCI)	7 Commissioner	of	Customs	(currently	under	Kenya	Revenue	Authority)	8 Director	of	Industries	9 Director	of	Internal	Trade	(Ministry	of	Trade)	10 Director	of	External	Trade	(Ministry	of	Trade)	11 Director	of	Weights	and	Measures	(Ministry	of	Trade)		 The	 government	 recognised	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 anti-counterfeits	 law	 was	damaging	 stakeholders	 like	manufacturers	 inasmuch	 as	 “IP	 owners	 and	 holders	were	losing,	and	there	was	damage	in	investment	in	IP	rights	and	goodwill	and	trust	in	 their	 brands” 477 .	 Therefore,	 the	 National	 Committee	 formed	 a	 Legal	 sub-committee	in	2001	whose	purpose	was	to	come	up	with	how	to	combat	counterfeits	and	 how	 to	make	 Kenya	 compliant	with	WTO	 regulations	 on	 enforcement	 of	 IP	rights.	The	first	step	involved	the	amendment	of	the	Trade	Descriptions	Act	so	to	strengthen	the	law	while	waiting	for	the	Act	of	Parliament.		According	to	ACA	“the	sub-committee	went	through	every	law	dealing	with	trade.	They	then	took	the	Trade	Descriptions	Act	and	recommended	amendments,	through	the	Statute	Law,	Miscellaneous	Amendments,	N.	2	of	2002,	so	to	strengthen	the	law	while	waiting	 for	 the	act	of	Parliament”478.	An	ACA	senior	official	states	 that	“the	amendment	 of	 the	 Trade	 Descriptions	 Act	 made	 sure	 that	 manufacturers	 were	protected	by	law	but	more	was	needed:	a	new	law.	And	this	was	a	new	phenomenon	for	 the	 country”479.	 	 The	 committee	 came	 up	 with	 drafting	 instructions	 for	 the	
Counterfeits	 Goods	 Bill	 2004	 aimed	 at	 outlawing	 counterfeits.	 Stakeholders’	workshops	were	 held	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 2004,	 and	 the	 legal	 sub-committee	 held	other	forums	including	one	for	members	of	parliament,	trying	to	build	consensus.	
                                                477	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Anti-Counterfeits	Agency,	Nairobi,	2014-02-26.	478	Ibid.	479	Ibid.	
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Then	the	final	drafting	of	the	proposed	Counterfeit	Goods	Bill	2004	was	handed	in	to	the	parliament,	“the	wording	was	borrowed	from	the	South	African	law,	but	you	know	 each	 country	 wants	 to	 have	 indigenous	 things,	 so	 they	 renamed	 it	 Anti-Counterfeits	Bill	2004”480.		From	2004,	when	the	Bill	was	handed	over	to	authorities,	to	2008	when	the	Bill	became	law,	“a	number	of	obstacles	got	in	the	way	including	political	issues”481.	KAM	suggests	 that	 the	Parliament,	 specifically,	 represented	a	challenge.	Counterfeiters	“have	a	lot	of	money.	They	can	also	fund	or	sponsor	members	of	parliament,	so	they	have	 influence”482.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	 strategize	 so	 to	make	parliamentarians	understand	how	affected	they	can	be	“even	if	they	are	up	there	in	the	social	arena”483.	Finally,	in	2008	“it	was	clear	that	everybody	was	a	victim,	not	only	 manufacturers	 but	 also	 consumers.	 Most	 counterfeits	 were	 fast	 moving	products	 and	we	brought	 up	 the	 issue	 of	 health	 and	 safety	 of	 consumers	 […]We	pushed	this	health	and	safety	aspect	at	the	Kenyan	parliament	and	the	committee	of	anti-counterfeits	that	was	previously	created”484.	In	November,	the	Bill	was	passed	by	the	Parliament	into	law	and	President	Kibaki	signed	it	on	December	24,	2008.	It	came	 into	 force	 on	 July	 7,	 2009.	 Before	 becoming	 effective,	 in	 March	 2009,	 the	Permanent	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Industrialization	 set	 up	 a	 Working	Committee	to	operationalize	the	Act.	This	was	particularly	in	response	to	the	fact	that	 the	National	Committee	rejected	 the	 idea	of	 letting	existing	 institutions	 take	over	but	rather	asked	for	the	appointment	of	a	brand-new	body	dealing	only	with	counterfeits.			The	Working	Committee	was	responsible	of	translating	the	act	into	reality.	It	had	to:	 develop	 a	 work	 plan	 for	 the	 operationalization	 of	 the	 act;	 prepare	 a	 budget	proposal,	 a	 scheme	 of	 service	 for	 members	 of	 staff;	 advise	 the	 Ministry	 on	 the	appropriate	 classification	 of	 the	 agency	 for	 recommendation	 to	 the	 State	Corporation	 Advisory	 Committee485 ,	 on	 the	 nomination	 and	 gazettement	 of	 the	Board	of	Directors,	on	the	commencement	of	the	Act,	and	any	other	issues.	The	work	of	 the	Working	Committee	 started	 in	 June	2009,	up	 till	 September	2009	when	 it	handed	everything	to	the	permanent	secretary	of	the	Ministry	of	Industrialization.	
                                                480	Ibid.		481	Ibid.	482	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Kenya	Association	of	Manufacturers,	Anti-Counterfeits	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-09-19.	483	Ibid.	484	Ibid.	485	They	look	at	functions	of	new	agencies	and	categorise	them,	apply	a	class:	A,	B,	C,	etc.).	ACA	was	categorized	as	class	C,	as	an	enforcement	agency.	
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The	legal	sub-committee	also	finished	its	work,	and	a	secretariat	was	formed	out	of	the	working	committee.	The	secretariat,	with	the	names	received	from	the	various	organisations,	on	9	November	2009	two	private	sectors	members	were	gazetted	as	Board	Members	(Gazette	Notice	12354	of	20/11/2009).	The	two	members	were	an	IP	expert	and	a	consumer	protection	expert.	The	other	members	of	the	Board	were	from	 the	 government,	 so	 there	 was	 no	 need	 to	 gazette	 their	 position.	 More	specifically	they	were	from	the	institutions	forming	the	national	committee.	On	2	December	 2009,	 the	 Board	 of	 Directors	 was	 inaugurated	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	Industrialization.	The	chairman	was	appointed	a	bit	later,	in	February	2010,	and	he	is	an	advocate	of	the	High	Court	of	Kenya.	The	permanent	secretary	handed	over	the	duties	to	the	Board	of	Directors,	and	the	Chairman	started	calling	meetings.		In	 the	meanwhile,	 in	 January	2010,	 an	 induction	workshop	was	organised	 for	Board	 members	 some	 of	 whom	 were	 not	 familiar	 with	 the	 issues	 concerning	counterfeits,	 with	 the	 aim	 to	 instruct	 every	 institution	 about	 the	 importance	 of	protecting	 IP	 rights,	 pay	 attention	 to	border	 entry	points	 and	 the	need	 to	 create	awareness	among	Kenyans.		The	creation	of	the	agency	surely	highlights	a	link	between	popular	concern,	the	effective	engagement	of	the	government	by	organised	civil	society	and	a	responsive	government	that	introduced	legislation	in	reaction	to	the	issue.	The	creation	of	the	agency,	which	is,	per	se,	manifestation	of	the	state	apparatus	and	society’s	capability	to	engage	each	other	in	democratic	processes,	is	not	the	solution	to	the	problem	as	the	challenges	posed	by	implementation	show,	but	it	was	an	important	first	step	to	regulate	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 involves	 a	 high	 number	 of	 institutions	 and	 affects	potentially	every	aspect	of	socio-economic	development.	
	
Counterfeiting	after	the	creation	of	ACA	The	situation	concerning	counterfeits	in	Kenya	is	still	quite	alarming,	even	after	the	establishment	of	ACA.	The	snapshot	provided	below	is	not	aimed	at	criticising	how	ineffective	the	Act	is	but	rather	at	showing	that	the	struggle	against	counterfeits	continues	to	involve	state	and	social	forces	in	a	complex	domestic	environment	that	impacts	the	way	relations	with	Chinese	actors	take	shape.	According	to	the	Kenya	Association	 of	 Manufacturers’	 2007	 position	 paper	 ‘Position	 paper	 on	
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counterfeits’486,	China	in	2007	was	the	country	of	origin	of	the	highest	number	of	counterfeits	imported	to	Kenya.	According	to	ACA,	seized	goods	listed	as	items	from	2010	till	2014	amount	to	almost	3	million	(2.998.639)	items,	almost	worth	KES	352	million	 (KES	 351.886.212) 487 .	 These	 are	 both	 locally	 and	 externally	 produced	counterfeits.	 Locals	 mainly	 contribute	 with	 spirits/alcohol,	 condiments	 and	seasoning,	 paints.	 They	 contribute	 “in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 often	 collect	 genuine	packaging	materials,	 package	 [non-original]	 commodities	 and	 deceive”488.	 As	 for	imported	counterfeits,	“while	before	it	was	Kenyans	introducing	counterfeits,	now	it	is	also	the	Chinese	themselves”.	Imported	counterfeits	were	and	still	are	“almost	only	from	China”.	Products	include:	consumer	chemical	products;	cosmetics;	motor	spare	 parts;	 soaps	 and	 detergents;	 alcohol	 and	 spirits;	 electrical	 goods;	 toners	(especially	HP);	dry	cell	batteries	(“dry	cell	batteries	were	popular	in	the	early	years	but	 not	 in	 the	 past	 three	 years”489);	 ball	 point	 pens;	mobile	 phones	 (Nokia	 and	Samsung);	medicines.		Despite	the	legal	framework	being	in	place,	and	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	the	Anti-Counterfeits	Act	–	as	innovative	as	it	 is	 in	Eastern	Africa	–	still	has	room	for	improvement,	the	real	problem	is	twofold:	the	source	of	the	problem,	namely	the	low	 purchasing	 power	 of	 the	 Kenyan/East	 African	 population,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	enforcement	capacity.	 	These	are	complemented	by	other	relevant	 issues	such	as	lack	 of	 harmonisation	 in	 East	Africa	 on	 counterfeits	 laws490,	 causing	 the	Kenyan	framework	 to	be	working	 in	a	vacuum,	 the	absence	of	 strict	 control	measures	 in	China,	and	the	lack	of	redress	mechanisms	for	consumers	in	Kenya.			
Kenya’s	purchasing	power	KAM	 points	 out	 that	 Kenya’s	 low	 purchasing	 power	 is	 the	 country’s	vulnerability 491 .	 As	 a	 source	 from	 KIPPRA	 noticed	 “there	 are	 two	 players:	 the	Chinese	looking	for	a	market	and	Kenyans	looking	for	a	product.	We	do	not	know	whether	it	is	demand	driven	or	supply	driven.	We	do	not	know	the	share”492.	If	the	counterfeits	phenomenon	is	demand-driven	due	to	poor	financial	capacity,	then	the	
                                                486	KAM	Standards	and	Regulatory	Committee,	‘Position	paper	on	counterfeits’,	presented	to	the	Finance,	Trade	and	Planning	Parliamentary	Committee	in	August	2007	487	Data	provided	by	ACA.	Unfortunately,	no	break	down	was	provided.		488	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Anti-Counterfeits	Agency,	Nairobi,	2014-02-26.	489	Ibid.	490	KIPPRA	Report	2013,	op.	cit.,	p.	86.	491	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Kenya	Association	of	Manufacturers,	Anti-Counterfeits	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-09-19.	492	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Kenya	Institute	for	Public	Policy	Research	and	Analysis,	Counterfeits	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-03-28.	
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legal	framework	that	ACAct	sanctions	is	part	of	a	formal	sphere	of	governance	that	is	detached	 from	the	 informal	one,	within	which	counterfeits	will	 continue	being	requested	 and	 distributed.	 	 As	 a	 colleague	 has	 put	 it,	 “copyrights	 are	 for	 the	developed	society”493	for	the	simple	reason	that	when	cash	fluidity	is	unavailable,	“consumers	unknowingly	demand	counterfeits	because	counterfeits	are	cheap”494.	KAM	acknowledged	that	“we	are	blaming	the	Chinese,	but	it	is	consumers	who	are	driving	this.	So,	there	is	the	need	to	create	awareness	about	the	fact	that	they	need	genuine	products”495.	The	Consumers	Federation	of	Kenya	(COFEK)	also	agrees	that	“China	 is	 a	 symptom.	 China	 is	 not	 the	 cause”496.	 There	 is	 obviously	 a	 distinction	between	the	demand,	by	common	people,	of	cheap	products	and	the	demand,	by	retailers,	 of	 counterfeits.	 As	 advanced	 by	 COFEK	 “no	 Kenyan	would	 take	 poison	knowing	 it	 is	 poison” 497 .	 However,	 the	 lack	 of	 border	 control,	 post-market	surveillance,	and	political	goodwill	do	not	allow	the	two	to	be	detached	effectively.	Moreover,	while	the	law	protects	IP	holders,	it	does	not	protect	consumers.	COFEK	is	a	relatively	new	body,	registered	in	March	2010,	just	a	few	months	before	the	new	constitution	was	 adopted.	 The	Consumers	 Protection	Act,	 in	 turn,	was	 passed	 in	2012.	While	 the	 legal	 framework	 –	 through	 the	 Constitution	 and	 the	 Consumers	Protection	Act,	among	others	–	“provides	high	thresholds	for	consumer	protection	in	 all	 spheres	and	 for	both	private	 and	public	 sectors”498,	 implementation	 is	 still	problematic	mainly	due	to	lack	of	awareness499.		
Enforcement	capacity	According	to	ACA,	in	2014,	counterfeits	had	become	less,	compared	to	the	1990s	up	to	the	time	of	passing	the	Act.	Customs	do	more	controls	but	“counterfeits	can	not	be	curbed	altogether.	 It	 is	an	area	 that	 involved	cartels,	what	we	do	 is	 try	 to	control.	People	are	still	bringing	in	counterfeits;	sometimes	they	declare	something	and	it	is	something	else,	you	cannot	stop	all	containers.	And	the	port	of	Mombasa	serves	Uganda,	Burundi,	Sudan,	South	Sudan,	DRC”500.	Borders’	control	is	a	problem,	worsened,	as	mentioned	above,	by	the	lack	of	a	harmonised	legal	framework	in	the	
                                                493	Skype	discussion	with	F.	Congolo,	22	May	2014.	494	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Kenya	Association	of	Manufacturers,	Anti-Counterfeits	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-09-19.	495	Ibid.		496	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Consumers	Federation	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-10-07.	497	Ibid.	498	Consumer	Federation	of	Kenya	(COFEK),	‘About	us’,	Consumer	Federation	of	Kenya	[website],	20	May	2013.	499	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Consumers	Federation	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-10-07.	500	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Anti-Counterfeits	Agency,	Nairobi,	2014-02-26.	
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East	 African	 region.	 The	 deficiencies	 in	 borders’	 controls	 are	 aggravated	 by	weaknesses	in	the	Kenyan	post-market	surveillance	system.		To	establish	whether	a	product	is	a	counterfeit,	the	product	needs	to	undergo	an	examination	 that	 establishes	 whether	 it	 meets	 quality	 standard	 specifications.	However,	as	the	Kenya	Bureau	of	Standards	(KEBS)	argues,	“many	products	have	no	standards,	 and	 even	 if	 we	 use	 international	 standards	 we	 have	 no	 capacity	 to	determine	 the	 performance”	501.	 In	 other	words,	 “if	 there	 is	 a	 complaint	 about	 a	product	that	didn’t	meet	expectations,	but	there	is	no	standard	and	no	testing,	there	isn’t	much	that	can	be	done.	We	have	now	8.000	developed	standards	but	the	British	Standards	 Institution,	 for	 instance,	 has	 20.000.	We	 continue	 to	 develop,	 and	 the	most	important	products	have	standards,	those	that	have	an	impact	on	consumers’	health	and	safety”502.	Regulatory	bodies	are	underfunded,	 “ACA	should	have	100	inspectors,	they	only	have	10.	The	lack	of	capacity	makes	no	sense	for	everything	else.”503			
Chinese	involvement	The	 involvement	 of	 Chinese	 authorities	 in	 providing	 controls	 of	 goods	 before	export	 is,	 reportedly,	 “not	 enough” 504 .	 Although	 the	 Chinese	 government	 has	sponsored	a	number	of	programmes	for	import	countries	on	inspection,	“they	take	you	 around	 in	 circles,	 they	 are	 not	 forthcoming	with	 info.	 They	 say	 they	 do	 not	support	their	business	people	who	do	bad	things;	they	say	these	people	are	messing	with	the	image	of	China.	But	they	know	the	port	used	by	counterfeiters,	and	they	do	not	do	a	crackdown”505.	KEBS	collaborates	with	a	number	of	partners	around	the	world	to	inspect	goods	before	they	are	loaded	onto	containers.	In	the	case	of	China,	it	collaborates	mainly	with	the	China	Certification	and	Inspection	Group.	Reportedly	“if	 they	 do	 not	 verify	 the	 quality	 before	 issuing	 a	 certificate	 of	 conformity,	 we	penalise	 them”.	 However,	 at	 times	 these	 certificates	 are	 bypassed	 and	 products	shipped.	 These	 products	 at	 times	 meet	 the	 quality	 standards,	 at	 times	 do	 not.	Although	there	is	a	penalty	if	products	on	the	Pre-Verification	of	Conformity	(PVoC)	list	–	mainly	products	that	affect	health	and	safety	–	are	not	inspected	and	provided	with	a	certificate,	“it	is	not	possible	to	inspect	100%	at	the	port	of	entry”506.	
                                                501	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Kenya	Bureau	of	Standards	(KEBS),	Nairobi,	2014-11-11.	502	Ibid.	503	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Consumers	Federation	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-10-07.	504	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Kenya	Bureau	of	Standards	(KEBS),	Nairobi,	2014-11-11.	505	Ibid.	506	Ibid.	
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Governance	in-the-making,	through	collaboration.	Besides	the	legal	aspects	of	counterfeiting	that	brought	together	a	wide	range	of	institutions,	awareness	campaigns	and	specific	 initiatives	between	the	public	and	the	private	sector	are	being	carried	out	 in	coordination.	ACA’s	Assistant	Director	headed	 the	main	 campaign	 and	 given	 the	novelty	 of	 the	Act	 a	 number	 of	 bodies	“needed	to	be	made	aware,	informed	and	trained”.		Seminars	were	held,	five	officers	went	to	England	for	benchmarking,	and	there	are,	for	instance,	agricultural	shows	where	original	and	fake	products	are	shown	and	information	provided	on	how	to	avoid	counterfeits.	Administrators	of	local	areas	are	engaged,	and	collaboration	is	taking	place	under	the	umbrella	of	Joint	Campaign	against	Counterfeits	(JCAC),	an	awareness	 organisation	 that	 gathers	 people	 directly	 affected	 by	 counterfeits.	Financial	support	is	provided	by	the	American	Embassy	(USAID	provides	funding	for	awareness)	and	from	the	British	Commission.		A	number	of	initiatives	mobilising	the	public	and	the	private	sector	have	taken	place	 since	 the	 creation	 of	 ACA.	 For	 instance,	 in	 2012	mobile	 operators	 and	 the	Communications	Commission	of	Kenya	(CCK)	came	together	and	decided	to	switch	off	mobile	phones	whose	handset	ID	number	could	not	be	recognised.	The	action	was	taken	in	an	attempt	“to	protect	consumers	from	substandard	phones,	safeguard	mobile	payment	systems	and	prevent	crime”507.	The	switching-off	provoked	strong	reactions	by	consumers	and	small	businesses	who	claim	to	have	bought	the	phones	at	full	price	not	knowing	they	were	counterfeit	and	blamed	the	government	for	not	being	able	to	stop	the	influx.	Disputes	over	compensation	between	the	government	and	 consumers	 are	 still	 ongoing,	 and	 KIPPRA	 raised	 the	 concern	 that	 anti-counterfeit	laws	do	not	protect	consumers	enough	–	vis-à-vis	IP	owners.	Similarly,	the	Kenya	Plant	Health	Inspectorate	(KEPHIS),	a	governmental	agency,	started	an	initiative	involving	consumers.	Their	mandate	is	to	look	into	products	that	deal	with	plants,	 seeds,	 fertilisers.	They	 initiated	 the	 idea	of	providing	each	product	with	a	barcode	(digits)	so	that	customers	can	verify	with	the	factory	the	originality	of	the	product	 before	 purchasing	 it.	 	 The	 input	 of	 manufacturers,	 however,	 in	 these	campaigns,	is	irregular	and	the	relations	with	them	delicate:	“they	do	not	want	to	show	 that	 their	 products	 may	 be	 counterfeited	 by	 someone	 as	 this	 shows	
                                                507	W.W.	Chebusiri,	‘Kenya's	battle	to	switch	off	fake	phones’,	BBC	News	Africa,	5	October	2012.	
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vulnerability	and	may	induce	consumers	to	avoid	buying	the	product	fearing	it	 is	counterfeit”508.		The	 creation	 of	 the	Act	 and	 the	Agency	 represented	 an	 important	moment	 of	democratic	governance	with	a	revision	of	legal	frameworks	that	were	perceived	to	be	no	more	suited	to	Kenya’s	socio-economic	development.	This	case	is	particularly	interesting	as	it	was	generally	framed,	by	interviewees,	as	a	case	of	acknowledged	inadequacy	of	Kenyan	laws,	and,	later,	of	implementation	capacity,	rather	than	as	a	case	of	China-blaming.	Although	the	actions	taken	towards	the	issue	represented	a	re-action	towards	Chinese	imports,	the	problem	was	always	framed	as	domestically	more	 than	 externally-led.	 The	 case	 highlights	 how	 the	 country’s	 legal,	 socio-economic	and	political	environment	can	leave	space	to	democratic	governance	to	take	place.	However,	understanding	the	relatively	new	co-existence	of	democratic	governance	and	rapid	economic	development	is	key	to	explaining	the	inconsistency	in	implementation	efforts	and	results.			
4.2.3 Small	traders	The	trade	balance	between	Kenya	and	China	is	currently509	significantly	skewed	towards	China	with	Kenya	importing	$3.22	billion	from	China,	equivalent	to	20%	of	its	 total	 imports	 but	 only	 exporting	 $50.6	 million,	 equal	 to	 0.97%	 of	 its	 total	exports510.	The	influx	of	fast-moving	goods,	as	seen	above	in	the	case	of	counterfeits,	has	 involved	 a	 very	 diverse	 range	 of	 products.	 India	 remains	 the	 top	 country	 of	origin	of	imports	for	Kenya	in	2013	(25%	of	Kenya’s	total	imports).	However,	60%	of	imports	from	India	are	in	refined	petroleum.	China,	on	the	other	hand,	the	second	country	of	origin	of	imported	goods	in	2013,	exports	to	Kenya	fast-moving	goods:	machines	 (23%	 of	 all	 imports	 from	 China)	 such	 as	 telephones,	 electric	 tools,	batteries,	 computers;	 textiles	 (19%);	metals	 (13%);	plastics	 and	 rubbers	 (9.1%);	transportation	 (6.4%),	 such	as	motorcycles,	 vehicle	parts	 etc.;	 chemical	products	(5.7%)	such	as	drugs511.		While	there	is	a	widespread	awareness	in	Kenya	that	Chinese	products	“cover	the	whole	range,	from	high	quality	to	low”512,	the	local	environment	mostly	demands	cheap	 products,	 which	 are	 not	 locally	 available	 due	 to	 limited	 industrial	
                                                508	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Anti-Counterfeits	Agency,	Nairobi,	2014-02-26.	509	Statistics	can	be	found	at:	Simoes	and	Hidalgo,	op.	cit.	510	Ibid.		511	Ibid.		512	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	National	Economic	and	Social	Council,	Nairobi,	2014-01-24.	
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development	(Kenya	manufactures	medium	quality	products	for	export,	the	prices	of	which	are	not	generally	particularly	low),	and	are	not	easily	sourced	from	abroad,	except	 from	 India.	 Interviewees	 advanced	 a	 general	 claim	 that	 Kenyans	 prefer	products	from	countries	like	Britain,	Italy,	Germany	“in	their	home	because	they	last.	They	are	aware	that	the	fancy	ones	from	China	break”513.	However,	most	products	imported	 from	these	countries	are	 too	expensive	 for	 the	majority	while	 the	ones	from	China	are	affordable.		These	products,	whose	quality	varies	considerably,	have	penetrated	the	formal	and	informal,	wholesale	and	retail	sectors.	As	in	other	parts	of	Africa,	and	the	world,	this	 influx	 of	 products	 has	 challenged	 Kenyan	 existing	 systems	 of	 production,	procurement	 and	 distribution.	While	 the	 influx	 of	 cheap	 products	 has,	 arguably,	damaged	manufacturers	in	a	number	of	sectors,	the	focus	of	this	section	is	not	on	the	competition	in	manufacturing	between	Kenyan	and	Chinese	firms.	Rather,	the	focus	is	on	the	contest	between	Kenyan	retailers	and	wholesalers	in	their	attempts	to	devise	strategies	to	protect	their	interests,	even	if	to	the	detriment	of	the	other.	Understanding	the	local	context	and	system	of	governance	is	key	to	contextualise	the	 resentment	 toward	 the	 Chinese,	 here	 considered	 a	 proxy	 for	more	 complex	domestic	relational	dynamics.		In	2012	the	Nairobi	Central	Business	District	(CBD)	became	the	stage	of	a	protest	of	small	local	traders	against	Chinese	retail	shop	owners.	The	section	below	aims	at	understanding	 the	 reasons	behind	 the	protest	and	uses	 the	event	 to	understand,	more	broadly,	the	agency	of	Kenyan	retailers	and	wholesalers	vis-à-vis	the	Chinese,	namely	the	actors	involved	and	their	logic	of	action.			
Foreign	investors	versus	petty	traders	According	 to	 a	 study	 conducted	by	KIPPRA	 in	2013,	 “the	wholesale	 and	 retail	trade	accounted	for	196,000	jobs	and	4.4	million	in	the	formal	and	informal	sectors	in	2007,	respectively.	Employment	 in	 the	wholesale	and	retail	 trade	 increased	 to	238,000	 (formal)	 and	 4.5	million	 (informal)	 in	 2011”514.	While	 the	 formal	 retail	sector	is	growing,	with	supermarket	chains	standing	tall	above	other	types	of	retail	activities,	the	informal	one	is	still	the	backbone	of	Kenya’s	economy.	In	particular,	in	Nairobi	the	size	of	informal	activities	is	comparatively	more	significant	than	in	other	
                                                513	Ibid.	514	KIPPRA	Report	2013,	op.	cit.,	p.	88.		
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parts	of	the	country.		The	two	are	often	intertwined,	and	it	is	not	possible	to	talk	of	retail	and	wholesale	sectors	without	considering	the	connectedness	between	formal	and	informal	activities.	King	argues	that	“in	Kenya,	and	particularly	in	Nairobi,	the	sheer	dynamism	and	activity	of	the	informal	(jua	kali)	sector	is	such	that	it	might	prove	difficult	 for	outsiders	 to	 find	a	 foothold”515.	The	domestic	 control	over	 the	penetration	of	the	sector	by	foreigners	is	not	just	exerted	through	the	policies	on	migration	and	FDI	but	also	through	the	vibrancy	and	competitiveness,	especially	of	the	informal	sector516.	One	of	the	main	problems	affecting	the	sector	is	the	lack	of	proper	 laws	 to	 register	 foreign	 investors.	 Such	 shortcoming	 has	 proved	 to	 be	particularly	 problematic	 in	 the	 relations	 with	 the	 Chinese	 as	 the	 absence	 of	regulations	has	caused	the	instalment	of	Chinese	petty	traders	that	have	claimed	to	be	entering	the	country	as	investors	but	rather	ended	up	competing	with	Kenyan	small	traders517.		According	 to	 the	 Kenya	 Investment	 Authority,	 the	 law	 does	 not	 require	 all	investors	to	register	with	KenIvest,	although,	by	law,	they	should	all	register	with	the	Registrar	of	Companies.		However,	“even	if	a	company	is	registered,	it	is	not	sure	if	then	they	have	operations	as	at	the	Registrar	they	do	not	even	have	the	basic	info	such	 as	phone	 and	 email”518.	 The	main	 issue	 for	 authorities	 is	 to	 get	 a	 complete	picture	of	foreign	investment	projects	that	take	place	in	the	country.	In	particular,	KenInvest	highlights	that	“when	they	[the	Chinese]	come	and	do	petty	trade,	this	is	not	good.	It	should	be	left	to	Kenyans,	but	we	do	not	know	much,	and	there	is	very	little	 data	 to	 prove	 this	 empirically”519.	 The	 Director	 continues:	 “We	 have	 been	pushing	on	bureaucracy	–	we	have	been	setting	up	a	one-stop	shop	for	investors,	and	 there	 should	 be	 a	 legal	 change	 to	 make	 it	 mandatory	 for	 investors	 to	 be	compelled	to	submit	info	to	us.		We	do	not	want	to	limit	their	[the	Chinese]	coming	to	Kenya,	but	we	need	to	control	how	they	come,	 that	 is	how	we	can	avoid	petty	trade” 520 .	 Also,	 the	 Consumers	 Federation	 of	 Kenya	 suggested	 that	 “China	 is	 a	symptom,	 they	 find	a	 lot	of	 loopholes	and	 then	 they	can	extend.	China	 is	not	 the	cause.	We	have	issues	with	borders,	surveillance,	political	goodwill”521.	
                                                515	King,	2013,	op.	cit.,	p.	122.	516	Ibid.	517	This	is	a	problem	that	Kenya	had	previously	faced	with	Indian	small	traders.	However,	that	occurred	at	a	historical	time	when	Kenya	was	just	becoming	a	sovereign	country	and	is	a	problem	that	has	been	absorbed	to	become	part	of	the	economic	structure	of	the	country.	The	relations	with	China	are	significantly	more	recent	and	enter	a	scenario	that	Kenyans	themselves	grew	to	control.		518	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Kenya	Investment	Authority,	Nairobi,	2014-01-31.	519	Ibid.	520	Ibid.	521	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Consumers	Federation	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-10-07.	
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The	 presence	 of	 Chinese	 small	 traders	 seems	 to	 be	 quite	 limited	 in	 Nairobi	although	knowing	the	exact	numbers	is	a	difficult	task.	According	to	the	Nairobi	City	Council,	 there	has	not	been	“a	big	 increment	of	 the	Chinese	community	 [in	small	businesses].	 They	 are	 here	 for	 big	 contracts;	 they	 are	 not	 coming	 for	 individual	businesses”522.	There	are	a	few	Chinese	restaurants,	there	is	a	China	centre,	which	is	 situated	 next	 to	 the	 Economic	 and	 Commercial	 Counsellor	 of	 the	 PRC.	 It	 was	created	to	host	Chinese	shops,	but	it	failed	because	people	simply	did	not	go	to	buy	products,	 and	now	hosts	a	Chinese	 supermarket,	 a	Chinese	 restaurant	and	a	 few	Kenyan-run	shops	selling	Chinese	items	-	clothes,	 jewellery,	travel	agency,	and	so	forth.	Beyond	this	centre,	there	were	a	few	Chinese	shops,	mainly	on	two	streets	in	the	Nairobi	Central	Business	District	but	after	the	demonstrations	that	occurred	in	August	2012,	most	Chinese	owners	left	the	country.			
August	2012	protests	In	August	2012	Kenyan	retail	traders	flamed	up	in	protests	in	the	Nairobi	central	business	 district	 against	 Chinese	 small	 businesses’	 competition.	 Unlike	 other	countries	 in	 Africa523 ,	 Kenya	 had	 not	 witnessed	 any	 street	 protests	 against	 the	Chinese	 before	 then,	 and	 no	 particular	 episodes	 of	 anti-Chinese	 sentiments	 had	occurred.	Even	during	the	2012	protests,	the	sentiments	were	not	directed	at	the	Chinese	 in	 general	 -	who	 are	 numerous	 in	Kenya	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 sectors	 such	 as	construction,	services,	education,	restaurants,	supermarkets	-	but	rather	at	a	small	portion	of	retail	shop	owners	selling	textiles	and	mobile	phones524.	According	to	an	interviewee	at	 the	Ministry	of	Trade	“[the	Chinese]	were	hawking	on	the	streets,	they	come	with	tourist	visas.	Hawking	is	allowed	to	some	extent	with	permission	by	the	 City	 Council.	 But	 the	 permit	 is	 usually	 not	 for	 foreigners.	 That	 is	 foreign	investment”525.	Beyond	hawking,	and	more	specific	to	the	case	of	the	2012	August	protests,	the	Chinese	were	accused	of	not	paying	“duty,	rent,	city	council	certificate,	and	they	buy	cheap	from	China,	whereas	Kenyans	need	to	pay	rent,	need	to	fly	to	China	to	buy	goods	and	they	can	not	compete”526.		
                                                522Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Nairobi	City	Council,	Nairobi,	2014-11-28.	523	See	the	cases	of	Zambia	at	‘Zambian	miners	kill	Chinese	manager	during	pay	protest’,	BBC	News	Africa,	5	August	2012;	‘Lesotho:	Anti-Chinese	resentment	flares’,	IRIN,	24	January	2008;	‘Malawi's	new	law	targeting	Chinese	traders	in	rural	areas	draws	criticism’,	The	Guardian,	Trade	and	Development,	9	August	2012;		524	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Overseas	Chinese	Association,	Nairobi,	2013-12-11.	525	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	International	Trade,	Department	of	External	Trade,	Nairobi,	2013-11-13.	526	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Overseas	Chinese	Association,	Nairobi,	2013-12-11.	
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With	weak	 Kenyan	 laws	 regulating	 the	 FDI	 sector,	 some	 Chinese	 entered	 the	country	as	small	retail	traders	rather	than	investors	competing	with	Kenyan	small	traders.	According	to	interviewees	reports,	given	the	presence	of	such	Chinese	small	traders,	 Chinese	 wholesalers	 started	 bypassing	 Kenyans	 to	 sell	 directly	 to	 the	Chinese.	This	provoked	resentment	among	Kenyan	wholesalers	who	believe	they	were	 being	 depredated	 of	 their	 middlemen	 status,	 i.e.	 buying	 from	 the	 Chinese	wholesalers	and	selling	to	Kenyan	retailers.	According	to	sources,	these	wholesalers	pushed	Kenyan	small	traders	to	protest	against	Chinese	small	traders,	so	to	drive	them	out	of	the	country.		Consultations	 soon	 started	among	a	number	of	different	 actors,	 including	The	Kenya	 Overseas	 Chinese	 Association,	 which	 is	 a	 Kenya-registered	 non-governmental	 association	 led	 by	 a	 Chinese	 national	 in	 Nairobi,	 the	 Kenya-China	Import-Export	 Promotion	 Association	 and	 the	 Chinese	 Embassy.	 The	 Kenya	Overseas	Chinese	Association	and	the	Chinese	Embassy	“put	a	lot	of	effort	into	this	issue	because	 it	 can	affect	people’s	minds	and	how	they	see	 the	Chinese.	We	did	communication	 with	 our	 people	 and	 with	 the	 Kenyan	 side”,	 including	 not	 only	organisations	 protecting	 Kenyan	 traders,	 but	 also	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce527.	Therefore,	according	to	interviewees,	the	Chinese	have	realised	that	they	can	own	the	manufacturing,	 the	wholesale,	but	 they	should	 leave	aside	 the	retail.	 In	other	words,	 the	 Chinese	 are	 ‘allowed’	 to	 benefit	 from	 production,	 importation,	wholesaling,	but	retail	should	remain	the	prerogative	of	Kenyans.		However,	as	negotiations	started	being	held,	 it	soon	became	apparent	that	 the	Chinese	were	not	as	guilty	as	they	had	been	portrayed.	As	a	source	highly	involved	in	the	negotiations	reported,	out	of	the	20/30	black-listed	Chinese	who	were	asked	to	provide	 the	registration	 license,	 tax	pay,	work	permit,	National	Social	Security	Fund	certificate,	a	certificate	from	the	City	Council,	most	of	them	had	all	in	order.	According	to	sources,	the	protest	rather	shed	light	on	the	fact	that	the	Chinese	were	bringing	into	the	market	a	new	type	of	business	strategy,	which	eroded	the	Kenyan	control	of	the	competition	within	the	sector.		
	
Rooted	informal	governance	Anti-Chinese	sentiments	stemmed	out	of	a	 feeling	of	 threat	 to	 the	control	of	a	sector	that	 is	vital	 for	Kenyan	small	and	medium	businesses:	retail.	However,	the	
                                                527	Ibid.	
	 142	
lack	of	formal	regulations,	in	this	case,	is	not	synonymous	with	lack	of	ownership	and	control	over	the	governance	of	the	issue	at	stake.	Informal	governance,	though	not	 formally	 and	 legally	 regulated,	 is	 nonetheless	 largely	 based	 on	 a	 system	 of	governance	constituted	of	accepted	norms	of	conduct,	legitimised	by	both	informal	sector	stakeholders	as	well	as	formal	and	state	actors.	The	influx	of	Chinese	cheap	products	has	challenged	the	system	of	production	and	wholesale	procurement	and	distribution	in	Kenya.	In	a	context	of	near	absence	of	state	forms	of	control,	where	the	 jua	 kali,	 i.e.	 the	 informal	 sector,	 produces	 and	 manages	 governance,	 the	emergence	of	new	challenges	brought	in	by	external	actors	is	informally	regulated.		In	 other	 words,	 despite	 the	 Chinese	 often	 too	 deterministic	 faith	 in	 the	 state	authority,	in	the	case	of	the	August	2012	protest,	it	was	necessary	for	Chinese	actors	to	 recognise	 the	 major	 role	 played	 by	 the	 informal	 sector	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 a	framework	for	the	state	to	intervene.	In	fact,	legally,	Chinese	retailers	were,	mostly,	abiding	by	the	law.	Therefore,	it	is	interesting	to	acknowledge	the	active	behaviour	adopted	by	official	Chinese	actors	such	as	the	Embassy	to	control	Chinese	citizens.	This	was	an	action	taken	in	the	name	of	‘peaceful	coexistence’	in	a	country	for	China	too	 strategic	 to	 let	 a	 minor	 issue	 such	 as	 that	 of	 retail	 jeopardise	 the	 overall	economic	relations.		Kenyan	agency	in	this	context	is	not	so	much	state	agency	or	collaborative	agency	across	the	state	and	non-state	environments	but	rather	informal	agency	carried	out	by	informal	sector	leaders,	but	also	more	mischievously	by	businessmen.	Given	the	high	 clientelistic	 nature	 of	 the	 informal	 sector,	 and	 the	 potential	 social	consequences,	 i.e.	 upheavals,	 the	 Chinese	 Embassy	 also	 played	 a	 major	 role,	interfering	with	Chinese	small	entrepreneurs’	settlement,	as	it	identified	the	retail	sector	as	a	no-go	area.	At	 the	same	time,	 this	 issue	has	shed	 light	on	 the	Kenyan	acknowledgement	 that	 gaps	 in	 the	 system	 exist	 and	 that	 the	 country’s	 journey	toward	 industrialisation	 needs	 increased	 guarantees	 that	 crucial	 areas	 of	 the	Kenyan	economy	are	not	compromised	by	the	encounter	with	an	increasingly	free	and	open	economy.			
4.3 Sectoral	dynamics	The	presumed	exploitation	of	the	African	labour	force	and	the	impact	of	Chinese	products	for	manufacturers,	wholesalers	and	retailers	has	probably	been	the	most	discussed	 topic	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 Sino-African	 relations.	 Due	 to	 the	 widespread	
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impact	at	many	social	levels,	these	dynamics	became	widely	acknowledged,	studied	and	 speculated	upon.	Analysing	 the	 actions	 taken	by	Kenyan	 actors	 vis-à-vis	 the	Chinese	in	the	trade	sector	seems	to	reveal	not	only	a	wide	range	of	actors,	Kenyan	and	 Chinese	 but	 also	 a	 range	 of	 circumstances	 under	 which	 action	 is	 deemed	necessary.	Contrary	to	the	next	two	sectors,	this	is	a	case	where	re-action	toward	the	Chinese	is	most	predominant,	vis-à-vis	pro-active	or	passive	behaviour.	When	the	Chinese	actions	are	perceived	negatively	by	Kenyans,	as	in	damaging	Kenyans’	interests,	re-actions	have	risen	at	formal	and	informal	levels.	The	re-actions	have	rotated	around	discourses	ranging	from	rights,	as	in	the	case	of	trade	unions	and	counterfeiting	(intellectual	property),	to	business	competition.		The	systems	of	governance	through	which	actors	navigate	and	which	they	constitute	are	very	diverse	in	the	three	cases	analysed.	In	the	case	of	the	unions,	the	system	is	highly	 formalised	 (rooted)	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 trade	 unions	 is	 historically	significant	within	 the	 country.	 In	 the	 second	case,	 the	 system	of	governance	was	identified	as	weak	and	was	fully	restructured	(in-the-making).	It	still	presents	major	problems	of	enforcement	not	only	due	to	resource	shortage	but	also	to	the	socio-economic	formation	of	the	country.	Finally,	in	the	last	case,	the	governance	system	is	rooted,	though	divided	between	informality	and	formality.	While	the	presence	of	a	 strong	 informal	 framework	 guarantees	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	 Chinese	 from	 an	economic	environment	that	 is	vital	 for	Kenyans,	 the	problem	is	part	of	a	broader	issue	concerning	the	regulation	of	investments	in	the	country,	which	lacks	proper	legal	attention.		Despite	 their	 diversity,	 the	 perception	 of	 threat	 was	 generally	 consequential,	across	cases,	to	the	Chinese	non-adherence	to	existing	systems	of	governance	and	negotiation	tables,	i.e.	attempting	to	change	the	norms	of	conduct.	In	all	these	cases,	agency	 as	 the	 willingness	 and	 ability	 to	 take	 appropriate	 action	 was	 key	 to	 the	outcome	of	the	issue	and	the	management	of	change.	This	shows	that	despite	the	obvious	 financial	 asymmetry	 between	 Kenya	 and	 China,	 where	 the	 former	 is	disadvantaged	compared	to	the	latter,	the	outcome	of	the	relational	dynamics	does	not	merely	depend	on	that.	The	Kenyan	availability	of	human	resources	that	were	able,	and	willing,	to	navigate	through	known	frameworks,	presumably	less	known	by	 the	 Chinese,	 has	 proved	 to	 be	 crucial	 to	 bringing	 the	 engagements	 with	 the	Chinese	back	 to	 settings	of	negotiation	 that	would	adhere	 to	broader	 systems	of	
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governance	where	Kenyans	would	be	advantaged.	 Importantly,	once	more,	 these	systems	are	not	always	synonym	with	legal	and	official	regulation.																																																
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Table	1:	Sectoral	comparison	of	interests,	actors	and	arenas/tables	of	negotiation	–	Trade			 		 Trade	unions	 Counterfeits	 Small	traders	
Interests	
Type	of	relation	 Commercial	 Commercial	 Commercial	
Issue	at	stake	 Treatment	of	workers	by	Chinese	companies	 Entry	of	counterfeit	products	from	China	(mainly	by	Kenyan	traders)	+	lack	of	legal	framework		 Chinese	retailers	occupying	spaces	of	trade		
Kenyans'	issue-
specific	interests	 Make	Chinese	companies	abide	by	domestic	legal	frameworks	
Control	the	damage	at	two	levels:	consumers'	rights	(limited),	manufactures	(main	argument)	>	hindering	national	development	
Make	Chinese	wholesalers	and	retailers	abide	by	the	informal	norms	of	business		
Overall	objective	
toward	China	 Reject	Chinese	activities	/behaviour	 Reject	Chinese	activities	/behaviour	 Reject	Chinese	activities	/behaviour	
Actors	
Initiator		 Grassroots	trade	unions	 Kenya	Association	of	manufacturers	 Small	traders	
Other	domestic	
actors	 Ministry	of	Labour,		Industrial	Court	 Ministry	of	Industrialization,	private	sector	associations	
City	Council,	The	Kenya	Overseas	Chinese	Association,	Kenya-China	Import-Export	Promotion	Association,	The	Chinese	Embassy	
Resources	
Chinese	companies	financially	more	powerful	than	Kenyan	trade	unions.	But	Kenyan	trade	unions,	in	terms	of	human	resources,	were	more	prepared	to	engage	the	dispute	mechanisms	
Kenyan	professional	human	resources	crucial	to	alter	the	system	of	governance	to	safeguard	K	interests:	intellectual	property	rights.		
Despite	the	potential	financial	advantage	of	Chinese	wholesalers,	at	the	retail	level	the	presence	of	close-knit	and	deeply	rooted	informal	network	of	small	traders	(human	resources)	with	their	accepted	norms	and	practices	acts	a	safeguard	to	Kenyan	interests	vis-à-vis	the	Chinese	
Arenas	and	
tables	of	
negotiation	
ARENA	'the	problem'	
contextualized	in	the	
Kenyan	domestic	
context	(historical	legacies	and	current	policy	preferences)		
ROOTED:	Highly	regulated	(policy	and	legal);	historical	significance	+	2010	constitution	
IN-THE-MAKING:	Acknowledged	gap	in	the	legal	system	in	2004,	legal	recognition	in	2008	with	creation	of	ACA	
ROOTED:	Existence	of	strong	informal	system	of	governance	sided	by	lack	of	specific	laws	to	regulate	foreign	investment	(especially	the	minimum	end	of	the	range)	with	recent	acknowledgement	by	KenInvest.		
Mobilization	
framework	
Existing	legal	framework	>	strong	link	between	framework	and	implementation.	Informal	actions	along	the	bureaucratic	ladder	attempt	bypassing	the	framework	with	not	much	success.	
Weak	institutional	framework	>	official	instruments	used	to	trigger	democratic	processes	of	policy	and	legal	change.	
Informal	with	political	dynamics.	Chinese	very	receptive	of	social	discontent,	requested	withdrawal	of	retailers.	Kenyans	used	the	means	known,	i.e.	protest,	even	if	outside	official	regulatory	frameworks.		
Mode	of	addressing	
the	issue	with	the	
Chinese	 Re-active	 Re-active	 Re-active	
Table	of	negotiation	 Light	alteration	 Conformity	 Light	alteration	Source:	Author’s	findings							
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CHAPTER	5 	
Kenyan	responses	to	healthcare	cooperation	and	trade	
with	China			
5.1 The	context	The	 increasing	Chinese	presence	 in	healthcare	development,	 far	 from	being	as	visible	and	controversial	as	that	presented	in	the	previous	chapter,	represents	one	of	 the	 most	 important	 cases	 of	 so-called	 South-South	 cooperation	 according	 to	which	the	engagement	is	moved	by	solidarity	and	mutuality	motives	in	spheres	that	relate	 not	 only	 to	 development	 assistance	 but	 also	 trade	 in	 health	 products	 and	devices.	 It	 is	 also,	 together	with	education,	one	of	 the	most	 important	 aspects	of	people-to-people	 engagements	 as	 reported	 in	 Sino-African	 documents	 such	 as	FOCAC	declarations.	From	trade	in	health	products	and	devices	to	the	construction	of	 hospitals,	 passing	 through	 capacity	 building	 and	 development	 of	 traditional	medicine,	Kenyan	actors	have	recently	experienced	the	entry	of	China	in	a	national	environment	 (the	 arena)	 that	 is	 mainly	 dominated	 by	 Western	 companies,	traditional	development	partners,	India,	and	to	a	smaller	extent	local	manufacturers,	yet	regionally	significant.	For	Kenya,	the	development	of	healthcare,	together	with	education,	is	one	of	the	most	 important	 issue-area	 of	 the	 Social	 Pillar	 under	 the	 Kenya	 Vision	 2030	framework.	It	is	worth	emphasising	that	the	system	of	governance	for	health	care	in	Kenya	is	a	complex	one,	“a	mixed	story	of	progress	and	inequality.	While	in	some	areas	there	has	been	good	progress,	in	others	there	still	remains	much	to	be	done	[…]	Overall	it	is	estimated	that	for	at	least	25%	of	the	population	there	is	an	unmet	need	for	most	forms	of	health	care”528.	Consequential	to	this,	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	specific	issues	unpacked	in	this	chapter	(which	reflect	the	areas	in	which	China	mostly	commits	itself	in	Africa)	present	lots	of	variance	in	the	structural	dimensions	of	governance	as	well	as	in	the	ability	of	agents	to	work	through	them.	In	particular,	the	heavy	involvement	of	traditional	donors	in	the	provision	of	most	forms	of	health	care	is	a	significant	aspect	of	the	analysis	of	Kenya-China	expanding	relations	in	the	sector.	
                                                528	Lewis	and	Kerr,	op.	cit.,	p.	4.	
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China	has	been	seen	as	an	important	partner	for	the	achievement	of	development	goals	 for	 three	 main	 reasons:	 for	 the	 trade	 in	 cheap	 quality	 drugs,	 for	 its	infrastructure	development	capacity	and	the	involvement	in	capacity	building.	For	China,	 the	 involvement	 in	health-related	activities	 in	Kenya	has	been	historically	rooted	 in	 South-South	 cooperation	 motives.	 Assistance	 provision	 for	 capacity	building	(through	the	dispatch	of	Chinese	Medical	Teams)	has	been	the	main	form	of	 cooperation	 with	 Africa	 since	 the	 1960s 529 .	 However,	 since	 the	 2000s,	 the	relations	are	fast	expanding	beyond	capacity	building	to	commercial	activities,	with	the	 Chinese	 hoping	 to	 gain	 a	 foothold	 in	 markets	 such	 as	 the	 Kenyan	 one,	 i.e.	relatively	advanced	and	a	hub	to	other	East	African	regions.	China’s	role	in	the	sector,	however,	 is	 still	 minimal	 compared	 to	 traditional	 partners	 and	 enjoys	 limited	visibility,	 despite	 having	 expanded	 quickly	 in	 the	 past	 ten	 years.	 This	 applies	 in	particular	to	areas	where	traditional	development	partners	have	not	ventured	such	as	the	development	of	mega-infrastructure	for	health	care	vis-à-vis	involvement	in	community-level	 projects,	 or	 the	 involvement	 in	 researching	 and	 developing	traditional	medicine.	Available	 English-language	 studies	 on	 China-Africa,	 let	 alone	 Kenya-China,	health-related	assistance	and	trade,	are	scarce.	They	tend	to	concentrate	on	China’s	motivations	for	providing	assistance	to	African	countries,	rather	than	concentrating	on	 an	 analysis	 of	 how	 Chinese	 assistance	 meets	 the	 needs	 of	 receiving	countries/communities,	 and	 are	 strongly	 framed	 as	 South-South	 cooperation	initiatives	 –	 only	more	 recently	 starting	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 commercial	 side	 of	 the	relations530.	 One	 of	 the	most	 studied	 aspects	 is	 the	 dispatch	 of	 Chinese	medical	teams	 to	 Africa,	 as	 an	 example	 of	 historically	 rooted	 solidarity531 .	 However,	 no	studies	are	 focusing	on	 if	and	how	these	engagements	are	 framed	within	African	contexts	 or	 how	 they	 meet	 African	 development	 agendas.	 Despite	 the	 extreme	importance	increasingly	attributed	to	healthcare	cooperation	by	China’s	top	levels,	especially	 in	 FOCAC	 documents,	 relations	with	 Kenya,	 as	 the	 cases	 below	 show,	appear	 limited	 if	 compared	 to	 other	 sectors	 or	 Kenya’s	 engagement	 with	 other	partners.	The	selection	of	the	aspects	under	analysis,	then,	was	not	consequential	to	
                                                529	See	A.	Li,	‘Chinese	Medical	Cooperation	in	Africa’,	Discussion	Paper,	no.	52,	Nordiska	Afrikainstitutet,	Uppsala,	2011;	X.	Wang,	J.	Zhu,	and	D.	Zhang,	‘China’s	foreign	aid	on	human	resources	for	health:	Experience	and	implications’,	Journal	of	African	Studies	and	Development,	vol.	5,	no.	5,	September,	2013;	Y.	Huang,	‘Pursuing	Health	as	Foreign	Policy:	The	Case	of	China’,	Indiana	Journal	of	Global	Legal	Studies,	vol.	17,	no.	1,	2010;		530	see	Bräutigam,	2011,	op.	cit.	531	See	Li,	2011,	op.	cit.;	Wang,	Zhu,	Zhang,	op.	cit.;	Huang,	2010,	op.	cit.;	D.H.	Shinn,	‘Africa,	China	and	Health	Care’,	Inside	
AISA,	nos.	3	and	4,	October/December	2006.		
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observations	of	increased	involvement	but	rather	reflected	the	need	to	understand	what	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Kenyan	 environment	 distanced	 the	 country	 from	 the	discourses	and	alleged	continental	expanding	practices	of	healthcare	cooperation	with	China.	This	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 understanding	 the	 decision-making	 process	 in	 Kenya	when	it	comes	to	prioritising	and	negotiating	health-related	assistance	projects	and	commercial	 activities	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 health	 system.	 The	 chapter	unpacks	the	study	of	the	system(s)	of	governance	and	the	processes	of	engagement	between	 actors,	 namely	 their	 interests	 and	 the	 modalities	 through	 which	 they	negotiate,	to	contextualise	China’s	assistance	and	commercial	presence.	The	three	cases	 selected	 to	 be	 explored	 represent	 three	 major	 types	 of	 engagement	 in	healthcare	 cooperation	 between	 China	 and	 African	 countries,	 namely	 the	development	of	trade	in	health	products	and	devices,	infrastructure	for	health,	and	traditional	 medicine.	 They	 embody	 very	 different	 forms	 of	 cooperation	 and	assistance	provision	by	China	to	Kenya.	They	also	shed	light	on	extremely	different	bureaucratic	structures	within	the	Kenyan	health	sector.	The	focus	is	not	only	on	the	Kenyan	decision-making	process	to	understand	the	rationale	behind	the	choice	of	partners	in	healthcare	assistance	for	development	as	well	as	in	trade,	but	also	-	and	most	importantly	for	this	sector	-	on	how	structures	define	actions.		Finally,	this	sector	provides	an	opportunity	to	study	complex	dynamics	belonging	to	both	commercial	and	development	assistance	spheres	of	engagement.	While	the	previous	chapter	focused	mostly	on	trade,	and	the	following	chapter	focuses	mostly	on	development	assistance,	this	one	presents	a	mix	of	the	two.			
5.1.1 China-Africa	healthcare	cooperation		The	chapter	first	looks	at	how	healthcare	cooperation	is	framed	in	China-Africa	relations.	Healthcare	cooperation	between	China	and	African	countries	is	set	against	a	very	articulate	international	context	that	involves	“26	multilateral	agencies,	more	than	40	bilateral	donors,	and	20	global	and	regional	funds”532.	Despite	the	long-term	engagement	between	China	and	African	countries	in	healthcare	cooperation	dating	back	 to	 the	 1960s,	 the	 relation	was	 formalised,	 institutionalised	 and	 accelerated	with	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 Forum	 on	 China-Africa	 Cooperation	 in	 2000	 and	 the	
                                                532	H.	Feldbaum,	K.	Lee	and	J.	Michaud,	‘Global	Health	and	Foreign	Policy’,	Epidemiologic	Reviews,	vol.	32,	no.	1,	2010,	p.	83.	
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establishment	of	parallel	forums533.	These	forums	have	been	the	platform	for	China	to	 announce	 its	 commitments	 towards	 Africa	 (more	 so	 than	 vice	 versa,	 indeed	normally	“the	two	sides	agree”	but	it	is	only	the	Chinese	government	that	“offers”)	and	to	evaluate	their	progress.	Far	from	meaning	that	all	the	projects	carried	out	between	China	and	any	given	African	country	are	part	of	FOCAC,	the	Forum	and	its	documents	nonetheless	provide	an	idea	of	what	 is	being	done,	albeit	general	and	rarely	country-specific.	Though	 still	mainly	 carried	 out	 at	 the	 state-to-state	 level	 these	 relations	have	begun	to	expand	to	people-to-people	exchanges.	The	people-centred	rhetoric	is	also	the	 focus	 of	 the	Ministerial	 Forum	 on	 China-Africa	 Health	 Development,	 held	 in	Beijing	 in	 August	 2013,	 defined	 by	 Li	 Anshan	 a	 “milestone”	 in	 China-Africa	relations534 .	 Li	 claims	 that	 this	 first	 ever	 meeting	 between	 Chinese	 and	 African	health	ministers	demonstrates	“commitment	at	the	highest	levels	to	jointly	address	health	challenges”.	The	Beijing	Declaration,	originated	from	the	deliberations	during	the	 same	 Forum,	 states:	 “Under	 the	 theme	 of	 ‘Priorities	 of	 China-Africa	 Health	Cooperation	 in	 the	New	Era’,	we	 have	 recognised	 health	 as	 a	 central	 element	 of	China-Africa	 cooperation,	 and	 its	 important	 role	 in	 developing	 China-Africa	relations	and	in	promoting	friendship	among	our	peoples”535.	Li	suggests	that	this	recognition	is	a	sign	of	“an	ongoing	evolution	of	China	and	Africa’s	joint	efforts	to	be	more	strategic	and	sustainable”536.		‘More	strategic	and	sustainable’	seems	to	mean	that	increased	attention	is	paid	to	working	in	close	collaboration	with	African	agents	to	make	sure	the	engagements	are	beneficial	to	the	specific	needs	of	the	country	in	question,	rather	than	a	one-size-fits-all	approach	from	China.	It	also	means	that	the	relations	need	to	move	toward	the	 inclusion	 of	 actors	 beyond	 the	 state-level	 in	 contributing	 to	 the	provision/request	of	assistance	(through	CSR	projects	as	explained	in	the	section	below	 on	 Development	 Assistance)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 development	 of	 commercial	relations	 (to	move	 from	assistance	 to	 trade	as	explained	 in	 the	section	below	on	Trade).	Whether	 this	 increased	attention	 is	 consequential	 to	 the	 experiences	 the	
                                                533	China-Africa	Forum	on	Traditional	Medicine	and	adoption	of	the	Plan	of	Action	for	the	Cooperation	of	Traditional	Medicine	between	China	and	African	Countries,	2002;	2nd	International	Roundtable	on	China-Africa	Health	Cooperation,	2009;	3rd	International	Roundtable	on	China-Africa	Health	Cooperation,	2011;	China-	Africa	Trade	and	Cooperation	on	Pharmaceuticals	and	Medical	devices,	2012;	4th	International	Roundtable	on	China-Africa	Health	Cooperation,	2013;	Ministerial	Forum	of	China-Africa	Health	Development	(part	of	FOCAC),	2013.		534	A.	Li,	‘Milestone	meeting	charts	a	shared	future	in	China-Africa	health	cooperation’,	Thomson	Reuters	Foundation,	16	August	2013.	535	National	Health	and	Family	Planning	Commission	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	Beijing	Declaration,	China-Africa	Ministerial	Forum	on	Health	Development,	16th	August	2013.	536	Li,	2013,	op.	cit.		
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Chinese	government	and	companies	had	in	Africa,	is	still	not	clear.	It	is	important	to	mention	that	studies	on	the	African	logics	of	inclusion	(i.e.	the	thinking	behind	the	decision	to	‘add’	China	-	or	‘fit	it	in’,	à	la	Clapham	-	to	the	‘list’	of	donors	from	which	to	receive	assistance,	and	 to	 the	 list	of	partners	with	which	 to	strike	commercial	deals)	of	China’s	assistance	efforts	and	commercial	penetration	of	drugs	and	devices	are	lacking.			To	better	understand	dynamics	of	assistance	and	trade,	the	two	aspects	are	separated	in	the	analysis	below.			
Development	Assistance	The	 recognition	 of	 health	 as	 a	 priority	 in	 the	 development	 of	 China-Africa	relations	 and	 in	 fostering	 friendship	 among	 the	 peoples	 is	 part	 of	 a	 broader	discourse	of	South-South	cooperation	as	well	as,	more	recently,	a	strategy	of	Chinese	soft	 power537 .	 Despite	 China	 emphasizing	 the	 importance	 of	 cooperation	 while	rejecting	the	donor-recipient	approach	of	DAC-OECD	members,	as	King	points	out,	there	seem	to	have	been	slight	changes	 in	China’s	discourses	on	cooperation	and	assistance,	namely	“an	acknowledgement	that	in	addition	to	the	discourse	of	South-South	 cooperation	 which	 China	 maintains,	 it	 is	 also	 operating	 as	 a	 major	 aid	agency”538.	King	suggests	that	“the	shift	from	‘cooperation’	to	‘aid’	reflects	a	sense	of	moving	from	being	‘first	among	equals’	in	the	non-aligned	states	and	in	the	earlier	period	of	opening	up,	to	being	now	an	emergent	superpower”539.		Since	the	first	FOCAC	in	2000,	development	assistance	for	health	has	continued	to	appear	in	the	documents	in	the	form	of	pledges	related	to	social	development.	The	 focus	 of	 the	 assistance	 became,	with	 time,	more	 articulate.	 From	 an	 almost	exclusive	focus	on	Chinese	Medical	Teams,	the	engagement	expanded	its	scope	to	the	 anti-malaria	 campaign,	 training	 African	 medical	 personnel,	 China-supported	medications,	facilities	and	hospitals	in	Africa,	and	Chinese	medical	cooperation	with	WHO	 and	 other	 international	 institutions 540 	but	 also	 cooperation	 in	 the	development	 of	 traditional	 medicine,	 anti-HIV/AIDS	 and	 other	 communicable	diseases	treatments	as	well	as	maternal	and	child	health,	and	emergency	response.		The	dispatch	of	Chinese	Medical	Teams	is	considered	one	of	the	most	effective	forms	of	Chinese	healthcare	assistance	to	Africa541.	Li	Anshan	reports	that	Chinese	
                                                537	Bräutigam,	2011,	op.	cit.,	p	.8.	538	King,	2013,	op.	cit.,	p.	7.	539	Ibid.	540	Li,	op.	cit.,	2011,	p.	7.	541	Shinn,	op.cit.,	p.15.	
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medical	teams	have	treated	240	million	patients	around	the	world	including	in	44	African	countries	from	1963	to	2009,	all	but	Egypt,	Ivory	Coast,	Kenya,	Mauritius,	Nigeria,	South	Africa	and	Swaziland.	Chinese	Medical	Teams	have	treated	the	most	diverse	 diseases	 not	 just	 through	 modern	 medicine	 but	 also	 through	 Chinese	traditional	medical	treatment,	“especially	acupuncture”542.	Despite	the	fact	that,	as	just	mentioned,	Kenya	never	requested/received	a	CMT,	the	issue	is	still	worth	of	attention	due	to	the	nature	of	the	cooperation,	namely	educational.	It	will,	however,	be	addressed	in	Chapter	6	in	the	context	of	a	more	detailed	elaboration	of	assistance	towards	human	resources	development.		Infrastructure	 is	 the	 area	 to	which	 China	 allocates	 the	 largest	 share	 of	 aid543.	However,	due	to	transparency	issues	concerning	China’s	release	of	data,	it	is	hard	to	estimate	the	exact	share	or	amount	of	aid	allocated	annually	to	infrastructure	for	healthcare.	According	to	Bräutigam,	up	to	2009,	China	“had	financed	the	building	(and	often	equipping)	of	more	than	100	hospitals	and	clinics	worldwide,	including	54	in	Africa”	544.	The	number	probably	included	the	2006	FOCAC	pledges	to	build	30	hospitals	and	30	malaria	centres.	According	to	 the	White	Paper	on	Aid	 issued	by	China	in	2014545,	from	2010	to	2012	out	of	580	construction	projects	built	by	China	overseas	–	amounting	to	52,4%	of	total	aid	disbursed	-	80	hospitals	were	built.		Finally,	 in	 terms	 of	 medicines	 and	 medical	 equipment	 donations,	 China	 has	provided	a	number	of	African	countries	with	free	medicines	to	fight	malaria,	cholera,	tuberculosis,	meningitis	among	others546,	equipment	such	as	mosquito	nets547	and	reproductive	 health	 medical	 equipment 548 .	 The	 single	 most	 important	 type	 of	donation	is	that	of	the	anti-malaria	drug,	Cotexin,	developed	in	1993	by	the	Chinese	pharmaceutical	company	Beijing	Holley-Cotec,	later	approved	by	the	WHO	and	used,	since	1996,	by	all	Chinese	medical	teams	–	as	per	request	from	the	Chinese	Ministry	of	Health549.	 China's	 leaders	 visiting	Africa	 have	 often	 offered	 Cotexin	 as	 a	 state	gift550.	Since	2006	another	Chinese	anti-malaria	drug	entered	the	scene,	the	Guilin	
                                                542	Li,	2011,	op.	cit.,	p.	18.	543	Bräutigam,	2011,	op.	cit.,	p.	3.	544	Ibid.,	p.	4.	545	Government	of	the	PRC,	2014,	op.	cit.		546	Shinn,	op.	cit.,	p.15	547	Shinn,	2006,	p.15	548	E.	Little,	‘China’s	Smart	Power	in	Reproductive	Health:	Reaching	out	to	Uganda’,	in	C.	McGiffert	ed.,	Chinese	Soft	Power	and	
Its	Implications	for	the	United	States,	Centre	for	Strategic	&	International	Studies,	Washington,	2009,	pp.	35-36.	549	Li,	2011,	op.	cit.		550	Ibid.,	p.	16.	
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Pharmaceutical	Company’s	Artesunate	injection,	approved	by	WHO	and	considered	the	most	effective	in	the	emergency	treatment	of	malaria551.	The	need	to	find	more	sustainable	solutions	for	the	disbursement	of	assistance	and	the	need	to	counter-balance	negative	perceptions	in	other	sectors552	may	have	led	China	to	evolve	its	development	paradigm	from	a	state-led	to	one	that	includes	private	 companies	 and	 non-governmental	 organisations	 in	 the	 disbursement	 of	funds	for	assistance	projects.	In	Kenya,	for	instance,	CSR	projects	(from	emergency	response	to	poverty	reduction/development)	carried	out	by	private	or	state-owned	enterprises,	are	increasingly	encouraged	by	the	Chinese	Commercial	and	Economic	Counsellor’s	 Office553.	 This	 was	 reportedly	 done	 so	 that	 the	 companies	 that	 are	engaged	on	the	ground	would	not	only	be	associated	with	big	projects	but	also	with	community-level	developments.	At	the	same	time,	the	Chinese	Red	Cross	has	been	collaborating	with	the	Kenyan	Red	Cross	on	a	few	projects	including	the	provision	of	humanitarian	aid	to	drought-affected	areas	in	2011554.			
Trade	Healthcare	cooperation	among	countries	and	multi-lateral	agencies	does	involve	not	 only	 development	 assistance	 but	 also	 trade	 in	 health-related	 products	 and	services	that	is	distinct	from,	but	also	intertwined	with	the	provision	of	assistance.	Bräutigam	 points	 out	 that	 “services	 that	were	 formerly	 free	would	 gradually	 be	changed	 into	 jointly	 run	 hospitals,	 pharmaceutical	 factories,	 and	 other	 kinds	 of	‘mutually	 beneficial	 cooperation,’	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 the	 export	 of	 China’s	pharmaceutical	 products	 and	 medical	 services” 555 .	 China’s	 pharmaceutical	companies	 have	 become	 competitive	 internationally	 and	 have	 started	 exporting,	making	 the	 country	 “the	 market	 with	 the	 best	 comprehensive	 advantages	 and	greatest	potential	for	the	future	development”556.		The	China-Africa	Trade	and	Cooperation	on	Pharmaceuticals	and	Medical	devices,	held	 in	 September	 2012,	 was	 convened	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 East	 Africa	Community	and	China	Chamber	of	Commerce	for	Import	and	Export	of	Medicines	and	Health	Products	(CCCMHPIE)	with	the	aim	to	“facilitate	exchange	of	information	
                                                551	Ibid,	p.	17.	552	Such	as	infrastructure	development.		553	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Chinese	Economic	and	Commercial	Counsellor’s	Office,	Nairobi,	2013-11-18.	554	‘China's	food	aid	to	Africa	and	Agricultural	Cooperation	with	African	Continent’,	Government	of	the	PRC	via	Reliefweb,	Beijing,	23	August	2011.	555	Bräutigam,	2011,	op.	cit.,	p.	8.	Also	see	D.	Bräutigam,	The	dragon's	gift:	the	real	story	of	China	in	Africa,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford,	2009,	p.	118-119.	556	B.	Ochieng,	‘Africa	Focus:	Kenya	hails	China's	assistance	in	health	sector’,	Xinhua,	19	July	2012.
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on	 the	 potentials	 for	 expanded	 cooperation	 between	 China	 and	 EAC	 countries	related	 to	 manufacture,	 technology	 exchange	 and	 trade	 in	 pharmaceuticals	 and	medical	devices”557.	The	CCCMHPIE	Vice-President	Meng	Dongping	pointed	out	that	“along	with	 the	 trade	and	cultural	exchange,	 the	healthcare	cooperation	between	China	and	Africa	has	shown	great	potential	with	the	trade	volume	maintaining	an	annual	 growth	 rate	 of	 40	 percent	 on	 average” 558 .	 Cao	 Gang,	 director	 of	 the	CCCMHPIE,	stated	that	“China	is	changing	the	historical	lack	of	medicine”559	in	Africa	mainly	thanks	to	the	“low	prices	and	good	quality	of	China's	medical	products”560.	In	fact,	“Africa	has	become	the	largest	export	market	for	medicine	made	by	China	and	 one	 of	 the	 fastest-growing	 markets	 for	 Chinese	 medical	 products	 […]	 The	growth	 rate	 of	 exports	 to	 Africa	 was	 higher	 than	 that	 for	 European	 and	 North	American	markets	in	the	same	period”561.	In	terms	of	production,	China	still	mainly	produces	 in	 China,	 though	 a	 number	 of	 pharmaceutical	 factories	were	 set	 up	 in	countries	such	as	Mali,	Tanzania,	Ethiopia	and	since	the	1990s,	“some	Chinese-built	pharmaceutical	 factories	 in	 Africa	 were	 privatized,	 and	 Chinese	 companies	 took	equity	participation	as	joint	ventures”562.	The	major	 issue	 concerning	 the	 trade	of	pharmaceuticals	 revolves	 around	 the	existence	 of	 counterfeit	 products.	 The	Chinese	 authorities,	 in	 2007	 “closed	more	than	 9000	 unlicensed	 pharmaceutical	 factories,	 terminated	 nearly	 400	counterfeiting	 operations	 and	 executed	 the	head	of	 China’s	 State	 Food	 and	Drug	Administration	 for	 corruption.	 However,	 significant	 weaknesses	 remain	 in	 the	regulation	of	pharmaceutical	production	in	China”563.	The	fight	against	counterfeits	involves	governments	as	well	 as	private	 companies	and	consumers	 in	China	and	African	countries	(see	the	previous	chapter	for	details).		
5.1.2 	Kenya-China	relations	This	section	briefly	 introduces	 the	system	of	governance	regulating	 the	health	sector	as	a	whole	(while	more	detailed	accounts	are	provided	for	each	case	below),	explaining	how	external	actors	interact	with	domestic	actors	within	the	system.		
                                                557	Ibid.	558	Ibid.	559	Y.	Wang	ed.,	‘Africa	becomes	largest	Chinese	medicine	export	market’,	Xinhua	via	Embassy	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China	in	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	4	November	2012.		560	Ibid.	561	Ibid.		562	Bräutigam,	2011,	op.	cit.,	p.	4.	563	Ibid.,	p.	9.	
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The	relations	between	Kenya	and	China	in	health	care	date	back	to	the	1980s564.	As	 in	most	 cases,	 the	 engagement	 flourished	 in	 the	 2000s	with	 the	 provision	 of	assistance	 by	 China	 and	 increased	 trade	 in	 medical	 products	 and	 devices.	 The	emergence	of	Chinese	services	and	products	must	be	contextualised	not	only	within	Kenya’s	domestic	system	of	governance	but	also	 in	comparison	to	 the	rest	of	 the	continent.	 While	 the	 Kenyan	 healthcare	 system	 of	 governance	 presents	shortcomings	in	terms	of	effective	planning	and	delivery,	it	is,	nonetheless,	the	most	advanced	in	the	East	African	region	in	policy	terms	as	well	as	legislative,	regulatory	and	 institutional,	occupying	the	17th	position,	out	of	52	countries565	in	the	Health	cluster	of	the	Ibrahim	Index	of	Good	Governance	(2013).		The	public	expenditure566	in	2014	was	61.25%	of	the	total	health	expenditure567	whereas	out-of-pocket	expenditure	was	26.1%568.	External	resources569	for	health	amounted	to	27.5%570	of	the	total	expenditure.	The	share	of	the	government’s	total	budget	allocated	to	healthcare	was	4%571	of	the	total	government	budget,	far	behind	the	threshold	of	15%	of	the	total	budget	which	was	set	as	a	target	to	be	met	by	2015	by	African	Governments	in	the	Abuja	Declaration	in	2001.	The	government	of	Kenya	is	strongly	supported	and	complemented,	in	policy-making	and	implementation,	by	development	partners	(at	both	bilateral	and	multilateral	 level)	and	implementing	partners	such	as	faith-based	organisations,	the	private	sector	and	civil	society	more	broadly.	 As	 reported	 by	 Business	 Monitor	 International	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health	operates	 approximately	 50%	 of	 health	 facilities,	 with	 the	 remainder	 run	 by	 the	private	sector,	missionary	organisations	or	the	Ministry	of	Local	Government572.	For	instance,	the	Catholic	Church	“operates	nearly	30	percent	of	all	healthcare	facilities	
                                                564	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Medical	Services,	Nairobi,	2014-09-29.		565	Rank	over	52	countries	where	1	is	the	best	and	52	the	worst.	566	Public	health	expenditure	consists	of	recurrent	and	capital	spending	from	government	(central	and	local)	budgets,	external	borrowings	and	grants	(including	donations	from	international	agencies	and	nongovernmental	organizations),	and	social	(or	compulsory)	health	insurance	funds.	Total	health	expenditure	is	the	sum	of	public	and	private	health	expenditure.	It	covers	the	provision	of	health	services	(preventive	and	curative),	family	planning	activities,	nutrition	activities,	and	emergency	aid	designated	for	health	but	does	not	include	provision	of	water	and	sanitation.	567	World	Bank	statistics,	2014.	http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/kenya/health-expenditure.	568	As	defined	by	the	World	Health	Organisation	“This	is	a	core	indicator	of	health	financing	systems.	This	indicator	contributes	to	understanding	the	relative	weight	of	private	entities	in	total	expenditure	on	health.	It	includes	expenditure	from	pooled	resources	with	no	government	control,	such	as	voluntary	health	insurance,	and	the	direct	payments	for	health	by	corporations	(profit,	non-for-profit	and	NGOs)	and	households.	As	a	financing	agent	classification,	it	includes	all	sources	of	funding	passing	through	these	entities,	including	any	donor	(funding)	they	use	to	pay	for	health”.	Available	at:	http://apps.who.int/gho/indicatorregistry/App_Main/view_indicator.aspx?iid=119.		569	As	defined	by	the	World	Health	Organisation:	“an	indicator	which	refers	to	the	origin	of	the	resources	used	to	purchase	health	services.	Some	of	these	external	sources	will	be	channelled	through	the	government's	budget,	some	through	insurance	agencies,	some	through	the	private	or	NGO	sectors.		As	such,	these	funds	cannot	simply	be	added	to	those	reported	in	the	earlier	breakdowns”.	Available	at:	http://apps.who.int/gho/indicatorregistry/App_Main/view_indicator.aspx?iid=91	570		World	Bank	statistics,	2014,		571	World	Bank	statistics,	2014.	http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/kenya/health-expenditure.		572	Business	Monitor	International,	Kenya	Pharmaceuticals	and	Healthcare	Report,	Q4,	Business	Monitor	International,	2014,	p.	56.	
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which	 includes,	 but	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 54	 hospitals,	 83	 health	 centres	 and	 311	dispensaries”573.		In	2007	the	Kenya	Health	Sector	Wide	Approach	(SWAp)	was	introduced	by	the	government	of	Kenya	to	guarantee	that	development	partners’	objectives	were	in	line	with	the	government	agenda	and	to	avoid	duplication	of	efforts.	Only	the	major	partners	adhered	to	the	Code	of	Conduct,	namely	the	US,	UK,	Denmark,	Germany,	Japan,	 the	 EU	 as	 well	 as	 representatives	 of	 multilateral	 agencies,	 while	 others	including	China	have	not,	to	date.	The	SWAp	agreement	emphasises:			 The	need	for	donor	agencies	to	align	their	health-related	commitments	with	the	Government	of	Kenya’s	development	agenda.		At	the	same	time,	it	envisions	that	the	government,	NGOs	and	donor	agencies	will	develop	and	employ	common	methodologies	for	planning,	disbursement	of	funds,	procuring	commodities	and	reporting	on	program	outcomes.		The	SWAp	Code	of	Conduct	also	underscores	the	need	for	donors	in	Kenya	to	provide	reliable	commitments	of	aid	over	a	multi-year	framework	in	order	to	facilitate	the	Ministry	of	Health’s	planning	process.574		China	 has	 not	 adhered	 to	 the	 SWAp 575 	or	 registered	 with	 associations	 of	manufacturers	and	service	providers,	such	as	the	Kenya	Healthcare	Federation576,	thus	 detaching	 itself	 from	 the	 local	 institutional	 and	 associational	 environment.	Notwithstanding	 this,	 the	 country	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 important	 partner	 for	 the	achievement	of	development	goals	for	three	main	reasons:	 for	the	trade	in	cheap	quality	drugs,	 for	 its	 infrastructure	development	capacity	and	the	 involvement	 in	capacity	building.	On	top	of	this,	China	is	also	seen	as	an	important	partner	for	its	involvement	 in	 researching	 and	 developing	 traditional	 medicine.	 Although	 this	latter	form	of	engagement	is	only	emerging,	it	is	a	potentially	influencing	source	of	soft	power	that	draws	upon	Africa’s	historical	dependence	on	traditional	medicine	and	 China’s	 willingness	 to	 push	 for	 global	 recognition	 of	 TCM	 at	 the	 policy	 and	legislative	levels.	Despite	the	relevance	of	traditional	medicine	for	both	African	and	Chinese	contexts,	the	issue	has	been	overlooked	by	Western	regulatory	institutions.	
                                                573	E.	Otuki,	‘Devolved	health	institutions	to	get	subsidised	drugs’,	Business	Daily,	5	August	2013.		574	Centre	for	Strategic	and	International	Studies,	‘Kenya:	The	big	picture	on	health’,	Smart	Global	Health	[website].		575	Kenya	has	a	preference	of	negotiating	donors’	support	for	health	through	the	Sector	Wide	Approach,	since	2007.	It	is	a	preference,	not	an	obligation.	This	preference	was	identified	as	best	practice	to	avoid	duplication	of	efforts	by	development	partners.	The	implications	of	such	preference	for	China,	which	is	not	part	of	SWAp,	are	that	Kenyan	actors	might	not	be	willing	to	bypass	the	existing	system	of	governance	in	order	to	negotiate	with	China.	Their	unwillingness	might	be	rooted	in	the	fact	that	for	the	actors	involved,	SWAp	is	the	most	meaningful	approach.				576	Branch	of	Kenya	Private	Sector	Association	(KEPSA)	for	healthcare.		
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The	 interest	 in	 promoting	 change	 internationally	 is	 accompanied	 by	 economic	interests	in	creating	a	market	for	Chinese	companies.		 	
5.2 Kenya’s	responses	The	interaction	between	Kenyan	stakeholders	in	the	healthcare	sector	vis-à-vis	China	mainly	revolves	around	inserting	a	new	player	in	a	scenario	well	populated	by	long-present	development	partners	and	commercial	actors.	This	implies	learning	about	 the	 way	 to	match	 domestic	 needs	 with	 the	 Chinese	 offer	 of	 development	assistance	and	trade	linkages.	It	also	means	identifying	what	aspects	of	the	system	of	governance	should	be	preserved	and	what	aspects	could	be	 improved	through	the	 engagement	 with	 China.	 The	 improvement	 of	 the	 health	 care	 system	 has	emerged	 as	 a	 priority	 for	 Kenya	 since	 the	 2000s.	 While	 some	 objectives	 were	achieved,	 such	 as	 the	 curbing	 of	 the	 HIV-AIDS	 crisis,	 many	 others	 remain	 and	represent	 challenges	 that	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 industrialisation	 process	 the	country	is	experiencing.		This	section	looks	at	how	and	why	different	Kenyan	agents	have	made	sense	of	their	 interaction	 with	 Chinese	 actors	 and	 how	 they	 have	 justified	 their	 actions	domestically.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 looks	 at	 the	 interplay	 between	 the	 interests	emerging	with	the	arrival	of	China	and	the	existing	systems	of	governance.	Existing	systems	 of	 governance	 are	 scrutinised	 to	 evaluate	 whether	 they	 are	 suitable	 to	guarantee	the	safeguard	of	Kenyan	actors’	interests,	be	these	old	or	new.	Opposite	
to	the	cases	of	the	previous	chapter	where	Kenyan	actors’	motivations	to	engage	with	
the	Chinese	were	triggered	by	social	discontent,	associated	with	an	unwanted	change	
in	the	systems	of	governance	caused	by	the	Chinese	products/activities,	in	the	case	of	
healthcare	the	motivations	to	engage	with	China	revolve	around	a	less	confrontational	
relation	with	the	Chinese.		The	cases	analysed	below	concern:		1. The	entrance	of	Chinese	health	products	and	technologies	in	the	public	and	private	sectors.	The	study	mainly	looks	at	the	different	penetration	rate	of	Chinese	goods	in	the	public	and	private	sectors,	which	reflects	the	structural	limitations	 that	 characterise	 the	 Kenyan	 system	 of	 governance	 and	 the	significant	role	historically	played	by	international	organisations.		
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2. The	 negotiation	 and	management	 by	 Kenyan	 actors	 of	 the	 infrastructural	assistance	provided	by	China,	including	equipment.	This	issue	is	relevant	to	evaluate	how	China’s	offers	are	contextualised	within	 the	Kenyan	existing	system	of	governance,	highly	dominated	by	multi-lateral	institutions.		3. The	 engagement/cooperation	 in	 the	development	 of	 the	Natural	 Products	Industry	initiative.	The	study	of	this	issue	attempts	to	evaluate	how	Kenyan	actors	 acknowledge	 the	 unsuitability	 of	 the	 system	 of	 governance	 to	safeguard	emerging	interests	and	how	they	engage	with	China	to	improve	it.			
5.2.1 Trade	in	Health	products	and	technologies	The	main	goal	of	Kenya	Vision	2030,	Social	pillar,	health	care	delivery	is	that	to	provide	“equitable	and	affordable	health	care	at	the	highest	affordable	standard	to	all	 citizens.”	577 	Chinese	 products	 are	 considered	 key	 to	 achieving	 Vision	 2030’s	goals	thanks	to	their	extremely	affordable	prices	and	good	quality.	However,	their	entrance	 is	subjected	not	only	 to	market	dynamics	but	also	 to	a	highly	regulated	system	of	governance,	which,	in	conjunction	with	China’s	own	limitations	(China	is	only	starting	to	emerge,	internationally,	as	a	producer	of	drugs	and	medical	devices),	acts	as	a	 force	hindering,	 for	now,	deeper	Kenya-China	relations.	This	case	sheds	light	 on	 how	 the	 current	 domestic	 structuring	 of	 the	 sector	 (heavily	 reliant	 on	international	 institutions)	 interferes	 with	 China’s	 FOCAC	 pledges	 of	 providing	medicines	to	African	countries.	This	case	is	particularly	interesting	as	it	shows	how	important	 it	 is	 to	 account	 for	 sub-sectoral	 characteristics	 to	 understand	 the	relations	and	the	way	the	structure	of	a	specific	policy	area	can	influence	domestic	and	international	agential	relations.		
	
Domestic	and	international	regulatory	institutions	Kenya	 is	 currently	 the	 largest	 producer	 of	 pharmaceutical	 products	 in	 the	Common	Market	for	Eastern	and	Southern	Africa	(COMESA)	region.	Of	the	region's	estimated	50	recognised	pharmaceutical	manufacturers,	30	are	based	in	Kenya	and,	together	with	 circa	other	12	 local	manufacturers,	 they	produce	a	broad	 range	of	products	for	both	the	local	and	international	markets	(primarily	essential	generic	medicines).	 Local	 manufacturing	 has	 capacity	 to	 produce	 formulations	 –	 mostly	generic	drugs	–	and	package	finished	products.	Manufacturers	are,	however,	highly	
                                                577	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	‘Kenya	Vision	2030,	The	Vision’,	Kenya	Vision	2030	[website].	
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reliant	 on	 imports	 of	 Active	 Pharmaceutical	 Ingredients	 (API),	 “with	 local	availability	limited	to	5%	of	the	total	 industrial	requirements”578.	APIs,	which	are	necessary	 to	 manufacture	 medicines,	 are	 imported	 from	 India,	 and	 increasingly	from	 China 579 .	 Directly	 competing	 with	 local	 products	 are,	 historically,	 Indian	products.	Low	prices	and	good	quality	are	the	main	incentives	for	this	long-lasting	relationship.	Indian	companies	produce	in	India	mainly	because	APIs	are	available	there.	 Generic	medicines	 from	 India	 have	been	procured	 for	 decades	 by	Kenya’s	public	 and	 private	 sectors.	 APIs	 are	 also	 procured	 from	 India,	 though	 China	 is	increasingly	entering	the	market.		Beyond	generic	medicines,	Kenya	is	highly	reliant	on	donors’	assistance	for	the	provision	of	drugs	for	communicable	diseases	such	as	HIV,	malaria,	TB.	Especially	in	 the	 case	 of	 HIV,	 according	 to	 the	 National	 AIDS	 &	 STI	 Control	 Programme	(NASCOP),	the	situation	improved	substantially	since	1999	to	the	point	that	“HIV	is	one	of	 the	Millenium	Development	Goals	that	we,	 in	Kenya,	achieved”580.	 In	1999	Kenya	 declared	 HIV/AIDS	 a	 national	 disaster.	 According	 to	 NASCOP	 “the	government	was	 looking	 for	 all	 sorts	 of	 partners”,	major	 ones	 becoming	 the	 US	President’s	Emergency	Plan	 for	AIDS	Relief	 (PEPFAR)	and	 the	Global	 Fund	 since	2003.	JICA	also	provided	significant	assistance	between	2006-2013,	but	the	grant	was	not	renewed581.	In	fact,	the	interviewee	at	NASCOP	continues,	“we	need	more	partners,	funding	from	traditional	donors	is	reducing.	We	need	to	continue	with	the	work	 and	 thus	 need	 to	 consider	 new	 partners,	 through	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	Affairs.	China	will	also	be	considered”.	Drugs	procured	through	donor	funding	and	NGOs	are	free	of	charge	and	must	be	WHO	pre-qualified.		The	main	diseases	that	fall	under	this	category	are	HIV/AIDS,	malaria,	TB	and	reproductive	health,	the	same	
categories	China	pledges	support	for.	However,	even	though	China	has	linked	its	aid	to	 the	 United	 Nations	 summits	 on	 financing	 the	Millennium	 Development	 Goals	(MDGs),	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 disconnect	 on	 how	 the	 country	 cooperates	 with	international	institutions	in	the	context	of	Kenya.	As	a	consequence,	despite	the	fact	that	China’s	pledges	well	align	with	Kenyan	needs,	China’s	lack	of	compliance	with	
international	mechanisms	excludes	it	from	the	Kenyan	market.	In	other	words,	Kenyan	
actors	decide	and	choose	to	follow	pre-set	routes	of	multilateral	cooperation	rather	
than	negotiating	with	China	independently.		
                                                578	Business	Monitor	International,	op.	cit.,	p.	71.	579	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Pharmacy	and	Poisons	Board,	Registrar	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-02-07.	580	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	National	AIDS	&	STI	Control	Programme	(NASCOP),	Nairobi,	2014-10-08.	581	Ibid.	
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The	entrance	of	Chinese	products:	procurement	and	distribution	As	 briefly	 outlined	 above,	 the	 option	 and	 choice	 to	 procure	 Chinese	 health	products	and	technologies,	as	new	as	they	are	in	the	Kenyan	context,	vary	according	to	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 including	 international	 requirements	 to	 which	 Kenya	subscribes,	the	capacity	of	manufacturing	firms,	and	price	and	quality.	Consequently,	the	 entrance	 of	 Chinese	 products	 is	 very	 highly	 dependent	 on	 the	 existing	governance	system	of	procurement	and	distribution.	While	in	other	cases	presented	in	 this	 thesis,	 there	 are	 occurrences	 where	 existing	 governance	 systems	 are	challenged	 by	 either	 the	 Chinese	 or	 Kenyan	 actors	 (in	 response	 to	 the	 Chinese	presence),	in	the	case	of	pharmaceuticals’	trade,	the	system	remains	unvaried.		Local	manufacturing	covers	ca	30%	of	Kenyan	needs,	the	remaining	is	imported	mainly	from	India,	though	Chinese	products	are	increasing582.	Kenya	is	the	top	one	destination	for	Chinese	products	in	East	Africa	(and	sixth	largest	in	terms	of	bilateral	trade)583.	 CCCMHPIE	Vice-President	Meng	Dongping	 stated	 that	 “in	 the	 past	 few	years,	trade	between	China	and	East	Africa	has	maintained	an	annual	growth	of	20	percent	 amounting	 to	 145	 million	 dollars	 whereby	 in	 2011	 the	 bilateral	 trade	between	China	and	Kenya	reached	78.87	million	dollars,	up	by	21.5	percent	year	on	year,	making	Kenya	 the	 largest	market	 for	China	 in	East	Africa.”584	Kenya,	and	 in	particular	Nairobi,	also	act	as	a	hub	through	which	transit	products	 for	export	to	neighbouring	countries.		Chinese	 firms	 produce	 in	 China,	 export	 to	 Kenya	 and	 distribute	 through	 local	agents	except	for	a	couple	of	companies	that	distribute	directly,	mainly	thanks	to	their	 size,	 the	 type	 of	 product	 exported	 and	 international	 recognition.	 Chinese	manufacturing	plants	are	not	present	in	Kenya	at	the	time	of	writing	although	they	were	set	up	in	other	African	countries.	Some	believe	that	“if	they	set	up	their	factory	plants	here	then	they	win”	by	beating	the	costs	India	faces	by	producing	in	India	and	exporting	to	Kenya585.	As	a	fact,	“there	was	a	Sino-Kenya	government	to	government	agreement	that	never	entered	into	production”586	though	the	reasons	are	unclear.	Chinese	products	entering	Kenya	are	mainly	antibiotics	and	anti-malaria	drugs	but	cover	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 medicines,	 including	 painkillers587 .	 The	 only	 WHO	 pre-
                                                582	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Pharmacy	Department,	Nairobi.	2014-09-30.	583	Ochieng,	op.cit.	584	Ibid.	585	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Kenya	Pharmaceutical	Association,	Nairobi,	2014-01-31.		586	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Pharmacy	and	Poisons	Board,	Registrar	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-02-07.	587	Ibid.	
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qualified	Chinese	drug	that	is	allowed	on	the	Kenyan	market	is	a	medicine	for	severe	malaria	that	became	WHO	recommended	in	2012,	time	after	which	Kenya	adopted	the	WHO	regulation588.	It	is	important	to	state	that	despite	the	impressive	growth	of	China’s	pharma	sector,	the	country’s	role	in	API	production	and	supply589	reminds	that	“the	country’s	pharmaceutical	industry	remains	positioned	at	the	lower-end	of	the	 global	 value	 chain” 590 .	 Other	 foreign	 companies,	 from	 Europe	 and	 the	 US,	provide	 donor-funded	 drugs	mainly	 for	 reproductive	 health.	 Kenya	 also	 imports	from	them	branded	products	primarily	for	tourists.		Below,	 a	 break-down	 of	 the	 systems	 of	 governance	 for	 drugs’	 registration,	procurement	and	distribution.			
Registration	and	quality	control	The	PPB	asserts	that	Chinese	drugs	do	not	present	particular	problems	during	the	registration	phase.	The	only	problem	observed	is	due	to	language	barriers.	The	PPB	 states:	 “we	 reject	 if	we	do	 not	 understand	 the	 language,	 not	 because	 of	 the	quality	but	 if	 you	 cannot	put	 together	 a	decent	 application	 then	we	doubt	 about	everything	else.”591	Those	that	do	not	register	directly	do	outsourcing	(this	will	be	further	 expanded	 in	 the	 section	 below	 on	 manufacturing,	 procurement	 and	distribution).	Despite	the	existence	of	a	relatively	strong	regulatory	framework	for	the	entrance	of	domestic	and	foreign	drugs	onto	the	market,	according	to	a	major	actor	 in	the	private	pharmaceutical	sector,	“the	regulatory	framework	we	have	is	good,	but	 it	 could	be	 stronger.	The	PPB’s	 capacity	 is	 still	weak	 in	 inspection	and	control.	It	needs	to	be	strengthened	so	we	can	separate	the	good	from	the	bad.	The	controls	must	not	only	be	at	entry	but	as	a	continuous	monitoring	process.”592	It	is	enough	to	say	that	the	PPB	has	only	started	in	2013	to	move	away	from	the	manual	recording	 of	 registered	 drugs	 and	 use	 an	 online	 portal	 for	 registration,	 renewal,	payment	of	operational	licenses593.	While	the	PPB	affirms	that	there	are	thousands	of	Chinese	companies	applying	for	registration594,	there	are	no	digital	records	of	the	medicines	that	have	been	approved	and	those	that	haven’t.	These	weaknesses,	 in	turn,	leave	space	for	sub-standard	drugs	to	come	in	un-registered	or	for	registered	
                                                588	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Malaria	Control	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-10-06.	589	Y.	Huang,	‘Chinese	Pharma:	A	Global	Health	Game	Changer?’,	Council	on	Foreign	Relations	[website],	31	March	2015.		590	Ibid.		591	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Pharmacy	and	Poisons	Board,	Pharmacovigilance	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-10-07.	592	Interview	with	an	executive,	Kenya	Healthcare	Federation,	Nairobi,	2014-10-08.	593	Business	Monitor	International,	op.	cit.,	p.	68;	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Pharmacy	and	Poisons	Board,	Pharmacovigilance	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-10-07.	594	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Pharmacy	and	Poisons	Board,	Registrar	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-02-07.	
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drugs	to	potentially	not	maintain	standard	levels	of	quality.	However,	it	is	difficult	to	 ascertain	 whether	 the	 belief	 that	 “Chinese	 counterfeits	 have	 not	 entered	 the	market”595	is	 based	 on	 objective	 facts	 or	 a	 rule	 of	 thumb.	Mostly,	 however,	 it	 is	believed	that	counterfeit	drugs	come	from	India596.	The	problem	with	counterfeiting	of	pharmaceutical	products	was	at	the	centre	of	a	major	dispute	between	pharma	manufacturers/agents	and	the	policy-making	bodies	during	the	drafting	of	the	Anti-Counterfeit	Act	to	the	point	that	the	section	of	the	Act	referring	to	medicines	had	to	be	suspended597.	Even	the	PPB	believes	that,	to	a	certain	extent,	the	problem	with	counterfeits	is	more	political	than	real:	“Chinese	and	Indian	drugs	are	so	demonised.	Some	manufacturing	companies	produce	the	same	drug	for	different	pharma	brands,	it	is	the	same	drug,	the	same	company	and	yet	one	brand	is	well	received	and	the	other	demonised.”598	The	 main	 problem	 concerning	 sub-standard	 drugs	 is	 the	 inefficiency	 of	regulations’	 implementation,	 in	 particular,	 in	 follow-up	 phases.	 In	 2009	 the	 PPB	introduced	pharmacovigilance	guidelines	because,	as	affirmed	by	PPB	“it	was	best	practice.	 Pharmacovigilance	 is	 carried	 out	 throughout	 the	world.	We	 decided	 to	adhere.” 599 	Pharmaco-vigilance	 mostly	 consists	 of	 clinical	 trials,	 studies	 of	 the	medicine	before	it	is	registered,	rather	than	follow	up	once	the	medicine	is	already	in	circulation.	This	is	done	for	only	a	portion	of	drugs	that	undergo	clinical	trials	in	Kenya	or	for	drugs	that	give	adverse	reactions.	The	PPB	says	that	they	“do	re-active	pharmacovigilance,	 rather	 than	pro-active”600.	So,	even	 if	 checks	are	done	during	registration	and	all	requisites	are	satisfied,	when	the	medicine	is	shipped	it	could	be	anything	 else 601 ,	 and	 the	 mechanisms	 in	 place	 to	 control	 are	 undermined	 by	implementation	constraints	including	lack	of	personnel	and	corruption.		
	
Procurement	and	distribution:	Public	sector	and	programme	items	The	 procurement	 of	 pharmaceutical	 products	 is	 mainly	 divided	 into602:	 APIs,	essential	drugs	(first	line	treatment,	i.e.	stock	items	in	hospitals),	programme	items	(drugs	targeting	specific	diseases	such	as	malaria,	TB,	HIV	and	reproductive	health),	
                                                595	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Kenya	Pharmaceutical	Association,	Nairobi,	2014-01-31.	596	Ibid.	597	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Pharmacy	and	Poisons	Board,	Registrar	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-02-07.	598	Ibid.	599	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Pharmacy	and	Poisons	Board,	Pharmacovigilance	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-10-07.	600	Ibid.	601	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Pharmacy	Department,	Nairobi.	2014-09-30.	602	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Kenya	Medical	Supplies	Agency	(KEMSA),	Procurement-Donor	Funded	Projects	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-09-17.	
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medical	supplies	(dressings,	nursing	care,	etc.).	The	public	sector	does	not	procure	APIs	but	only	finished	products,	whereas	the	private	sector	imports	ca	90%	of	APIs	for	distribution	to	Kenyan	manufacturers	and	finished	products.	The	Kenya	Medical	Supplies	 Agency	 (KEMSA)	 is	 a	 semi-autonomous	 institution	 responsible	 for	supplying	 drugs	 to	 public	 facilities.	 It	 does	 so	 through	 an	 open	 tender	 system	financed	by	 the	Ministry	of	Health.	KEMSA	competes	with	other	distributors,	 the	main	one	being	MEDS	in	the	private	market603.		The	procurement	pattern	in	the	public	sector	varies	according	to	the	type	of	drug,	whether	essential,	programme	items	or	medical	supplies.	Regarding	essential	drugs,	they	are	70%	locally	manufactured	and	30%	imported.	The	locally	manufactured	include	 Kenyan	 and	 Kenyan-Indian,	 but	 also	 multi-nationals	 such	 as	 GSK.	Programme	items	(must	be	WHO	qualified)	are	close	to	100%	imported	from	India	with	a	small	percentage	coming	from	Europe	and	the	US	for	reproductive	health.	According	to	KEMSA	Chinese	companies	rarely	win	the	bids	for	this	type	of	drugs,	except	from	one	single	case	for	which	the	pre-qualified	drug	only	comes	from	China	and	 it	 is	 a	 medicine	 to	 cure	 severe	 malaria	 produced	 by	 a	 major	 Chinese	pharmaceutical	company604,	which,	as	mentioned	above,	was	adopted	by	WHO	as	first-line	treatment	in	2012.	In	terms	of	medical	supplies,	the	scenario	changes	as	70%	are	imported	with	only	30%	locally	manufactured.	Of	the	imported	goods,	70%	comes	from	China	and	the	rest	from	India	and	other	countries,	with	“only	a	small	portion	from	the	developed	world”605.	The	relations	KEMSA	maintains	with	Chinese	companies	are	limited	and,	so	far,	not	consistent	in	terms	of	procurement,	which,	the	 agency	 stresses,	 “takes	 place	 through	 competitive	 bidding”.	 The	 statistics	provided,	however,	are	an	indication	of	an	increased	presence	in	the	past	few	years.		Still	part	of	the	public	governance	system	but	following	a	different	trajectory	are	the	donations	of	medicines.	According	to	KEMSA	“usually	we	do	not	request	them,	but	 they	 come	 out	 of	 bilateral	 discussions”606.	 In	 2003	 the	 Chinese	 government	donated	a	batch	of	malaria	drugs	 to	 the	government	of	Kenya.	The	donation	was	administered	by	KEMSA	and	was	channelled	through	the	Global	Fund607.	An	MOU	was	 signed	 by	 the	 Treasury	 and	 the	 Chinese	 government	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 the	
                                                603	Business	Monitor	International,	op.	cit.,	p.	68.	604	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Malaria	Control	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-10-06.	605	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Kenya	Medical	Supplies	Agency	(KEMSA),	Procurement-Donor	Funded	Projects	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-09-17.	606	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Medical	Services,	Nairobi,	2014-09-29.	607	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Pharmacy	Department,	Nairobi,	2014-09-30.	
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Ministry	of	Health608.	In	2007/2008	there	was	another	donation	but,	according	to	KEMSA,	the	anti-malaria	drug	donated	was	not	in	line	with	the	approved	treatment	and	had	to	be	donated	to	neighbouring	countries	except	from	a	share	of	it	that,	after	being	approved	by	the	Director	of	Medical	Services,	was	used	in	selected	geographic	areas	where	main	commodities	had	run	out.	According	to	other	sources,	the	main	problem	with	the	donation	was	that	despite	being	a	registered	product	its	shelf-life	was	 short 609 .	 	 In	 2010-2011	 the	 Chinese	 government	 gifted	 another	 batch	 of	duocotexin	and	injection	artemisin	through	the	Medical	Services	and	Public	Health	Division.	On	top	of	conventional	medicines,	in	2011/2012	the	government	of	China	also	donated	herbal	medicines,	through	the	Ministry	of	Health,	for	the	treatment	of	HIV.		The	PPB’s	guidelines	for	donations	mainly	restrict	the	expiry	date	and	the	quality	although	donations,	 if	 the	drug	 is	 registered	 in	 the	 country,	 are	not	 subjected	 to	follow-up	mechanisms.	In	the	forms	attached	to	the	donation,	donors	must	justify	why	that	product	cannot	be	sourced	locally,	then	sign	the	agreement.	According	to	the	 PPB,	 “our	 focus	 is	 on	 avoiding	 the	 dumping	 of	 low-quality	 products.	 Some	donations	come,	and	you	see	in	the	box	that	some	tablets	have	been	used	already.”610	These	occurrences,	however,	are	not	unique	to	donations	from	China.		
	
Procurement	and	distribution:	Private	sector	MEDS	 is	 the	equivalent	of	KEMSA	 for	 the	private	 sector.	According	 to	 sources	interviewed	 at	 the	 institution,	MEDS	 has	 no	 substantial	 experience	 in	 procuring	products	from	China.	The	private	sector	rather	procures	from	China	mainly	through	agents.	The	 sector’s	 institutional	 environment	 is	organised	and	vocal.	The	Kenya	Healthcare	Federation	(KHF)	is	the	umbrella	body	that	gathers	corporate	members	as	well	 as	 institutional	 and	professional	 associations	 ranging	 from	small	 to	 large	hospitals	and	clinics,	 from	doctors’	associations	to	pharmaceutical	manufacturing	ones	 and	 so	 forth.	 The	 Federation	 is	 comprehensive	 enough	 that	 analysing	 its	relation	–	through	reports	of	members’	behaviour	–	with	China,	is	here	considered	sufficient	to	generalise	for	the	sector.		According	to	KHF	no	Chinese	company	requested	membership,	probably	because	they	are	not	directly	present	in	the	country,	but	are	rather	represented	by	agents.	
                                                608	Ibid.	609	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Pharmacy	and	Poisons	Board,	Pharmacovigilance	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-10-07.	610	Ibid.	
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However,	“most	Chinese	products	on	the	market	are	represented	by	one	or	more	of	our	member	companies”611.	KHF	believes	that	Chinese	companies,	especially	those	that	 are	 operating	 in	 Kenya	 directly	 (i.e.	 without	 intermediaries),	 should	 stop	avoiding	the	institutional	environment,	and	join	the	network.	KHF	suggests	that	“it	would	be	good	for	them	to	join	us	as	we	provide	networking	and	it	would	be	good	for	them	to	get	integrated	into	the	Kenyan	system	rather	than	just	acting	on	their	own”612.		The	private	sector	trade	with	China	mainly	revolves	around	equipment	and,	more	significantly,	 active	 pharmaceutical	 ingredients.	 All	 42	 Kenyan	 pharma	manufacturing	companies	use	imported	APIs,	and	imports	from	China	compete	with	those	 from	 India.	 Between	 India	 and	 China,	 they	 cover	 ca	 90%	of	 the	market613	where	India	covers	30%	and	China	70%614.	Until	2011/2012	the	private	sector	was	highly	dominated	by	 Indian	products	 for	 the	pharma	 side,	 and	by	European	and	American	 products	 for	medical	 products	 and	 devices.	While	 in	 pharmaceuticals’	trade	Chinese	companies	have	not	explored	the	market	–	they	rather	act	through	local	 agents	 –	 in	 the	 trade	of	medical	products	 and	devices	 “quite	 a	 share	of	 the	market	is	taken	by	Chinese	products”615.	One	of	the	reasons	believed	to	be	keeping	Chinese	companies	away	from	investing	directly	is	that	“the	sector	is	dominated	by	a	number	of	 forces	 and	 the	 cost	of	 investment	 is	 too	high,	25	million	USD	 is	 the	starting	point.	That	is	why	the	Chinese	are	not	penetrating	too	much”616.		Beyond	 this	 complex	 domestic	 system	 of	 governance	 which	 obstructs	 the	penetration	of	Chinese	products,	the	negative	perception	associated	with	the	quality	of	products	coming	from	China	also	has	a	significant	impact	on	the	possibility	for	the	Chinese	to	get	a	share	of	the	market.	Particularly	regarding	medical	devices,	the	fact	that	Kenyan	facilities	are	historically	accustomed	to	products	from	Europe	and	the	 US	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 open	 to	 Chinese	 goods,	 which	 are	 currently	 mostly	distributed	to	level	2	or	3	clinics/hospitals	in	the	private	sector.	These	are	smaller	facilities,	not	the	top	end	of	the	private.	According	to	sources,	the	reason	why	they	serve	these	hospitals	 is	that	they	are	cheaper.	A	number	of	agents	noted	that	the	
                                                611	Interview	with	an	executive,	Kenya	Healthcare	Federation,	Nairobi,	2014-10-08.	612	Ibid.	613	Ibid.	614	Interview	with	an	executive	at	a	Kenyan-Indian	company	distributing	medical	products	and	devices,	Nairobi,	2014-10-15.	615	Interview	with	an	executive,	Kenya	Healthcare	Federation,	Nairobi,	2014-10-08.	616	Interview	with	an	executive	at	a	Kenyan-Indian	company	distributing	medical	products	and	devices,	Nairobi,	2014-10-15.		
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lower	costs	of	Chinese	products	sometimes	equals	to	low	quality	but	often	does	not.	This	variation	is	found	also	in	products	from	other	countries.			
Structurally-defined	governance	This	 case	 shows	 how	 the	 entry	 of	 Chinese	 products	 in	 the	 Kenyan	market	 is	subjected	to	a	highly	regulated	system	of	governance,	both	in	private	and	the	public	sectors.	The	interests	at	stake	are	diversified,	ranging	from	national	interests	to	curb	the	cost	of	health	care,	thus	looking	at	China	as	an	opportunity,	to	the	more	specific	interests	of	 stakeholders	 such	as	private	 sector	manufacturers,	distributors,	who	look	at	China	through	a	lens	of	market	competition,	to	technical	officers	in	public	institutions,	who	look	at	China	through	a	lens	of	abidance	to	procedural	standards.	This	system	is	highly	intertwined	to	the	international	environment,	dependent	upon	international	institutions	for	its	survival.	Within	this	international	context,	China	is	not,	 yet,	 a	 particularly	 strong	 player	 (China	 is	 only	 starting	 to	 emerge,	internationally,	 as	 a	 producer	 of	 drugs	 and	 medical	 devices),	 and	 Kenyans’	evaluation	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 engaging	 with	 China	 are	 informed	 by	 the	 Chinese	relative	 weakness	 in	 the	 sector.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 structural	 conditions,	 the	Chinese	official	rhetoric,	according	to	which	China	is	changing	the	historical	lack	of	medicines	in	Africa,	is	only	limitedly	catching	on	in	Kenya.	In	the	public	sector,	while	the	 lack	of	resources	may	give	rise	to	asymmetrical	dynamics	with	Chinese	actors,	the	presence	of	a	strong	system	of	governance	mostly	prevents	this	from	occurring.	The	presence	of	international	institutions	is	the	main	factor	 interfering	 with	 trade	 dynamics.	 Procurement	 takes	 place	 through	competitive	 bidding	 and,	 especially	 because	 of	 international	 institutions,	 it	 is	difficult	to	bypass	 it.	Because	of	these	international	 institutions,	 the	procurement	process	does	not	favour	Chinese	products,	which	are	mostly	non-WHO	prequalified.		In	the	private	sector,	dynamics	are	subjected	to	the	existence	of	a	strong	structure	where	 a	 few	 companies	 have	 historically	 dominated	 the	 stage,	 mainly	Indian/Kenyan-Indian.	The	lack	of	government	intervention	to	regulate	the	sector	has	provided	space	for	purely	 free	market	dynamics	where	Chinese	products	are	only	partially	gaining	prominence,	mainly	in	the	area	of	medical	devices,	rather	than	pharma	finished	goods,	where	the	Kenyan	manufacturing	ability	is	limited,	and	the	products	from	Europe/US	are	significantly	more	expensive.		
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In	other	words,	both	in	the	public	and	private	sector,	Chinese	products	are	used	to	 fill	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 system	 rather	 than	 used	 to	 change	 a	 system	 that	 is	 broadly	accepted	as	suitable	 to	safeguard	the	 interests	of	different	stakeholders.	This	 is	a	story	of	resilience	to	safeguard	interests	through	existing	governance	systems.			
5.2.2 Infrastructure	for	healthcare	In	Kenya	Vision	2030	and	the	Kenya	Health	Policy	2012-2030	there	is	particular	emphasis	on	the	need	to	develop	“adequate	and	appropriate	health	infrastructure”.	The	presence	of	China	in	infrastructure	development	for	healthcare	is	new	in	Kenya	and	less	wide-spread	compared	to	older	traditional	partners’,	but	the	magnitude	of	the	projects	developed	is	comparatively	more	impressive,	i.e.	major	hospitals	rather	than	community-level	dispensaries.	The	importance	of	studying	this	aspect	of	the	relation	is	to	shed	light	on	the	negotiation	process	between	Kenyan	stakeholders	so	to	understand	the	motivations	behind	the	selection	of	the	Chinese	partners	(or	the	acceptance	of	Chinese	offers	of	assistance)	and	the	definition	of	contract	details.	The	presence	of	China,	as	 in	 the	case	presented	above,	 is	 relatively	new	and	enters	a	system	of	governance	that	is	highly	regulated	by	multilateral	institutions.				
	Kenya-China	Infrastructure	for	healthcare		The	presence	of	China	in	providing	infrastructure	for	health	is	relatively	recent	in	Kenya.	The	number	of	projects	developed	 is	 relatively	small,	but	significant	 in	terms	of	visibility	given	they	are	major	hospitals,	vis-à-vis	smaller	projects	carried	out	 by	 traditional	 development	 partners 617 .	 The	 Chinese	 have	 engaged	 in	 the	construction	of	hospitals	as	big	as	Mama	Lucy	or	Kenyatta	Teaching	and	Referral	Hospital.	Before	2006,	when	the	negotiations	for	the	building	of	Mama	Lucy	Hospital	started,	Japan	was	the	major	donor	in	infrastructure	for	health,	together	with	the	UK.	Since	then,	however,	China’s	involvement	increased	to	the	point	of	delivering	the	construction	and	equipping	of	Kenyatta	Teaching	and	Referral	Hospital.	Under	Kenya	 Vision	 2030,	 one	 of	 the	 priorities	 is	 “improving	 the	 nation’s	 health	infrastructure,	 particularly	 in	 rural	 and	 severely	 deprived	 areas	 and	communities.”618	As	shown	below,	the	construction	of	major	infrastructure	by	China	
                                                617	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Infrastructure	Development	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-09-30.	618	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	Kenya	Vision	2030,	First	Medium	Term	Plan	2008-2012,	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2008,	p.	104.	
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is	not	exactly	 in	 “rural	and	severely	deprived	areas	and	communities”	but	rather	orbiting	around,	mainly,	the	city	of	Nairobi.		While	the	main	projects	regarding	healthcare	infrastructure	outlined	below	are	hospitals,	it	is	important	to	mention	that	Kenya	also	received	a	donation	from	China	in	2009	to	set	up	a	malaria	centre	and	has	approached	China	 to	 fund	 the	mobile	clinics’	 project.	 At	 the	 time	 fieldwork	was	 conducted	 the	Ministry	 of	 Health	 had	submitted	a	proposal	to	the	Treasury	asking	to	engage	the	Chinese	government	in	funding	the	mobile	clinics	project	aimed	at	nomadic	populations	who	do	not	have	easy	 access	 to	healthcare	 facilities.	The	 initiative	originated	 from	 the	Ministry	of	Health	 and	 was	 elaborated	 to	 take	 form	 through	 a	 loan	 from	 China.	 Further	investigation	will	be	needed	to	follow	up	on	the	realisation	of	the	initiative.		China	 has	 provided	 Kenya	with	 both	grants	 and	 loans	 for	 the	 construction	 of	infrastructure	for	healthcare.	The	type	of	provision,	i.e.	grant	versus	loan,	is	at	times	suggested	by	China,	at	other	times	it	is	negotiated	at	the	Ministerial	level	in	Kenya	and	put	forward	as	a	request	to	China.	The	support	provided	by	China	in	the	case	of	Gatundu	and	Mama	Lucy	hospitals	is	in	both	cases	in	the	form	of	a	grant,	in	which	case:		 The	Chinese	are	given	the	leeway	to	appoint	a	contractor	from	China.	They	appoint	a	contractor	who	can	undertake	the	magnitude	of	that	work.	Once	agreed	it	is	a	grant,	with	the	letter	of	economic	engagement	they	are	allowed	to	choose	their	own	companies	in	China	to	come	and	implement	the	project	in	the	country.	They	only	bring	in	their	technical	people,	but	general	labour	should	come	from	the	local	area	of	the	country.	The	Chinese	benefit	for	their	technical	people,	 but	Kenya	benefits	 as	 the	project	benefits	 locals	 and	 the	labour	force	comes	from	the	country619.			However,	if	it	is	a	loan,	“it	is	not	mandatory	that	you	use	a	Chinese	company.	Then	it	is	open	to	all.	But	if	combining	a	loan	and	a	grant,	the	condition	may	be	set	as	the	Chinese	are	given	preference”620.	There	are	generally	no	other	conditions	attached	by	 the	Chinese,	except	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 land	must	be	made	available,	 the	Kenyan	government	 must	 be	 responsible	 for	 facilitating	 the	 exemption	 of	 taxation	 for	imported	material	 and	where	 there	 is	 no	 exemption,	VAT	 and	development	 levy	
                                                619	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Infrastructure	Development	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-09-30.	620	Ibid.	
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should	 be	 paid	 by	 the	 beneficiary,	 that	 is,	 in	 this	 case,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health.	Alternatively,	 if	 not	 paid	 in	 the	 first	 place	 by	 the	 Ministry,	 a	 refund	 should	 be	provided.	On	top	of	this,	the	Kenyan	government	must	facilitate	the	work	permits	for	the	Chinese	entering	the	country	to	work	for	the	project	and	ensure	the	safety	in	the	areas	where	the	project	takes	place621.		In	 the	 cases	 presented	 below,	 Kenyan	 actors’	 behaviour	 is	 mainly	 pro-active	(meaning	Kenya	engaging	China)	though	set	within	a	more	general	Chinese	agenda	of	healthcare	diplomacy	and	economic	interests.	In	other	words,	in	all	the	cases	of	the	four	major	hospitals	funded	by	China,	of	which	two	as	grants	and	two	as	loans,	the	idea	to	ask	for	funds	to	China	originated	at	Ministerial	level	in	Kenya	(either	at	the	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 or	 Treasury).	 The	 only	 case	 when	 the	 Chinese	 directly	approached	 the	 management	 suggesting	 their	 availability	 to	 sponsor	 the	construction	was	the	case	of	Kenyatta	Teaching	and	Referral	Hospital.			
Malaria	Centre	As	for	the	malaria	centre,	it	deserves	separate	attention	in	light	of	the	fact	that	it	is	one	of	the	flagship	projects	promoted	by	the	Chinese	in	FOCAC	documents	as	part	of	their	health	diplomacy.	The	centre	was	not	requested;	it	was	rather	a	spontaneous	donation	by	the	Chinese	government.	According	to	sources	“[the	Chinese]	originally	started	the	Malaria	Centre.	They	wanted	to	set	it	up	in	a	hospital	on	Mbagathi	Road,	but	there	was	no	space.	We	suggested	another	hospital,	Mama	Lucy,	but	it	was	too	far	for	them.	And	then	they	came	here;	it	is	only	a	room,	a	small	centre”	set	up	at	Kenyatta	Hospital622.	Beyond	equipping	the	centre	with	microscopes,	a	PCR	reader	and	fridges,	under	the	Public	Health	Laboratory,	China	also	provided	training	 for	staff	on	malaria	and,	more	recently,	a	bus623.	It	is	apparently	the	Chinese	Embassy	that	fosters	relations	although	it	is	not	clear	under	which	Chinese	Ministry	this	is	done.		China	does	not,	however,	figure	as	one	of	the	main	partners	of	the	Kenyan	Malaria	Control	Division,	the	main	ones	being,	in	order	of	share:	USAID,	Global	Fund,	DFID624.	According	to	Kenyan	sources,	despite	the	donation,	the	lack	of	previous	connections	with	China	and	the	consequent	inability	to	judge	“how	they	work”	is	an	important	reason	why	the	engagement	is	not	developed	vis-à-vis	that	with	partners	like	DFID	
                                                621	Ibid.	622	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Malaria	Control	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-10-06.	623	Ibid.	624	Ibid.	
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that	have	“been	here	since	time	immemorial	and	we	know	how	they	operate.”625	The	other	essential	element	is	that	the	Malaria	Control	Division	-	under	the	Ministry	of	Health	–	while	leaning	on	the	strengths	of	multi-lateral	cooperation	(it	“thrives	for	partnerships”),	 is	bound	by	the	existing	system	of	governance.	This	means	that	 it	cannot	 single	 out	 a	 partner	 as	 coordination	 is	 at	 multi-lateral	 level.	 This	 is	 an	important	aspect	of	the	relation	with	China	that	repeats	itself	in	different	contexts,	underlining,	potentially,	the	importance	of	weighted	decision-making	on	the	part	of	Kenya,	and	structural	limitations.	In	other	words,	Kenya	is	structurally	dependent	on	multilateralism	and	not	willing	to	shift	to	bilateral	negotiations.			
Mama	Lucy	Kibaki	Hospital		Below	the	case	of	the	construction	of	Mama	Lucy	Kibaki	Hospital	is	presented,	at	times	 comparing	 it	 with	 the	 cases	 of	 Gatundu,	 Moi	 and	 Kenyatta	 Teaching	 and	Referral	hospitals.	Mama	Lucy	Hospital	 is	 one	of	 the	major	 four	hospitals	whose	(re/)construction	 was	 funded	 by	 the	 Chinese	 government	 in	 the	 past	 ten	 years	through	either	grants	or	loans.	The	others	being:	Gatundu	(grant),	Moi	Teaching	and	Referral	Hospital	 (loan	requested	but	not	given),	Kenyatta	Teaching	and	Referral	Hospital	 (loan).	The	reason	why	Mama	Lucy	was	chosen	as	a	 full	case	 is	 that	 the	project	was	completed	and	is	running.	The	others	were	either	partly	running	or	still	in	negotiation/construction	at	the	time	of	fieldwork,	and	it	resulted	being	tough	to	get	 in	 touch	 with	 the	 management	 in	 charge	 of	 overseeing	 the	 project.	 This	presented	 research	 complexities	 mainly	 because	 the	 only	 actors	 that	 could	 be	interviewed	were	at	ministerial	level.	The	aim	is,	on	the	other	hand,	to	show	how	different	Kenyan	actors	engaged	Chinese	actors	in	the	initiation	phase	and	partly	in	implementation.		In	2006	the	Ministry	of	Health	suggested	that	the	area	of	Kayole	in	Nairobi	had	no	hospital	and	needed	one	to	cater	for	circa	two	million	people.	At	the	same	time,	then	President	Kibaki	went	on	an	official	trip	to	China,	and	through	bilateral	talks,	he	 secured	 a	 grant	 of	 Sh544	million	 from	 the	 Chinese	 government	 to	 build	 the	hospital.	 Once	 the	 Treasury	 signed	 the	 deal,	 the	Ministry	 of	 Health	 engaged	 the	constructor	and	signed	an	agreement	 for	 implementation626.	The	agreement	was	contemporary	 to	 the	 third	 FOCAC	 Action	 Plan	 (2006)	 in	 which,	 quantifiable	
                                                625	Ibid.	626	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Infrastructure	Development	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-09-30.	
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initiatives	 were	 announced,	 including	 the	 commitment	 to	 build	 more	 than	 30	hospitals	across	Africa.	Mama	Lucy	was	one	of	them.			The	hospital	was	a	donation	whose	contract	 included	building	and	equipment	(including	 CT	 scan,	 theatre	 equipment,	 generators).	 The	 Kenyan	 government	contributed	 with	 land,	 water,	 security,	 consumables	 and	 other	 equipment,	 and	human	 resources 627 .	 Through	 the	 Kenyan	 government,	 circa	 15	 hospital	 staff	members	 were	 trained	 in	 China	 for	 three	months,	 including	 bio-medics,	 nurses,	physiotherapists,	 lab	 technicians,	administrators628.	Chinese	experts	 in	 the	above	fields	were	never	sent	 to	Mama	Lucy	Hospital,	a	 trend	 that	 is	observed	 in	Kenya	where	 Chinese	 (modern	 medicine)	 doctors	 are	 extremely	 few,	 especially	 in	 the	public	sector629.	The	human	resources	aspect	will	be	dealt	with	in	more	detail	in	the	Education	chapter.			
Negotiation	The	main	issue	concerning	this	case	revolves	around	establishing	and	honouring	the	terms	and	conditions	not	for	the	building	of	the	infrastructure	but	rather	for	the	structure’s	equipment	provision.	The	negotiation	can	be	divided	into	two	phases.	The	initial	phase	was	characterised	by	the	agreement	signed	between	heads	of	state.	It	did	not	follow	standard	procedures	as	the	contract	was	never	fully	commented	upon	by	technical	officers.	The	hospital	at	that	stage	was	non-existent,	there	was	no	management	and	all	the	decisions	were	taken	at	the	Ministerial	level	or	above.	The	monopoly	 of	 the	 negotiation	was	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 “the	 big	 bosses”	 and	 technical	experts	“couldn’t	say	much”630.	The	second	phase,	on	the	other	hand,	shows	a	shift	in	the	negotiation	process.	By	then	the	hospital	was	running,	and	the	management	was	 in	 place.	 The	 existence	 of	 this	 latter	 guaranteed	 more	 transparency	 as	 it	contributed	to	outlining	the	specifications	of	the	equipment	and	to	selecting	it.		In	the	first	phase,	the	equipment	supplied	was	new,	but	its	technology	was	old,	its	durability	limited	and	had	to	be	replaced	partly	with	hospital	funds,	partly	with	a	grant	from	the	Kenyan	government631.	The	age	of	the	equipment	was	not	the	only	problem;	there	were	also	issues	with	the	power	supply	rating,	different	from	that	of	Kenya,	and	with	after	sale	service	and	support	which	was	difficult	 to	obtain.	The	
                                                627	Interview	with	an	executive	at	Mama	Lucy	Kibaki	Hospital,	Nairobi,	2014-10-14.	628	Ibid.	629	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Medical	Practitioners	and	Dentists	Board,	Nairobi,	2014-12-5.	630	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Medical	Engineering	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-11-18.	631	Interview	with	an	executive	at	Mama	Lucy	Kibaki	Hospital,	Nairobi,	2014-10-14.	
	 171	
hospital’s	management	is	clear	in	expressing	that	the	problem	was	on	the	Kenyan	side	rather	than	the	Chinese	inasmuch	as	it	was	the	duty	of	the	Ministry	to	set	the	specifics	for	the	equipment	provision.	According	to	an	interviewee	at	the	hospital,	“it	was	a	failure	from	our	side.	The	Chinese	are	clear	and	consistent;	they	want	to	assist	 and	 want	 to	 have	 a	 foothold	 in	 the	 Kenyan	 market.” 632 	The	 lack	 of	communication	between	the	hospital	and	the	Ministry	does	not	only	exist	in	relation	to	Chinese-supported	projects	but	with	other	donors	too.	For	instance,	the	Ministry	signed	a	 contract	with	 the	World	Bank	 for	 the	provision	of	 equipment	while	 the	hospital	points	out	that	immediate	needs	do	not	concern	equipment	such	as	MRIs	but	rather	human	resources	and	extra	building	space.	In	the	second	phase,	however,	the	 negotiation	was	 less	 concentrated,	 and	 the	management	 of	 the	 hospital	was	included	in	the	decisions	concerning	the	outlining	of	the	equipment	specifications.	Consequently,	the	machines	received	turned	out	to	be	not	only	appropriate	to	the	hospital’s	actual	needs	but	also	of	excellent	quality.		It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	the	Ministry	of	Health	needs	not	be	studied	as	a	unitary	bloc.	Technical	officers	at	the	Ministry	mentioned	that	“there	are	guidelines	by	 the	Ministry	 of	 Health	 on	 equipment,	 but	 they	 are	 difficult	 to	 implement	 for	donations.”633	Except	for	the	equipment	classified	as	high	risk,	 the	rest	 is	difficult	not	to	accept	when	it	is	a	donation.	This	is	the	reason	why	the	Ministry	of	Health	prefers	to	ask	for	loans	rather	than	grants,	“with	loans	it	is	easier	to	abide	by	the	law.	However	 a	 lot	 of	 the	 equipment	 by	 China	 comes	 through	 a	 grant,	 so	 there	 are	problems”634	mainly	because,	due	 to	 the	nature	of	 the	 funding,	 i.e.	 a	grant	 rather	than	 a	 loan,	 there	 is	 no	 open	 bidding	 and	 at	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 sources	 in	technical	departments	report	that	only	when	the	Chinese	have	selected	the	company	for	 the	 provision	 of	 equipment	 the	 Ministry	 can	 then	 choose	 among	 available	products,	adding	that	“since	you	are	given	it	for	free,	you	don’t	speak	too	much,	even	if	 it’s	 not	 very	 good.” 635 	Another	 problem	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 concerning	 the	language:	 “once	 policy	 makers	 signed	 the	 papers,	 bureaucrats	 have	 language	problems	when	 it	comes	to	specifications	of	equipment	and	supplies.	This	 leaves	leeway	to	the	discretion	of	the	supplier.”636			
                                                632	Ibid.	633	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Medical	Engineering	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-11-18.	634	Ibid.	635	Ibid.	636	Interview	with	an	executive	at	Mama	Lucy	Kibaki	Hospital,	Nairobi,	2014-10-14.	
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Evolving	governance	patterns	This	 case	 is	 characterised	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 rooted	 system	 of	 governance,	historically	dependent	on	multilateral	international	institutions	as	well	as	foreign	funds.	The	Ministry	of	Health	is	a	relatively	weak	ministry	in	Kenya	due	to	its	high	fragmentation	and	to	the	heavy	reliance	on	multilateral	donors.	It	is	important	to	remember	that	even	though	Kenya	is	much	less	dependent	on	ODA	than	the	majority	of	African	countries,	the	health	care	sector	is	the	exception.	Given	the	volatility	of	aid	provision,	the	strengthening	of	domestic	capacity	has	been	inconsistent637.	China	 thus	 enters	 a	 system	where	 actors	 are	 accustomed	 to	 negotiating	with	traditional	partners	within	multilateral	settings,	while	less	institutionally	strong	to	negotiate	 bilaterally.	 Kenya	 is	 partly	 unable,	 partly	 unwilling	 to	 negotiate	 at	 the	bilateral	level.	Both	aspects	are	consequential	to	the	country’s	strong	dependence	on	international	donors.	Inability	is	due	to	the	fact	that	volatility	in	donors’	funding	has	exacerbated	inconsistent	training	and	thus	availability	of	well-prepared	human	resources.	 While	 these	 resources	 have	 gathered	 experience	 (albeit	 limited)	 in	negotiating	at	the	multilateral	level,	they	have	not	done	so	at	the	bilateral	level.	Even	more,	while	they	have	gained	experience	in	negotiating	with	traditional	partners,	they	lack	experience	in	dealing	with	China.	Unwillingness	is	instead	due	to	the	fact	that	Kenya	has	identified	multi-stakeholder	cooperation	as	a	best	practice,	vis-à-vis	bilateral	cooperation.	The	ability	of	Kenyan	actors	 to	 act	 to	 safeguard	 their	 interests	 is	 subjected	 to	fluctuation.	While	on	the	one	hand	the	provision	of	Chinese	assistance	(sometimes	as	grants,	sometimes	as	 loans)	has	been	welcomed	by	Kenyans	on	the	whole,	the	interference	 of	 the	 political	 elites,	 including	 high-level	 bureaucrats	 in	 the	negotiation	of	the	contracts	has	been	resented	by	the	technocrats	who	were	unable	to	 leverage	 their	 recommendations	 and	 guarantee	 the	 safeguard	 of	 procedural	standards	in	the	contracts.		This	 applied	 to	 both	 the	 content	 and	 the	modality	 of	 interaction.	 In	 terms	 of	content,	 the	 absence	 of	 technical	 staff	 during	 the	 negotiation	 of	 contracts	 has	resulted	in	the	provision	of	infrastructure	that	was	selected	by	the	Chinese	and	not	suitable	for	Kenyan	standards.	In	terms	of	modality,	China’s	non-adherence	to	multi-lateral	 frameworks	 exacerbated	 the	 inconsistency	 in	 negotiations	 where	 high-politics	 fill	 the	many	 gaps	 existing	 in	 the	 governance	 framework.	 Particularly	 in	
                                                637	See	Mwega,	2009,	op.cit.	
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relations	to	infrastructure,	including	technological	infrastructure,	much	needed	in	the	country,	the	asymmetrical	relations	with	China	(and	with	most	external	partners)	lead	the	bureaucracy	to	an	inability	to	control	the	negotiation	process.		The	 construction	 of	 Mama	 Lucy	 Hospital	 was	 the	 first	 important	 work	 of	infrastructure	assistance	in	health	provided	by	China	to	Kenya.	The	unfamiliarity	in	negotiating	with	the	Chinese	and	the	consequential	 learning	curve	seems	to	have	played	a	role	in	shifting	strategy	and	setting	stricter	rules	for	the	negotiation	of	the	second	phase	of	equipment	provision.	However,	a	bigger	problem	seems	to	persist	between	 the	Ministry	 and	 the	hospital,	 not	because	of	 the	Chinese	presence,	 but	because	of	lack	of	communication	concerning	priorities	setting.	While	the	inability	to	coordinate	across	the	national	bureaucracy	impacts	negotiations	with	all	donors,	not	 only	 China,	 the	 lack	 of	 experience	 with	 the	 latter	 further	 exacerbates	 the	problem.			
5.2.3 Traditional	Medicine	Since	 the	 early	 2000s	 traditional	 medicine	 has	 been	 gaining	 momentum	worldwide	and	in	Kenya.	In	2002	the	WHO	launched	its	first	traditional	medicine	strategy.	In	the	same	year,	the	first	China-Africa	Forum	on	Traditional	Medicine	was	held	 in	 Beijing.	 The	 Chinese	 system	 was	 already	 one	 of	 the	 most	 advanced	 for	traditional	medicine	research	and	policy	development.	The	diffusion	of	traditional	medicine	 abroad	 had	 been	 part	 of	 China’s	 healthcare	 diplomacy,	 through	 the	dispatch	 of	 Chinese	Medical	 Teams,	 since	 the	 1960s638,	 as	 forms	 of	 South-South	cooperation.	 The	 engagement	with	 African	 countries	 became	 institutionalised	 in	2000	with	the	first	FOCAC	action	plan	in	which	the	promotion	of	cooperation	in	the	use	of	traditional	medicine	and	pharmacy	was	pledged.	In	Africa,	up	to	80%	of	the	population	uses	 traditional	medicine	 to	help	meet	health	 care	needs,	whereas	 in	China	40%	of	all	healthcare	delivered	comes	from	traditional	medicine639.		The	aim	of	studying	this	case	is	to	shed	light	on	how	a	new	aspect	of	development	is	 identified,	 pushed	 forward	 in	 policy	 and	 legislative	 circles	 and	 the	 choice	 of	partners	made	to	achieve	desired	outcomes.	Like	in	the	other	cases	presented	in	this	chapter,	 the	 relation	 with	 the	 Chinese	 is	 not	 studied	 because	 of	 the	 challenges	caused	 to	 Kenya	 (some,	 but	 limited),	 but	 because	 of	 the	 choice	 of	 Kenyans	 to	
                                                638	The	first	Chinese	Medical	Team	in	Africa	was	dispatched	to	Algeria	in	1964.		639	World	Bank,	‘Traditional	Healer	Services’,	The	World	Bank	[website].		
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establish	a	relation	with	China	for	the	improvement	of	the	system	of	governance.		The	 case	under	 study	 is	 that	 of	 the	Natural	 Products	 Industry	 initiative,	 and	 the	purpose	 of	 the	 analysis	 is	 to	 explain:	 1)	 how	 the	 decision-making	 process	 was	articulated	across	platforms	and	by	a	number	of	different	stakeholders;	2)	the	extent	to	which	Chinese	expertise	was	purposely	sought	and	used	to	develop	a	domestic	industry.			While	 the	 fragmented	 domestic	 governance	 environment	 has	 led	 different	stakeholders	to	engage	each	other	with	caution,	the	nature	of	the	issue	at	stake,	i.e.	the	development	of	the	sector	through	the	Natural	Products	Initiative,	has	also	seen	them	work	in	collaboration.	The	development	of	the	NPI	initiative	did	not	originate	in	a	vacuum.	It	is	thus	important	to	briefly	outline	the	social	constraints	as	well	as	the	policy	and	legislative	domestic	and	international	imperatives	out	of	which	such	initiative	was	born.	This	is	particularly	relevant	as	China	has	shown	interest	in	using	traditional	medicine	as	a	tool	of	soft	power	not	only	to	attract	African	governments	and	people	but	also	to	use	their	support	 to	 increase	the	profile	of	TCM	on	global	platforms	 such	 as	 the	 WHO,	 where	 traditional	 medicine	 has	 been	 for	 long	overlooked.	In	other	words,	the	analysis	below	looks	at	how	the	actors	involved	in	the	system	of	governance	have	recognised	its	unsuitability	to	safeguard	emerging	interests	and	have	used	the	relationship	with	China	to	improve	the	system	of	governance.			
The	Witchcraft	Act	1925	In	 1925,	 the	 British	 government	 enacted	 the	Witchcraft	 Act,	 Cap.67,	 Laws	 of	Kenya,	which	was	 later	revised	 in	1962	and	1981	but	never	repealed	 to	 this	day.	Anything	relating	to	traditional	medicine	was	associated	with	witchcraft	as	part	of	a	 broader	 demonization	 of	 African	 traditions.	 Modern	 health	 services	 were	introduced,	and	they	replaced	what	was	seen	by	colonial	authorities	as	primitive	practices 640 .	 The	 practice	 survived	 but	 only	 underground	 and	 it	 started	 being	accepted	 as	not	 illegal	 only	 towards	 the	 end	of	 the	1970s,	more	precisely	 in	 the	1979-83	Development	Plan,	although	the	“legislation	continued	to	abstain	from	the	regulation	of	traditional	medicine”641.		
                                                640	P.	Ongugo	et.	al,	Protecting	Traditional	Health	Knowledge	in	Kenya:	The	role	of	Customary	Laws	and	Practices,	International	Institute	for	Environment	and	Development,	London,	2012,	p.	9	641	Ibid.	
	 175	
According	 to	 the	National	Health	Practitioners	Association	 (NATHEPA642),	 this	lack	or	gap	in	the	legal	and	policy	frameworks	opened	the	door	to	foreigners.		It	was	somewhat	easier	for	foreigners	to	practice	than	for	locals,	“there	was	segregation,	and	this	put	Africans	last”643.	The	government	started	providing	“licenses	to	healers	from	China	and	India	to	open	traditional	health-care	practices”644.	At	the	same	time,	especially	Asians,	 i.e.	 Indians,	had	been	in	Kenya	for	decades	and	kept	practising.	The	1980s	 and	1990s	were	 years	 of	 opening	up	 and	officialization	of	 traditional	medicine,	 uplifting	 it	 from	 the	 negative	 connotation	 that	 had	 characterised	 the	practice	since	the	colonial	period.	With	the	2000s,	as	the	international	environment	started	paying	increased	attention	to	matters	revolving	around	traditional	medicine,	Kenya	too	advanced	more	rapidly.	Multi-stakeholder	workshops	and	other	activities	were	held	to	formulate	a	policy	to	sustain	and	develop	the	practice645.	In	the	process	of	sector’s	restructuring,	China	represented	a	governance	system	to	emulate.			
	Traditional	Medicine	developments	in	the	2000s-2010s	Since	 the	 early	 2000s	 traditional	 medicine	 has	 been	 gaining	 momentum	worldwide	and	in	Kenya.	In	2002	the	WHO	launched	its	first	traditional	medicine	strategy,	 and	 the	 Kenyan	 government	 signed	 the	 international	 agreement	 that	pledged	 to	 put	 regulatory	 mechanisms	 in	 order.	 In	 Kenya,	 “stakeholders	 in	traditional	medicine	and	medicinal	plants	have	been	holding	workshops	and	other	activities	to	come	up	with	a	policy	to	sustain	and	develop	the	practice”646.	After	two	national	conferences	in	2001	and	2003	organised	by	the	Ministry	of	Health	aimed	at	 producing	 a	 Bill	 of	 practice	 in	 traditional	 medicine,	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 a	committee	 and	 sub-committees	 led	 by	 the	 National	 Council	 for	 Population	 and	Development	 (NCPD)	 in	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Planning	 and	 National	 Development,	 a	policy	named	 ‘Traditional	Medicine	 and	Medicinal	Practice’	was	drafted	 in	2005.	According	 to	stakeholders,	 the	policy	was	 “not	 the	best	policy”	647	but	provided	a	much-needed	guideline	to	emerge	out	of	a	vacuum	that	was	not	guaranteeing	the	proper	protection	of	the	products	and	practice.	Next	to	it	in	2009	the	‘National	Policy	
                                                642	NATHEPA	is	an	association	of	traditional	medicine	practitioners,	that	the	Ministry	of	Culture	decided	to	create	with	the	intent	of	uniting	practitioners	so	they	could	have	more	leverage	in	negotiating	their	interests.		643	Interview	with	a	professor	of	pharmacy	and	traditional	medicine	at	Kenyatta	University,	2014-11-04.	644	Export	Processing	Zones	Authority,	Kenya’s	Pharmaceutical	Industry	2005,	Export	Processing	Zones	Authority,	Nairobi,	2005,	p.	4.	645	Ministry	of	Sports,	Culture	and	the	Arts,	‘Draft	of	the	National	Policy	on	Traditional	Medicine	and	Medicinal	Plants’,	Ministry	of	Sports,	Culture	and	the	Arts,	Nairobi,	September	2005,	p.6		646	Ibid.		647	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Culture,	Traditional	Medicine	Department,	Nairobi,	2014-10-10.	
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on	Culture	and	Heritage’	came	 into	existence	officially	strengthening	the	value	of	traditional	medicine	and	the	steps	the	government	should	have	taken	to	integrate	it	into	the	national	health	care	system.		The	2010	Constitution	acknowledged	the	importance	of	traditional	medicine	and	included	a	note	on	the	duty	of	the	state	to	“protect	and	enhance	intellectual	property	in,	 and	 indigenous	 knowledge	 of,	 biodiversity	 and	 the	 genetic	 resources	 of	 the	communities”648.	Researchers	noted	that	“TM	was	becoming	much	more	recognised	by	politicians	and	policy-makers.	People	were	coming	out	to	put	products	on	the	market”	649.	In	the	same	period	the	‘Traditional	Medicine	and	Medicinal	Plants	Bill	2010’	 was	 drafted	 and	 presented	 to	 Parliament	 for	 discussion.	 The	 Bill	 made	provisions	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 Council	 to	 spearhead	 the	 management	 of	traditional	medicine	and	to	regulate	traditional	medicine	practitioners.	At	that	point	also	the	PPB	realised	that	the	products	had	to	be	registered	and	issued	the	2010	guidelines	 for	 the	 ‘Registration	 of	 Herbal	 and	 Complementary	 Products’.	 The	guidelines	targeted	the	products	only,	not	the	practice	although	“separating	them	is	very	difficult.	This	is	what	the	policy	is	trying	to	do”650.	In	2013	when	the	II	Medium	Term	Plan	of	Kenya	Vision	2030	was	launched,	a	pledge	was	added	highlighting	the	importance	 of	 “Develop[ing]	 policies	 and	 guidelines	 to	 embrace	 research	 on	alternative	medicines	(natural	products)	underpinned	in	the	legal	and	institutional	framework”651	and	the	Natural	Products	Initiative	became	a	flagship	project	under	the	 economic	 pillar	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 research	 and	manufacturing	 based	 on	“locally	derived	natural	health	products”652.		The	year	2014	was	marked	by	the	publication	of	two	important	documents	for	traditional	medicine,	namely:	the	Traditional	Health	Practitioners	Bill	2014	and	the	Health	 Bill	 2014	 which	 included	 a	 full	 section	 (Part	 VIII)	 on	 traditional	 and	complementary	medicines	that,	albeit	still	vague,	provided	for	the	establishment	of	a	 regulatory	body,	 the	documentation	and	mapping	as	well	as	standardization	of	traditional	 medicine,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 policy	 guidelines	 for	 integrating	conventional	and	traditional	medicine	systems.	The	Ministry	of	Health,	despite	not	being	the	main	responsible	for	traditional	medicine	(nonetheless	having	a	division	for	traditional	medicine),	has	shown	interest	in	the	budgetary	aspects	relating	to	the	
                                                648	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	Constitution	of	Kenya,	op.	cit.	Part	II,	Art	69	(1)	(c).		649	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Kenya	Medical	Research	Institute	(KEMRI),	Nairobi,	2014-11-05.	650	Ibid.	651	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	Kenya	Vision	2030,	Second	Medium	Term	Plan	2013-2017,	op.	cit.,	p.	81.	652	Ibid.	
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inclusion	 of	 the	 use	 of	 traditional	medicine	 in	 the	 national	 framework	 of	 health	provision.	By	being	cheap	and	 locally	available,	 traditional	medicine	would	be	an	asset	for	the	Ministry	to	cut	costs	on	drugs’	expenditure.	Once	the	Health	Bill	2014	becomes	an	Act,	 it	will	provide	 traditional	medicine	with	proper	recognition	and	other	documents	will	then	be	able	to	be	formalised	and	implemented.	For	instance,	the	 Traditional	 Health	 Practitioners	 Bill	 2014	 would	 provide	 IP	 protection	 to	practitioners	once	they	declare	what	their	medicines	are	made	of653.	This	issue	is	in	turn	linked	to	two	major	aspects	that	need	to	be	considered:	the	domestic	context,	in	 particular	 the	 organisational	 structure	 of	 practitioners,	 and	 the	 international	context	that	does	not	easily	reconcile	traditional	medicine	with	intellectual	property	laws.			
Practitioners:	indigenous	and	foreign	The	 organisational	 structure	 of	 practitioners	 is	 problematic	 and	 immature.	Interviewees	 in	 the	 sector	 point	 out	 that	 “practitioners	 are	 still	 organising	themselves.	 There	 is	 fear	 of	 competition	 and	 personality	 issues”654.	 The	 fear	 of	competition	 also	 stems	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 practice	 and	 the	 products	 are	 not	protected	and	that	if	“stolen”	no	redress	mechanism	is	in	place.	For	this	reason,	the	NPI	prioritised	the	definition	of	how	property	rights	can	be	applied	to	traditional	medicine	and	 indigenous	knowledge:	 the	Kenya	 Industrial	Property	 Institute	and	the	Kenya	Copyright	Board	are	working	on	it.	Also,	in	the	Office	of	the	Administrator	General,	mandated	to	administer	copyrights,	the	issue	of	traditional	knowledge	and	cultural	expressions	is	gaining	prominence.	Besides	this	legal	matter,	which	will	be	further	 expanded	 below	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 international	 context,	 the	 above-mentioned	 lack	 of	 structural	 organisation	 by	 traditional	 healers,	 according	 to	KEMRI	leaves	space	to	foreigners	to	operate	almost	with	no	control.	Apparently	due	to	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 associational	 life	 of	 traditional	 healers,	 the	 Ministry	 of	Culture	 initiated	 NATHEPA	with	 the	 aim	 of	making	 sure	 traditional	 healers	 had	representatives,	and	the	association	could	act	as	 the	national	point	of	contact	 for	foreign	practitioners	operating	in	Kenya.	It	is	not	compulsory	to	register	with	the	association	and	given	its	lack	of	organisation	practitioners	are	not	incentivized	to	do	so.		
                                                653	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Pharmacy	Department,	Nairobi.	2014-09-30.	654	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	National	Museums	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-10-17.	
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Chinese	 practitioners,	 for	 instance,	 tend	 to	 go	 to	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 that	provides	them	with	a	license	to	set	up	clinics.	For	the	registration	of	products,	the	PPB	 receives	 applications	 and	 “lists”	 products.	 The	 lack	 of	 harmonisation	 is	currently	being	tackled	by	the	Ministry	of	Health’s	Division	of	traditional	medicine	which	is	trying	to	synchronise	different	policies655.	Despite	this	lack	of	structured	control,	at	the	Ministry	of	Health	(traditional	medicine	division),	a	source	reported	that	 generally	 the	 documents	 provided	by	 the	 Chinese	 abide	 by	 the	 law	 and	 are	presented	 by	 qualified	 personnel.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 source	 also	 points	 out:	“There	are	elements	for	which	we	have	question	marks,	concerning	the	practice	and	the	qualifications	but	we	have	no	way	to	assess	them”656.			
International	legal	shortcomings	One	of	the	main	problems,	perceived	by	traditional	healers,	which	leads	them	to	operate	in	isolation,	 is	the	fact	that	the	law	does	not	provide	guarantees	for	their	inventions.	The	law	on	copyrights	draws	from	Western	laws	which	are	claimed,	by	Kenyans,	 not	 to	 be	 comprehensive	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 “patentable	 thing”,	 if	conceived	in	relation	to	indigenous	knowledge.	The	problem	resides	in	the	fact	that	indigenous	 knowledge	 and	 products	 are	 not	 novel	 per	 se	 –	 pre-requisite	 for	something	to	be	patentable	–	as	they	have	been	in	tradition,	passed	down	orally,	and	kept	secret	for	as	much	as	man	has	existed.	What	can	be	novel	about	them	is	the	fact	that	they	are	revealed,	and	their	potential	industrial	applicability657.		The	problem	of	intellectual	property	rights	and	indigenous	knowledge	does	not	apply	to	Kenya	alone.	Sources	involved	in	policy-making	affirm	that:	“the	world	is	crippling	on	how	to	categorise	indigenous	knowledge	and	see	how	it	is	patentable.	This	needs	a	sui	generis	approach.	There’s	no	moving	away	from	the	reality	that	this	knowledge	is	a	source	of	new	innovation”658.	Workshops	organised	by	the	Chinese	often	 highlight	 the	 issue	 by	 discussing	 how	 to	 make	 TCM	 more	 acceptable	internationally,	in	terms	of	regulations,	safety	and	quality	control.659		
	
	
                                                655	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Kenya	Medical	Research	Institute	(KEMRI),	Nairobi,	2014-11-05.	656	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Traditional	Medicine	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-11-17.	657	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	National	Museums	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-10-17.	658	Ibid.	659	Ibid.	
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The	Natural	Products	Industry	initiative	The	 primary	 driver	 for	 establishing	 a	 proper	 framework	 is	 the	 potential	 to	contribute	 to	national	development,	but	 the	 threat	 from	outside	 is	 the	secondary	driver:	“because	Kenya	did	not	have	such	a	programme,	despite	having	wealth	in	traditional	 resources,	 that	 void	 attracted	 foreign	 companies	 to	 exploit	 such	resources.	Chinese	and	other	foreigners	visit	Kenya,	they	go	and	talk	to	communities	and	 take	 away	 indigenous	knowledge”660.	Nonetheless,	 the	problem	 identified	 in	relation	to	China’s	presence	in	the	market	is	relatively	small.	Kenyan	practitioners	do	 not	 perceive	 competition	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 Chinese	 products	 are	 more	advanced	in	terms	of	packaging	and	are	scientifically-produced661.	According	to	an	interviewee	at	the	Ministry	of	Culture	“there	are	no	Kenyan	companies	packaging	traditional	medicines	[…]	Traditional	healers	have	their	clinics	where	they	also	have	medicines”662.	The	need	to	emphasise	the	value	of	proper	packaging	resulted	in	the	creation,	in	2008,	of	the	Natural	Products	Industry	Initiative.		For	 the	 development	 of	 the	 initiative,	 China	 was	 identified	 as	 one	 of	 the	“experienced	countries”	663,	together,	mainly,	with	India,	from	which	Kenya	aimed	to	learn.	While	collaboration	initiatives	have	been	put	in	place,	KEMRI	suggests664	that	 most	 research	 projects	 were	 aimed	 at	 studying	 Chinese	 products	 and	 the	feasibility	 of	 their	 commercialization	 in	 Kenya/Africa,	 rather	 than	 studying	 how	
indigenous	Kenyan	products	could	be	developed.	It	became	evident	that	in	order	to	operate,	a	proper	regulatory	framework	had	to	be	put	in	place.	The	development	of	the	 NPI	 became	 a	 key	 reason	 to	 regulate	 the	 sector	 but	 also	 to	 push	 for	 the	promotion	of	research	on,	and	manufacturing	of,	Kenyan	products.	The	Convention	on	Biological	Diversity	was	domesticated	to	create	the	Natural	Products	Industry	Policy	2014.		The	development	of	this	collaboration	is	premised	on	a	number	of	national	and	mutual	interests	that	are	just	gaining	prominence	and	are	yet	promising	to	become	a	 major	 area	 of	 national	 and	 international	 development.	 Kenya’s	 interest	 in	
establishing	a	relation	with	China	is	mainly	twofold:	learn	from	the	Chinese	expertise	
through	 training	 and	 capacity	 building	 programmes,	 and	 partner	 to	 develop	 a	
scientifically-based	commerce-oriented	industry.	While	the	partnership	with	China	is	
                                                660	Ibid.	661	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Culture,	Traditional	Medicine	Department,	Nairobi,	2014-10-10.	662	Ibid.	663	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Traditional	Medicine	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-11-17.	664	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Kenya	Medical	Research	Institute	(KEMRI),	Nairobi,	2014-11-05.	
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not	the	only	one,	India	also	playing	a	major	role,	according	to	the	Ministry	of	Culture,	China	 is	 the	 most	 important	 bilateral	 partner 665 .	 The	 programme	 started	 in	2008/2009,	 and	 since	 then	 a	 very	 wide	 range	 of	 actors	 participated	 in	 its	
development.	 The	 multi-stakeholder	 approach	 was	 fundamental	 because	 “by	 its	
nature,	this	project	needs	different	skills”	including	the	knowledge	of	communities,	the	
department	 of	 culture,	 natural	 resources	 managers,	 scientific	 experts	 (for	 plants,	
animals,	etc.),	experts	of	product	development	(pharma,	personal	care,	nutritionists),	
marketing	and	so	forth.		Although	 partnerships	 are	 not	 in	 place	 yet	 with	 research	 institutes	 and	companies	in	China,	the	aim	of	the	NPI	is	that	to	forge	strategic	alliances666.	A	more	detailed	account	of	this	aspect,	i.e.	education	and	training,	is	provided	in	Chapter	6.	However,	by	means	of	introduction	it	is	important	to	mention	that	one	of	the	key	motivations	to	choose	China	as	a	partner	for	the	NPI	was	the	possibility	to	increase,	through	 training	 provided	 by	 Chinese	 institutions,	 capacity	 building	 not	 only	 in	medical	training	but	also	in	management,	including	the	syncing	of	conventional	and	traditional	medicine	usage	in	the	national	healthcare	system.	NPI	leaders	suggested	that	“one	way	of	ensuring	that	we	do	not	have	to	go	through	unnecessary	expenses	is	to	come	up	with	a	team	that	learns	from	the	procedures	and	the	practices	of	China	as	well	as	the	legal	mechanisms	that	make	that	practice	possible”667.	The	possibility	to	learn	from	a	country	that	was	challenged	by	a	Western	idea	of	healthcare	delivery,	and	yet	perfected	a	conventional-traditional	blended	version	of	healthcare	delivery,	resonated	with	the	Kenyan	experience	and	proved	to	be	a	key	factor	in	wanting	to	partner	with	China.		The	aim	of	the	project	was	also	that	to	protect	the	Kenyan	industry	from	non-indigenous	 traditional	 products	 and	 practitioners	 entering	 the	 country.	 An	interviewee	pointed	out:	“even	if	the	Chinese	can	do	better	than	us	at	the	moment,	we	understand	our	own	medicine.	Chinese	traditional	medicine	is	foreign	to	us;	it	is	traditional	to	China”668.	To	protect	the	industry,	the	intention	is	that	to	use	modern	science	 and	 business	 expertise	 to	 help	 practitioners	 add	 value	 to	 traditional	medicine	like	the	Chinese	have	done,	for	instance,	with	Artemisin	(a	drug	for	malaria	recognised	by	the	WHO)	which	is	a	direct	consequence	of	TCM.	Artemisia	has	been	
                                                665	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Culture,	Traditional	Medicine	Department,	Nairobi,	2014-10-10.	666	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	National	Museums	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-10-17.	667	Parliamentary	Debates,	National	Assembly,	9	December	2009,	(A),	(Mwiria,	Assistant	Minister	for	Higher	Education,	Science	and	Technology),	p.34.	668	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Traditional	Medicine	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-11-17.	
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used	in	China	for	centuries	to	manage	malaria	to	the	point	when	researchers	studied	what,	 in	 the	 plant,	 controls	 malaria	 and	 made	 modern	 medicine,	 tested	 and	recognised	by	the	WHO	for	universal	use669.		Part	of	the	NPI	was	an	initiative	in	2014	between	the	Chinese	government	and	a	number	of	Kenyan	stakeholders.	The	idea	of	a	collaboration	started	when	a	Chinese	governmental	“high-level”	delegation	visited	Kenya	and,	in	an	attempt	“to	find	how	to	 alleviate	 health	 problems”	 while	 commercialising	 a	 Chinese	 product,	 advised	KEMRI	to	develop	a	concept	note	outlining	how	they	thought	the	cooperation	with	the	Chinese	government	could	benefit	them.	KEMRI	and	the	National	Museums	of	Kenya,	together	with	the	Ministry	of	Health	(Natural	Products	division),	then	started	collaborating	on	a	concept	“articulated	around	the	possibility	of	setting	up	a	small	industry,	 within	 the	 Institute	 or	 through	 the	 Kenyan	 government” 670 .	 More	specifically	 the	 aim	 outlined	 in	 the	 concept	 was	 that	 to	 “develop	 a	 small	manufacturing	industry,	to	manufacture	HIV	products	which	are	registered	in	the	country	and	bring	Africans	and	the	Chinese	to	collaborate	and	do	some	research	on	the	industry”671.				
Governance	in-the-making	The	case	of	the	NPI	sheds	light	on	how	a	problem	is	identified	and	acted	upon	by	a	number	of	governmental	and	social	stakeholders	to	drive	policy	change/creation.	It	 is	 important	 on	 both	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 levels.	 The	 state	 pivots	between	a	 local	dimension	characterised	by	the	need	for	deep	structural	reforms	and	the	international	context	from	which	it	aims	to	learn.	It	is	a	case	of	governance	in-the-making,	where	the	ideological	and	practical	reliance	on	China	plays	a	key	role.	Domestically,	the	historical	demonization	of	traditional	medicine	has	created	a	vacuum	in	the	social	and	governmental	structures	of	governance,	leaving	space	for	an	anarchical	domestic	organisation	of	the	sector	and	the	penetration	of	foreigners.	The	 relations	 between	 governmental	 organs	 and	 social	 groups,	 including	practitioners	and	manufacturers,	are	highly	disjoint	due	to	lack	of	trust	by	the	latter	in	the	guarantees	of	protection	provided	by	the	former.	Internationally,	the	revival	of	 traditional	 medicine	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 reparation	 against	 the	 imposition	 of	
                                                669	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	National	Museums	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-10-17.	670	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Kenya	Medical	Research	Institute	(KEMRI),	Nairobi,	2014-11-05.	671	Ibid.	
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Western	values	and	the	limits	placed	upon	the	world	by	Western-led	international	institutions.		Within	 this	 context,	 the	 presence	 of	 China	 is	 neither	 the	 cause	 nor	 the	consequence	 of	 the	 domestic	 change,	 but	 rather	 an	 example	 of	 successful	development	 with	 which	 Kenyan	 stakeholders	 engage	 for	 the	 achievement	 of	 a	stated	goal.	In	other	words,	the	Chinese	presence	is	not	here	important	as	a	trigger	for	change	but	rather	as	a	chosen	facilitator	for	such	change.	Stakeholders,	however,	remind	 that	 the	 Chinese	 government	 as	well	 as	 private	 companies	 have	 specific	diplomatic	 and	 commercial	 interests	 in	 getting	 a	 foothold	 in	 Kenya.	 Chinese	interests	have	tended	to	overlook	Kenyan	domestic	needs,	such	as	the	development	of	Kenyan	traditional	medicine	rather	than	the	development	of	Chinese	medicine	for	Kenyan	 audiences.	 The	 weakness	 of	 the	 domestic	 system	 of	 governance,	 in	 this	sense,	could	provide	spaces	to	the	Chinese	to	penetrate	the	sector	further.	However,	there	are	at	least	two	elements	that	suggest	this	will	not	happen:	at	the	top	levels	there	 is	an	interest	 in	developing	Kenyan	traditional	medicine	as	 it	 is	believed	to	contribute	to	the	reduction	of	costs	in	the	provision	and	delivery	of	health	care.	This	is	 true	 for	Kenyan	 traditional	medicine,	 rather	 than	 traditional	medicine	of	other	countries,	as	it	is	locally	sourced.	Therefore,	it	is	likely	that	both	bureaucratic	and	research	circles	will	negotiate	to	safeguard	this	interest.	At	the	same	time,	when	it	comes	 to	 consumers,	 though	 Chinese	 traditional	 medicine	 has	 been	 gaining	 a	foothold	 in	 Kenya,	 this	 has	 happened	 on	 a	 relatively	 small	 scale.	 This	 is	 mainly	because	the	world	of	beliefs	which	surrounds	the	usage	of	traditional	medicine	is	directly	 linked	 to	 specific	 local/indigenous	 traditions	 which	 have	 historical	 and	collective	meaning.	Such	meaning	cannot	thus	easily	be	detached	from	the	territory	and	imported	from	abroad.				
5.3 Sectoral	dynamics	As	 mentioned	 above,	 China’s	 provision	 of	 healthcare	 assistance	 and	 trade	 in	health-related	 products	 is	 not	 new	 to	 Africa,	 but	 it	 is	 quite	 so	 to	 Kenya.	 The	relationship	with	traditional	partners	(both	in	trade	and	development	assistance)	is	a	key	feature	of	the	discussions	concerning	the	relatively	new	presence	of	China.	All	three	 cases	 highlight	 how	 international	 standards	 have	 become	 embedded	 in	Kenyan	 systems	 of	 governance.	 As	mentioned	 in	 the	 introduction,	 healthcare	 in	
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Kenya	is	a	highly	diversified	sector,	which	presents	“a	mixed	story	of	progress	and	inequality” 672 .	 Particularly	 relevant	 to	 understanding	 this	 diversification	 is	 the	acknowledgement	 that	 the	 heavy	 involvement	 of	 donors	 and	 international	organisations	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 most	 forms	 of	 health	 care	 has	 made	 domestic	institutions	 less	 independent	 from	 broader	 systems	 of	 governance.	 The	 large	bureaucracy	of	the	Ministry	of	Health	and	the	strong,	albeit	uneven,	interference	of	international	 institutions	 in	 the	 management	 of	 aid,	 has	 caused	 Kenyan	 actors’	decreased	negotiating	power	vis-à-vis	China.	As	 opposed	 to	 the	 cases	 presented	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 cases	 in	 this	chapter	 do	 not	 revolve	 around	 a	 particular	 problem	 with	 which	 Kenyan	 actors	identify	 the	Chinese	arrival.	On	the	contrary,	 the	cases	have	 in	common	a	 lack	of	contestation	 and	 a	 nuanced	 and	 calculated	 approach	 to	 the	 external	 actor.	 This	nuanced	type	of	relation,	in	a	sense	less	confrontational	compared	to	that	presented	in	the	previous	chapter,	between	state	and	social	forces	but	also	between	each	of	them	 and	 Chinese	 actors,	 appears	 to	 be	 informed	 by	 both	 a	 cautious	 approach	towards	a	new	partner	in	development	and	structural	limitations.		The	systems	of	governance	and	actors	involved	are	quite	different	in	the	three	cases.	The	first	two	cases	present	a	system	of	governance	that	is	historically	rooted	where	Kenyan	interests	are	broadly	safeguarded	through	the	system.	The	content	and	modality	of	the	Chinese	engagement	with	Kenyans	are	negotiated	domestically	in	a	way	that	tends	to	preserve	the	existing	systems.	In	these	two	cases	of	modern	medicine,	the	historical	dependence	upon	donors	for	the	development	of	the	sector	seems	to	have	created	a	system	where	such	dependence	is	not	challenged	but	rather	sought.	With	the	decrease	of	aid	provision	from	traditional	partners,	the	next	logical	step	identified	is	that	to	 look	for	new	partners,	rather	than	strengthen	the	sector	from	the	inside.	This	is	consequential	to	the	acknowledgement	that	local	resources	–	 human	 and	 financial	 –	 are	 insufficient.	 The	 third	 case,	 however,	 is	 one	where	governance	 is	being	 restructured,	 and	China	 is	perceived	as	a	key	contributor	 to	such	restructuring.	The	lack	of	organisation	within	Kenya	resulting	in	the	absence	of	 formal	 engagement	 between	 the	 state	 and	 social	 forces	 is	 the	 focus	 of	 a	government	initiative	aimed	at,	among	other	things,	changing	to	protect	and	boost	local	knowledge.	The	presence	of	China	is	so	far	not	detrimental	but	rather	a	key	example	during	a	delicate	phase	of	policy	and	legislative	formulation.	
                                                672	Lewis	and	Kerr,	op.	cit.,	p.	4.	
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Kenyan	behaviour	is	largely	pro-active,	namely	a	conduct	of	engagement	dictated	by	an	increasing	awareness	that	China	is	providing	complementary	options	to	those	of	traditional	partners	at	times	more	suitable	to	fulfil	Kenyan	emerging	objectives.	However,	 in	 comparison	 to	 other	 partners,	 China	 is	 identified	 as	 only	 relatively	significant	 for	 the	achievement	of	such	objectives.	This	 is	due	to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Chinese	 interests	 in	 engaging	 with	 Kenyan	 actors	 are	 not	 equally	 relevant	 to	Kenyans.	However,	even	more,	it	is	due	to	the	fact	that	China’s	non-adherence	to	the	modalities	of	 interaction	among	foreign	and	local	stakeholders,	as	 ‘prescribed’	by	the	system	of	governance,	contributes	to	its	isolation.																										
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Table	2:	Sectoral	comparison	of	interests,	actors,	and	arenas/tables	of	negotiation	-	Health		 		 Mama	Lucy	Hospital	 Trade	in	medical	products	and	devices	 Natural	Products	Initiative	
Interests	
Type	of	relation	 Aid	 Commercial	 Commercial-aid	
Issue	at	stake	 Lack	of	infrastructure	and	equipment	in	hospital	
Need	of	cheap	products	intertwined	to	mismatch	between	what	china	pledges	to	provide	and	what	can	be	provided	to	K	according	to	domestic	and	international	norms	
Neglect	of	Kenyan	traditional	medicine,	increase	of	Chinese	traditional	medicine	
Kenyans'	issue-
specific	interests	 Use	Chinese	company	to	achieve	domestic	development	plan.	 Source	cheap	Chinese	products	
Use	Chinese	expertise	(companies	and	education)	to	achieve	domestic	development	plan.	In	the	process	of	sector’s	restructuring,	China	represented	a	governance	system	to	emulate.		
Overall	objective	
toward	China	 Fitting	China	in	 Engaging	China	as	a	partner	in	development		 Engaging	China	as	a	partner	in	development		
Actors	
Initiator		 Ministry	of	health	-	Minister's	office	(very	large	bureaucracy)	 Grassroots	-	wholesalers	 National	Museums	of	Kenya	
Other	domestic	
actors	 Hospital	management	 Pharmacy	and	Poison	Board	 Ministry	of	Culture,	Ministry	of	Health	(including	PPB),	KEMRI	(research	institute)	
Resources	
Economic	asymmetry	leveraged	by	the	presence	of	professional	human	resources	able	to	safeguard	the	system	of	governance	
		
Kenyan	professional	human	resources	crucial	to	alter	the	system	of	governance	to	safeguard	Kenyan	interests:	introduction	of	traditional	medicine	in	the	healthcare	delivery	system	
Arenas	and	
tables	of	
negotiation	
ARENA	'the	problem'	
contextualized	in	the	
Kenyan	domestic	
context	(historical	legacies	and	current	policy	preferences)		
ROOTED:	High	donor	assistance.	Foreign	aid	negotiation	regulated,	esp.	since	2004/2007	to	increase	Kenyan	ownership,	but	presence	of	donors	undermined	the	state	of	institutional	capacity.	
ROOTED:	Regulated	by	both	domestic	and	international	institutions	(very	intertwined	due	to	the	developing	status	of	K).	Trade	Sector	dominated	by	private	actors	and	associations	operating	side	by	side	with	Aid	providers.	No	change	in	policy	or	legal	preferences	foreseen.	
IN-THE-MAKING:	Newly	significant	issue-area,	triggered	by	awareness	of	benefits	for	healthcare	budget,	and	the	increase	of	foreign	practitioners.	Witchcraft	act,	unregulated	sector.	Recent	acknowledgement	of	the	need	of	policy	and	legal	transformation	to	include	TM	in	healthcare	provision.	Recent	policy	changes	(2005,	2009,	2010,	2013,	2014)	
Mobilization	
framework	
Weak	framework	for	donations,	easily	bypassed	by	high-level	officials	in	order	to	secure	funding	(and	high	politics)	>	Re-orientation	of	strategy	with	hospital's	involvement	
Strong	wholesalers	groups,	operating	within	formal	domestic	and	international	frameworks	
Mainly	horizontal,	between	ministries.	still	at	drafting	stage.	little	involvement	of	NATHEPA	(which	is	fractioned	on	its	own,	within)	
Mode	of	addressing	
the	issue	with	the	
Chinese	 Passive	and	re-active	 Pro-active	 Pro-active	
Table	of	negotiation	 Light	alteration	 Conformity	 Light	alteration	Source:	Author’s	findings		
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CHAPTER	6 	
Engagement	in	the	Education	Sector			
6.1 The	context		Typically	an	area	of	people-to-people	cooperation	under	the	FOCAC	framework	and	Chinese	aid	policy,	education	cooperation	and	development	assistance	between	Kenya	and	China	is	an	increasingly	dynamic	area	of	engagement.	This	cooperation	involves	government-to-government	deals	as	well	as	agreements	between	schools	and	 the	 private	 sector	 or	 civil	 society	 organisations,	 which	 are	 crucial	 actors	 in	implementing	 and	 re-defining	 governments’	 plans.	 Current	 projects	 range	 from	establishing	 Confucius	 Institutes	 to	 sending	 students	 on	 exchange	programs	 and	again	to	training	human	resources	in	several	professional	fields.		For	 Kenya,	 the	 development	 of	 education	 and	 training,	 together	 with	 health-related	development,	is	the	most	important	issue-area	of	the	Social	Pillar	under	the	Kenya	Vision	2030	framework.	Kenya	aims	at	providing	“a	globally	competitive	and	quality	education,	training	and	research”	and	to	be	“a	regional	centre	of	research	and	development	in	new	technologies”.	The	focus	of	Kenya	Vision	2030	on	higher	education	and	research	is	consequential	 to	major	policy	changes	occurred	within	the	sector	–	and	the	country	–	since	the	NARC	government	was	elected	in	2002,	the	most	relevant	of	which	was	the	shift	from	a	primary	to	a	secondary	education	focus.	The	 arrival	 of	 China	 has,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 opened	 up	 space	 to	 explore	 areas	 of	education	that	had	been	neglected,	in	particular	higher	education,	such	as	Technical	and	Vocational	Education	and	Training	(TVET)	or	traditional	medicine.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	it	has	shown	how	the	Western	footprint	is	deep	in	a	country	where	there	 is	 a	 general	 mentality	 according	 to	 which	 “if	 I’m	 Chinese-trained,	 I'm	 not	associated	with	good	training”673,	vis-à-vis	training	carried	out	in	Europe	or	the	US.	While	this	belief	does	not	seem	to	be	fully	confirmed	by	those	who	engage	directly	with	China,	it	is	indicative	of	the	general	atmosphere.		For	China,	 engaging	 in	 educational	 cooperation	and	assistance	has	become	an	important	aspect	of	foreign	policy,	an	instrument	devised	to	move	beyond	high-level	rhetoric,	used	to	address	negative	perceptions	and	social	discontent	often	caused	by	
                                                673	Interview	with	a	Kenyan	executive	at	a	Confucius	Institute,	2013-10-31.	
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the	 presence	 of	 Chinese	 activities,	 products	 and	 agents.	 In	 other	 words,	 fierce	critiques	 against	 the	 Chinese	 at	 the	 grassroots	 levels	 in	 Africa	 have	 spurred	 the	Chinese	willingness	to	step	in,	to	control	relational	processes	through	the	pro-active	buildup	 of	 positive	 images.	 While	 the	 provision	 of	 assistance	 is	 one	 reason	 for	China’s	involvement,	more	recent	research	suggests	that	motivations	also	concern	the	development	of	Chinese	firms’	industrial	capacity	in	Africa,	and	the	penetration	of	markets	through	the	provision	of	equipment	and	training	on	it.	In	other	words,	the	motivations	behind	the	provision/negotiation	of	educational	cooperation	and	assistance	are	increasingly	expanding	from	public	diplomacy	to	market	seeking.		Available	studies	on	educational	cooperation	and	assistance,	exception	made	for	the	Confucius	Institutes,	are	few.	They	tend	to	concentrate	on	China’s	motivations	for	engaging	Africa’s	students	and	technical	staff	while	there	is	almost	no	attention	in	the	literature	in	understanding	if	and	how	these	engagements	are	framed	within	African	domestic	agendas	of	development674.	This	chapter	focuses	on	understanding	the	decision-making	process	in	Kenya	when	it	comes	to	prioritising	and	negotiating	educational	 projects	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 education	 and	 training	 system,	studying	 the	 environment	 and	 the	 processes	 of	 engagement	 between	 actors	 to	contextualise	 China’s	 assistance	 and	 cooperation.	 The	 three	 cases	 selected	 to	 be	explored	 represent	 three	major	 types	 of	 engagement	 in	 educational	 cooperation	between	 China	 and	 African	 countries,	 namely	 the	 development	 of:	 technical	cooperation,	human	resources	for	health,	and	Chinese	language	through	Confucius	Institutes.	 They	 embody	 very	 different	 forms	 of	 cooperation	 and	 assistance	provision	 by	 China	 to	 Kenya.	 They	 also	 shed	 light	 on	 extremely	 different	bureaucratic	structures	within	the	Kenyan	educational	sector.				
6.1.1 China-Africa	Educational	Cooperation	and	Assistance	Educational	cooperation	between	China	and	African	countries	has	boomed	with	the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Forum	 on	 China-Africa	 Cooperation	 in	 2000,	 and	more	specifically	after	FOCAC	2006	as	 the	 range	of	 cooperation	activities	expanded675.	The	cooperation	between	China	and	African	countries,	however,	dates	back	to	well	before	the	2000s	and	expands	beyond	FOCAC	commitments	to	bilateral	agreements.	Drawing	upon	South-South	cooperation	principles	of	mutual	support	and	benefit,	
                                                674	W.	Benjekkoun,	‘China-Africa	Co-operation:	Capacity	Building	and	Social	Responsibility	of	Investments’,	Policy	Insights	no.	24,	South	African	Institute	of	International	Affairs,	August,	2015.	675	For	a	more	detailed	account	see	King,	2013,	op.	cit.,	pp.	34-35,	and	FOCAC	Action	Plans	2003,	2006,	2009.	
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the	 formal	 training	of	African	 technicians,	managers,	 skilled	 labour,	 students	has	been	 part	 of	 China’s	 foreign	 policy	 since	 the	 1950s	 when	 the	 first	 educational	exchanges	took	place	(between	Egypt	and	China)676.	They	increased	in	the	1990s	when	university	partnerships	between	Chinese	and	African	universities	started,	in	support	 of	 science	 laboratories,	 and	 took	 a	 new	 flavour	 in	 the	 2000s	 as	 Chinese	migration	 to	Africa	 intensified,	often	causing	clashes	between	migrants	and	 local	populations,	thus	elevating	educational	cooperation	to	priority	foreign	policy	status.		Despite	the	focus	on	cooperation	principles,	which	are	nested	in	the	belief	that	the	 two	 sides	 are	 equal,	 the	 relations	between	China	 and	African	 countries	have	often	been	framed	as	the	provision	of	experts	from	China	to	Africa677.	While	this,	on	the	one	hand,	seems	to	remind	of	North-South	asymmetric	relations	in	education	and	 training,	on	 the	other,	King	suggests	 that	 “reciprocity	 should	not	be	equated	with	 exact	 symmetry	 […]	 reciprocity	 could	 involve	 looking	 across	 [FOCAC]	commitments	 as	 a	whole	 and	making	 a	 judgement	 about	win-win	 economic	 and	social	cooperation”678.	Predominantly	 led	 by	 China’s	 interests	 to	 develop	 its	 soft	 power,	 the	engagements	 with	 the	 African	 continent	 range	 from	 the	 set-up	 of	 Confucius	Institutes,	 to	 the	 training	 of	 human	 resources	 in	 several	 professional	 fields,	 the	provision	 of	 scholarships	 to	 study/train	 in	 China,	 the	 construction	 of	 schools,	including	 China-Africa	 friendships	 schools	 (FOCAC	 2009),	 cultural	 exchanges,	university	 linkages,	 and	 more	 specific	 projects	 such	 as	 ‘Cultures	 in	 Focus’,	 the	‘China-Africa	 Think	 Tanks	 10+10	 Partnership	 Plan’	 or	 the	 ‘20+20	 Cooperation	Plan’679.	Differently	from	other	development	partners	such	as	Korea	International	Cooperation	Agency	(KOICA,	South	Korea),	Japan	International	Cooperation	Agency	(JICA,	Japan)	and	the	Department	for	International	Development	(DFID,	UK),	King	reminds	that	China	“does	not	produce	glossy	accounts	of	its	education	development	projects	 […]	 Nor	 does	 it	 produce	 regular	 sector	 policy	 statements	 about	education”680.	FOCAC	documents	and	the	White	Papers	on	China’s	Foreign	Aid	(2011	and	2014)	as	well	 as	 the	2013	White	Paper	on	China-Africa	Economic	and	Trade	
Cooperation	outline	China’s	commitments	but	the	lack	of	more	detailed	statistical	
                                                676	King,	2013,	op.	cit.,	p.	34.	677	See	FOCAC	declarations	and	action	plans	(2000,	2003,	2006,	2009,	2012,	2015);	White	Paper	on	China’s	African	Policy	(2006);	White	Paper	on	China-Africa	Economic	and	Trade	Cooperation	(2013).		678	King,	2013,	op.	cit.,	p.	31.	679	See	FOCAC	declarations	and	action	plans	(2000,	2003,	2006,	2009,	2012).	Annex	II	provides	a	summary	of	commitments.		680	K.	King,	‘China’s	Higher	Education	Engagement	with	Africa:	A	Different	Partnership	and	Cooperation	Model?’,	in	
Education,	Learning,	Training	:	Critical	Issues	for	Development,	International	Development	Policy	series	no.	5,	Graduate	Institute	Publications	and	Brill-Nijhoff,	Geneva	and	Boston,	2014,	p.	2.	
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data	makes	it	tough	to	identify	what	share	–	both	in	terms	of	type	and	quantity	–	goes	to	specific	countries	(see	Annex	II).			
6.1.2 Kenya-China	Educational	Cooperation	and	Assistance	The	connections	between	Egerton	University	in	Kenya	and	Nanjing	Agricultural	University	 in	 China	 started	 in	 the	 1990s.	 Together	 with	 a	 few	 scholarships	 and	short-term	training	support	to	study	in	China	provided	since	the	1980s,	these	were	the	first	forms	of	educational	cooperation	between	Kenya	and	China.	In	other	words,	the	 cooperation	 between	 the	 two	 countries	 before	 the	 2000s	was	minimal681.	 A	major	shift	occurred	in	the	early	2000s.	According	to	King,	“the	FOCAC	process,	from	late	2003,	produced	a	dramatic	change	in	short-term	training	numbers,	from	just	a	handful	a	year	 to	over	100	annually”682.	Similarly,	 long-term	scholarships	 “which	had	been	running	at	just	some	ten	a	year	from	1982,	went	up	to	some	40	annually	from	2007”683.	Concomitantly,	in	2005,	the	first	Confucius	Institute	in	Africa	was	set	up	at	 the	University	of	Nairobi.	 Since	 then	a	high	number	of	 students	have	been	awarded	scholarships	and	awards	to	study	in	China.	This	period	of	change	coincided	with	a	broader	shift	taking	place	in	Kenya	–	and	in	Africa	–	since	the	election	of	the	NARC	 government	 in	 2002,	 and	 since	 a	 shift	 in	 global	 development	 cooperation	(with	the	adoption	of	the	Rome,	Paris	and	Accra	declarations	in	2003,	2005,	2008	respectively)	which	acknowledged	the	need	for	donors	to	align	their	agendas	with	local	 objectives.	 The	historical	 absence	 and	 the	 relatively	 recent	 arrival	 of	 China	must	be	understood	within	this	context	of	domestic	efforts	and	international	shifts	in	aid	provision	to	education.			
Kenya:	domestic	and	international	frameworks	Since	 independence,	 and	 before	 the	 NARC	 government	 election	 in	 2002,	 the	education	 sector	 had	 received	 uneven	 national	 and	 international	 attention.	Domestically,	the	struggle	concerned	the	provision	of	free	and	universal	education	for	 all,	 set	 against	 ever-present	 governmental	 financial	 constraints	 and	 regional	disparities	 in	 resource	allocation684.	 Internationally,	 the	 focus	of	donors	 changed	significantly	over	time,	shifting	from	basic	education	to	skills	development,	mostly	
                                                681	King,	2010,	op.	cit.,	p.	490.	682	Ibid.	683	Ibid.,	p.	491.	684	C.	Colclough	and	A.	Webb,	‘The	Impact	of	Aid	on	Education	Policy	in	Kenya’,	RECOUP	Working	Paper	no.	36,	University	of	Cambridge,	2010,	p.	7.	
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depending	on	the	“interests	and	expertise	of	the	bilateral	agencies”685	rather	than	recipients’	needs.			However,	as	mentioned	above,	a	major	shift	occurred	in	the	early	to	mid-2000s	at	both	domestic	and	international	level.	The	NARC	government	came	to	power	in	2002,	 making	 education	 a	 fundamental	 aspect	 of	 the	 electoral	 manifesto.	Concomitantly,	a	new	phase	of	 improved	relations	with	donors	started,	based	on	increased	trust	in	the	democratically-run	government	and	on	sounder	planning	in	education,	and	in	other	sectors686.	This	is	the	period	when	not	only	the	number	of	OECD-DAC	donors	increased	(“from	17	in	the	1990s	to	34	by	2008”687),	but	also	non-OECD	 donors	 started	 emerging,	 most	 notably	 China 688 .	 In	 2005,	 thanks	 to	 the	technical	 support	 of	 the	 World	 Bank,	 the	 Kenya	 Education	 Sector	 Support	Programme	 (KESSP)	 was	 launched,	 in	 alignment	 with	 the	 country’s	 Economic	Recovery	Strategy689.	According	to	a	DFID	report,	recalling	the	Ministry	of	Education	Science	 and	 Technology,	 “explicit	 also	 was	 the	 aim	 of	 establishing	 strong	 and	coordinated	relationships	with	donors,	whilst	maintaining	ownership	of	the	policies	being	implemented	at	the	national	and	local	levels”690.	In	the	same	period,	the	Rome	(2003),	 Paris	 (2005)	 and	 Accra	 (2008)	 declarations	 were	 adopted	 marking	 a	substantial	change	in	global	development	cooperation,	which	emphasised	the	need	for	 donors	 to	 align	 their	 agendas	 with	 local	 objectives	 while	 also	 encouraging	increased	 local	 ownership	 of	 the	 policy	 agenda	 and	 implementation	 systems.	Nevertheless,	in	Kenya,	‘local	ownership’	was	only	partially	successful	due	to	at	least	a	couple	of	factors:	first,	donors	were	sceptical	about	the	ability	of	executive	officers	in	 Kenya’s	 ministries	 to	 operate	 efficiently	 and	 accountably	 thus	 ending	 up	requiring	Kenya	to	 follow	donors’	procedures	 instead	of	 its	own691.	Secondly,	 the	differences	between	donors’	budget	agendas	and	those	of	Kenya	influenced	Kenyan	objectives.	As	a	consequence,	primary	education	–	favoured	by	most	development	partners	 vis-à-vis	 secondary	 education	 –	 remained	 the	 focus	 of	 Kenya’s	development	agenda	in	the	2000s692.	Although	“the	development	of	both	TVET	and	
                                                685	Ibid.,	p.	12.	686	Ibid.,	p.	9.	687	Ibid.,	p.	11.	688	Ibid.,	p.	11;	also	see	King,	2010,	op.	cit.	689	Colclough	and	Webb,	op.	cit.,	p.	15.	690	Ibid.,	p.	16.	691	Ibid.,	p.	22.	692	African	Development	Fund,	‘Support	to	the	Enhancement	of	Quality	and	Relevance	in	Higher	Education,	Science	and	
Technology	Project’,	African	Development	Fund,	2012,	p	.3.	
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tertiary	education693	were	included	amongst	the	priorities	of	KESSP,	[…]	planning	for	them	was	weak,	and	they	did	not	find	favour	with	donors	who	contributed	to	the	pool” 694 .	 Therefore,	 while	 the	 objectives	 concerning	 the	 delivery	 of	 primary	education	to	all	were	met,	secondary	education	still	needed,	throughout	the	2000s	up	to	the	early	2010s,	serious	policy	and	implementation	attention695.		While	“the	government	remains	the	main	financier	of	higher	education”696,	the	allocation	 of	 resources	 is	 insufficient	 to	 meet	 the	 rise	 in	 enrolment	 in	 higher	education	facilities697	–	consequential	to	an	improved	primary	education	system,	as	well	as	a	“changing	economic	landscape	in	Africa,	which	requires	specialized	skills	in	critical	numbers”698.	While	 the	major	education	development	partners	–	DFID,	CIDA,	USAID	–	“continue	to	support	basic	education	primarily”699,	a	few	others	have	started	 engaging	 in	 higher	 education	 development.	 The	 AFB,	 China	 and	 the	Netherlands	 have	 been	 supporting	 TVET	 institutions,	 the	 French	 Development	Agency	is	“supporting	studies	on	private	sector	engagement	in	higher	education	and	university	education	financing	mechanisms,	while	the	German	Academic	Exchange	Service	will	continue	with	capacity-building	activities	in	higher	education”700.	Most	development	 partners	 adhere	 to	 aid	 effectiveness	 principles,	 specifically	 with	regards	to	country	ownership,	and	have	developed	agendas	in	line	with	KESSP	and	Vision	2030.	China’s	engagement	in	educational	cooperation	and	assistance	is	not	comparable	to	other	agencies’	modalities,	namely	sector-wide	approaches.		
The	entrance	of	China	China	is	acting	according	to	agendas	often	detached	from	multi-lateral	paradigms,	mainly	providing	unsystematic	assistance	rather	than	adopting	“large-scale	project	approaches”701.	 King	 reports	 that	 China’s	 cooperation	with	 the	 formal	 education	sector	 in	Kenya	 involves	 “provision	of	 school	buildings,	university	 links	projects,	Chinese	 language	 training	 in	 formal	 settings	 like	 Nairobi,	 Kenyatta	 and	 Egerton	Universities,	 or	 the	 provision	 of	 short-	 and	 long-term	 training”702.	 However,	 the	
                                                693	According	to	the	World	Bank,	tertiary	education	includes:	universities,	colleges,	technical	training	institutes,	community	colleges,	nursing	schools,	research	laboratories,	centers	of	excellence,	distance	learning	centers.	Available	at:	World	Bank,	'Tertiary	Education	(Higher	Education)',	The	World	Bank	[website],	<www.worldbank.org/education/tertiary>.	694	Colclough	and	Webb,	op.	cit.,	p.	26.	695	Interviews.	696	African	Development	Fund,	op.	cit.,	p.	3.	697	Ibid.	698	Ibid.,	p.	2.	699	Ibid.,	p.	3.	700	Ibid.,	pp.	3-4.	701	King,	2013,	op.	cit.,	p.	ix.	702	King,	2010,	op.	cit.,	p.	489.		
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support	 to	 human	 resource	 development	 does	 not	 only	 involve	 government-to-government	 projects.	 There	 are	 increasing	 privately	 provided	 language	 training	centres,	as	well	as	a	“very	wide	range	of	enterprise-based	training	associated	with	the	 spectrum	 of	 Chinese	 companies,	 which	 span	 the	 range	 from	 the	 high-tech	Huawei,	in	information	technology,	to	China	Road	and	Bridge	Corporation,	to	a	large	pharmaceutical	 like	Holley	Cotec,	 to	vehicle	assemblers	 like	DFM,	Focin	and	King	Bird,	and	to	a	multiplicity	of	much	smaller	firms”703.	The	training	provided	by	these	companies	generally	fulfils	the	companies’	direct	needs	and	is	not	part	of	broader,	coordinated	development	programs.		This	 diversified	 scenario	 provides	 for	 a	 range	 of	 Chinese	 interests	 behind	education	 and	 training	 cooperation	 and	 assistance	 with	 Kenya,	 namely	 the	promotion	of	 its	 image	(through	soft	power	instruments	 like	Confucius	Institutes	and	 scholarships),	 the	 increase	 of	 Chinese	 companies’	 sales	 and	 production	(through	the	training	of	local	human	resources	and	exposure	to	Chinese	products)	and	 to	 a	 smaller	 extent	 cooperation	 in	 scientific	 research	 and	 exchanges.	 These	interests	are	framed	as	part	of	the	South-South	rhetoric	which	relies	on	concepts	such	 as	 equality	 and	mutuality.	 However,	 despite	 the	 commonly	 held	 belief	 that	China	provides	assistance	to	Africa	in	the	‘response	mode’	rather	than	prescribing	for	Africa704,	the	cases	below	show	that	the	response	mode	is	rarely	the	approach	adopted.	 The	 ‘response	 mode’	 is	 intended	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 assistance	 by	 the	Chinese	 upon	 request	 of	 the	 local	 environment.	 Quite	 inversely,	 there	 are	 often	specific	 Chinese	 interests	 behind	 these	 actions,	 informed	 by	 agendas	 that	 range	from	industrial	development	to	soft	power.	These	 interests	often	presume	a	pro-active	Chinese	approach	so	to	achieve	the	(Chinese)	stakeholders’	objectives.	While	these	may	overlap	with	local	needs	in	terms	of	content,	the	modality	of	provision	may	 distance	 itself	 from	what	Kenya	 has	 come	 to	 identify	 as	 a	 best	 practice,	 i.e.	coordination.		Bearing	in	mind	the	main	research	question	the	section	below	looks	at	how	and	why	 different	 Kenyan	 agents	 have	made	 sense	 of	 their	 interaction	with	 Chinese	actors	and	how	they	have	justified	their	actions	domestically.	
	
	
                                                703	Ibid.,		704	King,	2013,	op.	cit.,	p.	xi.	
	 193	
6.2 Kenyan	Responses	The	interaction	between	Kenyan	stakeholders	 in	the	education	sector	vis-à-vis	China	mainly	revolves	around	inserting	a	new	player	in	a	scenario	well	populated	by	 long-present	 development	 partners.	 This	 implies	 learning	 about	 the	 way	 to	match	 domestic	 needs	 with	 Chinese	 offers	 of	 educational	 cooperation	 and	assistance.	It	also	implies	acknowledging	that	the	economic	landscape	in	Kenya,	and	in	Africa	more	generally,	is	changing:	industrialization	has	become	a	key	policy	area	that	rests	upon	fundamental	social	developments	to	be	enacted,	the	most	important	of	which	is	the	development	of	human	resources	to	cater	for	the	country’s	emerging	needs.	 For	 instance,	 the	 improvement	 of	 healthcare	 professionals’	 training	 and	working	environments	is	considered	key	to	guaranteeing	a	healthy	population,	in	turn	able	to	work	and	produce;	the	training	and	development	of	technical	experts	is	crucial	 for	 the	 country	 to	 engage	 actively	with	 the	 construction	 boom	and	 other	emerging	sectors.		Despite	 the	 widespread	 emphasis	 put	 on	 China’s	 role,	 the	 collaboration	 with	China,	 at	 times	 requested,	 at	 other	 times	 speculatively	 received	 (in	 line	with	 the	tension	mentioned	above	between	assistance	and	business),	is	made	sense	of	within	a	pre-existing	domestic	agenda	according	to	which	the	collaboration	is	adapted.	The	dynamics	between	state	and	societal	organs	concerning	the	opening	up	to	the	new	partner	are	interesting	to	study	for	the	way	change	is	perceived	and	acted	upon,	not	only	at	the	organisational	level	but	also	at	the	level	of	individuals.	The	mere	fact	that	China	 is	a	new(er)	partner	provides	 for	 interesting	processes	of	decision-making	within	which	deliberations	are	made	as	to	what	added	value	is	provided	compared	to	other	partners	and	to	what	is	the	priority	for	Kenya	vis-à-vis	potential	clashing	Chinese	priorities.		The	areas	identified	as	salient	are:	1. Starting	partnerships	between	technical	and	vocational	universities	and	 colleges	 and	 Chinese	 companies.	 In	 particular,	 understanding	 the	readiness	and	flexibility	of	Kenyan	actors	to	both	adapt	to	the	Chinese	modus	operandi	 and,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 dictate	 the	 rules	 of	 ownership	 and	cooperation.	The	study	mainly	looks	at	the	interaction	between	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya,	a	number	of	colleges,	 the	Ministry	of	Education,	AVIC	International.	
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2. Education	and	training	in	healthcare.	The	study	looks	at	two	aspects	of	the	cooperation:	the	management	of	Chinese-offered	training	in	Kenya	and	the	management	of	Chinese-offered	scholarships	to	study/train	in	China.	The	section	aims	at	unveiling	the	mechanisms	and	synergies	between	state	and	social	 organisations	 and	 the	 sectoral	 structure	 that	 have	 restrained	 the	arrival	of	Chinese	medical	teams	and	limited	the	number	of	Kenyan	students	from	 undertaking	 medical	 training	 in	 China.	 The	 stakeholders	 under	consideration	 are	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Culture,	 Kenya	Medical	Research	Institute	and	a	few	private	companies.		3. The	case	of	Confucius	Institutes.	The	focus	 is	on	the	role	of	Kenyan	stakeholders,	 their	 deliberations	 and	 motivations	 to	 set	 up	 Confucius	Institutes	in	three	(at	the	time	of	research)	Universities.	This	is	a	particular	case	as	the	issue	of	CIs	has	received	extraordinary	journalistic	and	academic	attention	in	the	past	decade.	Kenya	is	home	to	the	first	Confucius	Institute	in	Africa,	 set	 up	 in	 2005	 at	 the	University	 of	Nairobi.	Most	 available	 studies	focus	 on	 China’s	motivations	 behind	 this	 educational	 initiative,	with	 little	emphasis	placed	on	the	role	of	the	local	context705.	The	aim	of	the	analysis	below	is	to	contribute	to	the	debate	by	presenting	how	different	universities	in	Kenya	have	received	and	blended	the	Chinese	initiative	into	local	contexts.			
6.2.1 Technical	and	Vocational	Education	and	Training	Criticism	 toward	 China’s	 limited	 employment	 of	 local	 human	 resources,	especially	 in	 the	 infrastructure	 sector,	 is	often	contrasted	by	Chinese	 companies’	claims	that	Africans	are	not	adequately	qualified	to	cover	managerial	or	technical	roles.	While	knowledge	transfer	and	support	for	the	development	of	the	Technical	and	Vocational	Education	and	Training	(TVET)	sector	in	African	countries	is	pledged	for	in	FOCAC	documents,	there	is	a	paucity	of	studies	that	focus	on	understanding	how	the	development	is	contextualised	within	African	domestic	agendas.	The	TVET	issue	was	singled	out	by	the	Kenyan	Ministry	of	Education	when	asked	in	what	areas	Kenya	mostly	cooperates	with	China.		For	Kenya,	the	development	of	TVET	has	become	one	of	the	main	objectives	of	the	development	blueprint	document,	Kenya	Vision	2030,	launched	in	2008.	In	turn,	
                                                705	See	M.	Procopio,	‘The	effectiveness	of	Confucius	Institutes	as	a	Tool	of	Soft	Power	in	South	Africa’,	African	East-Asian	
Affairs/The	China	Monitor,	Issue	1-2,	June,	2015.	
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for	China	the	development	of	local	human	resources	for	technical	jobs	in	Kenya	is	reportedly	fundamental	to	be	able	to	rely	more	consistently	on	local	labour,	reduce	the	negative	perceptions	of	China’s	presence	by	involving	the	local	workforce,	and	expose	 future	 experts	 to	 Chinese	 industrial	 machineries/products	 (through	 the	provision	of	 industrial706	machines	 for	 training	purposes).	The	choice	to	 focus	on	this	 issue	stemmed	 from	 the	need	 to	understand	how	Kenyan	stakeholders	have	blended	China’s	commitments	to	offer	training	and	other	interests	into	a	changing	domestic	governance	environment.	The	changing	environment	 refers	both	 to	 the	booming	 industrial	 development	 in	 Kenya	 and	 to	 the	 recognition	 of	 higher	education	as	a	key	sector.		Studying	the	cooperation	in	TVET	is	fascinating,	especially	because	the	encounter	occurs	between	cultures	that	have	different	understandings	of	the	relation	between	education	 and	 labour.	 Fieldwork	 research	 led	 to	 finding	 out	 that	 the	 problem	perceived	by	China	concerning	the	lack	of	trained	human	resources	is	consequential	to	 a	 Kenyan	 domestic	 context	 characterised	 by	 a	 culture	 of	 separation	 between	technical	and	vocational	education	and	its	applicability	in	real	scenarios,	vis-à-vis	the	Chinese	system	where	factories	and	colleges	are	more	integrated.	Even	when	TVET	is	linked	to	production,	in	Kenya,	it	is	often	a	matter	of	small	scale	production	rather	than	industrial707.	According	to	a	leading	Kenyan	employers’	association	in	the	construction	sector,	“the	training	was	not	a	necessity	before	as	construction	was	small,	there	was	no	demand.	Now	there	is	a	construction	boom	in	the	whole	region”,	and	there	is	the	need	for	more	systematic	training708.		While	education	and	training	of	human	resources	by	the	Chinese	in	Kenya	often	takes	 place	 at	 the	 company	 level 709 	with	 varied	 commitment	 and	 results,	 the	Ministry	of	Education-TVET	Directorate	has	started	to	lead	projects	in	collaboration	with	educational	 institutions	 in	 the	country,	with	 the	aim	to	start	developing	 the	sector	 more	 consistently	 and	 comprehensively.	 The	 largest	 project	 led	 by	 the	Ministry	has	been	 supported	by	 the	Chinese	 state-owned	aerospace	 and	defence	company,	AVIC	International,	through	a	concessional	loan,	and	has	been	developed	at	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya	and	other	higher	education	colleges.	
                                                706	These	machines	have	industrial	capacity.	In	other	words,	they	are	not	designed	for	training	but	for	industrial	production.		707	J.	Simiyu,	Entrepreneurship	Education	as	a	Tool	to	Support	Self-Employment	in	Kenya,	TVET	Best	Practice	Clearinghouse,	issue	2,	UNESCO-UNEVOC,	Bonn,	2010.	708	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Kenya	Association	of	Building	and	Engineering	Consultants	(KABCEC),	Nairobi,	2104-09-14.	709	See	King,	2013,	op.	cit.	for	a	comprehensive	account.		
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The	 analysis	 below	 mainly	 focuses	 on	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 Ministry	 of	Education-TVET	Directorate,	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya	(TUK),	a	public	body,	and	their	engagement	with	AVIC	International.		
	
TVET	and	Kenya	Vision	2030	While	the	TVET	sector	has	experienced	moderate	growth	over	the	past	40	years,	with	 Vision	 2030	 it	 has	 become	 “the	 leading	 engine	 that	 the	 economy	 must	essentially	 rely	 upon	 to	 produce	 adequate	 levels	 of	 the	middle	 level	 manpower	needed	to	drive	the	economy	towards	the	attainment	of	the	vision”710	and	as	“the	vehicle	for	socio-economic	and	technological	transformation”711.		In	 2010,	 Sessional	 Paper	 No.5	 mentioned	 the	 need	 to	 revamp	 technical	education 712 .	 According	 to	 different	 sources,	 the	 main	 challenge	 for	 technical	education	 was	 the	 lack	 of	 equipment	 and	 infrastructure.	 Because	 of	 these	shortcomings,	“a	proposal	was	done	to	seek	support	from	foreign	partners”713,	and	a	number	of	MOUs	were	signed	with	ADB,	the	Netherlands	and	China,	through	an	agreement	between	the	Ministry	and	the	Embassy	of	China714.	At	the	same	time,	the	awareness	that	appropriate	training	needed	to	be	provided	grew,	and	in	2011	the	University-Industry	 Partnership	was	 created.	 Before	 this	 initiative	was	 born	 the	relation	 between	 educational	 institutions	 and	 industries	 only	 revolved	 around	coordinating	industrial	attachments	rather	than	critically	looking	at	the	challenges	and	needs	of	the	industry	so	to	address	them	at	the	university	level715.	In	a	sense,	according	 to	 sources,	 there	was	a	 failure	 in	 communication	between	educational	institutions	and	the	industry	as	the	skills	of	students	graduating	from	universities	or	colleges	were	not	necessarily	those	requested	by	the	industry.		The	 significance	of	 the	 sector	 continued	 to	grow,	 and	 the	TVET	Act	2013	was	passed	on	4th	June	2014	with	the	aim	of	regulating	the	operation	of	TVET	institutions.	The	 Act	 requested	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Technical	 and	 Vocational	 Education	 and	Training	 Authority	 (TVETA),	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Curriculum	 Development	Accreditation	Certifying	Council	(CDACC)	that	was	inaugurated	in	November	2014,	
                                                710	Ministry	of	Education	Science	and	Technology,	‘Draft	Technical	and	Vocational	Education	and	Training	(TVET)	Policy’,	
Ministry	of	Education	Science	and	Technology,	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya,	March	2014,	p.	11.	711	United	Nations	Educational,	Science	and	Cultural	Organisation	(UNESCO),'World	TVET	Database	-	Country	Profiles	Kenya',	International	Centre	for	Technical	and	Vocational	Education	and	Training	(UNEVOC)	[website].	712	Interview	with	an	executive,	Ministry	of	Education,	Technical	and	Vocational	Education	and	Training	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-11-19.	713	Ibid.	714	Ibid.	715	Interview	with	professors	of	engineering	at	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-11-05.	
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and	the	creation	of	a	TVET	fund,	a	source	for	resource	mobilisation.	The	purpose	of	the	 creation	 of	 these	 bodies	was	 regulating	TVET	 training	 and	 re-organising	 the	TVET	 sector	 to	meet	 Vision	 2030’s	 goal	 of	 industrialisation716	that	 “places	 great	emphasis	 on	 science,	 technology	 and	 innovation	 in	 general	 and	 TVET	 in	particular”717.	According	to	an	interviewee,	“we	want	to	get	industrialised	and	to	do	that	we	need	sound	TVET	training	so	people	can	start	changing	raw	materials	into	finished	products.	The	government	took	the	effort.”718	While	orchestrated	from	the	top,	at	the	Ministerial	level,	the	development	of	TVET	and	its	links	with	the	industry	are	strictly	reliant	on	educational	institutions	and	the	industrial	sector,	public	and	private.	 In	 fact,	 TVET	 in	 Kenya	 is	 delivered	 by	 both	 government	 and	 private	providers,	 which	 include	 for-profit	 and	 non-profit	 NGOs	 and	 church-based	institutions 719 .	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 ADB	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 have	 also	participated	 to	 providing	 external	 funding	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 sector.	However,	interviewees	suggested	that	the	engagement	with	China	is	the	largest	and	most	comprehensive.		
Chinese	equipment	and	training	The	areas	that	mostly	needed	to	be	tackled	for	developing	the	sector	were	thus	equipment,	 infrastructure	and	training.	 In	2010,	after	acknowledging	the	need	to	seek	 support	 from	 foreign	 partners,	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 domestic	stakeholders	were	not	used	to	supporting	major	educational	projects,	the	Ministry	of	 Education	 signed	 a	 Memorandum	 of	 Understanding	 (MOU)	 with	 the	 Chinese	Embassy	 and	 later	 entered	 a	 contract	 with	 AVIC	 International	 for	 the	 supply	 of	equipment,	 capacity	 building	 and	 civil	 work,	 namely	 building	workshops,	 for	 all	technical	 training	 institutions,	 to	 be	 completed	 within	 5	 years.	 A	 year	 later	 the	project	was	deemed	too	vast	and	reduced	in	size	to	provide	equipment	and	capacity	building	 to	 10	 institutions	 only720,	 selected	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	 Education	with	 a	vision	to	strengthen	TVET.		The	Technical	University	of	Kenya	was	selected	by	the	Ministry	to	lead	the	project,	and	it	was	provided	with	the	full	range	of	equipment,	i.e.	mechanical,	electrical	and	electronic,	rapid	prototyping,	while	the	other	nine	institutions	received	one	type	of	
                                                716	Ibid.			717	UNESCO,	op.	cit.			718	Interview	with	professors	of	engineering	at	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-11-05.	719	Ministry	of	Education	Science	and	Technology,	op.	cit.,	p.	13.	720	Interview	with	an	executive,	Ministry	of	Education,	Technical	and	Vocational	Education	and	Training	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-11-19.	
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equipment	 only.	 The	 equipment	 was	 negotiated	 between	 the	 Ministry	 and	 the	institutions	that	were	requested	to	suggest	the	kind	of	equipment	they	could	benefit	from	based	on	their	traditional	areas	of	training721.	According	to	sources,	however,	the	Ministry	 already	 had	 in	mind	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 equipment	 had	 to	 benefit	 the	development	of	TVET.	At	TUK,	the	equipment	available	before	the	batch	from	AVIC	Int’l	arrived	was	“from	the	1970s,	it	was	old	but	functional,	it	was	European-made,	in	Britain,	Germany,	Italy.	It	is	now	still	in	use	but	on	other	campuses”722.	The	new	equipment	 is	very	advanced,	and	 it	 is	believed	to	have	 improved	the	university’s	capacity	in	mechanical	and	electrical	engineering	although	it	is	not	all	in	use	due	to	power	shortage723.	The	equipment	provided	by	AVIC	 Int’l	has	 industrial	capacity,	not	 mere	 training	 capacity.	 This	 aspect	 is	 considered	 significant	 by	 educational	stakeholders	for	how	the	relation	between	education	and	industry	can	develop.	The	availability	of	machines	capable	of	producing	for	the	industry	is	seen	as	an	incentive	to	produce,	and	production	leads	towards	industrialisation,	i.e.	Kenya	Vision	2030’s	ultimate	goal.	This	provision	is,	however,	accompanied	by	an	awareness	that	“the	Chinese	are	interested	in	business	[…]	This	project	is	for	showcasing	what	they	can	do.	This	is	a	way	of	marketing	in	Africa”724.	According	to	a	source	“the	fact	that	the	Chinese	may	donate	and	then	want	to	have	returns	is	not	only	a	Chinese	problem.	Anyone	who	donates	something	has	a	reason	to	donate	equipment.	Then	students	are	 more	 familiar	 with	 this	 equipment,	 and	 when	 they	 have	 to	 suggest	 to	procurement	departments	where	to	buy,	 they	suggest	buying	this	equipment	[…]	I’m	 not	 surprised	 if	 the	 Chinese	 have	 an	 agenda	 in	 doing	 this”725 .	 While	 other	partners,	such	as	a	group	from	the	Netherlands,	one	from	Belgium	and	ADB,	more	recently	 provided	 equipment,	 the	 project	 with	 AVIC	 Int’l	 is	 deemed	 the	 largest	project	in	the	education	sector.		The	 provision	 of	 equipment	 was	 contracted	 together	 with	 the	 provision	 of	training	for	learning	how	to	use	it.	A	cascade	approach	was	adopted	where	each	of	the	ten	institutions	sent	two	teachers	to	China	for	a	3-month	training	in	2012,	and	the	teachers,	upon	return,	trained	more	teachers	and	students.	What	proved	to	be	significant	in	this	context	of	cooperation	at	the	level	of	higher	education	was	to	be	
                                                721	Interview	with	professors	of	engineering	at	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-11-05.	722	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-11-04.	723	Ibid.		724	Interview	with	professors	of	engineering	at	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-11-05.	725	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-11-04.	
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able	to	calibrate	what	the	Chinese	offered	to	what	the	institutions	needed,	and	more	generally	what	the	country	aimed	to	as	a	whole.	While	the	training	associated	with	the	provision	of	equipment	by	AVIC	Int’l	has	been	highly	considered	thanks	to	its	blending	with	the	desired	trajectory	of	TVET	development,	in	the	case	of	another	major	college	in	the	country,	the	absence	of	a	complementary	agenda	between	 the	Chinese	and	Kenyan	stakeholders	 led	 to	 the	rejection	of	Chinese	training	offers.	A	Chinese	group	offered	to	set	up	a	Chinese-run	training	centre	within	the	College,	which	trains	teachers	in	Kenya.	According	to	the	offer,	a	Chinese	firm	would	have	sponsored	the	establishment	of	an	ad	hoc	training	centre	within	the	institution,	running	it	on	its	own	terms	while	offering	a	different	programme	from	what	was	part	of	the	curriculum,	which,	according	to	the	Institute,	was	 aimed	 at	 enhancing	 “competence	 based	 training,	 to	 provide	 people	 with	practical	skills	so	when	students	leave	they	are	ready	for	the	job	market”726.	While	the	competency-based	training	would	have	matched	the	need	to	develop	TVET,	it	did	not	match	the	institute’s	training	mandate,	focused	on	teachers’	training	rather	than	skills	development,	and	was	rejected	not	only	by	the	Institute	but	also	by	the	Ministry	 of	 Education	 that	 “felt	 uncomfortable”	mainly	 because	 it	 perceived	 the	Chinese	offer	as	aimed	at	“supporting	Chinese	companies	in	Kenya”727.		The	Ministry	also	pointed	out	 that	 the	provision	of	 funding	 to	 start	 a	 training	centre	 should	 not	 have	 misled	 the	 Institute	 to	 accept	 it	 as	 “there	 are	 a	 lot	 of	programmes	out	there	that	do	not	work	because	they	are	not	framed	for	us	[…]	You	need	involvement	from	the	stakeholders	to	make	these	programmes	sustainable”728.	This	involvement	is	what	the	cooperation	with	AVIC	Int’l	provided	a	basis	for.	In	a	way,	 the	 provision	 of	 equipment	 provided	 the	 grounds	 for	 intensifying	 relations	with	the	industry	through	the	involvement	of	societal	stakeholders	as	exemplified	below.			
‘Africa	Tech	Challenge’	linking	schools	to	factories	The	equipment	requested	to	AVIC	was	not	meant	to	satisfy	training	needs	only	but,	thanks	to	its	industrial	capacity,	it	was	intended	to	lead	the	institutions	using	it	towards	production729.	This	was	a	departure	from	previous	practices	as	production	
                                                726	Interview	with	an	executive	and	an	officer	at	the	Kenya	Technical	Trainers	College,	Nairobi,	2014-10-10.	727	Interview	with	an	executive,	Ministry	of	Education,	Technical	and	Vocational	Education	and	Training	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-11-19.	728	Ibid.	729	Ibid.	
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had	 mostly	 been	 limited	 to	 training	 purposes	 or	 to	 help	 the	 “immediate	community”730	through	small	scale	simple	production	of	items	such	as	machines	to	cut	the	grass	for	cows.		With	the	long-term	aim	of	changing	this	pattern	of	limited	interaction	between	educational	 institutions	 and	 factories,	 and	 of	 enhancing	 technical	 training	 to	support	small	factory	development731,	the	Ministry	of	Education,	TVET	Directorate	generated	a	competition	named	the	Africa	Tech	Challenge	that	took	place,	for	the	first	time,	in	summer	2014,	aimed	at	producing	a	spare	part	that	could	be	used	in	industrial	environments.	Africa	Tech	Challenge	saw	the	participation	of	18	institutes	including	universities,	each	composed	of	a	team	of	three	people.	An	initial	training	period	 of	 6	 weeks	 was	 provided,	 after	 which	 the	 competition	 started	 with	 a	preliminary	 phase	 and	 a	 final	 phase	 in	 which	 six	 teams	 competed	 to	 win.	 The	training	was	hosted	by	TUK	and	the	machines	used	were	those	provided	by	AVIC.	However,	 of	 all	 the	 institutes	 participating,	 not	 all	 were	 beneficiaries	 of	 AVIC	equipment	 meaning	 that	 for	 a	 number	 of	 students	 the	 training	 of	 Africa	 Tech	Challenge	provided	the	first	chance	to	work	on	very	advanced	machines.	AVIC	 International,	 which	 was	 already	 partnering	 with	 the	 Ministry	 for	 the	equipment	supply	to	TUK	and	other	colleges,	was	the	first	to	be	approached	by	the	Ministry	 and	 was	 asked	 to	 sponsor	 the	 competition.	 AVIC	 agreed	 by	 providing	trainers	 and	 guaranteeing	 that	 the	 winning	 products	 would	 be	 bought	 by	 the	company	or	its	affiliates	to	be	used	in	the	heavy	machinery	industry.	The	contracts	foresee	the	production	of	three	types	of	spare	parts,	two	of	which	are	then	going	to	be	 shipped	 to	 China	 and	 one,	 produced	 through	 a	 collaboration	with	 the	 Kenya	National	Youth	Service,	is	going	to	be	used	in	Kenya	in	the	heavy	machinery	industry.			The	idea	of	linking	educational	institutions	to	factories	was	not	new,	but	it	was	now	 possible	 to	 intensify	 it	 thanks	 to	 the	 widespread	 presence	 of	 advanced	equipment	and	thanks	to	the	idea	of	using	the	institutions’	premises	and	machines	to	produce	items	to	be	used	in	real	contexts	of	production.	However,	at	the	Ministry,	an	interviewee	pointed	out	that	linking	the	factories	and	educational	institutions	is	still	at	an	early	stage	of	concept	development	and	turning	to	production	on	a	regular	and	consistent	basis	will	take	a	long	time732.	In	order	to	facilitate	this	process	and	guarantee	 its	 sustainability,	 after	 the	 success	 of	 the	 first	 round	 of	 Africa	 Tech	
                                                730	Ibid.	731	Ibid.	732	Ibid.	
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Challenge,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 invited	 a	 number	 of	 Kenyan	 organisations	whose	members	are	highly	impacted	by	the	level	and	quality	of	human	resources’	training,	such	as	the	Kenya	Association	of	Manufacturers,	the	Kenya	Private	Sector	Alliance	and	the	Federation	of	Kenyan	Employers,	to	join	the	sponsoring	of	Africa	Tech	 Challenge	 and	 to	 make	 their	 members	 aware	 that	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	institutions	across	the	country	that	have	human	and	machine	capacity	to	support	their	development733.	According	to	sources,	a	number	of	local	institutions	agreed	to	join	the	initiative	by	providing	employment	attachments734.		As	 a	 source	 at	 an	 educational	 institution	 pointed	 out	 “now	we	 have	 the	 best	equipment,	 some	 of	 which	 is	 not	 even	 available	 in	 the	 industries.	 It	 is	 now	 a	challenge	 for	 us	 to	 use	 the	 facilities	 to	 train	 students	 and	 workers	 to	 use	 the	machines.”735	According	to	interviewees	in	the	sector,	the	availability	of	advanced	machinery	 could	 be	 a	 way	 to	 revolutionise	 the	 whole	 idea	 behind	 production,	learning	 from	 countries	 like	 Germany	 where	 the	 industries	 rely	 on	 training	institutions	 and	 the	 state-of-the-art	 machinery	 available	 there	 to	 spearhead	products	 before	 fully	 developing	 them736 .	 	 While	 Kenya	 currently	 “follows	 the	industry”	by	looking	at	“what	industries	do	and	train	people	to	do	that”737	the	aim	is	to	reach	such	a	collaborative	 level	of	 interaction	according	to	which	the	 industry	makes	use	of	 training	 institutions’	 intellectual	 as	well	 as	machinery’s	 capacity	 to	develop	better	products	and	“when	they	see	that	 it	becomes	profitable,	 they	may	acquire	facilities.”738			
Collaborative	governance,	in-the-making	This	case	is	one	of	governance	in-the-making	where	domestic	actors	identified	the	unsuitability	of	existing	systems	of	governance	to	achieve	emerging	objectives.	Because	of	this	perceived	deficiency,	a	collaborative	type	of	governance	was	devised	to	draw	upon	public	and	private	resources.	The	presence	of	Chinese	companies	in	Kenya	was	not	identified	as	the	cause	of	change,	but	as	an	element	that	emphasised	the	need	to	restructure	the	system.	The	case	focuses	on	the	initiatives	conceived	by	Kenyan	 actors	 to	 create	 the	 conditions	 to	 fill	 the	 gap	 systematically,	 in	 higher	
                                                733	Ibid.	734	Non-state	actors	were	included	in	the	second	round	of	the	competition,	including	Kenyan	Gearbox	software	and	iHub.	For	more	information,	refer	to	www.avicatc.org.	735	Interview	with	professors	of	engineering	at	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-11-05.	736	Ibid.	737	Ibid.	738	Ibid.	
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education	 facilities	 rather	 than	 in	 factories,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 long-term	 project	 of	educational	development,	while	discouraging	the	issue	to	be	addressed	on	a	need-basis	by	individual	Chinese	companies.		The	 example	 of	 China’s	 relations	 between	 education	 and	 the	 industry	 is	 well	valued.	 However,	 it	 is	 not	 singled	 out,	 other	 countries’	 approaches	 are	 equally	appreciated.	Notwithstanding	this,	while	other	development	partners	had	engaged	in	capacity	building,	China’s	AVIC	International	did	not	merely	provide	training	but	was	also	willing	to	provide	much-needed	equipment	that	was	perceived,	by	Kenyans,	to	 be	 the	 missing	 link	 for	 the	 development	 of	 more	 comprehensive	 relations	between	education	and	the	 industry.	While	AVIC	International’s	engagement	was	widely	praised,	an	interviewee	at	TUK	suggested	that	“a	huge	number	of	people	in	Kenya	are	educated	in	the	West.	It	will	take	a	long	time	for	Kenyans	to	place	people	with	a	degree	from	a	Chinese	university.	These	are	roots	from	the	colonial	era”739.		In	fact,	despite	the	fundamental	and	positive	role	played	by	AVIC	Int’l	for	the	start	of	 the	 Africa	 Tech	 Challenge	 project,	 the	 TVET	 Directorate	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	Education	encouraged	the	participation	of	different	domestic	associations	with	the	aim	of	tackling	the	problem	at	the	source,	namely	guaranteeing	a	more	direct	link	between	domestic	factories	and	educational	institutions.	Collaborative	governance,	though	 still	 in-the-making,	 seems	 to	 be	 characterising	 the	 relationship	 between	state	 and	 non-state	 actors.	 The	 way	 the	 collaboration	 with	 Chinese	 actors	 was	processed,	and	Kenyan	and	Chinese	agendas	compared,	shows	that	confrontation,	rather	 than	 accommodation,	 took	 place,	 to	 guarantee	 that	 the	 Chinese	 offer	 of	assistance	would	well	match	 local	needs.	The	opening	up	 to	 include	a	number	of	other	domestic	organisations	and	the	adhesion	of	these	organisations	to	the	project	is	symptomatic	of	a	responsive	and	collaborative	environment	where	not	only	the	state	 bureaucracy	 but	 also	 the	 private	 sector	 is	willing	 to	 participate	 in	what	 is	perceived	as	a	process	of	change	and	a	cornerstone	to	achieving	the	Vision	2030’s	goal	of	industrialization.			
6.2.2 Human	resources	for	healthcare	In	 the	 case	 just	 above,	 Chinese	 and	 Kenyan	 actors	 identified	 a	 problem	 that	impacted	 stakeholders	on	 either	 side	 (Chinese	 and	Kenyan)	 -	 namely	 the	 lack	of	locally	available	technically-trained	human	resources	leading	Chinese	companies	to	
                                                739	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-11-04.		
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rely	on	Chinese	technical	personnel	rather	than	Kenyan	-	and	negotiated	a	way	to	overcome	it.	Contrary	to	that,	in	the	case	of	Human	Resources	for	Health	(HRH)	740,	the	problem	is	not	identified	by	the	stakeholders	involved.	It	rather	emerges	from	a	comparison	of	China’s	commitments	towards	healthcare	development	in	Africa	(see	Annex	I)	and	the	specific	case	of	Kenya.	Despite	the	Chinese	commitments	to	provide	education	and	training	assistance	to	African	countries,	and	despite	the	dire	need	for	Kenya	to	develop	its	human	resources	for	healthcare,	the	engagement	between	the	two	has	been	limited	both	in	terms	of	Chinese	personnel	working/visiting	Kenya,	for	 instance	 Medical	 Teams,	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 Kenyan	 students	 and	 staff	studying/training	in	China.	Research	conducted	in	Kenya	has	revealed	a	mismatch	
between	 the	 type	 of	 assistance	 China	 pledges	 to	 offer	 and	 the	 kind	 that	 Kenyan	
stakeholders	find	to	be	appropriate	to	the	local	needs,	in	line	with	the	existing	system	
of	governance.			The	 Chinese	 involvement	 in	 education	 and	 training	 for	 healthcare	 has	 been	framed	for	decades	under	the	South-South	cooperation	umbrella	with	the	dispatch	of	Chinese	Medical	Teams	(CMTs)	to	Africa	since	the	1950s	and	the	use	of	traditional	Chinese	medicine741.	More	recently	CMTs	have	also	been	identified	as	instruments	to	increase	China’s	soft	power	in	Africa.	However,	as	Fan	points	out	discussing	the	Beijing	 Declaration	 of	 the	 first	 Ministerial	 Forum	 on	 China-Africa	 Health	Development,	 the	 risk	 China	 incurs	 is	 that	 of	 focusing	 “on	 providing	 ‘things’	 –	sending	 medical	 teams,	 drugs,	 prefabricated	 clinics” 742 	not	 focusing	 on	 the	sustainability	of	the	projects	or	on	whether	they	align	with	the	recipient	country’s	specific	needs.	As	a	 consequence,	 taking	 the	 case	of	Kenya,	 the	 soft	power	China	attempts	 to	exercise	 remains	 limited	 in	 its	potential	effectiveness	as	 the	analysis	below	demonstrates.		An	increasingly	emerging	rationale	behind	China’s	involvement	in	the	education	and	training	of	HRH,	similarly	 to	what	was	 found	out	 for	TVET,	 is	 that	 to	expose	Kenyan	healthcare	professionals,	from	technicians	to	doctors,	to	Chinese	products,	through	training.	In	other	words,	the	idea	is	that	to	use	public	diplomacy	to	create	a	market.	This	allows	professionals	to	familiarise	with	the	products	the	Chinese	offer	
                                                740	“Human	resources	for	health	(HRH)	include	public	and	private	sector	doctors,	nurses,	midwives,	pharmacists,	technicians	and	other	paraprofessional	personnel,	as	well	as	untrained	and	informal-sector	health	workers,	such	as	practitioners	of	traditional	medicine,	community	health	workers,	and	volunteers”,	World	Health	Organisation,	The	world	health	report	2006–
Working	together	for	health,	World	Health	Organisation,	Geneva,	2006.	 	741	Li,	2011,	op.cit.	742	V.	Fan,	'China-Africa	Health	Cooperation:	A	New	Era?',	Centre	for	Global	Development	(CGD)	[website],	23	August	2013.	
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and,	 presumably,	 increases	 chances	 of	 commercial	 exchange743 	vis-à-vis	 others,	such	as	Western	or	Indian	products	(which	are	still,	however,	dominant	as	showed	in	the	previous	chapter).		For	Kenya,	in	turn,	the	engagement	with	China	in	education	and	training	is	very	new,	 it	 is	 not	 yet	 developed	 and	 remains	marginal	 in	 the	 overall	 picture	 of	 the	development	 of	 human	 resources	 for	 health.	 The	 question	 is	 then	 how	 and	 the	extent	to	which	the	Kenyan	government	and	social	stakeholders	filter	the	provision	of	assistance	and	steer	it	towards	what	is	needed	rather	than	merely	accept	what	is	offered.	As	mentioned	above,	despite	the	Chinese	emphasis	on	the	‘response-mode’,	in	 the	 case	 of	 Kenya,	 assistance	 is	 mostly	 provided	 in	 line	 with	 China’s	 African	commitments	(namely	the	dispatch	of	Chinese	Medical	Teams,	the	set-up	of	Malaria	centers	and	the	training	of	personnel	in	both	conventional	and	traditional	medicine),	rather	than	based	on	local	governance	systems	and	necessities.		Cooperation	 in	 education	 and	 training	 in	 healthcare	 is	 not	 (yet)	 structured	between	the	two	countries,	it	rather	takes	place	through	the	Chinese	provision	of	unsystematic	 assistance,	 often	 not	 part	 of	 longer-term	 projects.	 In	 collaborating	with	 Kenya,	 China	 enters	 an	 environment	 that	 is	 already	 highly	 populated	 by	international	 and	multilateral	 organisations.	However,	 the	 system	of	 governance	presents	itself	as	fragmented,	“with	several	ministries	and	government	departments	taking	different	roles	and	responsibilities.	The	greatest	challenge	has	been	the	lack	of	 coordination	 among	 the	 various	 training	 agencies,	 resulting	 in	 inefficiency,	duplication	of	effort	and	wastage	of	resources	(Ministries	of	medical	services	and	public	health	and	sanitation,	2009)”744.	As	demonstrated	 in	 the	previous	chapter,	the	health	sector,	not	only	HRH,	is	one	where	there	is	considerable	variance	in	the	successful	 agenda	 design	 and	 implementation.	 In	 particular,	 the	 presence	 of	development	partners	and	international	institutions	has	weakened	the	indigenous	public	 management	 of	 resources	 as	 showed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 (case	 of	infrastructure	 development).	 Therefore,	 public	 bodies	 are	 too	 heavily	 reliant	 on	international	 institutions	and	are	thus	unaccustomed	to	negotiate	beyond	known	boundaries	and	methodologies.	China	non-adherence	to	international	mechanisms	makes	the	processes	of	negotiation	even	more	unusual.		
                                                743	Bräutigam,	2011,	op.	cit.,	p.	8;	Bräutigam,	2009,	op.	cit.,	p.	118-119.	744	H.	Kiambati,	C.	Kiio	and	J.	Toweett,	‘Understanding	The	Labour	Market	of	Human	Resources	for	Health	in	Kenya’,	World	
Health	Organisation,	Working	Paper,	November	2013,	p.	7.	
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Education	and	training	for	health:	national	and	international	frameworks	Several	factors	have	inhibited	Kenya’s	ability	to	provide	adequate	health	care	for	its	citizens.	The	most	important	is	underfunding	of	the	health	sector	which	has	an	impact	on	human	resources	availability	and	distribution	that,	in	turn,	influence	the	provision	of	adequate	healthcare.	The	WHO	has	flagged	Kenya	as	“facing	an	acute	shortage	of	health	workers.		Universities	and	training	facilities	are	only	producing	40	percent	of	the	needed	health	workforce,	and	poor	distribution	and	retention	is	a	serious	concern	particularly	in	rural	areas	where	the	need	is	greatest”745.	The	Kenya	Medical	Training	College	trains	the	largest	number	of	health	workers	in	Kenya746.	Data	is	tough	to	gather,	and	only	the	Nursing	Council	provides	statistics	related	to	the	training	of	nurses.	The	Council	suggests	that	“the	public	and	mission-sponsored	institutions	train	the	largest	number	of	nurses.	The	proportion	of	the	public	sector	increased	from	60%	in	2005	to	75%	in	2009.	On	average,	the	public	trains	about	70%,	whereas	 the	missions	 train	about	20%.	This	 implies	 that	most	of	 the	nurse	training	relies	on	public	 sector	 resources”747.	Due	 to	poor	pay	and	poor	working	conditions	“over	the	years,	Kenya	has	experienced	a	brain	drain	of	health	workers	[…]	many	ending	up	in	Western	countries”	mainly	the	UK	followed	by	the	US,	Canada	and	Australia748.	Since	2009,	however,	“the	number	of	health	workers	seeking	new	job	opportunities	[abroad]	has	declined	because	of	improved	working	condition	and	remuneration	in	Kenya	in	both	the	public	and	private	sectors”749.	The	country	has	made	significant	progress	in	the	recruitment	of	health	professionals	also	“through	a	collaborative	effort	with	development	partners	such	as	the	United	States	Agency	for	International	 Development	 (USAID),	 Danish	 International	 Development	 Agency	(DANIDA)	and	the	Global	Fund	to	Fight	AIDS,	Tuberculosis	and	Malaria	(GFATM)	who	have	 funded	 the	 recruitment	 of	 health	workers	 on	 short-term	 contracts	 for	both	public	and	faith-based	organisations.”750	This	collaboration	with	development	partners	was	also	consequential	to	requests	put	forward	by	the	Kenyan	government	to	“any	country	to	provide	help	so	to	guarantee	reaching	the	threshold	set	by	the	WHO	of	health	workers	per	person”751.	To	 tackle	 the	 issue,	 two	were	 the	 crucial	
                                                745	USAID,	'USAID	Kenya	Health	Systems	Strengthening',	USAID,	September	2013.	746	Kiambati,	Kiio	and	Toweett,	op.	cit.,	p.	7.	 	747	Ibid.	748	Business	Monitor	International,	op.	cit.	749	Kiambati,	Kiio	and	Toweett,	op.	cit.,	p.	7.	750	Kenya	Ministry	of	State	for	the	Development	of	Northern	Kenya	and	other	Arid	Lands	and	IntraHealth	International,	
Human	Resources	for	Health	(HRH)	Assessment	Report	for	Northern	Kenya:	Overview	of	Health	Workforce	Distribution	across	
10	Counties,	May	2013,	p.	72.	751	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Human	Resources	Development	Department,	Nairobi,	2014-11-18.	
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aspects:	increase	the	number	of	health	care	students,	and	retain	them	in	the	country	after	graduation.			
China’s	entrance	When	 in	 the	1970s	 “the	number	of	CMTs	 in	Africa	greatly	 increased”	with	 the	“advent	of	CMTs	in	22	countries”752,	Kenya	and	China	were	still	facing	a	stalemate	in	their	diplomatic	relations,	situation	under	which	CMTs	are	usually	withdrawn	or	not	dispatched753.	However,	since	the	establishment	of	FOCAC	in	2000	–	and	with	the	advent	of	Kibaki’s	Look	East	Policy	–	the	two	countries	have	deepened	relations	in	a	number	of	fields,	including	the	medical	one.	FOCAC	commitments	concerning	human	resources	for	health	mainly	revolve	around	the	dispatch	of	Chinese	Medical	Teams,	the	set	up	of	Malaria	centres,	the	training	of	personnel	in	both	conventional	and	 traditional	medicine	 (see	Annex	 I).	 Chinese	Medical	 Teams	have	 treated	 the	most	different	diseases	not	just	through	modern	medicine	but	also	through	“Chinese	traditional	 medical	 treatment,	 especially	 acupuncture” 754 .	 Given	 CMTs	 are	reportedly	dispatched	upon	request,	 the	attention	of	 this	analysis	 focuses	on	 the	Kenyan	 system	 and	 attempts	 to	 find	 the	 reasons	 why	 requests	 were	 never	 put	forward,	or	if	so,	if	they	were	rejected	by	the	Chinese.	Similarly,	while	anti-malaria	training	 provision	 by	 China	 has	 been	 widespread	 across	 Africa755 ,	 again	 Kenya	benefited	only	limitedly.	Education	and	training	cooperation	and	assistance	between	the	two	countries	is	very	recent,	and	although	this	study	presents	a	snapshot	of	the	situation	up	to	early	2014,	the	relations	keep	evolving.	For	instance,	at	the	Ministerial	Forum	on	China-Africa	Health	Development,	held	 in	Beijing	 in	August	2013,	China’s	commitments	made	reference	to	new	areas	of	cooperation	such	as	“cooperation	between	academic	and	research	institutions	in	China	and	Africa”	as	well	as	the	establishment	of	“joint	research	laboratories	and	ethical	conduct	in	the	medical	field”	and	the	opening	up	to	“invite	young	scientists	from	Africa	to	China	to	carry	out	academic	research	and	vice	 versa”.	 Finally,	 the	 declaration	 also	 includes	 a	 commitment	 to	 “facilitate	communication	 and	 cooperation	 between	 non-government	 organisations	 in	 the	health	 sector”,	 particularly	 through	 the	 “China-Africa	 friendly	 civil	 partnership	plan”756.	
                                                752	Li,	2011,	op.cit.,	p.	9.	753	Ibid.		754	Ibid.,	p.	18.	755	Ibid.,	p.	15.	756	Ministerial	Forum	on	China-Africa	Health	Development,	Beijing,	August	2013.	
	 207	
	
Chinese	education	and	training	in	Kenya	Despite	the	lack	of	human	resources	for	health	and	the	ratio	of	doctor/patient	still	being	extremely	inadequate	in	the	country,	Chinese	Medical	Teams	were	never	requested	 by	 Kenya.	 CMTs	 are	 demand-driven,	 like,	 arguably,	 most	 assistance	provided	by	China.	Interviewees	in	Kenya	confirmed	that	permits	were	never	issued	to	Chinese	healthcare	professionals	to	operate	in	Kenya	except	from	a	brief	period	in	2010	when	the	Chinese	navy	hospital	ship,	Peace	Ark,	docked	at	Mombasa	port	between	13	and	18	October.	According	 to	 the	Medical	Practitioners	and	Dentists	Board,	the	body	in	charge	of	issuing	permits	for	foreign	Health	Care	Professionals	(HCPs)	to	operate	in	Kenya,	the	doctors	were	licensed	to	work	temporarily	in	Kenya,	“they	stayed	 less	 than	a	month,	and	 that	 is	unusual.	Doctors	at	mission	hospitals	usually	 stay	 longer.”757	The	 Human	 Resources	 division	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 Health	suggests	that	the	reason	why	Kenya	never	turned	to	China	is	“historical,	during	the	Cold	War,	Kenya	was	more	aligned	with	the	West,	it	never	intended	to	get	support	from	the	East	until	 the	other	day,	 in	 the	1990s,	when	 the	West	 started	 imposing	sanctions”758.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	country	has	been	accustomed	to	 the	Western	provision	 of	 doctors	 on	 a	 voluntary	 basis,	 and	 of	 training	 through	 Western	organisations,	never	considering	the	Chinese.	On	the	other	hand,	the	preference	of	the	country	has	been	on	providing	training	to	Kenyan	human	resources	rather	than	giving	space	to	foreign	human	resources	to	operate	in	the	country.	Foreign	HCPs	are	mainly	 “volunteers	 at	 mission	 hospitals.	 There	 are	 circa	 700	 foreigners	 in	 the	country,	mostly	from	the	US,	UK,	Sweden,	Netherlands,	South	Africa	(few),	India”759.	The	problem	mainly	 seems	 to	 concern	 the	existence	of	 strong	historical	 linkages	with	Western	institutions,	including	faith-based	organisations	providing	healthcare	and	accepting	foreign	doctors	to	work	for	them,	rather	than	with	a	deliberate	action	to	oppose	the	entry	of	Chinese	physicians.	In	fact,	responses	like	this	were	frequent:	“if	they	came,	the	Chinese,	they	would	be	helpful.	I	have	interacted	with	them,	they	are	easy,	they	have	minimal	demands”760.		Beyond	CMTs,	China	has	committed	to	focusing	on	providing	training	to	African	countries	as	part	of	government	assistance	on	malaria	management,	HIV-AIDS	and	other	 communicable	diseases	 (see	Annex	 I).	 In	2003,	Li	Anshan	reports	 that	 “six	
                                                757	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Medical	Practitioners	and	Dentists	Board,	Nairobi,	2014-10-07.	758	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Human	Resources	Development	Department,	Nairobi,	2014-11-18.	759	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Medical	Practitioners	and	Dentists	Board,	Nairobi,	2014-10-07.	760	Interview	with	an	executive	at	Mama	Lucy	Kibaki	Hospital,	Nairobi,	2014-10-14.	
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Chinese	experts	and	28	African	participants	from	14	countries	attended	[a	malaria-management]	 one-week	 training	 course,	 which	 was	 highly	 praised	 by	 African	participants	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Kenyan	 Minister	 of	 Health	 and	 the	 Chinese	ambassador”761.	Again,	 in	 2007-2008	Chinese	personnel	was	 in	Kenya	 to	deliver	training762	in	malaria	management	and	in	2014	the	Chinese	government	sponsored	a	 training	 in	 China	 to	 which	 experts	 from	 the	 Malaria	 Control	 Division	 and	 the	Ministry	of	Health	participated763.	However,	as	mentioned	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	 sector’s	 reliance	 on	 multilateral	 cooperation	 makes	 it	 difficult	 for	 Kenyan	stakeholders	to	allow	China	to	carry	out	training	and	initiatives	disjoint	 from	the	existing	 system	 of	 governance.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 provision	 of	 this	 training	seems	to	be	an	end	in	itself,	where	the	Chinese	are	not	contributing	to	the	Kenyan	management	of	 the	disease	but	 continue,	nonetheless,	 to	provide	 training	 that	 is	defined,	 in	 content	 and	 modality,	 by	 what	 is	 recognised	 as	 important	 flagship	initiatives	of	Chinese	healthcare	diplomacy.		As	 far	 as	 it	 concerns	 the	 involvement	 of	 non-state	 actors	 in	 the	 provision	 of	education	and	training,	Beijing	Holley-Cotec	 in	2006	has	donated	Ksh	3.5	million	worth	of	scholarships	to	the	College	of	Health	Sciences,	University	of	Nairobi,	 for	needy	and	outstanding	students764.	However,	the	Healthcare	Federation	of	Kenya,	branch	of	the	Kenya	Private	Sector	Alliance,	suggested	that	despite	the	dire	need	of	training,	Chinese	pharmaceutical	companies	have	not	supported	any.	Explanations	provided	by	the	Federation	revolve	around	“a	language	problem,	a	cultural	problem	and	a	sense	of	comfort	that	we	do	not	have	with	the	Chinese.	We	get	general	requests	for	the	provision	of	training	by	Germany,	the	Netherlands,	not	the	Chinese.	I	would	be	 interested	 in	 getting	 in	 touch	 with	 the	 China	 Healthcare	 Federation,	 our	counterpart.	 And	 if	 Chinese	 pharma	 companies	 do	 provide	 training,	 then	maybe	their	awareness	is	weak	as	we	do	not	know	about	that”765.	This	is	one	more	case	in	which	Chinese	actors	are	not	part	of	the	associational	environment	that	constitutes	a	share	of	the	sectoral	system	of	governance.		
                                                761	Li,	2013,	op.	cit.,	p.	67.	762	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Malaria	Control	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-10-06.	763	Ibid.	764	University	of	Nairobi,	Varsity	Focus,	op.	cit.,	pp.	21-22.	765	Interview	with	an	executive,	Kenya	Healthcare	Federation,	Nairobi,	2014-10-08.	
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Beyond	the	private	sector,	 there	have	not	been	other	Chinese	non-state	actors	involved	 in	 the	 sector,	 except	 the	 Chinese	 Red	 Cross	 through	 which	 Chinese	companies’	donations	(CSR)	have	been	channelled	on	a	couple	of	occasions766.			
Chinese	education	and	training	in	China	The	cooperation	in	education	and	training	does	not	only	take	place	in	Kenya	but	also	 through	 the	opportunities	 created	 for	 students	 and	professionals	 to	 train	 in	
China.	China	is	providing	scholarships	for	training	health	personnel	from	two	weeks	to	 master	 level.	 It	 is	 providing	 the	 highest	 number	 of	 short	 courses	 and	 has	surpassed	 Japan	 that	 was	 previously	 the	 leader	 through	 JICA767 .	 Long	 courses,	instead,	 are	mainly	 provided	by	Commonwealth	 countries	 such	 as	Britain,	 India,	Australia.	 China	 mainly	 provides	 courses	 in	 service	 delivery	 and	 critical	 areas	whereas	Germany	is	the	leader	in	management	with	Japan	providing	both768.	While	the	 scholarships	 can	 be	 offered	 to	 different	 departments	 at	 both	 the	Ministry	 of	Education	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health,	 generally	 it	 is	 the	 Human	 Resources	Development	Division	at	the	Ministry	of	Health	that	assigns	postgraduate	and	in-service	 scholarships	 through	 a	 needs	 assessment	while	 the	Ministry	 of	 Education	assigns	those	for	undergraduate	studies769.	According	to	the	Ministry	of	Health,	the	support	 from	China	 has	 been	 increasing,	 and	Kenyan	 stakeholders	 decide	which	type	of	professional	figures	should	receive	training	opportunities.	The	issues	around	which	 the	 training	 revolve	are,	however,	often	established	by	China	and	 involve:	malaria,	 HIV,	 health	 system	 management,	 community	 health,	 laboratory.	 The	Ministry	of	Health,	for	instance,	sent	“not	less	than	a	hundred	people/personnel	to	short	 training	 in	 China	 since	 2011.	 In	 2013,	 30	 people	went	 to	 get	 training	 and	deepen	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 healthcare	 system”770 .	 	 As	 far	 as	 it	 concerns	undergraduate	 training,	 for	 instance	 that	 undertaken	 by	 medical	 students,	 the	Kenya	Medical	and	Dentists	Board	suggests	that	students	returning	from	medical	studies	in	China	often	seem	not	to	pass	the	exams	in	Kenya	due	to	the	fact	that	the	curriculum	studied	in	China	is	different	compared	to	that	in	Kenya771.	However,	due	to	the	relatively	new	nature	of	the	relations,	no	specific	actions	have	been	taken,	yet,	
                                                766	‘Donation	to	Kenya	Red	Cross	Society	by	the	Chinese	Community	in	Kenya’,	Embassy	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	in	
the	Republic	of	Kenya,	6	January	2008;	L.	Hou,	‘Chinese	communities	donate	to	victims'	families	after	Kenya	attacks’,	China	
Daily,	08	April	2015.	767	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Human	Resources	Development	Department,	Nairobi,	2014-11-18.	768	Ibid.	769	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Human	Resources	Development	Department,	Nairobi,	2014-11-18.	770	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Medical	Services,	Nairobi,	2014-09-29.	771	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Medical	Practitioners	and	Dentists	Board,	Nairobi,	2014-10-07.	
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to	 improve	 the	 partnership	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 teaching	 content	 and	 quality	standards	of	the	two	countries	align.		An	 interesting	 aspect	 concerning	 health-related	 training	 in	 China	 is	 that	 of	perceptions.	 Kenyans	 are	 yet	 to	 establish	 trust	 toward	 the	 Chinese	 in	 health	products	and	practices.	Most	interviewees	reported	that	it	is	general	belief	that	the	West	offers	better	training	than	China	but	that	since	it	is	limited,	it	is	worth	taking	advantage	 of	 the	 Chinese	 offers	 too.	 Perceptions	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	understanding	 of	 the	 medical	 profession	 as	 carried	 out	 by	 Chinese	 nationals	 in	Kenya	or	of	training	organised	in	China.	This	perception	is	often	compared	to	one	concerning	the	West’s	provision	of	education	and	training,	 largely	deemed	better	than	 the	 Chinese.	 Ministry’s	 bureaucrats	 and	 healthcare	 professionals	 at	 the	directorate	level	in	various	structures	are	aware	of	this	widespread	perception	and	often	 stand	 in	 the	 middle	 reporting	 that	 “those	 trained	 in	 China	 feel	 it	 wasn’t	good” 772 ,	 and	 “come	 back	 with	 good	 stories	 for	 sightseeing” 773 ,	 leading	 to	 a	generalised	perception	that	Chinese	training	is	not	serious.	However,	this	depiction	is	balanced	with	the	acknowledgement	that	there	are,	as	per	experience,	brilliant	Chinese	doctors	and	 training	can	be	 top	 level.	 So	 far,	however,	 the	quality	of	 the	training	has	not	been	systematically	assessed774.	Mostly,	students	and	professionals	go	 to	 China	 to	 undertake	 training	 on	 conventional	medicine	 although	 traditional	medicine	is	also	gaining	momentum.	
	
Traditional	medicine	education	and	training	The	 attention	 to	 training	 in	 traditional	 medicine	 is	 set	 against	 a	 maturing	domestic	 environment	 that	 recognises	 the	 potential	 importance	 of	 traditional	medicine	to	reducing	the	costs	of	health	care	provision.	For	traditional	medicine	to	have	an	impact,	however,	Kenyan	actors	have	identified	the	need	to	improve	and	formalise	 education	 and	 training	 significantly.	 China’s	 dominant	 role,	internationally,	in	the	development	and	use	of	traditional	medicine	in	health	care	provision,	was	recognised	as	a	determining	factor	to	intensify	links.		Although	it	is	not	the	only	initiative	undertaken	in	collaboration	with	China,	the	Natural	Products	Industry	Initiative	(explained	in	Chapter	5)	sheds	light	on	two	key	Kenyan	motivations	for	choosing	China	as	a	partner	in	education.	The	first	concerns	
                                                772	Interview	with	an	executive	at	Mama	Lucy	Kibaki	Hospital,	Nairobi,	2014-10-14.	773	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Medical	Engineering	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-11-18.		774	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Human	Resources	Development	Department,	Nairobi,	2014-11-18.	
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the	possibility	 to	 increase,	 through	 the	 training	provided	by	Chinese	 institutions,	capacity	building	not	only	in	medical	training	or	product	development	but	also	in	management,	including	the	syncing	of	conventional	and	traditional	medicine	usage	in	 the	 national	 healthcare	 system.	 The	 possibility	 to	 learn	 from	 a	 country	 that	perfected	a	conventional-traditional	blended	version	of	healthcare	delivery	proved	to	be	a	key	factor	in	wanting	to	partner	with	China.	The	second	motivation	concerns	the	 fact	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 China	 symbolises	 more	 than	 a	 mere	 partner	 in	development.	It	symbolises	the	possibility	of	unearthing	indigenous	traditions	for	long	buried	under	colonialism	and	post-colonialism.		As	described	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	institutional	environment	surrounding	the	development	of	traditional	medicine	is	weak,	under	major	revision	by	concerned	governmental	 and	 non-governmental	 stakeholders	 in	 Kenya.	 Because	 of	 the	fragmented	and	unofficial	environment,	education	and	training	are	not	regularised,	even	less	formalised	by	institutions	of	higher	learning.	While	traditional	healers	in	China	are	formally	recognised775,	in	Kenya	they	are	not.	According	to	the	Ministry	of	Culture	(Traditional	Medicine	section),	“there	are	no	courses	or	degrees,	but	we	are	in	the	process	[of	creating	educational	opportunities]	[…]	working	on	a	formula	to	develop	a	college	with	certificate	diploma	and	degree”776.	At	Kenyatta	University,	for	 instance,	 the	 curriculum	 of	 the	 Faculty	 of	 Pharmacy	 is	 still	 based	 on	 the	Commonwealth	 curriculum.	 While	 some	 staff	 has	 been	 trained	 in	 China	 in	traditional	medicine,	to	integrate	the	knowledge	into	the	actual	teaching	is	proving	quite	difficult.	The	 legal	 framework	needs	reform,	 i.e.	 repealing	 the	1925	Act,	 for	traditional	medicine	use	and	practice	to	be	legalised	and	thus	appeal	students,	staff	and	the	general	public.		Regarding	 research,	 according	 to	 the	 Kenya	 Medical	 Research	 Institute,	Traditional	Medicine	Division,	 “there	 is	no	collaboration.	The	 Japanese	who	built	this	Institute	were	the	first	collaborators.	We	were	doing	research	for	our	products,	and	they	funded	a	lot.	The	Chinese	as	collaborators,	they	want	to	develop	their	own	products	 as	 the	 industry	 comes	 up” 777 .	 This	 is	 not	 well	 received	 and,	 as	 a	consequence,	 partnerships	 have	 not	 taken	 off.	 One	 of	 the	 challenges	 to	 these	partnerships,	 beyond	 the	 Chinese	 focus	 on	 Chinese	 product	 development,	 is	identified	in	the	secrecy	that	surrounds	the	practice	and	use	of	traditional	medicines	
                                                775	World	Bank,	'Traditional	Healer	Services',	op.	cit.	776	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Culture,	Traditional	Medicine	Department,	Nairobi,	2014-10-10.	777	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Kenya	Medical	Research	Institute	(KEMRI),	Nairobi,	2014-11-05.	
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in	both	countries.	Some	researchers	have	mentioned	that	even	during	their	visits	in	China	their	understanding	of	compositions	was	very	limited	due	to	limited	exposure	by	the	Chinese.	The	only	type	of	interaction	between	KEMRI	and	the	Chinese	revolves	around	the	provision	 of	 scholarships	 for	 students	 and	 researchers	 to	 visit	 China.	 In	 China,	training	 revolves	 around	 the	 Chinese	 experience	 rather	 than	 exploring	commonalities	across	traditional	medicine	cultures	more	broadly778.	This	applies	to	both	the	research	and	policy	environments.	According	to	the	leading	group	of	the	NPI,	in	2011	the	Chinese	Embassy	invited	them	to	attend	a	workshop	in	Beijing	for	about	a	month.	An	interviewee	reported	“They	frame	it:	we	want	to	help	you	develop	your	capacity.	That	is	appealing	to	Africa	and	even	to	us.	We	cannot	afford	primary	care	 for	 citizens”779.	 The	 training	 revolved	 around	 traditional	 Chinese	medicine,	“how	 that	now	contributes	 to	national	development,	 how	 to	 integrate	 it	 into	 the	medical	system,	their	legislative	framework,	how	they	managed	to	create	a	business	becoming	 very	 important.	 Their	 focus	 was	 to	 discuss	 how	 to	 make	 TCM	 more	acceptable	internationally,	regulations	and	safety	and	quality	control”780.		Similarly,	according	 to	 an	 interviewee	 from	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health,	 Traditional	 Medicine	Division,	“when	they	invite	African	people	to	go	to	Africa,	they	show	acupuncture	and	the	basics	of	Chinese	traditional	medicine”781.	Even	though	the	training	in	China	is	 in	Chinese	 traditional	medicine,	 according	 to	 an	 interviewee	 the	 training	 “was	useful,	it	empowered	me,	I	know	where	we	need	to	take	our	medicine,	to	which	level.	We	need	scientific	evidence”782.	In	addition	 to	 the	engagements	 in	higher	education	and	with	state	organs,	 the	relations	 between	 Kenyan	 and	 Chinese	 stakeholders	 in	 traditional	 medicine	education	and	training	also	 involve	practitioners	as	well	as	producers.	 	 In	Kenya,	despite	the	presence	of	settled	Chinese	practitioners	the	interaction	between	them	and	 Kenyan	 traditional	medicine	 practitioners	 is	 very	 limited	 due	 to	 a	 secretive	mentality	on	both	sides.	The	Ministry	of	Culture	suggests	that	on	a	 few	instances	Chinese	 practitioners	 visited	 the	 country,	 “when	 they	 come	 we	 organise	seminars/workshops,	we	can	build	 capacity.	Mostly	 the	 training	 is	 in	 the	area	of	packaging	but	 also	 for	 the	use	of	medicine”783.	Members	of	 associations,	 such	 as	
                                                778	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Pharmacy	and	Poisons	Board,	Pharmacovigilance	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-10-07.	779	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	National	Museums	of	Kenya,	2014-10-17.	780	Ibid.	781	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Traditional	Medicine	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-11-17.	782	Ibid.	783	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Culture,	Traditional	Medicine	Department,	Nairobi,	2014-10-10.	
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NATHEPA,	 and	 traditional	 medicine	 centres,	 have	 also	 travelled	 to	 China	 on	scholarships	 provided	 by	 the	 Chinese	 Embassy 784 .	 Chinese	 private	 companies	selling	traditional	medicines	in	Kenya	also	provide	training,	which	is	specific	to	the	use	of	their	products.	For	instance,	a	company	producing	herbal	products	“invited	doctors	from	Nairobi	Hospital	to	go	to	China	to	visit	the	factory,	the	plants	we	use,	the	packaging,	the	whole	process.	So	that	when	they	write	a	prescription,	they	have	a	 more	 self-confident	 approach	 to	 prescribing	 it.	 It	 is	 not	 just	 about	 smashing	plants”785.			The	training	provided	by	China	is	deemed	beneficial	by	Kenyan	actors	for	both	policy	 development	 and	 product	 development.	 There	 is,	 however,	 an	 increasing	awareness	 of	 the	 Chinese	 interests	 behind	 such	 benevolent	 actions,	 namely	 an	interest	 to	 gain	a	 foothold	 in	 the	Kenyan	market.	While	Kenyans	have	 shown	an	interest	 in	 developing	 Kenyan	 products,	 they	 are	 still	 working	 out	 a	 system	 of	governance	suitable	to	protect	such	interests.		
	
Rooted	governance,	partially	in-the-making	From	the	study,	what	emerges	is	that	the	management	of	education	and	training	for	conventional	and	traditional	medicine	differs.		Similarly	to	the	cases	presented	in	Chapter	5,	China’s	assistance	for	conventional	medicine	 encounters	 an	 articulate	 system	 of	 governance,	 populated	 by	 a	 high	number	of	governmental	and	non-governmental	actors,	domestic	and	international,	which	cooperate	with	the	Ministry	of	Health	and	the	Ministry	of	Education	in	long-term	 assistance	 projects,	 often	 coordinated	 at	 multi-lateral	 level.	 These	 make	 it	difficult	 for	 a	 new	 partner	 to	 penetrate	 the	 system,	 especially	 when	 the	 latter’s	provision	of	 assistance	 is	 independent	of	 such	 system.	China’s	 assistance,	mostly	short	term	and	often	one-off,	is	not	decisive	in	a	sectoral	context	that	is	historically	populated	by	traditional	development	partners	and	products.	The	Chinese	provision	of	medical	teams,	or	experts	in	malaria	centres,	despite	being	considered	‘flagship’	projects	by	the	Chinese	in	FOCAC	documents,	is	temporary,	it	is	not	contextualised	in	long-term	development	programs	and	does	not	speak	directly	to	Kenya’s	needs	in	healthcare	professionals’	development.	At	the	same	time,	the	fact	that	the	training	provided	by	China	is	often	considered	sub-standard	sheds	light	on	the	absence	of	
                                                784	Ibid.	785	Interview	with	an	executive	at	a	Chinese	company	manufacturing	traditional	medicines,	Nairobi,	2014-02-06.	
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Kenyan	action	to	guarantee	that	the	teaching	content	and	quality	provided	outside	the	country	is	suitable	to	Kenyan	standards	and	needs.		In	the	case	of	traditional	medicine,	the	system	of	governance	is	identified	as	fully	unsuitable	for	safeguarding	emerging	interests,	i.e.	the	development	of	traditional	medicine	policies	and	products	to	contribute	to	the	delivery	of	a	more	affordable	and	widespread	 health	 care	 provision	 system.	 Chinese-provided	 training	 is	 thus	useful	 to	 gain	 knowledge	 so	 to	 develop	 a	 more	 suitable	 system	 of	 governance.	Despite	the	Chinese	focus	on	the	Chinese	experience	and	Chinese	products,	Kenyan	actors	have	identified	the	need	to	re-adapt	the	lessons	to	the	Kenyan	system,	thus	excluding	Chinese	offers	of	research	partnerships	to	develop	Chinese	products.	In	other	 words,	 even	 though	 the	 system	 of	 governance	 is	 weak	 and	 under	 full	restructuring,	single	negotiations	are	showing	the	Kenyan	willingness	and	ability	to	use	the	Chinese	involvement	to	their	benefit.	This	case	then	suggests	the	co-existence	of	two	types	of	systems	of	governance:	one	that	is	rooted	(conventional	HRH	education)	though	it	presents	deficiencies,	and	the	other	that	is	in-the-making	(traditional	HRH	education).	In	the	case	of	traditional	medicine	education,	though	the	system	of	governance	is	still	being	structured	and	although	 the	 Chinese	 have	 attempted	 to	 act	 in	 ways	 that	 would	 benefit	 their	products’	 expansion	 in	 Kenya,	 thus	 non-conforming	 to	 the	 Kenyans’	 priority	 of	developing	 the	 Kenyan	 system,	 Kenyan	 actors	 have	 demonstrated	 an	 ability	 –	though	 still	 limited	 and,	 presumably,	 non-comprehensive	 –	 to	 bring	 back	 the	relation	 with	 China	 to	 fulfil	 Kenyan	 priorities.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 conventional	 HRH	education,	 however,	what	 is	 observed	 is	 a	 heterogeneous	 set	 of	 behaviour,	most	likely	consequential	to	the	fragmented	nature	of	the	system	of	governance.	Hence,	while	Chinese	Medical	Teams	have	not	set	 foot	 in	 the	country,	conforming	to	the	preference	 to	 train	 locals	 rather	 than	 welcoming	 foreigners,	 the	 system	 faces	 a	stalemate	when	it	comes	to	guaranteeing	that	the	training	provided	by	China	is	in	line,	in	terms	of	teaching	content	and	quality,	with	Kenyan	standards.	The	absence	of	specific	actions	to	tackle	the	problem	leads	to	believe	that	Kenyan	actors	are	more	passively	than	actively,	addressing	the	issue.				
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6.2.3 Confucius	Institutes	Confucius	Institutes	are	a	peculiar	form	of	educational	assistance	provided	by	the	Chinese	government	to	higher	education	institutions	all	over	the	world.	They	are	a	Chinese	invention	that	does	not	find	equals	in	other	development	partners’	forms	of	educational	 cooperation.	 At	 times	 compared	 to	 the	 British	 Council,	 the	 Alliance	Française,	the	Goethe	Institute	and	the	Instituto	Cervantes786,	they	differ	from	these	mainly	because	of	their	set	up	within	foreign	universities,	which	implies	a	formula	of	 cost-sharing	 as	 well	 as	 curriculum	 negotiation 787 .	 According	 to	 King,	 “as	 to	locating	 the	 Confucius	 Institute	 as	 a	 particular	 aid	 modality,	 there	 are	 clearly	problems	with	identifying	it	as	a	form	of	official	development	assistance,	as	more	than	 50	 percent	 of	 the	 support	 from	 China	 is	 going	 to	 Confucius	 Institutes	 and	Confucius	Classrooms	in	so-called	developed	countries”788.	They	have	received	much	more	attention	by	the	media	and	academia	than	any	other	form	of	educational	cooperation	and	assistance	by	China	in	the	past	few	years.	This	 is	 mainly	 because	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 Chinese	 government,	 and	 the	 –	debatable	–	use	of	Confucius	Institutes	as	official	tools	of	soft	power,	may	impact	freedom	of	expression	in	host	universities789.	This	applies	to	CIs	worldwide	though	Africa	has	been	targeted	as	a	particular	context	 for	 the	projection	of	 this	 form	of	Chinese	 soft	 power790.	 The	 expansion	 of	 CIs	 in	 Africa	 is	 often	 considered	more	peculiar	than	in	other	regions	due	to	the	absence	of	Chinese	language	centres	prior	to	the	establishment	of	CIs791	and	due	to	the	arguably	enhanced	power	asymmetry	between	any	given	African	country	and	China792.		For	Kenya,	the	hosting	of	CIs	must	be	contextualised	in	a	broader	environment	of	rapid	internationalisation	of	higher	education.	Though	foreign	language	teaching	is	not	 identified	 as	 a	 primary	 need	 in	most	 policy	 documents,	 the	 development	 of	policy	 and	 practice	 of	 tertiary	 education,	 thus	 including	 language	 learning,	 has	become	fundamental	to	the	country	as	a	consequence	of	an	increment	of	students’	enrollment	since	the	early	2010s.	The	 first	Confucius	 Institute	 in	Kenya	(also	the	
                                                786	See	F.Hartig,	‘Confucius	Institutes	and	the	Rise	of	China’,	Journal	of	Chinese	Political	Science,	vol.17,	2012,	p.57.		787	King,	2010,	op.cit.		788	King,	2014,	op.	cit.,	p.	8.	789	For	debates	around	the	issue	of	‘soft	power’	in	relation	to	Confucius	Institutes	see:	King,	2013,	op.cit.,	pp.173-175;	Hartig,	2012,	op.cit.;	Guo,	2008,	op.cit.;	S.	Ding,	The	Dragon’s	Hidden	Wings:	How	China	Rises	with	Its	Soft	Power,	Lexington	Books,	New	York,	2008;	F.	Hartig,	‘Soft	Power	Push	or	Conspiracy:	A	Case	Study	of	Confucius	Institutes	in	Germany’,	Asian	Studies	Association	of	Australia,	18th	Biennial	Conference,	Adelaide,	Australia,	5-8	July	2010;	R.S.	Zaharna,	J.	Hubbert	and	F.	Hartig,	‘Confucius	Institutes	and	the	Globalisation	of	China’s	Soft	Power’,	Figueroa	Press,	Los	Angeles,	2014.	790	See	Procopio,	op.cit.		791	F.	Hartig,	‘The	Globalisation	of	Chinese	Soft	Power:	Confucius	Institutes	in	South	Africa’,	in	Zaharna,	Hubbert	and	Hartig,	2014,	op.cit,	pp.53-54.		792	Procopio,	op.	cit.,	p.	101;	see	also	King,	2013,	op.	cit.	for	an	account	of	the	relations	between	hard	and	soft	power.		
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first	in	Africa)	was	set	up	at	the	University	of	Nairobi	in	2005.	It	was	followed	by	the	CI	 at	 Kenyatta	 University	 established	 in	 2008,	 and	 the	 CI	 at	 Egerton	 University	launched	in	2013.	A	fourth	CI	was	established	in	early	2015	at	Moi	University	but	the	timing	falls	beyond	the	timeframe	of	this	thesis	and	the	analysis	below	does	not	thus	include	it.	It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	the	institutions	hosting	the	three	Confucius	Institutes	under	study	present	very	different	environments.	Modalities	of	action	 within	 the	 university,	 the	 interaction	 with	 Chinese	 stakeholders,	 the	integration	 of	 the	 CI	 to	 the	 local	 teaching	 system	 all	 differ	 significantly.	 This	 is	seemingly	due	to	the	type	of	institution	and	the	degree	to	which	the	teaching	of	a	foreign	language	such	as	Chinese	is	contextualised,	but	also	to	the	Chinese	interests	in	setting	up	links	with	that	specific	institution.		While	Chinese	motivations	and	modalities	of	action	behind	the	establishment	of	CIs	have	been	studied	at	length,	they	are	only	briefly	touched	upon	in	this	analysis,	which	rather	focuses	on	the	Kenyan	motivations	and	modalities	of	engagement.				
Foreign	language	and	culture	teaching	in	the	2000s	In	 a	 context	 of	 increasingly	 high	 enrolment	 rates	 in	 universities	 and	 higher	education	 institutions,	 foreign	 languages	 in	 Kenya	 are	 seen	 as	 “tools	 of	 global	commerce	 and	 thus	 of	 growing	 importance	 to	 the	 country	 and	 to	 university	graduates” 793 .	 The	 internationalisation	 of	 higher	 education	 through	 the	collaboration	between	local	and	foreign	institutions	is	seen	as	a	mechanism	used	to	improve	 access 794 .	 Universities	 –	 especially	 leading	 ones	 such	 as	 Nairobi,	 Moi,	Kenyatta	–	are	increasingly	under	pressure	to	“offer	courses	that	are	in	tandem	with	market	needs”,	so	to	“expand	their	student	registers”795.	China	is	then	only	one	of	the	various	countries	that	are	attempting	to	gain	a	share	of	the	students’	population.	Languages	 such	 as	 French	 and	 German,	 but	 also	 Arabic,	 are	 becoming	 more	important	 in	 a	 context	 of	 rapid	 regional	 integration	 and	 expansion.	 French,	 for	instance,	 is	 deemed	 by	 investors	 a	 key	 language	 to	 support	 expanding	 Kenyan	interests	“in	Rwanda	and	Burundi	–	two	French-speaking	countries	seen	as	growth	frontiers	by	Kenyan	companies	keen	to	expand	their	business	horizons	beyond	the	national	borders”796.	Arabic	“is	also	gaining	ground	as	more	Kenyans	head	to	Dubai	
                                                793	G.	Nganga,	‘Kenya:	Cashing	in	on	foreign	language	learning’,	University	World	News,	4	July	2010.	794	D.	Alusa	‘Internationalization	of	Higher	Education: The	Case	of	Kenya’,	United	States	International	University-Africa,	Nairobi,	2015.	795	Nganga,	op.	cit.		796	Ibid.	
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and	 Saudi	 Arabia	 to	 work,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 Sudan	 for	 emerging	 business	opportunities”797.		While	the	teaching	of	 languages	such	as	French,	German,	Arabic,	 is	historically	rooted	in	Kenya,	the	teaching	of	Mandarin	is	much	more	recent.	While	the	former	are	 generally	 fully	 integrated	 within	 university	 systems,	 the	 latter	 is	 provided	through	Confucius	Institutes	that	are	jointly	managed	by	the	local	university	and	a	partner	university	in	China.	Because	of	this	modality	of	engagement,	the	teaching	of	Mandarin	resembles	more	an	academic	partnership	than	a	local	university	initiative.	This	 has	 consequences	 for	 the	 management	 of	 the	 teaching.	 In	 fact,	 while	 the	teaching	of	languages	integrated	within	any	specific	university	system	is	subjected	to	the	rules	that	ensure	quality	assurance	at	that	particular	institution,	the	teaching	of	Mandarin	 is	subjected	to	the	rules	of	 the	Hanban	(the	Chinese	body	under	the	Ministry	of	Education	regulating	the	teaching	of	Chinese	language	overseas),	which	also	provides	funds	to	the	CIs	for	their	set	up	and	running.	Despite	the	increasing	importance	 of	 higher	 education	 development,	 according	 to	 Alusa	 “there	 is	 no	specialized	agent	for	accreditation	of	collaboration	activities	in	higher	education	in	Kenya”798.	This	is	confirmed	by	interviews	conducted	with	a	relevant	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Education,	Higher	Education	Department799.	The	absence	of	a	proper	system	of	governance	leaves	space	for	interpretation	by	both	domestic	and	foreign	actors.			
Confucius	Institute,	a	‘response-mode’	assistance?		Even	 though	 Confucius	 Institutes	 are	 labelled	 as	 ‘demand-driven’	 forms	 of	assistance,	 the	 cases	 in	 Kenya	 do	 not	 readily	 support	 the	 statement.	 The	 only	university	in	Kenya	that	had	previous	links	with	Chinese	universities	before	the	set-up,	 in	 2005,	 of	 the	 first	 Confucius	 Institute,	 was	 Egerton	 University.	 Egerton	University	started	a	partnership	with	Nanjing	Agricultural	University	in	1997.	From	1998	 to	 2003	 the	 university	 received	 volunteer	 Chinese	 teachers	 teaching	 the	language.	 Importantly,	 the	 university	 also	 established	 research	 links	 with	 the	Chinese	 counterpart	 and	 trained	 students	 in	 agro-production.	 Then,	 in	 2012,	according	 to	 a	 source	 from	 the	 University,	 “we	 decided	 to	 do	 an	 administrative	change	and	set	up	a	Confucius	Institute.	The	main	drive	for	this	was	to	improve	our	
                                                797	Ibid.	798	Alusa,	op.	cit.				799	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Education,	Higher	Education	Division,	Nairobi,	2014-11-19.	
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own	 research	 environment	 and	 students’	 training.	 Many	 of	 us	 are	 increasingly	studying	in	China”800.		Apart	from	the	case	of	Egerton	University,	in	all	other	cases,	the	decision	to	set	up	 the	 institutes	was	 not	 driven	 by	 students	 or	 staff	 demand	 but	was	 rather	 an	executive	strategy.	This	strategy	was	formulated,	first	and	foremost,	by	the	Chinese.		A	Chinese	CI	executive	stated	that	Kenya	was	chosen	to	set	up	the	first	CI	in	Africa.	He	continued:	“The	reason	why	Kenya	was	chosen	as	the	first	location	to	set	up	an	Institute	is,	to	my	advice,	the	fact	that	Kenya	is	in	a	good	geographic	position,	it	is	a	smooth	country,	with	no	much	problem	and	that	developed	well.	UON	is	also	the	best	University	 in	East	Africa.	And	Nairobi	provides	a	good	context,	with	 the	UN	offices,	 etc.”801 .	 On	 the	 other	 side,	 Kenyan	 CI	 executives	 stated	 that	 the	 idea	 of	introducing	the	Chinese	language	was	not	like	for	other	languages	where	there	was	integration	in	one	department.	In	the	case	of	the	Chinese	language,	“there	was	the	need	to	cater	for	one	institute”802.	Similarly,	with	the	students,	the	use	of	tactics	by	the	Confucius	Institute	to	attract	them	leads	Kenyan	interviewees	to	believe	that	the	interest	in	learning	the	language	is	more	rooted	in	the	financial	support	received	than	in	the	Chinese	language	and	culture.	At	the	launch	of	one	of	the	institutes,	the	students	of	the	CI	were	paid	to	be	the	audience.	The	event	had	to	be	attended	by	Chinese	high-level	political	figures,	on	a	visit	 from	China.	Similarly,	 in	another	 institution,	 the	students	are	provided	with	fee	waivers	to	study	Chinese	if	they	are	good	at	singing	and	willing	to	join	the	CI	 choir,	which	 is	 an	 important	 instrument	 for	CIs	 to	 show	 the	 cultural	 embrace	between	China	and	Kenya,	at	international	and	political	events.		A	 Kenyan	 administrator	 at	 a	 Confucius	 Institute	 also	 suggests	 that	 students	largely	learn	the	language	not	because	of	pure	interest	in	it	or	Chinese	culture,	but	because	through	the	Institute	they	have	an	opportunity,	to	travel,	to	experience.	The	fact	that	the	Institute	provides	scholarships	to	travel	to	China	“is	a	big	chance	for	students	here.	 If	 you	promise	 to	 take	 students	abroad,	 it	helps	attract	 them.	The	Chinese	also	host	many	events,	 competitions,	 students’	 activities	–	 and	 they	give	students	incentives	to	participate,	including	financial	incentives”803.	Similarly	with	teachers,	a	Chinese	executive	suggests	that	“if	we	offer	the	course	they	come,	if	we	
                                                800	Interview	with	a	Kenyan	executive	at	a	Confucius	Institute,	2013-11-22.	801	Interview	with	a	Chinese	executive	at	a	Confucius	Institute,	2013-10-03.	802	Interview	with	Kenyan	and	Chinese	executives	at	a	Confucius	Institute,	2014-11-14.	803	Interview	with	a	Kenyan	executive	at	a	Confucius	Institute,	2013-10-31.	
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do	 not	 offer	 it	 they	 do	 not	 come”804,	 emphasising	 the	 importance	 that	 financial	aspects	play	in	the	relations.		While	these	cases	do	not	aim	at	concluding	that	in	Kenya	there	is	no	interest	in	learning	the	Chinese	 language	and	culture	–	or	that	 if	 it	were	not	 for	the	Chinese	strategies	 to	recruit	students,	no	one	would	study	Chinese	–	 they	do	nonetheless	suggest	 that	 the	Chinese	 interest	 in	 the	existence	of	 the	 Institutes	 is	more	than	a	mere	 ‘response’.	 On	 the	 Kenyan	 side,	 however,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 understand	whether	financial	assistance	is	filtered	and	conditionally	accepted,	i.e.	based	on	the	universities’	quality	standards,	or	is	rather	undiscerningly	received.			
Administrative	vs.	Academic	autonomy	The	 fact	 that	Confucius	 Institutes	are	used	as	Chinese	 foreign	policy	 tools	has	triggered	criticism	around	the	world	concerning	the	degree	of	academic	autonomy	foreign	institutions	could	maintain	over	the	teaching	of	the	Chinese	language	and	culture.	The	issue	concerns	the	amount	of	control	that	the	host	university	can	exert	over,	mainly,	 teaching	 content	 and	 human	 resource	management.	 This	 ability	 to	control	 the	 relations	 must	 be	 contextualised	 in	 a	 relationship	 where	 economic	asymmetry	 is	significant.	For	 instance,	 the	Chinese	Hanban	has	provided	 funding	not	 only	 for	 the	 set-up	 of	 the	 Institute,	 the	 Director,	 teachers,	 textbooks	 and	activities	linked	to	the	Institute	but,	in	some	cases,	it	has	also	linked	the	Confucius	Institute	to	other	deals,	such	as	the	provision	of	infrastructure	to	the	university,	i.e.	equipment	and	construction	of	classrooms.	A	Kenyan	interviewee	commented:			 the	facilities	[at	the	Confucius	Institute]	are	so	different,	so	good.	If	you	enter	a	Chinese	class,	it’s	not	Kenya.	Equipment	is	from	China,	computers	are	available,	whatever	material	is	always	available,	there’s	no	risk	for	students	to	run	out	of	textbooks,	whatever	the	level.	The	reading	material	is	given	for	free,	sometimes	also	writing	pens.	There	was	a	time	in	which	we	entered	a	class,	there	were	about	300	students,	they	all	had	a	special	pen	for	reading	the	pronunciation.	They	are	very	strategic;	they	put	in	a	lot	of	investment805.		
                                                804	Interview	with	a	Chinese	executive	at	a	Confucius	Institute,	2013-10-03.	805	Interview	with	a	Kenyan	executive	at	a	Confucius	Institute,	2013-10-31.	
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The	 Chinese	 contribution,	 in	 a	 context	 like	 that	 of	 Kenyan	 universities	where	funds	are	hard	to	gather,	does	seem	to	make	a	difference.	The	Chinese	provision	of	significant	 funds	 is	 a	 sign	 of	 the	 Confucius	 Institutes’	 high	 importance	 for	 the	Chinese	government.	Because	of	this,	Kenyan	stakeholders	expressed	the	idea	that	sometimes	they	felt	they	had	lost	control806.	A	Kenyan	interviewee	from	one	of	the	Institutes	 suggests	 that	 “they	 [the	Chinese]	are	powerful	beyond	 the	department	and	university.	For	instance,	if	there	is	a	complaint	about	a	member	of	staff,	it	is	a	question	 that	 should	 be	 dealt	with	 at	 the	 Faculty	 level.	 But	 instead,	 the	 Chinese	Embassy	goes	to	the	Vice-Chancellor	although	the	Vice-Chancellor	does	not	know	anything	about	 the	 issue”807.	 In	other	words,	 the	Chinese	bypass	 the	governance	systems	and	are	supported	from	the	inside	of	the	university	system	by	a	figure	that	is	highly	political:	the	Vice-Chancellor.	This	permissiveness	is	also	consequential	to	a	lack	of	control	at	the	governmental	level,	where	the	Ministry	of	Education	is	fully	unresponsive.		These	relations	have	 led	 to	questioning	 the	extent	 to	which	Kenyans	maintain	freedom	 in	 choosing	 the	 teaching	 content	 and	 modalities.	 The	 main	 problem	identified	is	that	of	who	decides	the	curriculum	and	how	quality	is	ensured.	In	all	the	cases,	 the	curriculum	development	 is	mediated	by	the	host	university.	 In	one	case,	representative	of	the	others,	a	Kenyan	CI	executive	mentioned	that	“they	[the	Chinese	at	the	CI]	develop	the	programme	but	here	at	the	university	people	have	a	lot	of	say.	The	programme	goes	through	the	Department,	 the	Faculty,	 the	College	and	Senate.	We	argued	that	a	big	part	should	be	language.	Then	the	programme	was	moderated”808.		However,	although	the	universities,	through	the	structures	in	place	to	guarantee	quality,	attempt	to	exert	control,	Kenyan	interviewees	suggested	that	it	is	not	easy	to	do	so.	This	is	linked	to	the	issue	of	human	resources:	most	human	resources,	from	the	director	to	teachers,	are	dependent	upon,	and	selected	by,	the	Hanban.	Similarly,	the	exam	that	students	are	asked	to	take	to	evaluate	their	progress	(HSK)	 is	also	administered	by	the	Hanban.	Consequently,	when	it	comes	to	testing	the	quality	of	teaching,	 there	 is	 no	 independent	 assessor.	 Only	 recently	 Kenyan	 graduates	 in	Chinese	are	starting	to	go	back	to	Kenya	to	teach.	This	is	perceived	to	be	the	main	avenue	 to	 increase	 transparency	 of	 the	 teaching	 content	 and	 quality,	 and	
                                                806	Ibid.	807	Ibid.	808	Ibid.	
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sustainability	of	the	project.	Confucius	Institutes	in	Kenya	are,	in	fact,	fully	reliant	on	 the	Hanban	with	 no	 intent,	 to	 date,	 to	move	 toward	 a	 sustainable	 version	 of	Chinese	language	teaching,	i.e.	funding	independent	courses.			
Passive	governance	and	non-conformity	This	 is	 a	 case	 where	 the	 system	 of	 governance	 is	 very	 weak.	 The	 interests	emerging	 in	 the	 cooperation	 with	 China	 (i.e.	 language	 teaching/learning)	 are	relatively	 new,	 and	 there	 has	 not	 been	 a	 full	 acknowledgement,	 yet,	 by	 Kenyan	actors,	 of	 the	 significance	 this	 carries	 for	 the	 country.	 While	 this	 applies	 to	 all	languages,	not	only	Mandarin,	the	case	of	Confucius	Institutes	is	peculiar	given	its	presence	 directly	 inside	 foreign	 institutions.	 The	 existing	 regulatory	 framework	does	not	specifically	regulate	the	presence	of	foreign	organisations	within	Kenyan	educational	institutions.	Although	the	structures	to	ensure	quality	assurance	within	universities	are	used	to	filter	this	Chinese	form	of	educational	assistance,	the	same	structures	 were	 also	 bypassed	 –	 at	 the	 moment	 of	 setup	 and	 later	 in	 specific	circumstances	 –	 to	 serve	 higher	 political	 aims.	 For	 the	 Chinese,	 these	 aims	concerned	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Institutes	 as	 tools	 from	which	 to	 launch	 soft	power	initiatives,	while	for	Kenyans	the	‘higher’	aims	included	the	receipt	of	funds.	In	 fact,	 the	 significant	 deployment	 of	 Chinese	 financial	 and	 human	 resources,	consequential	to	the	Chinese	state	interests	in	using	Confucius	Institutes	as	tools	of	soft	 power,	 exacerbates	 a	 dynamic	 of	 dependence	 upon	 foreign	 resources.	 The	justification	behind	the	reliance	upon	dependence	seems	to	be	that	the	provision	of	Chinese	 language	 teaching	 for	 free	 is	more	 important	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	country	 than	 the	 safeguard	 of	 academic	 independence	 (from	 the	 Chinese	government)	and	the	strict	control	of	the	quality	of	education.		Similar	to	the	case	of	conventional	HRH,	the	absence	of	specific	actions	to	tackle	the	 problem	 of	 quality	 assurance	 leads	 to	 believe	 that	 Kenyan	 actors	 are	 more	passively	than	actively,	addressing	the	issue,	though	somehow	consciously	doing	so	to	perpetuate	financial	dependence.				
6.3 Sectoral	dynamics		 As	 introduced	 above,	 the	 interaction	 between	 Kenyan	 stakeholders	 in	 the	education	sector	vis-à-vis	China	mainly	revolves	around	inserting	a	new	player	in	a	
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scenario	 well	 populated	 by	 long-present	 development	 partners.	 This	 implies	learning	about	the	way	to	match	domestic	needs	with	Chinese	offers	of	educational	cooperation	 and	 assistance,	 learning	 about	 different	 values,	 such	 as	 production	versus	rights,	and	understanding	how	and	if	these	novelties	find	space	in	Kenyan	contexts.	 Importantly,	 the	way	ownership	 is	understood	and	exercised	cannot	be	separated	from	the	interests	of	Chinese	stakeholders	and	their	capacity	to	achieve	objectives.	For	instance,	Confucius	Institutes	are	an	established	and	comprehensive	policy	initiative,	with	financial	and	diplomatic	capacity,	whereas	in	the	case	of	TVET,	the	Chinese	initiative	is	not	as	highly	regulated,	the	actor	is	one	and	the	resources	available,	though	significant,	are	more	limited	than	those	for	CIs.	These	resources	are,	 in	 fact,	 dependent	 on	 a	 private	 company’s	 willingness	 to	 expand	 its	 CSR	portfolio	–	and	bring	production	to	Africa	–	rather	than	on	the	government’s	funds	and	willingness	to	achieve	visibility	for	soft	power	aims.		The	system	of	TVET,	highly	controlled	and	regulated	by	the	Ministry	and	higher	education	institutions,	has	promptly	engaged	the	Chinese	and	is	aiming	to	develop	an	 inclusive	governance	approach.	 In	 the	case	of	human	resources	 for	health	 the	relations	with	China	are	of	 two	kinds:	1)	 the	engagement	 in	conventional	HRH	is	characterised	by	extremely	limited	and	circumscribed	relations,	mainly	short-term	training,	 which	 is	 arguably	 providing	 only	 limited	 benefits	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	teaching	 content	 and	 quality	 does	 not	 align	 with	 Kenyan	 standards;	 2)	 the	engagement	 in	 traditional	HRH	 is	 instead	characterised	by	 relations	 that	 revolve	around	 knowledge-transfer	 for	 the	 re-structuring	 of	 the	 system	 of	 governance.	While	the	first	case	shows	conformity	to	the	existing	system	of	governance,	a	partial	acknowledgement	of	its	deficiencies	but	no	action	to	tackle	them,	the	second	case	shows	that,	despite	the	fact	that	the	system	of	governance	is	weak	and	under	full	restructuring,	single	negotiations	are	showing	the	Kenyan	willingness	and	ability	to	use	the	Chinese	involvement	to	their	benefit.	Similarly	 to	 the	 case	 of	 conventional	 HRH,	 the	 case	 of	 Confucius	 Institutes	presents	a	type	of	Kenyan	ownership	that	is	extremely	limited.	However,	while	the	former	conforms	to	a	system	of	governance	that	despite	being	rooted	is	significantly	fragmented	reducing	the	ability	to	judge	the	suitability	of	the	Chinese	engagement	to	 Kenyan	 needs,	 the	 latter	 bypasses	 known	 tables	 of	 negotiation	 –	 through	 the	direct	links	established	between	the	Chinese	Embassy	and	the	higher	ranks	of	the	Universities	–	with	no	particular	action	taken	to	transform	the	system.		
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Finally,	 in	 the	 cases	of	TVET	and	 traditional	HRH,	 the	 involved	Kenyan	actors	highly	 valued	 legal	 and	 institutional	 frameworks,	 feeling	 protected	 by	 their	existence.	 Even	 in	 cases	 where	 these	 frameworks	 were	 not	 adequate	 and	 thus	needed	restructuring,	the	first	step	of	the	change	process	was	that	to	identify	how	the	frameworks	could	be	improved.	However,	in	the	case	of	Confucius	Institutes,	and	partially	 in	 the	 case	of	 conventional	HRH,	 the	 legal	 and	 institutional	 frameworks	seem	to	be	virtually	meaningless.	In	the	first	case,	this	is	due	to	the	convenience	of	depending	on	foreign	resources	without	constraints,	in	the	second	case	instead,	it	is	a	more	nuanced	type	of	disregard	of	the	system,	mainly	consequential	to	its	very	fragmented	and	disorganised	nature.																									
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Table	3:	Sectoral	comparison	of	interests,	actors,	and	arenas/tables	of	governance	-	Education		 		 Technical	and	Vocational	Education	and	Training	 Human	resources	for	healthcare	 Confucius	Institutes	
Interests	
Type	of	relation	 Commercial-aid(CSR)	 Aid	(with	some	commercial	returns)	 Aid		
Issue	at	stake	
Lack	of	Kenyan	skilled	workforce	for	the	industries,	with	the	Chinese,	arguably,	taking	over	the	jobs	and	training	Kenyans	only	for	specific	purposes.	Need	to	develop	the	sector	comprehensively	and	strategically.		
Lack	of	health	professionals,	with	China	pledging	to	provide	help	to	overcome	the	problem	as	part	of	its	south-south	cooperation,	but	focusing	on	African	commitments	rather	than	Kenyan	specific	needs.		
Regulating	the	operations	of	the	Confucius	Institutes	within	universities,	and	language	teaching	
Kenyans'	issue-
specific	interests	
Use	Chinese	company	to	achieve	domestic	development	plan,	i.e.	training	and	development	of	technical	experts	able	to	actively	engage	with	the	construction	boom	and	other	emerging	sectors.		
Use	Chinese	aid	to	achieve	domestic	development	plan,	i.e.	training	of	human	resources	for	health,	necessary	to	guarantee	proper	health	care	delivery	and	thus	a	healthy	population	able	to	work.	Learn	from	the	Chinese	for	traditional	medicine	training.	
Use	Chinese	aid	to	develop	language	courses	and	links	with	China.		
Overall	objective	
toward	China	 Engaging	China	as	a	partner	in	development		 Fitting	China	in	(conventional),	engaging	China	as	a	partner	in	development		(traditional)	 Fitting	China	in		
Actors	
Initiator		 Ministry	of	Education	–	TVET	(small	office)	 Ministry	of	Health	-	Human	Resources	office,	Ministry	of	Culture	 Universities	(Nairobi,	Kenyatta,	Moi,	Egerton)	
Other	domestic	
actors	 Educational	institutions,	Private	sector	associations	 Ministry	of	Education,	NATHEPA	 Ministry	of	Education	
Resources	
Kenyan	human	resources	crucial	to	alter	the	system	of	governance	to	safeguard	Kenyan	interests:	increased	relations	between	schools	and	factories	to	improve	the	industrialization	process	
		
Asymmetry	in	financial	and	human	resources	seems	to	not	provide	guarantees	for	the	safeguarding	of	academic	independence	
Arenas	and	
tables	of	
negotiation	
ARENA	'the	
problem'	
contextualized	in	
the	Kenyan	
domestic	context	(historical	legacies	and	current	policy	preferences)		
IN-THE-MAKING:	New	significant	policy-area,	whose	relevance	is	triggered	by	increased	industrialization	and	recognition	of	secondary	education	as	crucial	for	the	country's	growth.	Recent	institutionalization	(2014),	previously	not	significant.	
ROOTED	>	Conventional:	significant	lack	of	HRH,	reliance	on	external	actors.	Fragmented	system	of	governance,	lack	of	coordination	at	domestic	level.	IN-THE-MAKING	>	Traditional:	weak	institutional	environment,	education	and	training	is	not	regularized,	nor	formalized	by	higher	education	institutions	
NON-EXISTING:	Recent		internationalization	of	higher	education	to	fulfil	increasing	demand	and	market	needs.	Weak	system	of	governance	to	regulate	internationalization	and	even	more	lack	of	a	specific	system	of	governance	to	regulate	the	presence	of	a	foreign	institution	within	local	universities.	
Mobilization	
framework	
New	framework	of	engagement	spearheaded	by	Africa	Tech	Challenge	(Ministry	of	Education).	Still	weak	link	between	framework	and	implementation,	but	Kenyan	ownership	maintained.	
Weak	framework	to	negotiate	bilaterally,	heavy	reliance	on	multilateral	institutions	
Weak	framework	that	allows	financial	assistance	to	be	undiscerningly	received	by	the	Cis,	with	the	tacit	consent	of	university	management	(at	times)	and	unresponsive	behaviour	by	the	Ministry	of	Education	
Mode	of	addressing	
the	issue	with	the	
Chinese	 Pro-active	 Passive	(conventional),	pro-active	(traditional)	 Passive	
Table	of	
negotiation	 Conformity	 Conformity	(conventional)	+	light	alteration	(traditional)	 Non	conformity	Source:	Author’s	findings	
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CHAPTER	7 	
Negotiating	Governance:	Contestation,	Cooperation	and	
Passivity			
7.1 Overview	This	Chapter	 looks	at	 the	 findings	presented	 in	Chapters	4,	5	and	6	discussing	them	in	relation	to	the	conceptualization	of	agency	presented	in	Chapter	2.	In	the	previous	 chapters,	 the	 author	 has	 scrutinised	 governance	 in	 the	 sub-national	sectoral	 settings	where	 it	most	 often	 occurs809.	 This	 approach	has	helped	 reveal	“previously	 unexamined	 sources	 of	 agency” 810 	in	 Sino-African	 relations.	 These	sources	have	raised	issues	concerning	the	role	of	individuals,	their	belief	systems,	the	 systems	of	governance	 including	 institutions	and	norms,	and	 finally,	 the	way	preferences	 are	 safeguarded.	 Through	 the	 comparative	 study	 of	 the	 interplay	between	interests	and	arenas,	this	chapter	attempts	to	identify	trends	in	behaviour,	the	implicit	and	explicit	negotiating	strategies	that	Kenyan	actors	adopt811	and	the	way	they	guarantee	the	safeguard	of	their	interests.		However,	before	moving	 to	 the	analysis,	 it	 is	 important	 to	remember	 that	 this	study	is	about	real	governance,	which	according	to	Olivier	de	Sardan	“is	composed	of	multiple	 dimensions,	 some	 convergent	 and	others	 contradictory;	 it	 is	 also	 the	product	of	local,	sectoral	and	individual	microdynamics;	and	lastly,	it	faces	on	every	front	 a	 pluralism	 of	 forms	 of	 action”812.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	empirical	 work	 highlighted	 two	 challenges	 for	 the	 identification	 of	 patterns:	 the	diversity	 of	 organisational	 architectures	 across	 sectors	 and	 sub-sectors	 and	 the	changing	nature	of	such	architectures.	Recalling	Habeeb813,	this	thesis	suggests	that	the	factors	that	contribute	to	Kenya’s	control	of	the	relations	with	China	should	not	be	 identified	 in	 the	 state’s	 aggregate	 power,	 or	 the	 sum	of	 state’s	 resources,	 but	rather	in	the	context	and	the	structure	of	the	specific	negotiations.	In	a	country	that	has	undergone,	in	the	past	twelve	years,	incredible	changes	in	governance,	first	with	the	opening	up,	albeit	in	a	controlled	fashion,	to	multi-party	democracy,	and	then	
                                                809	Sellers,	op.	cit.,	p.	135.	810	Ibid.		811	Whitfield	and	Fraser,	op.	cit.,	p.342.	812	Olivier	de	Sardan,	op.	cit.,	p.4.	813	Habeeb,	op.cit.		
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with	a	major	constitutional	reform	in	2010,	domestic	governance	is	entirely	in	flux.	This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 country	 is	 totally	 destabilised,	 but	 rather	 that	 the	constitutional	changes	required	a	dynamic	updating	of	bureaucratic	structures,	thus	putting	 the	 country	 in	 a	 transition	 era.	 This	 transition	 occurs	 at	 varying	 speed	depending	on	 the	 actors’	 ability	 and	willingness	 to	 respond	 to	 constitutionalism.	Underlying	this	is	the	acknowledgement	that	Kenya	as	a	country	has	changed	since	the	 early	 2000s,	 the	 economy	 “no	 longer	 relies	 on	 the	 state;	 the	 multi-party	democracy	is	here	to	stay	and	presidential	demands	provoke	as	much	resistance	as	obedience”814.	As	Alden	and	Ammon	highlight	in	their	work	on	FPA,	the	focus	“on	the	foreign	policy	process	as	opposed	to	foreign	policy	outcomes,	is	predicated	on	the	belief	that	closer	scrutiny	of	 the	actors,	 their	motivations,	 the	structures	of	decision	making	and	the	broader	context	within	which	foreign	policy	choices	are	formulated	would	provide	 greater	 analytical	 purchase”815.	 The	 previous	 chapters	 aimed	 to	 unpack	exactly	these	processes	by	defining	the	actors	involved,	their	motivations	to	engage	with	 China	 individually	 or	 to	 seek	 collaboration	with	 other	 domestic	 actors,	 the	structures	of	decision	making	in	different	sectors	that	have	limited	or	facilitated	the	interests	to	be	fulfilled	and	so	on.	Although	the	ultimate	outcomes	of	these	processes	may	all	seem	similar,	namely	that	Kenyan	actors,	more	often	than	not,	act	to	assert	ownership	(though	to	different	degrees),	studying	the	processes	allows	to	ascertain	that	 there	 is	 not	 one	 single	 way	 of	 negotiating	 governance.	 This	 is	 particularly	important	in	a	study	of	relations	with	external	actors.	Knowledge	of	the	governance	systems	within	which	 external	 actors	 attempt	 to	 insert	 themselves	 in	 pursuit	 of	their	interests	seems	more	important,	from	the	analysis	of	the	previous	chapters,	than	China	has	accounted	 for,	especially	 in	 the	 initial	phases	of	 its	 relations	with	Kenya.		In	 the	 sections	 below	 a	 comparison	 of	 the	 interests	 involved	 in	 Kenya-China	relations	is	presented,	of	whether	the	systems	of	governance	have	been	considered	suitable	to	guarantee	the	safeguard	of	such	interests	and	finally	the	strategies	used	to	 either	 bring	 the	 relations	 with	 China	 within	 existing	 systems	 or	 to	 alter	 the	systems	in	order	to	make	them	better	suited	to	safeguard	the	specific	interests	that	emerged	in	the	relations	with	China.	In	the	analysis	that	follows	what	is	emphasised	
                                                814	Hornsby,	op.	cit.,	p.	7.	815	Alden	&	Ammon,	op.	cit.,	p.	1.	
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is	the	diversity	of	approaches,	more	than	the	variety	of	outcomes	which,	as	noted	above,	generally	resulted	in	Kenyan	actors	asserting	ownership.		
7.2 Actors	As	introduced	in	Chapter	1,	 the	willingness	 to	exert	control	 in	the	negotiations	with	China,	in	other	words,	the	motivation	to	do	so,	is	strictly	related	to	the	interests	that	any	given	actor	perceives	to	be	affected	in	its	relations	with	China.	Actors	are	not,	however,	a	mere	concentrate	of	 interests,	as	they	are	first	constituted	by	the	ideas	 and	 memories	 of	 the	 communities	 from	 which	 they	 emerge 816 	(Wight’s	agency2,	comes	before	agency1	and	agency3817)	and	the	resources	available	to	them,	generally	depending	upon	the	position	they	occupy	in	society.	The	sections	below	comparatively	discuss	the	repertoires	and	the	resources	that	contribute	to	shaping	the	interests	that	are	found	behind	Kenyans’	actions	toward	the	Chinese.	Before	moving	 to	 the	analysis,	a	specification	 is	necessary.	The	previous	 three	chapters	have	shown	that	the	types	of	actors	engaged	in	negotiating	Kenya-China	relations	 are	 quite	 diverse.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 belief	 that	 only	 state	 actors,	 such	 as	government	officials,	define	the	relations,	they	are	also	forged	by	a	number	of	agents	that	are	not	part	of	the	politico-administrative	structure.	There	are	those	that	have	arguably	 turned	 to	 China	 for	 personal	 and	 business	 reasons.	 And	 there	 is	 also	 a	wider	 range	 of	 actors,	 from	 upper	 to	 lower	 level	 bureaucrats,	 professional	associations,	 trade	unions,	private	sector	representatives,	 informal	sector	 leaders	and	so	forth,	that	have	experienced	China	due	to	the	role	they	cover	in	society	rather	than	for	direct	personal	interests.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	literature818	tends	to	put	forward	an	idea	of	Sino-African	relations	 as	 broadly	 divided	 between	 an	 elite	 understanding	 of	 the	 relations	 as	positive,	 and	 the	 wider	 masses’	 understanding	 as	 negative,	 presumably	consequential	 to	 the	 degree	 of	 interests’	 fulfilment,	 the	 cases	 presented	 in	 the	previous	three	chapters	do	not	readily	confirm	this.	Rather	than	focusing	exclusively	on	this	functional	distinction	(agency3,	namely	the	role	occupied	in	society,	i.e.	the	agent’s	function),	to	better	understand	agents’	behaviour,	one	needs	to	turn	to	“the	competing	repertoires	that	[agents]	mobilise	in	their	interactions”819,	and	then	to	the	
                                                816	Whitfield	and	Fraser,	op.	cit.,	p.	344.	817	Wight,	op.	cit.		818	see	Alden	and	Park,	op.cit.			819	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	547.	
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“resources	that	individuals	and	organised	interest	groups	have	at	their	disposal”820.	In	other	words,	the	first	step	to	understanding	the	agents’	willingness	and	ability	to	negotiate	their	interests	is	to	recognise	that	they	have	a	personal	understanding	of	Kenya’s	 relations	with	 China,	 which	 is	 partly	 consequential	 to	 the	 position	 they	occupy,	defined	by	the	resources	they	have	at	their	disposal,	but	also	equally,	if	not	more,	consequential	to	their	own	beliefs,	originating	from	ideas	that	are	rooted	in	the	socio-political	and	economic	context	from	which	they	come.			
7.2.1 Repertoires	As	mentioned	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 repertoires	 are	 used	 to	 “defend	 and	 to	 challenge	existing	types	of	statehood	and	power	relations”821.	The	repertoires	that	emerge	in	Sino-African	 relations	 are	 mostly	 twofold:	 one	 consists	 in	 framing	 the	 relations	under	 the	 South-South	 cooperation	 label,	 defining	 them	 through	 concepts	 of	mutuality,	equality,	solidarity,	non-interference,	economic	development.	The	other	is	the	opposite,	framing	the	relations	with	China	as	damaging	for	locals	and	counter-productive,	mainly	disrespectful	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 rights.	 In	Kenya	 too	 this	dichotomous	understanding	of	 the	 relations	with	China	was	observed.	Especially	the	Look	East	policy	and	the	trials	of	Uhuru	Kenyatta	and	William	Ruto	at	the	ICC	have	 created	 a	 basis	 for	 challenging	 existing	 developmental	 discourses	 and	 the	country’s	relations	with	external	actors.	From	a	reliance	on	Western	partners	and	their	 focus	 on	 socio-economic	 rights,	 Kenya	 has	 started	 shifting	 the	 focus	 of	 its	developmental	path	to	economic	development,	following	in	the	footsteps	of	China	and	India.	It	would,	however,	be	inaccurate	to	depict	the	country	as	fully	focusing	on	economic	 development,	 dismissing	 the	 importance	 of	 constitutional	 rights	 and	duties.	This	is	even	more	evident	when	one	looks	at	the	specific	cases	analysed	in	the	 previous	 chapters.	 Across	 all	 the	 cases	 a	 common	 thread	 is	 the	 perceived	necessity,	by	concerned	stakeholders,	to	have	a	legal	and	regulatory	framework	that	guarantees	the	safeguard	of	interests	in	a	just	manner.	This	highlights	that	Kenyan	actors	do	keep	in	great	consideration	the	rule	of	law,	despite	acknowledging	that	its	implementation	is	difficult	and	unequally	guaranteed.		Probably	the	most	significant	aspect	of	the	analysis	of	repertoires	is	that	Kenyan	actors’	understanding	of	China	was	always	 in	reference	to	their	understanding	of	
                                                820	Ibid.		821	Ibid.		
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traditional	partners’	behaviour.	For	some	agents,	negotiating	with	Western	partners	or	Japan	signified	‘serious’	negotiations,	where	quality	(from	training	to	products)	and	the	general	good	of	Kenyans	was	safeguarded.	These	agents	compared	this	view	with	one	where	the	engagement	with	China	was	characterised	by	superficial	public	relations	rather	than	professional,	absence	of	quality,	Chinese	interests	safeguarded	rather	 than	Kenyans’.	Other	agents	expressed	opposite	perceptions,	 according	 to	which	China	 represented	 the	best	 partner	 thanks	 to	 their	 hands-on	pragmatism,	convenient	 deals	 and	 non-normative	 approach,	 rather	 working	 to	 fulfil	 what	Kenyans	identify	as	their	priority.	The	argument	for	appreciating	China	was	in	most	cases	 in	 opposition	 to	 not	 appreciating	 the	 West.	 An	 extreme	 example	 was	 an	interviewee	 that	 compared	 the	 relation	 Kenya	 has	 with	 China	 and	 the	 West	 to	medical	methods:	“even	in	medicine	sometimes	we	introduce	a	disease	to	kick	out	another	 disease.	 The	 same	 with	 the	 Chinese	 and	 the	 West,	 we	 introduced	 the	Chinese	 to	 kick	 out	 the	 West” 822 .	 Between	 these	 two	 extremes,	 some	 agents	identified	 pros	 and	 cons	 in	 dealing	 with	 either	 traditional	 or	 Chinese	 partners.	Mostly,	 this	 last	 category	 of	 agents	 acknowledged	 the	 need	 to	 mediate	 either	approach.	 Ideals	of	good	governance,	democracy,	and	so	 forth,	 remain	 important	pillars	of	Kenya’s	national	priorities	as	demonstrated	by	the	Constitution,	and	by	the	many	 grassroots	 actions	 that	 attempt	 to	 conform	 to	 them.	 However,	 prolonged	exposure	 to	 and	 engagement	 with	 Western	 partners	 has	 clearly	 evidenced	 the	West’s	 self-interests	 behind	 seemingly	 benevolent	 actions.	 This	 is	 an	 important	lesson	that	Kenyans	learnt,	which	is	transferred	to	the	relations	with	China,	creating	a	sense	of	awareness	as	 to	what	 lies	behind	the	proclaimed	benign	nature	of	 the	engagement.	An	interviewee	suggested	that	“we	don’t	look	either	East	or	West,	we	look	forward,	drawing	from	whichever	side	support	comes	from”.	This	support	is,	however,	rarely	blindly	received;	it	mostly	must	fulfil	existing	priorities.		Consequential	 to	 this,	 a	 mix	 of	 positive	 and	 negative	 beliefs	 and	 perceptions	toward	 the	newcomer,	 i.e.	China,	are	 found	at	all	 levels:	 ranking	higher	up	 in	 the	bureaucracy	or	 lower	down	 in	 civil	 society	 groups	was	not	 an	 indication	of	how	agents	 understood	 China.	 Kibaki’s	 Look	 East	 Policy,	 and	 the	 Kenyatta-Ruto’s	continuation	of	such	policy,	is	firmly	grounded	in	personal	needs	which	can	form	an	important	motivational	basis	for	the	direction	the	country	takes	in	foreign	policy.	
                                                822	Interview	with	a	professor	of	pharmacy	and	traditional	medicine	at	Kenyatta	University,	2014-11-04.				
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These	 personal	 needs	 have	 been	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 trials	 at	 the	 International	Criminal	Court,	framed	as	trials	by	the	West	against	Africa,	in	which	China	played	the	 positive	 role	 of	 alternative	 power,	 non-interfering	 in	 national	 governance.	However,	beyond	the	executive,	which	has	powers	that	are,	more	or	 less,	 limited	according	to	the	policy	sector	under	consideration,	the	role	occupied	on	the	social	ladder	was	not	directly	proportional	to	the	degree	of	appreciation	toward	China.				Thus,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 find	 small	 traders	 that	 praise	 Chinese	 products	 and	businessmen	 that	 provide	 them	 with	 goods	 to	 sell,	 but	 also	 small	 traders	 that	condemn	the	Chinese	for	stealing	their	jobs	or	putting	them	out	of	business.	There	are	officials	in	ministries	that	open	up	to	negotiations	with	China	because	it	is	‘faster,	less	prescriptive,	more	convenient’	 than	with	traditional	partners,	and	those	that	reject	Chinese	proposals	because	not	in	line	with	the	division’s	interests,	regardless	of	 how	 much	 money	 could	 flow.	 These	 points	 of	 view	 fluctuate	 throughout	bureaucracies	as	well	as	social	groupings.	Because	functional	attributes,	namely	the	
role	occupied	in	society,	do	not	guarantee	cohesive	approaches,	intra-group	tensions	
emerge.	The	tensions	are	at	times	articulated	on	the	basis	of	personal	beliefs	–	‘the	Chinese	are	exploiting	Kenya’	or	‘the	Chinese	are	giving	Kenya	a	chance	to	develop’	–	 at	 times	on	 the	basis	of	professional	beliefs	 –	 the	quality	of	products,	 training,	contract	 development	 is	 not	 adequate	 to	 Kenyan/sectoral	 standards,	 versus	 not	only	 it	 is	 adequate	 in	 terms	 of	 quality	 but	 also	 affordable.	 Especially	 in	 this	 last	sphere	of	professional	judgement,	in	a	number	of	cases	it	was	emphasised	that	the	relations	with	China	are	not	perfect,	i.e.	China	is	not	the	best	provider	in	terms	of	quality	of	services/goods,	but	they	suit	Kenya’s	current	needs,	hence	making	China	the	most	appropriate	provider.	 	This	 leads	 to	 the	next	section	 that	addresses	 the	resources	available	to	Kenyan	actors	to	assess	the	relations	with	China	and	steer	them	toward	the	protection	of	Kenyan	interests.			
7.2.2 Resources	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	2,	it	is	important	to	acknowledge	that	not	all	actors	have	equal	resources	at	their	disposal.	Resources	form	the	major	basis	of	power	and	as	Olivier	de	Sardan	put	it	there	are	at	least	two	kinds	of	power,	“the	power	everybody	has	 and	 the	 power	 only	 some	 people	 have” 823 .	 The	 executive	 and	 high-level	bureaucrats	 have	 access	 to	 a	 wider	 pool	 of	 financial	 resources	 than	 lower	 level	
                                                823	Olivier	de	Sardan,	op.	cit.,	p.	186.	
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bureaucrats	 or	 some	 societal	 groups	 (not	 always	 true	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 private	sector),	 thus	creating	a	power	imbalance	across	the	system	of	governance,	which	they	all	are	part	of.	However,	in	most	of	the	cases	analysed	in	the	previous	chapters,	the	 mobilisation	 of	 the	 resources	 available	 to	 the	 executive	 and	 high-level	bureaucrats	 is	 circumscribed	by	 complex	 systems	of	 governance	 that	 reduce	 the	power	asymmetry	between	the	top	and	the	bottom.	This	is	consequential	to	the	fact	that	in	most	cases	the	expertise	resides	with	the	lower	bureaucratic	levels	and	social	groups	 such	 as	 professional	 organisations,	 trade	 unions,	 educational	 institutions	and	so	 forth.	 In	other	words,	while	 the	politicized	high-levels	of	 the	bureaucracy	potentially	have	more	power	to	strike	direct	deals	with	external	actors,	and	more	financial	power	than	the	lower	levels,	it	is	generally	the	lower	level	bureaucrats	and	social	groups	that,	by	being	in	charge	of	implementing	the	deals,	manage	to	leverage	the	decisions	taken	at	the	top.	It	is	thus	important	to	look	not	only	at	financial,	but	also	human	resources	available	to	Kenyans	in	the	negotiation	process.		An	 analysis	 of	 human	 resources	 often	 lacks	 in	 Sino-African	 relations	 where	studies	focus,	more	often	than	not,	on	structural	and	financial	resources.	By	looking	at	negotiating	agents	in	Kenya,	the	profile	that	emerges	is	that	of	actors	with	a	very	good	knowledge	of	the	sectors	within	which	they	operate.	From	trade	unionists	to	technical	universities’	directors,	from	officers	at	the	Ministry	of	Education	to	those	in	 the	 National	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Council,	 from	 manufacturers	 associations’	leaders	 to	private	sector	 representatives	 in	 the	pharma	 industry,	all	 these	actors	have	 demonstrated	 a	 very	 comprehensive	 set	 of	 skills	 in	 negotiating	 with	 the	Chinese.	 These	 have	 included:	 full	 knowledge	 of	 the	 legal,	 institutional	 and	regulatory	environment	within	which	they	operate,	good	knowledge	of	the	gaps	(or	lack	 thereof)	 that	 the	 Chinese	 aimed	 at	 filling,	 a	 relative	 understanding	 of	 the	Chinese	strategies.		For	 instance,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 trade	 unions,	 Chinese	 companies	were	 financially	stronger	than	Kenyan	trade	unions.	However,	in	terms	of	human	resources,	Kenyan	trade	unions	were	significantly	more	prepared	to	engage	the	dispute	mechanism,	despite	 the	 interference	 from	 bureaucrats	 interested	 in	 preserving	 the	 relations	with	the	Chinese.	Their	skills	would	have,	however,	been	almost	meaningless	if	not	supported	by	a	legal	and	institutional	system	regulating	labour	disputes.	Similarly,	in	the	case	of	counterfeits	as	well	as	traditional	medicine	and	TVET,	Kenyan	human	and	financial	resources	were	necessary	to	alter	the	existing	system	of	governance	to	
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benefit	Kenya	as	a	whole	(i.e.	protection	of	intellectual	property	rights,	introduction	of	 traditional	 medicine	 in	 the	 healthcare	 delivery	 system,	 increased	 relations	between	schools	and	factories	to	improve	the	industrialization	process).	In	cases	of	dependence	upon	assistance/aid,	the	issue	of	resource	asymmetry	is	more	salient	as	it	is	assumed	that	the	economic	asymmetry	leads	to	an	impossibility	of	safeguarding	Kenyan	interests.	For	instance,	in	the	case	of	Confucius	Institutes,	the	economic	asymmetry	seems	not	to	provide	guarantees	for	the	safeguarding	of	academic	independence.	However,	in	the	healthcare	sector,	also	highly	dependent	on	donors,	while	the	Chinese	offers	of	aid	are	welcome	on	some	levels,	China’s	non-adherence	 to	 Sector	 Wide	 Approaches	 has	 acted	 as	 an	 obstacle	 to	 the	implementation	of	 projects.	 This	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 act	 of	 agency	based	on	 the	use	of	professional	 human	 resources,	 vis-à-vis	 the	 politicised	 top	 levels,	 to	 leverage	financial	asymmetry.	The	acceptance	of	offers	beyond	SWAPs,	such	as	the	setup	of	a	Malaria	 Centre,	 followed	 a	 rationale	 according	 to	 which	 the	 offers	 were	 a	 free	surplus,	and	they	would	not	alter	the	existing	system	of	governance.		These	 skills	 are	 a	 necessary	 element	 to	 obtain	 positive	 outcomes	 in	 the	negotiations	though	they	are	not	sufficient.	The	quantity	and	distribution	of	human	resources,	together	with	financial	resources	are	indispensable	and	often	lacking,	if	not	 at	 the	 decision-making	 level,	 at	 the	 implementation	 one.	 Kenyans’	 lack	 of	resources	 is	most	 evident	 in	 implementation/enforcing	 scenarios	 rather	 than	 in	decision-making	or	agenda-setting.	In	fact,	while	the	ability	to	identify	the	‘right’	set	of	 legal,	 institutional	 and	 regulatory	 tools	 for	 governing	 specific	 issues	 is	 often	demonstrated,	when	it	comes	to	implementation	there	are	often	gaps	that	reduce	the	ability	to	control	the	outcomes.	This	is	not	unique	to	the	engagements	with	China,	although	in	some	cases	China	was	identified	as	the	main	problem,	or	its	efforts	to	penetrate	that	sector	served	as	a	catalyst	for	action.	The	development	of	the	Public	Private	Partnership	 initiative	 (legalised	by	 an	Act	 of	Parliament	 and	Presidential	Assent	 in	2013)824	is	one	way	deemed	relevant	 to	potentially	 solve	 this	 resource	shortage	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 by	 merging	 public	 and	 private	 financial	 and	 human	capacities.					
                                                824	Public	Private	Partnership	Unit,	op.	cit.		
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7.3 Layered	interests	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	2,	studying	interests	 is	crucial	as	they	emphasise	the	importance	 and	 relevance	 that	 the	 engagement	 with	 China	 has	 for	 different	stakeholders.	Hufty	suggests	that	“in	any	given	situation,	what	 is	at	stake	may	be	completely	 different	 for	 each	 actor”825.	 The	 interests	 can	 be	 consistent	 among	 a	range	 of	 national	 actors	 vis-à-vis	 external	 forces,	 but	 they	 can	 also	 be	 divergent	giving	 rise	 to	 domestic	 confrontation.	 It	 is	 the	 very	 confrontational	 dynamics	between	 domestic	 players,	 as	 they	 attempt	 to	 safeguard	 their	 interests,	 that	emphasise	the	suitability	of	a	system	of	governance	to	safeguard	broader	domestic	interests.	 As	 a	 reminder,	 domestic	 interests	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 best	 safeguarded	
through	the	systems	of	governance	that	leverage	acts	of	narrow	self-interest.	Sino-African	 debates	 rest	 upon	 a	 general	 critique	 that	 African	 countries	 have	‘turned	 East’	 adopting	 country-wide	 approaches	 toward	 China	 thanks	 to	 its	proclaimed	non-interference	policy	and	lack	of	political	conditions.	Even	in	Kenya,	the	 adoption	of	 the	Look	East	Policy	has	 often	 led	 commentators	 to	 sustain	 that	Kenya	is	pro-China	and	that	the	country’s	interests	align	with	the	Eastern	power’s.	However,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 sectors	 studied,	 assuming	 that	 interests	 are	unitary	and	that	they	emerge	out	of	state	agents	only,	wipes	out	the	complexities	of	country-systems	and	does	not	take	into	account	the	profoundly	different	priorities	that	different	sectors	and	specific	issues	occupy	within	the	national	context	and	in	relation	to	external	presences.		In	Chapter	2	the	importance	of	focusing	on	layered	interests	was	emphasised:	the	national,	 the	 sectoral	 and	 the	 issue-specific.	 In	 all	 three	 empirical	 chapters,	 the	analysis	 starts	with	 the	 identification	 of	macro-level	 approaches	 to	 the	 sector	 to	understand	 the	 emphasis	 put	 on	 it	 in	 Sino-African	discourses.	 By	 then	 exploring	specific	cases,	the	interests	become	more	specific,	at	times	aligning,	at	times	clashing	with	macro-orientations.		At	 the	national	 level,	 two	broad	categories	of	 interests	 are	 identified:	 the	 first	concerns	economic	development,	the	second	the	safeguard	of	constitutional	rights	and	 the	 democratic	 journey.	 In	 Sino-Africa	 relations	 it	 is	 often	 argued	 that	 the	Chinese	 contribution	 to	 the	 former	 has	 deeply	 compromised	 the	 latter.	 These	national	 interests	 are	 incorporated	 in	 Kenya’s	 development	 blueprints	 and	 are	
                                                825	M.	Hufty,	‘Investigating	policy	processes:	The	governance	analytical	framework	(GAF)’,	in	U.	Wiesmann,	H.	Hurni	eds.,	with	an	international	group	of	co-editors,	Research	for	Sustainable	Development:	Foundations,	Experiences,	and	Perspectives,	Perspectives	of	the	Swiss	National	Centre	of	Competence	in	Research	(NCCR)	North-South,	University	of	Bern,	vol.	6,	Geographica	Bernensia,	Bern,	2011,	p.	408.		
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absorbed	by	implementing	actors,	who,	at	times,	favour	one	over	the	other,	though	most	 often	 recognise	 the	 value	 of	 both.	 In	 particular,	 Kenya	 Vision	 2030	 can	 be	considered	a	synthesis	of	the	country’s	willingness	to	move	toward	industrialisation,	i.e.	economic	development,	while	preserving	constitutional	rights,	clearly	evidenced	by	 the	 focus	 on	 collaborative	 governance	 to	 achieve	 economic	 and	 social	development.	The	very	development	of	Kenya	Vision	2030	was	consequential	to	a	long	consultative	process	with	social	groups	at	large,	including	the	private	sector,	and	thus	a	variety	of	stakeholders,	not	only	state	actors,	generally	identify	with	it.	The	involvement	of	China	in	the	national	context	is	deemed	key	to	developing	Kenya	Vision	2030:	 China	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 contributor	 to	 the	 economic	 development	 of	 the	country.	However,	China’s	emphasis	(at	least	initially)	on	state-to-state	relations	did	not	align	with	 the	other	national	 interest,	 i.e.	 inclusive	development.	The	Kenyan	government	did,	in	a	few	cases,	attempt	to	side	with	China,	bypassing	other	relevant	domestic	 actors,	 in	 the	 name	 of	 rapid	 development.	 This	 has	 occurred	 mainly	because	of	direct	personal	interests	from	the	executive	or	business	elites,	but	also	as	a	result	of	the	Chinese	corrupting	strategic	Kenyan	actors,	such	as	judges.		While	 the	national	policy	has	surely	provided	 incentives	 to	engage	with	China	(and	 India)	 increasingly,	 the	sectoral	and	 issue-specific	analyses	seem	to	suggest	that,	at	these	levels,	this	is	not	happening	with	the	same	enthusiasm	and	promptness.	In	fact,	as	mentioned	above,	the	Look	East	policy	is	one	among	many	foreign	policy	approaches,	 a	 relatively	 new	 one,	 whose	 existence	 has	 not	 phased	 out	 existing	preferences	 altogether.	 The	 interests	 behind	 the	 sectors	 emerge	 out	 of	 complex	dynamics	of	domestic	governance.	While	 the	priority	 level	 that	a	 sector	occupies	within	national	policies	can	be	upgraded	or	downgraded	by	 the	government,	 the	actual	 change	 also	 depends	 on	 how	 the	 interests	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 stakeholders	(national	and	international)	within	the	sector	are	affected.	Even	 more	 evidently,	 when	 the	 specific	 issue	 under	 the	 sectoral	 umbrella	 is	unpacked,	the	perceived	complementarity	of	Kenyan	and	Chinese	national	agendas	does	not	always	find	a	fit.		This	is	to	say	that	even	if	Kenyan	and	Chinese	interests	in	developing	a	sector	are	complementary	from	a	broad	point	of	view,	these	interests	may	 become	 void	 if	 contextualised	 within	 specific	 policy	 and	 implementation	environments.	Rhetorical	interests,	which	imbue	national	and	sectoral	approaches,	may	be	dismissed	at	the	issue-specific	level	where	actors	become	more	concerned	with	the	practicalities	of	the	engagement.	For	instance,	while	healthcare	as	a	whole	
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is	 a	 key	 sector	 for	 Kenya	 2030,	 some	 elements	 of	 it	 are	more	 important	 in	 the	priority	 ladder	 than	 others.	 To	 add	 complexity,	 while	 China	 as	 a	 whole	 has	 its	priority	 objectives,	 namely	 ideologically-charged	 notions	 of	 assistance	 to	 Africa	through	the	trade	in	cheap	products,	equipment	and	infrastructure,	when	it	comes	to	 specific	 sectoral	 cases	 China’s	 broad	 general	 direction	 is	 challenged	 and	renegotiated	by	implementing	actors	and	their	specific	priorities.			
7.4 Arenas	As	 mentioned	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 arenas	 represent	 the	 “political	 space	 in	 which	relations	 of	 power	 and	 authority	 are	 vested”826.	 The	 analyses	 carried	 out	 in	 the	previous	 three	 chapters	 found	 that	 negotiation	 arenas	 vary	 significantly	domestically	depending	not	only	on	the	sector	but	also	the	policy	area	under	study.	This,	 in	 turn,	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 talk	 about	 a	 ‘Kenyan’	 approach	 to	 China	 in	safeguarding	domestic	interests.	Very	different	arenas	were	presented	in	the	previous	
three	 chapters,	 some	 fully	 domestically	 defined,	 others	 mostly	 defined	 by	 the	
international	environment,	some	bureaucracy-led,	others	socially-orchestrated,	some	
regulated,	others	 lacking	defined	modes	of	 conduct.	 In	other	words,	arenas	can	be	formalised	systems	of	governance	within	which	actors	interplay,	but	also	informal	or	 a	mix	 of	 the	 two.	 According	 to	 the	 issue	 at	 stake,	 they	 can	 span	 across	 local,	national,	 international	 contexts	 (see	 the	 role	 of	 multilateral	 international	institutions	 in	 sectors	 such	 as	 healthcare	 and	 education).	 Different	 actors	 and	stakeholders	contribute	to	the	norms,	laws	and	interests	that	form	an	arena,	which	is	 historically	 determined.	 As	 anticipated	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 some	 of	 these	patterns/systems	have	been	“dominated	by	longstanding	conventions	on	how	and	by	 whom	 statehood	 is	 defined”,	 i.e.	 rooted	 governance;	 others	 were	 defined	 as	“lack[ing]	predefined	or	commonly	recognised	procedural	modalities	for	decision	making”827,	 i.e.	absence	of	governance	system;	and	 finally	a	 third	 type	which	 is	a	combination	 of	 the	 first	 two,	 i.e.	 governance	 in-the-making,	 where	 a	 governance	system	 either	 did	 not	 exist	 and	 is	 under	 construction,	 or	 did	 exist	 but	 was	acknowledged	as	inappropriate,	hence	needing	restructuring.	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	2,	systems	of	governance	leverage	narrow	acts	of	self-interest.	In	the	case	of	Kenya,	this	is	particularly	relevant	given	the	direct	personal	
                                                826	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	551.	827	Ibid.,	p.	550	
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importance	China	played	for	Presidents	Kibaki	and,	even	more,	Kenyatta.	Presidents	Kibaki	and	Kenyatta	have	had	personal	interests	in	the	development	of	the	country’s	relations	 with	 China.	 The	 political	 environment	 and	 the	 relations	 with	 external	sources	 of	 economic	 and	 political	 power	 (emphasising	 the	 East/West	 divide	especially	around	the	elections	in	2002	and	2007	for	Kibaki	and	Raila,	and	with	the	ICC	trials	for	Kenyatta	and	Ruto)	have	allowed	the	presidents	to	occupy	a	relevant	position	 in	 foreign	 policy	 and	 steer	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 domestic	 environment.	Notwithstanding	this,	as	exemplified	in	the	various	cases	presented,	understanding	
real/actual	governance	in	Kenya-China	relations	requires	an	effort	to	consider	“big	men”	 as	 the	 tip	 of	 an	 iceberg	 that	 is	 constructed	 upon	 broader	 bases	 of	 socio-political	and	economic	governance	frameworks.			
7.4.1 Rooted	governance	and	governance-in-the-making	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	2,	negotiation	arenas	“have	spatial,	social	and	temporal	dimensions	[…]	which	need	to	be	traced	empirically	on	a	case	by	case	basis”828.	This	is	 what	 has	 been	 done	 in	 the	 previous	 three	 chapters,	 identifying	 the	 way	governance	is	negotiated	and	establishing	whether	the	relations	with	the	Chinese	are	enacted	in	conformity	with	existing	systems	of	governance	or	rather	lead	to	their	alteration.	Arenas	were	at	times	identified	as	adequate	by	stakeholders	to	face	new	challenges	and	opportunities,	at	times	not.	The	systems	of	governance	that	China	has	encountered	are,	broadly	speaking:	rooted,	and	in-the-making.	These	can,	in	turn,	be	formally	or	informally	acted	upon.				Table	4:	Types	of	systems	of	governance		 Rooted	system	of	governance	 System	of	governance	in-the-making	
	 Formal	 Informal	 Formal	 Informal	
Domestically	
shaped	 Trade	unions			 Small	traders	 Counterfeits			 		
Internationally	
shaped	 Trade	of	health	products;	Infrastructure	for	health;		Conventional	HRH	
		 Traditional	medicine;	traditional	HRH;	TVET	 Confucius	Institutes	
Source:	Author’s	findings.		
                                                828	Ibid.		
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What	 has	 been	 found	 is	 that	 Kenyans’	 relations	 with	 China	 mostly	 unfold	 in	contexts	where	governance	frameworks	(formal	or	informal)	are	in	place,	rooted,	legitimised	 by	 concerned	 stakeholders.	 Rooted	 governance	 is	 characterised	 by	highly	 regulated	 patterns	 of	 rule	 though	 it	 is	 important	 to	 emphasise	 that	 these	patterns	 can	be	 very	different	depending	on	 the	 specific	 issue-area.	They	 can	be	formal	 (as	 showed	 in	 the	 cases	 of	 trade	 unions,	 trade	 of	 health	 products,	infrastructure	for	healthcare,	human	resources	for	healthcare)	or	 informal	(small	traders).	They	can	be	domestically	determined	(trade	unions	and	small	traders)	but	also	deeply	shaped	by	international	structures	(health	and	education	related	issues)	and	by	the	presence	of	 traditional	external	actors	 in	specific	social	and	economic	sectors.	The	fact	that	governance	is	rooted	does	not	equal	to	stating	that	the	actual	behaviour	 conforms	 to	 established	 norms	 of	 conduct.	 This	 aspect	 will	 be	 better	looked	at	below	when	the	modalities	of	interaction	are	explored.		Governance	in-the-making	is,	in	turn,	characterised	by	a	system	of	rule	that	is	in	the	course	of	either	being	revisited	or	created.	Because	of	its	changing	nature,	it	is	not	fully	defined,	and	negotiations	were	still	taking	place	at	the	time	of	research	(the	cases	of	counterfeits,	traditional	medicine,	TVET,	Confucius	Institutes	are	examples).	The	cases	presented	show	different	bases	upon	which	change	occurs.	In	the	three	cases	under	formal	governance,	the	gaps	in	the	legal	system	were	recognised	to	be	the	 main	 problem,	 although	 institution-building	 was	 also	 a	 major	 factor	 in	 the	decision	to	restructure	the	system.	In	the	case	of	Confucius	Institutes,	the	system	of	governance	 is	 fragile.	 The	 regulatory	 framework	 does	 not	 specifically	 address	foreign	language	teaching	within	educational	institutions	or	the	presence	of	foreign	organisations	within	Kenyan	educational	institutions.	On	top	of	this,	the	significant	deployment	of	Chinese	financial	and	human	resources,	consequential	to	the	Chinese	state	 interests	 in	using	Confucius	 Institutes	 as	 tools	of	 soft	power,	 exacerbates	 a	dynamic	of	dependence	upon	foreign	resources.	The	belief	behind	the	reliance	upon	dependence	seems	to	be	that	the	provision	of	Chinese	language	teaching	for	free	is	more	 important	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	 country	 than	 safeguarding	 academic	independence	(from	the	Chinese	government)	and	the	strict	control	of	the	quality	of	education	(see	Table	below:	Sub-sectoral	systems	of	governance).		In	 these	 cases	 of	 governance	 in-the-making,	 although	 the	 systems	 are	 found	inadequate	for	safeguarding	Kenyan	interests,	often	the	cases	analysed	emphasised	the	acknowledged	inadequacy	by	Kenyans	of	their	legal	and	institutional	systems,			
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Source:	Author’s	findings	
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and,	later,	of	implementation	capacity,	rather	than	focusing	on	China-blaming.	Even	though	the	presence	of	China	may	have	highlighted	the	need	for	change,	the	problem	was	always	 framed	as	a	domestic	 issue	more	 than	an	externally-driven	one.	 It	 is	particularly	interesting	to	observe,	during	an	assessment	of	agency-as-ownership,	the	cases	of	governance	in-the-making.	These	are	occurring	at	a	time	when	Kenya	is	fully	on	the	way	toward	the	implementation	of	constitutional	democracy.	While	the	values	 associated	 with	 democratic	 development	 are	 kept	 in	 high	 consideration	during	 the	 formulation	 of	 ideal	 systems	 of	 governance,	 the	 reality	 of	 economic	(under)development	 represents	 an	 obstacle,	 or	 at	 least	 a	 point	 of	 separation	between	 the	 official	 realm	 of	 policy-making	 and	 the	 actual	 possibilities	 of	governance.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 counterfeits,	 despite	 the	 exemplary	democratic	process	through	which	the	governance	system	was	restructured,	the	fact	that	much	of	the	population	still	requests	cheap	products,	irrespective	of	the	level	of	quality,	is	a	major	obstacle	to	the	actual	successful	implementation	of	the	system.		For	 foreigners,	 inserting	 themselves	 in	 such	 different	 systems	 of	 governance	requires	 understanding	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game.	 However,	 even	 in	 cases	 where	governance	is	rooted,	the	Chinese	have	tended	to	either	ignore,	i.e.	not	be	aware	of	the	norms	regulating	the	sector,	or	to	feel	not	bound	by	existing	norms,	thus	acting	beyond	 them 829 .	 The	 Chinese	 non-abidance	 to	 locally	 accepted	 frameworks,	domestically	or	internationally	defined	(i.e.	reliance	on	multilateral	cooperation),	is	often	reduced	by	requesting	the	Chinese	to	abide	by	the	laws	and	institutions,	if	they	exist,	or	by	creating	more	appropriate	legal	and	institutional	frameworks.	There	is	no	indication	that	in	cases	of	rooted	governance	actors	end	up	being	more	successful	in	negotiating	with	the	Chinese	than	in	cases	of	governance	in-the-making.	However,	what	 is	 important	 to	 note	 is	 that	 in	 all	 cases,	 except	 that	 of	 Confucius	Institutes	 and	 partially	 the	 case	 of	 conventional	HRH,	 the	 actors	 involved	 highly	valued	legal	and	institutional	frameworks,	feeling	protected	by	their	existence.	Even	in	cases	where	these	frameworks	are	not	adequate	and	thus	need	restructuring,	the	first	 step	 of	 the	 change	 process	 is	 that	 to	 identify	 how	 the	 frameworks	 can	 be	improved.	This	does	not	mean	that	through	actual	governance	practices	all	actors	fully	and	always	adhere,	but	rather	that	the	country	as	a	whole	increasingly	believes	in	the	value	of	the	law	to	protect	inclusive	processes	of	governance.	It	is	by	looking	
                                                829	‘10	things	Chinese	people	should	know	about	doing	business	in	Africa’,	translated	by	Olander,	The	China	Africa	Project,	29	December	2015,	<http://www.chinaafricaproject.com/translation-10-things-chinese-people-should-know-about-doing-business-in-africa/>.	
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at	the	modalities	of	engagement	that	one	understands	how	these	frameworks	are	valued,	when	they	are	bypassed	and	why.			
7.5 Modalities	Depending	on	the	suitability	of	the	arenas	to	safeguard	interests,	the	modalities	of	action	by	Kenyan	actors	vis-à-vis	the	Chinese	change.	First,	actions	are	unpacked	by	 looking	 at	 the	 initiator,	 then	 actual	 mobilisation	 practices	 are	 analysed	 to	establish	whether	they	conform	to	existing	patterns.	This	is	done	by	studying	the	tables	 of	 negotiation,	 which,	 as	 specified	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 are	 “a	 formalized	 setting	where	contending	social	groups	decide	upon	key	aspects	of	statehood	over	a	given	period	 of	 time”830.	While	 arenas,	 i.e.	 systems	 of	 governance,	 are	 harder	 to	 alter,	tables	 of	 negotiation	 can,	 more	 easily,	 be	 subjected	 to	 short-term	 interests	 and	politicisation.	Sino-African	relations	are	 imbued	with	concerns	that	 the	economic	and	 power	 asymmetry	 between	 African	 countries	 and	 the	 Chinese	 lead	 the	executives	of	the	former	to	bypass	domestic	systems	of	governance	to	strike	deals	with	 the	 latter.	 This	 can	 be	measured	 by	 contrasting	 announced	 developmental	agendas	 and	 actual	 project	 development.	 The	 assumption	 is	 that	 agendas	 are	broadly	 negotiated	 across	 arenas,	 and	 thus	 take	 into	 consideration	 different	stakeholders’	 needs.	 Project	 development,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 may	 be	 more	subjected	to	one-off	needs.		This	tension	between	arenas	and	tables,	which	translates	into	a	tension	between	agendas	and	actual	development,	 is	an	 important	point	not	only	 for	Kenya-China	relations	but	Sino-African	relations	in	their	entirety.	The	presence	of	China,	despite	its	 non-interference	 discourse,	 has	 been	 feared	 to	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 existing	systems	of	governance,	especially	democratic	processes	of	development	in	Africa,	through	 the	 alteration	 of	 procedural	 standards	 of	 negotiation.	Also,	 even	 though	Sino-African	 relations	 have	 their	 platforms	 of	 engagement,	 such	 as	 FOCAC	 and	people-to-people	 meetings,	 while	 these	 may	 act	 as	 springboards	 for	 advancing	bilateral	 engagements,	 they	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 play	 a	 particular	 role	 in	 the	 actual	negotiations	between	the	Kenyans	and	the	Chinese.	The	fact	that	China	often	acts	outside	 multilateral	 systems	 of	 governance	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 in	 previous	chapters.	This	is	found	to	be	the	main	reason	why	Kenyans	find	it	difficult	to	engage	
                                                830	Hagmann	and	Péclard,	op.	cit.,	p.	551.	
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with	the	Chinese.	 Indeed,	more	than	the	content	of	the	engagement	(that	often	is	complementary	to	Kenya’s	needs),	what	prevents	Kenyans	from	fully	engaging	with	China	is	the	modality	of	the	engagement.	 In	 fact,	what	seems	to	be	relevant	to	the	
ultimate	control/ownership	of	the	negotiation	with	the	Chinese	is	the	conformity	of	
negotiation	processes	to	the	general	system	of	norms	and	practices	as	understood	and	
legitimised	by	Kenyans.		The	 following	 sections	 look	 at	 modalities	 of	 action,	 dismissing	 the	 idea	 that	Africans	 only	 engage	 in	 contestation	 with	 the	 Chinese,	 meaning	 that	 the	circumstances	 of	 engagement	 are	 not	 only	 threat-related	 circumstances	 but	 also	cooperation-seeking,	where	Kenyan	agency	is	pro-active.			
7.5.1 Initiator	Focusing	on	the	initiator	helps	identify	under	what	type	of	circumstances	Kenyan	actors	engage	with	China.	Focusing	on	actors,	especially	on	who	initially	identifies	the	 engagement	 with	 the	 Chinese	 as	 salient,	 and	 who	 then	 contributes	 to	 the	governance	 of	 the	 relations,	 is	 fundamental	 to	 acknowledge	 power	 relations	domestically	and	internationally.	Based	on	the	main	assumptions	in	the	literature,	the	findings	show	that	it	is	not	only	Chinese	actors	initiating	the	relation	with	Kenyan	
actors	 but	 also	 vice	 versa.	 This	 is	 an	 essential	 element	 to	 ascertain	 the	degree	of	ownership	in	engagement	dynamics.	Studying	the	initiator’s	actions	in	specific	cases	provides	insights	on	the	motivations	for	engagement,	which	in	turn	are	necessary	to	 understand	 how	 Kenyan	 actors	 perceive	 the	 presence	 of	 China	 and	 their	engagement	 with	 it.	 In	 order,	 however,	 to	 understand	 internal	 dynamics	 of	interaction	 it	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 focus	 exclusively	 on	 the	 initiator	 but	 it	 is	 also	necessary	 to	 pay	 attention	 to	 the	 other	 actors	with	which	 the	 initiator	 interacts	within	specific	frameworks	of	governance,	at	negotiation	tables	(presented	below).			
Re-active	behaviour/Contestation	The	re-action	is	more	intense	not	when	the	interests	with	the	Chinese	clash	but	when	the	interests	between	different	Kenyan	groups,	responsible	of	‘governing’	the	specific	 issue,	 diverge.	 The	 more	 a	 threat	 is	 perceived,	 the	 more	 a	 re-action	 is	expected.	This	behaviour	is	particularly	evident	in	the	analysis	of	the	trade	sector	where	 the	arrival	of	Chinese	products	and	businesses	 is	perceived	as	a	 threat	by	local	 associations,	 traders	 and	 manufacturers.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 traders,	 the	 threat	
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concerns	 the	 Chinese	 occupation	 of	 business	 spaces	 traditionally	 belonging	 to	Kenyans	and	the	challenge	of	existing	frameworks	of	business	governance	between	wholesalers	and	retailers.	In	the	case	of	counterfeits,	the	entry	of	counterfeits	was	perceived	as	a	 threat	 to	 innovation	and	national	development.	 In	both	cases,	 the	initiator	 was	 a	 non-state	 actor:	 small	 traders	 in	 one	 instance	 and	 the	 Kenya	Association	of	Manufacturers	in	the	other.	As	for	trade	unions,	the	threat	was	the	lack	 of	 respect	 of	 laws	 and	 the	 subtle	 relations	 between	 Kenyan	 governmental	officials	and	Chinese	companies.	In	these	three	cases,	the	challenges	provided	by	the	Chinese	are	novel	in	the	sector.	In	cases	of	dependence	on	China’s	resources,	like	certain	cases	in	healthcare	and	education	show,	contestation	is	less	likely	to	occur.	Dependence	here	refers	to	the	narrow	concept	of	dependence	on	aid	rather	than	the	broader	concept	of	less	direct	economic	dependence	such	as	in	trade.	The	issue	then	becomes	whether	the	donor-recipient	relation	interferes	with	the	decision-making	to	the	advantage	of	China	(or	any	 other	 external	 actor)	 or	 the	 mechanisms	 available	 in	 the	 country	 regulate	donations/assistance	 to	 the	point	of	guaranteeing	Kenyan	ownership	despite	 the	possible	limited	contestation	behaviour.	A	case	such	as	that	of	the	construction	and	equipping	 of	 Mama	 Lucy	 hospital,	 case	 in	 which	 a	 donation	 from	 the	 Chinese	government	was	provided,	shows	how	the	management	can	step	up	controls	over	the	development	of	the	project	even	if	economic	asymmetry	(especially	in	cases	of	donations)	constrains	the	freedom	to	oppose	resistance.	This	case	is	also	important	as	it	shows	how	re-active	behaviour	not	only	can	be	in	place	even	in	cases	of	free	assistance	 but	 also	 how	 the	 relationships	 are	 not	 static	 and	 the	 elaboration	 of	strategic	 behaviour	 can	 occur	 at	 different	 stages	 of	 the	 engagement.	 Sectors	 like	healthcare	 and	 education,	 as	 opposed	 to	 trade,	 are	 historically	more	 externally-influenced.	As	such,	China’s	arrival	 is	not	perceived	as	a	 threat	but	rather	as	one	more	presence	that	needs	to	be	“fit	in”.		Economic	elites	also	play	a	major	 role,	 and	 in	Kenya	 they	are	often	extremely	intertwined	with	political	bureaucracies831.	Despite	not	always	openly	contesting	Chinese	activities,	if	China	pursues	“self-serving	economic	strategies	that	negatively	affect	influential	domestic	coalitions”832	then	the	government	–	often	in	response	to	more	or	 less	openly	vocal	domestic	pressures	–	may	develop	 counter-policies	or	
                                                831	Booth	et	al.,	op.	cit.		832	Flemes	&	Wehner,	op.	cit.			
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strategies	 like	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 ACA,	 case	 in	 which	 manufacturers’	groups	 advocated	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 national	 institutions	 to	 halt	 the	 spread	 of	counterfeits	from	China.		
	
Pro-active	behaviour/Cooperation	In	these	cases,	it	is	interesting	to	understand	how	Kenyan	actors	articulate	their	motivations	 to	 engage	 the	 Chinese	 vis-à-vis	 other,	 often	 better	 known	 and	 long-present,	 partners.	 The	 situation,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 re-active	 mode,	 is	 a	 ‘non-confrontational’	 situation	 although	 the	 entry	 of	 China	 in	 the	 country	 may	 have	spurred	 the	 actions	 to	 change.	 Pro-active	 behaviour	 is	 characterised	 by	 the	recognition	by	Kenyan	actors	of	specific	needs	in	each	sector/area,	followed	by	the	identification	 of	 Chinese	 resources	 as	 useful	 for	 the	 achievement	 of	 desired	outcomes.	The	actors	involved	in	the	issue	at	stake	thus	initiate	a	transformation	of	the	system	to	include	Chinese	actors	for	the	implementation	of	specific	policies	or	projects.	The	cases	that	exemplify	this	behaviour	are:	trade	in	medical	products	and	devices,	TVET	and	NPI.	While	in	the	first	instance	the	initiator	is	a	non-state	actor,	namely	wholesalers,	 in	 the	 other	 two	 cases	 the	 initiator	 is	 a	 state	 actor,	 i.e.	 the	Ministry	of	Education,	TVET	Directorate	and	the	National	Museums	of	Kenya,	under	the	Ministry	of	Culture.	All	 the	 cases	are,	however,	 characterised	by	an	 inclusive	approach	to	governance	where	both	state	and	non-state	actors	are	deemed	key	to	achieving	success.		In	these	cases,	China	is	sought	to	fill	a	gap,	mainly	in	terms	of	resource	provision,	while	domestic	actors	tend	to	maintain	full	control	of	the	governance	dynamics.	In	the	case	of	trade	of	health	products,	the	motivation	for	wholesalers	to	engage	with	Chinese	 firms	was	 the	 sourcing	of	 cheap	products.	Kenyan-Indian	manufacturers	and	distributors	have	limited	the	penetration	of	Chinese	goods	by	favouring	trade	with	 India	 while	 the	 government	 has	 not	 been	 able	 to	 favour	 Chinese	 products	despite	 their	 advantageous	 price.	 In	 both	 the	 cases	 of	 TVET	 and	 the	 case	 of	 the	Natural	 Products	 Industry,	 knowledge	 of	 the	 country’s	 structural	 limitations	 has	pushed	state	organs	to	re-organise	internally	and	seek	support	externally	not	in	a	‘full	 dependence’	 approach	 but	 rather	 through	 trade	 and	 support	 to	 training.	 In	these	occurrences,	it	is	interesting	to	study	how	the	motivation	to	approach	China	was	articulated	because	it	shows	control	not	only	over	the	domestic	scenario	but	also	over	what	exactly	is	needed	from	the	external	actor.	In	the	case	of	TVET,	the	
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motivation	included	the	praise	of	the	pragmatic	approach	of	the	Chinese	to	linking	education	and	production,	together	with	AVIC	International	availability	to	provide	training	resources	and	education.	Whereas	 in	 the	case	of	 the	NPI,	 the	motivation	included	 a	 practical	 aspect,	 namely	 learning	 from	 the	 expertise	 that	 China	 has	gained	globally	in	the	development	of	traditional	medicine	and	an	ideological	aspect,	namely	partnering	to	free	Kenya	from	the	negative	connotation	that	British	colonial	rulers	had	placed	upon	traditional	medicine.		
Passive	behaviour/Passivity	While	 the	 cases	 above	 have	 dismissed	 the	 general	 belief	 that	 Africans	 are	unwilling	 and	 unable	 to	 negotiate	 to	 their	 benefit,	 it	 is	 also	 necessary	 to	acknowledge	that	there	are	cases	in	which	the	behaviour	of	Kenyan	actors	has	been	passive,	and	no	agency/control	over	the	relationship	with	China	was	shown.	There	can	 be	 various	 reasons	 why	 a	 passive-type	 of	 behaviour	 occurs:	 perception	 of	complete	 domination/inability	 to	 act,	 the	 issue	 is	 not	 perceived	 as	 significant	 or	relevant,	and/or	the	potential	threat	is	not	yet	perceived.	In	the	cases	analysed	in	this	 thesis	 the	 types	 of	 passivity	 that	 are	 observed	 vary.	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	passivity	 can	 be	 a	 normal	 behaviour	 if	 limited	 in	 time.	 It	 becomes	 chronic,	potentially	assuming	negative	connotations,	when	it	is	protracted	in	time.		Minor	cases	of	passive	behaviour	are	found	in	the	healthcare	and	education	sector.	Only	one	major	case	of	passive	behaviour	was	identified	in	the	Confucius	Institutes	case.	 The	 establishment	 of	 Confucius	 Institutes	 is	 consequential	 to	 high	 levels	 of	interest	by	China	(the	institutes	used	as	a	soft	power	tool)	encountering	relatively	uncritical	 acceptance	 by	 Kenyans.	 This	 lack	 of	 control	 concerns	 both	 the	management	 of	 the	 Institute	 and	 the	 content	 of	 teaching.	 Both	 the	Ministry	 and	Universities	have	minimal	control	over	the	administration	of	the	Institutes.	While	the	 reason	 could	 be,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 fact	 that	 education	 is	 a	 sector	historically	influenced	by	external	actors	and	highly	fragmented	in	the	delivery	of	education	 and	 training,	 this	 specific	 case	 also	 highlights	 how	 university	 leaders	uncritically	accept	financial	dependence,	potentially	to	the	detriment	of	the	quality	of	 education.	 Similar	 cases	 are	 found	 in	 the	 management	 of	 China’s	 offers	 of	assistance	in	infrastructure	for	healthcare	(see	the	initial	negotiation	for	Mama	Lucy	Hospital)	and	in	cases	of	China’s	assistance	in	conventional	HRH.		
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In	all	cases,	the	system	of	governance	is	a	weak	one,	reliant	on	external	financial	resources	and	not	institutionally	fit	to	avoid	the	fulfilment	of	narrow	self-interests,	mostly	determined	by	high-political	motivations.	The	lack	of	domestic	negotiations,	mostly	due	to	the	weakness	of	the	system	of	governance,	leads	the	national	context	to	become	irrelevant	to	the	outcome	of	the	relation	with	China.		
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Table	6:	Initiator’s	behaviour	(by	sub-sector)		
Source:	Author’s	findings.				
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7.5.2 Tables	of	negotiation	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	2,	the	study	of	negotiation	tables	and	their	conformity	to	the	broader	negotiation	arena	is	significant	to	understand	whether	established	norms	and	procedures	are	maintained	or	bypassed.	It	is	also	important	as	it	helps	to	 understand	 whether	 these	 behaviours	 are	 sector-defined	 or	 rather	 sector-irrelevant.	Negotiation	tables	have	increased	as	new	issues	emerged	between	Kenya	and	China.	In	the	cases	analysed	in	this	thesis,	negotiation	tables	with	China	have	at	times	conformed	with	what	was	envisioned	in	the	system	of	governance	to	which	they	belong,	while	at	times	they	have	been	subjected	to	alterations,	the	extreme	of	which	 was	 full	 non-conformity.	 Conformity	 refers	 to	 both	 domestic	 actors’	conformity	and	external	actors’	conformity	to	existing	procedural	norms.		In	four	cases	the	table	of	negotiation	with	the	Chinese	conformed	with	existing	norms	and	practices.	However,	in	five	cases	an	alteration	was	observed.	Of	these,	4	cases	presented	a	light	alteration,	while	one	case	(Confucius	Institutes)	presented	full	non-conformity.			Table	7:	Conformity	to	tables	of	negotiation	(by	sub-sector)	
 
Rooted	Governance	 Governance	in-the-making	
Conformity	 Light	alteration	 Non-conformity	 Conformity	 Light	alteration	 Non-conformity	
Trade	of	health	products	 Trade	unions	 	 Counterfeits	 Traditional	medicine	 Confucius	Institutes	HRH	conventional	 Infrastructure	for	health	 	 TVET	 Traditional	HRH	 	
	 Small	traders	 	 	 	 	Source:	Author’s	findings.		In	the	cases	of	light	alteration,	this	depended	on	very	different	factors.	In	the	case	of	trade	unions,	despite	the	existence	of	a	strong	system	of	governance	for	dispute	resolution,	 the	 government	 interference	 was	 based	 on	 broader	 interests	 in	infrastructure	 development,	 from	 which	 originated	 the	 need	 to	 maintain	 good	relations	with	the	Chinese.	The	governance	system	provides	for	a	negotiation	table	populated	by	three	types	of	actors,	namely	the	trade	union,	the	Ministry	of	Labour,	and	the	company	or	the	employers’	association	on	its	behalf.	On	top	of	these,	the	negotiation	 also	 involves	 the	 Judiciary,	 i.e.	 the	 Industrial	 Court,	 for	 cases	where	
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stakeholders	 do	 not	 manage	 to	 settle	 disputes.	 The	 arena	 is	 legally	 and	institutionally	 defined,	 though	 recently	 challenged	 by	 devolution	 processes	 of	implementation.	It	is,	however,	generally	legitimised	within	the	country.	The	tables	of	 negotiation	 with	 the	 Chinese,	 i.e.	 the	 actual	 negotiation,	 shows,	 however,	 an	alteration	of	the	norms	and	practices	deemed	legitimate	in	the	domestic	arena.	This	alteration	is	mostly	related	to	the	Chinese	presence,	rather	than	foreign	presence.	It	entails	alleged	corruption,	as	well	as	improper	government	interference.		In	the	case	of	infrastructure	for	health,	a	similar	scenario	was	observed	(note	that	both	cases	revolve	around	infrastructure	development)	but,	contrary	to	the	case	of	trade	unions,	the	relations	with	China	showed	a	gap	in	the	governance	system.	In	other	 words,	 the	 heavy	 reliance	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 on	 international	institutions	 has	 weakened	 the	 institutional	 ability	 to	 negotiate.	 This	 becomes	particularly	evident	when	the	Ministry	negotiates	with	an	actor	that	does	not	adhere	to	the	international	institutions’	system.	However,	 it	 is	deemed	a	 ‘light’	alteration	because	the	relational	process	with	the	Chinese	has	shown	a	learning	curve	based	on	 which	 the	 role	 played	 by	 high-level	 bureaucrats	 was	 downplayed	 by	 the	professionals	involved	in	the	negotiation.		In	 the	case	of	 traders,	 the	scenario	differs	as	 the	governance	system	 is	mainly	informal,	 though	 heavily	 supported	 by	 business	 elites,	 often	 linked	 to	 political	constituencies.	 The	 alteration,	 in	 this	 case,	 consists	 in	 the	 acknowledgement,	 by	formal	 authorities,	 that	 the	 informal	 system	 of	 governance,	 while	 balanced	domestically,	is	vulnerable	to	inputs	from	foreign	actors.	Despite	the	ability	of	the	informal	 sector	 to	 control	 the	 entry	 of	 Chinese	 traders,	 this	 was	 not	 based	 on	formally	recognised	instruments.	The	Kenya	Investment	Authority	recognised	that	the	Chinese	exposed	a	major	gap	in	the	country’s	system	of	governance	of	foreign	investment,	namely	the	lack	of	a	proper	regulatory	regime.	While	traders	are	not	necessarily	investors,	the	fact	that	they	are	allowed	to	enter	the	country	and	set	up	small	activities	is	perceived	as	such.	This	‘allowance’	is	mainly	consequential	to	the	fact	that	investment	limits	are	not	regulated.	The	Chinese	have	had	to	come	to	terms	with	the	fact	that	their	activities	must	not	only	comply	with	formal,	legally	regulated	norms,	but	also	with	informal	norms,	not	legally	regulated	but	nonetheless	highly	regulated,	 not	 state-led	 but	 often	 approved	 –	 if	 not	 directly	 supported	 –	 by	government	agents.		
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guarantee	 negotiation	 tables	 conform	 to	 the	 broad	 system	 of	 governance.	 The	temporary	nature	of	these	occurrences	is	shaped	by	the	ability	of	Kenyan	actors	to	identify	the	weaknesses	that	the	relations	with	the	Chinese	have	emphasised	and	act	to	resolve	them.	As	Mosley	et	al.	pointed	out,	“any	negotiating	game	is	bound	to	change	significantly,	not	least	as	a	result	of	the	fact	that	after	years	of	experience	both	 sides	 of	 the	 bargaining	 table	 figure	 out	 ways	 to	 neutralize	 each	 other’s	strategies.”833	The	only	 case	of	 non-conformity	 is	 the	 case	of	 Confucius	 Institutes	where	 the	governance	 system	 is	 still	 at	 the	 initial	 stages	of	 a	 substantial	 restructuring.	The	Confucius	 Institutes,	 peculiar	 and	 unique	 as	 they	 are	 at	 global	 level,	 have	 thus	entered	 a	 system	 that	 is	 not	 well	 articulated	 to	 safeguard	 Kenyan	 interests	(perceived	 to	 be	 academic	 independence	 over	 dependence	 on	 external	 financial	resources).	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 negotiations	 occur	 mainly	 between	 the	 Chinese	Embassy	and	the	Vice-Chancellors	of	the	educational	institutions	where	the	CIs	are	set	up	is	not	well	received	but	it	cannot	easily	be	contested	either,	given	the	lack	of	regulatory	frameworks.	At	the	same	time,	the	passivity	of	educational	institutions	and	the	Ministry	of	Education	in	attempting	to	create	stricter	procedural	norms	of	conduct	 is	 understood	 as	 an	 act	 of	 convenience	 which	 exacerbates	 financial	dependence,	accommodating	Chinese	interests.			
7.6 Conclusions	Actors	 move	 across	 regulated	 and	 unregulated	 spheres	 of	 action	 for	 the	achievement	 of	 their	 interests.	 The	 patterns	 observed	 in	 the	 cases	 studied	 here	combine	 everything	 from	 elements	 of	 the	 democratic	 model	 –	 constitutionally	grounded	 since	 2010	 in	 Kenya	 –	 to	 informal	 clientelism.	 The	 frequent	 lack	 of	adherence	of	China	 to	existing	governance	 frameworks	has	been	received	with	a	diversity	of	reactions,	ranging	from	exclusion	to	accommodation.	While	the	Chinese,	knowingly	 or	 unknowingly,	 often	 bypass	 existing	 governance	 frameworks,	 the	instances	 in	 which	 Kenyan	 agents	 and	 structures	 bring	 governance	 back	 to	existing/legitimised	 patterns	 are	more	 than	 the	 instances	 in	which	 the	 opposite	occurs.	This	occurs	across	sectors	and	also	across	modalities	of	interaction,	i.e.	trade	versus	aid,	for	example.	The	fact	that	Kenyans	are	more	likely	to	bring	governance	
                                                833	Mosley,	Harrigan	and	Toyle,	1991,	cited	by	Whitfield	and	Fraser,	op.	cit.,	p.	345.		
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back	to	existing,	institutionalised	patterns,	rather	than	being	dominated	by	external	frameworks,	is	important	not	only	in	the	context	of	international	relations,	but	also	in	a	domestic	scenario	where	democratization	is	not	merely	constitutional	jargon,	but	 a	 de	 facto	moment	 occurring	 through	myriad	 of	 actions	 carried	 forward	 by	bureaucrats	and	society	alike.		Interestingly,	it	is	found	that	more	often	the	modality,	rather	than	the	content	of	the	 negotiation,	 represents	 the	 point	 of	 fracture	 between	 Chinese	 and	 Kenyan	agents.	In	other	words,	most	cases	studied	show	that	Kenyans	are	not	against	the	relations	with	China	because	they	believe	they	would	not	be	beneficial,	but	because	the	Chinese	do	not	adhere	 to	existing	modi	operandi.	This	 lack	of	alignment	with	norms	of	conduct	is	at	times	exacerbated	by	Kenyans,	at	times	it	is	recognised	as	a	product	of	weak	domestic	procedural	norms.	Eventually	what	seems	to	be	relevant	to	 the	 ultimate	 control/ownership	 of	 the	 negotiation	 with	 the	 Chinese	 is	 the	conformity	of	negotiation	processes	to	the	general	system	of	norms	and	practices	as	understood	and	legitimised	by	Kenyans.																												
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CHAPTER	8 	
Conclusions			
8.1 Overview	One	of	the	problems	of	the	literature	within	which	this	thesis	rests	is	the	impulse	to	provide	 a	 ‘grand’	meaning	 to	China-Africa	 relations,	 an	 impulse	 that	has	been	difficult	 to	 fulfil	entirely.	First,	 this	expectation	was	based	on	an	assumption	that	China	 had	 one	 coherent	 set	 of	 interests	 across	African	 countries,	which	 are	well	planned	in	Beijing	to	be	exported	to	Africa.	Second,	it	was	believed	that	the	reception	in	 Africa	 would	 not	 vary	 extensively	 across	 54	 countries.	While	 the	 first	 aspect	started	being	unpacked	by	 scholars	 and	policy	makers	with	 thriving	 interest,	 i.e.	breaking	down	‘China’	into	the	multiplicity	of	interests	and	structures	it	is	made	of,	the	 second	 aspect	 remains	 highly	 un-problematized,	 i.e.	 Africa	 largely	 remains	 a	
collective	discourse,	a	‘receiving’,	‘unsuspecting’834	continent	acted	upon	by	the	last-comer	 in	 a	 long	 list	 of	 external	 presences	 that	 had	 normatively	 advised	 and	pragmatically	exploited	elites	and	peoples	south	of	the	Sahara.		Hence	the	need	to	fill	this	gap	and	pay	attention	to	Africans	and	their	contexts,	unpacking	 the	multidimensional	 aspects	 of	 specific	 African	 social,	 economic	 and	political	realities	to	achieve	a	more	accurate	and	representative	understanding	of	relations.	This	led	the	author	to	select	one	country,	rather	than	multiple	countries,	which	proved	to	be	an	important	method	for	a	particularised	study	of	the	arguably	asymmetrical	relations	between	Africans	and	external	actors,	and	of	the	‘win-win’	discourse	 between	 China	 and	 African	 countries.	 Transcending	 the	 disciplinary	boundaries	that	often	adopt	single	levels	of	analysis,	this	thesis	combines	reasoning	about	macro-,	meso-	 and	micro-level	 dynamics,	 i.e.	 national,	 sectoral	 and	 issue-specific.	It	studies	Kenya-China	relations	by	moving	beyond	the	limitations	of	‘one	sector’	comparisons,	where	the	broader	context	rarely	plays	a	role.	It	is	crucial	to	recognise	that	countries	do	not	necessarily	have	similar	priorities	when	it	comes	to	specific	issues,	sectors,	even	national	interests.	Therefore,	using	such	three-layered	approach	and	paying	attention	to	the	specific	and	broader	contexts	simultaneously,	leverages	 the	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 that	 a	 country-system	 adopts	 vis-à-vis	
                                                834	Gadzala,	2015,	op.	cit.		
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external	 forces,	 allowing	 analysts	 to	 balance	 conclusions	 concerning	 the	asymmetrical	relations	of	power,	which	have	long	been	characterising	the	scholarly	debates	around	Africa	in	international	relations.		Although	Africa	cannot	be	taken	as	a	unitary	single	block,	and	the	choice	of	Kenya	to	explain	the	role	of	domestic	politics	within	the	China-Africa	discourse	does	not	aim	to	be	representative	of	the	whole	continent,	the	method	used	(layered	interests)	and	 the	 relational	 dynamics	 that	 were	 observed	 domestically	 and	 in	 relation	 to	China,	are	 likely	to	facilitate	the	understanding	of	Sino-African	dynamics	 in	other	countries.	Indeed,	what	is	unique	in	the	findings	are	not	the	relations	between	Kenya	and	China,	but	rather	the	standing-point	from	which	these	relations	were	observed.		This	dissertation	changed	the	standing-point	from	which	Sino-African	relations	have	largely	been	observed,	giving	Africa	a	more	prominent	position.	In	this	context,	it	questions	whether	known	concepts	and	norms	of	international	relations	can	or	should	 be	 applied	 to	 Sino-African	 relations.	 Starting	 with	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	African	countries	can	have	theoretical	utility	in	International	Relations	Theory,	to	challenging	the	widely	held	positions	that	Africans	are	unwilling	and	unable	agents	in	 international	 relations,	 the	analysis	of	 the	 relations	between	Kenya	and	China	provides	a	basis	 to	 think	about	how	the	discourses	and	practices	 that	have	been	widely	generalised	should	be	reviewed	with	caution.		The	 approach	 adopted	 in	 the	 thesis	 was	 a	 critique	 of	 International	 Relations	Theory	 in	 its	 (non)	 engagement	with	 Africa.	 The	 findings	 tend	 to	 reveal	 that	 IR	theories,	when	 applied	 to	African	 scenarios,	 can	 indeed	have	 explanatory	 power	leading	to	believe	that	IR	theorists	should	engage	seriously	with	Africa,	rather	than	keeping	it	at	the	limits	of	the	discipline.	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	findings	–	both	theoretical	and	empirical	–	suggest	that	other	theoretical	bodies	of	scholarship	could	well	explain	these	real-world	dynamics,	maybe	in	conjunction	with	IRT.		For	 instance,	 the	 thesis	 brings	 to	 light	 units	 of	 analysis	 that	 are	 typical	 of	 the	International	 Political	 Economy	 (IPE)	 discipline,	 such	 as	 sources	 of	 finance,	regionalism,	 transnational	 governance.	 By	 bringing	 African	 dynamics	 to	 the	foreground,	this	thesis	demonstrates	how	an	African	country	inserts	itself	into	the	international	 political	 economy	 of	 specific	 sectors,	 not	 as	 a	 passive	 agent,	 but	through	active	strategies	of	engagement,	mainly	of	contestation	and	cooperation.	Passivity,	 instead,	 is	 more	 rarely	 observed.	 Similarly,	 a	 focus	 on	 theories	 of	institutional	change	could	have	shed	more	light	on	the	distinction	between	formal	
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and	 informal	 institutions835	and	 their	 impact	 on	 Kenya’s	 relations	 with	 external	forces.	It	could	have	also	helped	to	explain	the	conditions	under	which	institutions	stop	functioning	and	institutional	change	is	likely	to	occur;	and	the	role	of	actors	in	determining	the	rules	of	the	game836.		Despite	the	absence	of	these	theoretical	bodies	in	this	thesis,	the	sections	below	highlight	some	of	the	main	findings	with	the	hope	that	they	can	be	the	starting	point	to	develop	the	Sino-African	literature	in	further	unexplored	directions.				
8.2 Agency-as-ownership	of	the	governance	process.	A	new	wave	of	scholarly	attention	on	African	agency	 in	 international	relations	has	 started	 emerging	 in	 the	 early	 2010s.	 However,	 available	 studies	 on	 African	agency	 have	 not	 provided	 yet	 a	 comprehensive	 account	 of	 the	 elements	 that	contribute	to	it.	That	is	what	this	thesis	has	attempted	to	do,	not	merely	by	focusing	on	agency	as	actors’	decisions,	but	more	broadly	on	agency	as	the	ownership	of	the	
governance	 process,	 which	 is	 constituted	 by	 the	 interaction	 of	 beliefs,	 interests,	resources	and	systems	of	governance.	This	type	of	agency	is	contingent	on	historical,	political,	 cultural,	 economic	 realities	 and	 does	 not	 thus	 allow	 to	 talk	 of	 'African'	agency	easily.	As	the	cases	in	this	thesis	demonstrate,	it	is	hard	to	talk	about	‘agency’	in	unitary	terms	even	within	a	single	country,	let	alone	across	a	continent.		The	conceptualization	of	agency	that	is	presented	in	this	thesis	puts	forward	a	few	 propositions.	 First,	 above	 all,	 the	 thesis	 adopts	 a	 state-society	 approach	 to	understanding	agency.	This	decision	was	grounded	in	the	belief	that	the	governance	of	domestic	or	foreign	affairs	cannot	be	circumscribed	within	‘state’	and	‘non-state’	boundaries.	In	other	words,	the	thesis	does	not	treat	agency	toward	external	actors	as	 an	 affair	 of	 either	 the	 state	 or	 society,	 but	 rather	 as	 the	 inevitable	 relational	process	 between	 the	 two.	 It	 is	 in	 the	 very	 transcendental	 nature	 of	 this	conceptualization	of	agency	that	the	core	of	Kenyan	agency	is	found.	While	cases	of	strained	 relations	 between	 the	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 exist,	 so	 do	 cases	 of	cooperation.	Though	the	conceptualization	of	agency	is	here	applied	to	a	country	where	governance-sharing	is	increasingly	valued	and	has	become	constitutionally-protected,	the	elements	of	agency	identified	in	the	conceptualization	can	be	used	to	
                                                835	G.	Helmke	and	S.	Levitsky,	‘Informal	institutions	and	comparative	politics:	A	research	agenda’,	Perspectives	on	Politics,	vol.	2,	no.	4,	2004,	p.	727.	836	K.A.	Shepsle,	‘Rational	choice	institutionalism’,	in	S.	Binder,	R.	Rhodes	and	B.	Rockman	eds.,	Oxford	Handbook	of	Political	
Institutions,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford,	2008,	p.	25.	
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analyse	agency	elsewhere.	The	content	of	the	analysis	is	expected	to	differ	across	countries,	as	much	as	it	differs	within	Kenya,	across	sectors.		In	fact,	the	relations	between	Kenya	and	China	are	found	to	be	as	complex	as,	and	a	 reflection	 of,	 domestic	 politics.	 To	 understand	 this,	 one	must	 not	 look	 beyond	national	boundaries	as	the	complexity	is	to	be	found,	first	and	foremost,	in	how	the	
domestic	context	conceives	foreign	presences,	strategizing	them	to	achieve	domestic	
and	 foreign	aims.	 In	other	words,	while	 the	presence	of	China	may	be	peculiar	 in	terms	 of	 specific	 Kenyan	 perceptions	 and	 interests	 that	 come	 into	 play,	 it	 is	conceived	domestically	as	nothing	more	nor	less	than	an	external	actor.	The	cases	presented	 suggest	 that	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 relations	 with	 China	 are	 highly	dependent	upon	Kenyans’	willingness	and	ability	to	either	use	existing	governance	systems	or	create	more	suitable	ones,	to	face	the	opportunities	and	challenges	China	has	brought	to	the	country.	In	other	words,	the	explanatory	realm	is	found	within	Kenya,	more	than	outside.		The	 focus	of	 this	study	on	 local	governance,	and	the	relevance	of	state-society	interdependence,	 consciously	 departs	 from	 the	 dichotomy	 that	 is	 often	 found	 in	Sino-African	 studies	 between	 state-to-state	 and	 people-to-people	 interactions,	 of	limited	 utility	 to	 understand	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 engagements.	 To	 capture	 the	complexity	 and	 the	 fast-paced	 shifts	 of	 Sino-African	 relations	 it	 was	 urgent	 to	identify	more	fine-grained	units	of	analysis	than	the	state	and	pay	closer	attention	to	micro-level	dynamics.	This	does	not	aim	at	diminishing	the	importance	and	the	power	of	the	state.	The	dichotomy	was	used	to	understand	African	elites’	relations	with	 China	 as	 revolving	 around	 the	 safeguarding	 of	 patrimonial	 linkages	 within	national	 boundaries,	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 the	 population.	 However,	 the	 cases	analysed	show	that,	while	patrimonial	linkages	are	present	at	some	level	(see	the	business	elites	during	the	Kibaki	era,	Chapter	3),	they	are	not	excessively	evident	in	all	instances	and	in	such	a	way	that	ends	up	benefiting	few	at	the	expense	of	others.	Especially	with	the	Kenyatta-Ruto	leadership,	patronage	relationships	have	diluted,	mainly	due	to	the	split	nature	of	governance.		Stringent	 political	 reasons	 have	 remained	 relevant	 in	 Kenya-China	 relations	including	 essential	 elements	 of	 interdependence	 where	 Kenya	 needs	 China	 but	China	also	needs	Kenya	(see	the	case	of	Uhuru	Kenyatta	and	William	Ruto’s	trials	at	the	 International	 Criminal	 Court,	 and	 the	 ‘use’	 of	 China	 to	 leverage	 the	Western	influence).	However,	beyond	high	politics,	the	activities	in	which	Kenyan	state	and	
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social	groups	engage	with	China	are	generally	part	of	broader	plans	of	development,	national	or	sectoral,	public	or	private.	This	means	 that	 in	everyday	activities,	 the	engagement	 of	 Kenyan	 actors	 with	 the	 Chinese	 is	 not	 as	 exceptional	 as	 often	believed.	 The	 layered	 interests	 approach	 helps	 understand	 that	 while	 national	interests	 are	 rhetorically	 framed	 around	 mutual	 benefit	 etc.	 sectoral	 and	 issue-based	 interests	 are	 often	 revisited	 to	 fit	 existing	 meanings	 and	 patterns	 of	engagement.	This	also	sheds	light	on	the	fact	that	state	and	social	groups	in	Kenya	do	not	set	their	motivations,	and	do	not	act	much	differently	from	what	is	expected	from	the	literature	 in	 IR.	 To	 gather	 a	more	 representative	 picture	 of	 empirical	 dynamics,	though,	it	was	necessary	to	acknowledge	the	derivative	and	multidisciplinary	nature	of	IR,	not	thus	using	a	single	approach	but	rather	combining	features	drawn	from	a	range	of	approaches.			
8.3 Democracy	or	economic	development?	Blended	governance	
instead.		An	important	question	that	arises	from	the	analyses	carried	out	throughout	the	thesis	 concerns	 whether	 the	 governance-in-flux	 that	 has	 been	 described	 is	symptomatic	of	a	particular	moment	in	the	history	of	Kenya,	one	characterised	by	the	 arrival	 of	 China,	 or	 is	 rather	 a	 continuation	 of	 a	 pre-existing	 trajectory.	Contemporary	discourses	have	been	suggesting	that	a	national	break	with	the	past	has	been	taking	shape,	with	the	country’s	domestic	policies	Looking	East.	However,	how	quickly	are	grassroots	sectoral	interests	adjusting	to	this	 international	shift?		Having	 China	 as	 a	 partner-option	 for	 development	 does	 not	 mean	 choosing	 the	country	over	others.	The	rationale	behind	the	selection	of	China	as	a	partner,	where	applicable,	 is	often	calculated	 to	draw	benefits	 that	are	more	complex	 than	mere	‘economic	advantage	without	conditions’.	First,	the	myth	that	China	does	not	attach	conditions	is	soon	dispelled	by	actors	 involved	in	the	negotiations837.	Second,	the	conditions	are	generally	negotiated,	rarely	accepted	in	their	original	format838.	The	
                                                837	See	the	cases	of:	infrastructure	for	health,	where	contracts	with	the	Chinese	involve	purchase	of	Chinese	products,	or	the	case	of	the	Malaria	Centre,	where	Chinese	conditions	are	non-negotiable	and	end	up	not	fitting	into	the	existing	framework	of	procurement/project	development;	the	case	of	Confucius	Institutes,	where	the	establishment	of	the	institutes	is	mainly	decided	and	developed	according	to	Chinese	actors’	agendas	(rather	than	providing	the	service	in	response-mode	as	stated);	the	case	of	TVET,	where	the	Chinese	wanted	to	establish	a	school	under	their	conditions	within	an	existing	institute;	the	case	of	trade	unions,	where	the	Chinese	created	a	new	company	in	order	to	avoid	raising	the	minimum	wage	of	the	CBA.	It	is	normal	that	Chinese	actors	set	conditions,	it	is	not	normal	to	expect	that	they	do	not	do	so.		838	See	all	the	cases	presented	in	the	note	above,	and	how	Kenyan	actors	negotiated	with	the	Chinese.		
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contacts	with	China	are	in	fact	also	used	as	strategic	means	to	negotiate	with	the	West	when	this	latter	is	considered	to	offer	better	options.		One	 of	 the	 main	 questions	 revolving	 around	 Sino-African	 relations	 is	 that	 of	whether	China’s	presence	in	Africa	will	contribute	to	the	continent’s	emergence	and	development	or	will	rather	throw	it	back	into	a	phase	of	colonial	rule.	Linked	to	this	is	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 China’s	 lack	 of	 attention	 to	 democracy	 and	 good	governance,	i.e.	transparency,	accountability,	etc.,	will	spoil	decades	of	efforts,	from	the	 West	 and	 African	 countries	 to	 put	 Africa	 on	 the	 ‘right	 path’	 to	 democratic	development,	in	order	to	favour	economic	development.	Inherent	in	this	concern	is	the	belief	that	the	two	approaches,	one	heralded	by	the	West,	the	other	by	China,	would	not	be	easily	reconciled.	 It	was	often	assumed	that	African	countries	have	been	standing	at	a	juncture	since	the	arrival	of	China,	asked	to	choose	between	one	direction	or	 the	other,	 i.e.	 the	Western	 liberal	approach	or	 the	Eastern	economic	development	model.	The	general	idea	that	either	one	or	the	other	approach	must	be	chosen	seems	to	reflect	an	ideologically-charged	idea	of	Africa	trapped	between	the	East/West	divide.		In	 fact,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 this	 dissertation,	 what	 appears	 to	 emerge	 more	strongly	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 actual	 contexts	 is	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 blended	 type	 of	
governance	where	the	constitutional	democratic	model	starts	being	absorbed,	and	the	economic	development	model	is	catching	on	at	significant	speed.	The	argument	I	put	forward	based	on	the	cases	analysed	in	this	thesis	is	that	Kenyans	are	working	to	unite	these	paths,	presumably	parallel,	into	a	governance	model	that	makes	sense	domestically.	Inevitably	each	‘original’	paradigm	is	bound	to	lose	something	on	the	way,	 but	 the	 emerging	 model,	 freed	 of	 normative	 prescriptions	 and	 economic	lessons,	may	eventually	be	more	suited	to	the	country’s	current	specific	needs.	An	interviewee	 commented	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 road	 by	 the	 Chinese:	 “there	 were	complaints	about	standards,	but	compared	to	what	was	there	before…	this	 is	not	about	 perfection” 839 .	 This	 highlights	 a	 tension	 between	 an	 understanding	 of	development	 as	 comprehensive	 development	 vis-à-vis	 possible	 development,	 i.e.	based	on	actual	available	resources	and	capacities.		A	 senior	 officer	 at	 the	 Kenya	 National	 Highways	 Authority	 (the	 institution	 in	charge	of	managing	 infrastructural	mega-projects	 in	Kenya,	 highly	 involved	with	
                                                839	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	National	Economic	and	Social	Council,	Nairobi,	2014-01-24.		
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Chinese	construction	companies)840,	 in	his	own	words,	expressed	 the	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	the	two	models	for	Kenya:		The	World	 Bank	 introduces	 all	 those	 rules	 on	 governance	which	 are	 a	thing.	They	want	the	strengthening	of	capacity	etc.	When	the	project	is	over,	in	10/15	years	 this	 is	what	 is	going	 to	stay.	They	pushed	us	 to	set	up	 the	National	Transport	Safety,	though	it	is	still	a	baby	institution,	and	they	are	now	working	to	check	the	use	of	alcohol	on	the	streets,	etc.	These	things	have	a	long	term	impact.	Their	contracts	are	well	structured,	and	things	are	done	properly.	But	the	Chinese	provide	us	with	fast	delivery.	And	for	me,	there	is	a	way	for	both.	We	need	the	Chinese	now,	to	move	on	[i.e.	keep	the	pace	of	infrastructural	 and	 economic	 development],	 and	we	need	 institutions	 like	the	WB	to	help	us	set	those	long	term	goals	that	are	necessary	for	Kenya’s	future.	But	we	need	to	remember	we	also	need	space	for	the	local	industry.	At	 the	 airport	 now,	 they	 [the	 Chinese]	 stay841	behind	 offices,	 in	 economic	accommodation,	but	things	will	change.	Now	they	can	do	that,	but	over	time	it	is	human	nature	to	want	more.	There	will	come	a	time	when	their	prices	will	not	be	competitive	anymore.	Even	in	China	now	wages	are	increasing.	It	is	good	for	now	while	it	lasts,	but	we	need	to	build	up	our	local	capacities.		While	 the	 Chinese	 model	 of	 development,	 i.e.	 economic	 development	 before	social	and	political	rights,	is	currently	advantageous	for	Kenya,	it	would	be	short-sighted	 not	 to	 see	 its	 limits.	 Similarly,	 while	 the	 Western	 emphasis	 on	comprehensive	contracts,	where	workers’	rights	are	safeguarded,	 is	 important	 to	build	 a	 better	 social	 texture,	 the	 inability	 to	 pay	 comfortably	 for	 those	 services	cannot	be	ignored.		Hence	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 blend	 which	 emerges	 from	 a	 very	 specific	 national	environment	 where	 constitutionalism	 is	 being	 absorbed,	 and	 economic	development	is	being	valued	and	promoted.	Although	it	is	undeniable	that	in	Kenya	development	has	often	been	linked	to	clientelistic	legitimacy,	the	picture	that	was	
                                                840	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Kenya	National	Highways	Authority,	Nairobi,	2014-02-19.		841	Chinese	technicians	and	workers	working	for	construction	companies	are	often	accommodated	on	the	construction	site,	in	modest	accommodation	units,	with	few	comforts.	This,	in	turn,	lowers	the	project’s	costs,	making	Chinese	projects	more	affordable	than	Western	ones.	The	argument	of	the	interviewee	is	that	sooner	or	later	(expected	to	be	sooner	rather	than	later	according	to	the	increase	of	minimum	wages	in	China)	even	Chinese	technicians	and	workers	will	start	rejecting	such	living	conditions	and	will	demand	better	accommodation	–	and	maybe	better	pay.	In	turn,	Chinese	projects	will	not	be	as	affordable	as	they	currently	are.		
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observed	was	 also	 one	 of	 bureaucrats	 and	 common	 people	who	 believed	 in	 the	country’s	 development	 and	 acted	 professionally	 to	 achieve	 the	 objective,	 not	motivated	by	allegiance	to	a	leader,	but	by	their	personal	and	professional	ethics.	In	other	 words,	 while	 corruption	 and	 clientelism	 are	 part	 of	 the	 story,	 so	 are	transparency	and	competence.	This	occurs	in	a	country	where	governance	is	in	flux,	where	the	economy	“no	longer	relies	on	the	state;	the	multi-party	democracy	is	here	to	 stay	 and	 presidential	 demands	 provoke	 as	much	 resistance	 as	 obedience”842.	Especially	after	the	new	constitution	was	passed,	setbacks	against	it	have	been	met	“with	vigorous	resistance	from	Kenyans,	resistance	that	confirmed	that	the	many	years	spent	negotiating	the	new	constitution	had	introduced	into	the	Kenyan	body	politic	a	fresh	civic	sensitivity	against	rule	by	presidential	fiat”843.		Consequentially,	the	state	that	emerges	in	the	Kenyan	context	is	not	only	one	that	would	merely	perpetuate	clientelistic	networks,	but	also	one	that	is	dependent	upon	societal	forces	including	the	private	sector.	At	the	same	time,	civil	society	is	not	only	composed	 of	 actors	 embodying	 the	 normative	 good	 reflected	 in	 much	 of	 the	literature	on	civil	society,	but	also	narrow-purposed	groups,	business	networks,	etc.	far	 from	being	 exemplary	organisations	 acting	 for	 the	 good	of	 the	majority.	This	argument	goes	hand	in	hand	with	the	idea	that	Sino-African	relations	are	welcomed	by	the	elites	and	despised	by	the	population.	The	picture	is	less	neat	than	this,	more	blurred,	confused,	and	yet	more	balanced.	Both	the	state	and	non-state	realms	are	filled	with	actors	of	diverse	beliefs	and	motivations.	This	is	why	looking	at	beliefs,	perceptions,	 ideologies	 (toward	 China,	 and	 other	 external	 actors)	 is	 crucial.	Unpacking	them	allows	one	to	observe	how	they	are	less	role-determined	and	more	person-determined	than	previously	thought.				
8.4 Dependence	for	sustainability	Another	 important	 aspect	 concerns	 the	 dependence	 upon	 external	 forces	 and	if/how	the	arrival	of	China	is	perpetuating	this	behaviour.	It	is	not	an	option,	but	a	condition,	 that	 Kenya	 relies	 on	 external	 forces	 to	 continue	 on	 its	 journey	 of	development.	In	a	way,	it	is	possible	to	state	that	Kenya’s	pre-existing	extraversion	strategies	continue	with	the	Chinese.	However,	a	number	of	other	elements	seem	to	
                                                842	Hornsby,	op.cit.,	p.7	843	Murunga,	Okello	and	Sjögren,	op.	cit.,	p.	ix.		
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suggest	that	dependence	on	external	powers	is	bound	to	diminish	in	the	years	ahead.	The	sheer	dynamism	of	the	country’s	growing	middle	class,	the	nation	and	sector-wide	commitment	to	industrialization,	the	increased	awareness	that	democracy	is	“here	to	stay”,	the	purposive	detachment	from	Western	aid	and	the	adoption	of	aid	provision	 declarations	 such	 as	 the	 Paris	 and	 Accra	 ones	 that	 focus	 on	 the	 host	country’s	elaboration	of	priorities.	All	these	elements	suggest	that	Kenyans	are	more	interested	in	taking	ownership	of	the	development	path,	‘from	inside’.	After	all,	the	relations	with	China	and	the	recent	financial	crisis	have	emphasised,	once	more,	that	the	foreign	provision	of	assistance	does	not	last	forever,	and	that	it	is	subjected	and	vulnerable	 to	 alterations	 occurring	 in	 donor	 countries.	 Not	 only,	 there	 is	 also	 a	growing	 segment	 of	 the	 population,	 i.e.	 the	 youth,	 that	 is	 increasingly	 educated,	digitalized	 and	 dynamic	 enough	 to	 strategically	 use	 domestic	 and	 international	resources	 to	 create	 new	 spaces	 of	 development	 within	 the	 country,	 rather	 than	outside	of	it.		Consequentially,	while	dependence	implies	an	asymmetrical	relationship,	what	seems	 to	 emerge	 from	 the	 analysis	 is	 that	 sustainability	 in	 development	 is	increasingly	 becoming	 an	 established	 concept,	 guiding	 Kenyan	 approaches	 to	external	actors.	This	does	not	eliminate	dependence	on	foreign	financial	and	human	resources,	 but	 it	 suggests	 that	 the	 country	 is	 gearing	 up	 to	 make	 use	 of	 these	resources	for	long-term	developments	rather	than	use	them	as	one-off	free	grants.	Part	of	this	picture	is	the	recognition	that	Kenya	does	not	merely	‘receive’	Chinese	trade,	investments,	assistance,	but	also	‘requests’	them.	For	long	in	the	literature,	it	was	believed	that	if	anything,	African	countries	were	struggling	to	fit	the	Chinese	into	 contexts	 where	 they	 imposed	 themselves.	 However,	 it	 was	 clarified	 that	focusing	on	Africa	as	the	recipient	provides	a	partial	portray	of	actual	engagements.	Pro-active	behaviour	is	also	observed	according	to	which	Kenyan	actors	identify	and	
choose	China	as	a	partner	in	trade,	development	and	more.				
8.5 Time	for	social	change	Finally,	international	relations	theories	do	not	easily	contribute	to	accounting	for	
variations	through	time.	This	study	emphasises	the	importance	of	accounting	for	the	dynamic	 nature	 of	 processes,	 how	 agents	modify	 them	 in	 itinere	 and	 how	 these	processes	 modify	 agents.	 Understanding	 the	 relatively	 new	 co-existence	 of	
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democratic	 governance	 and	 rapid	 economic	 development	 requires	 awareness	concerning	the	fact	that	uncertainty	surrounds	implementation	efforts	and	results.	Kenyan	and	Chinese	actors	are	still	studying	each	other	although	the	intensification	of	social,	political	and	economic	activities	has	exposed	them	to	one	another	more	often	and	more	comprehensively.		Nonetheless,	beyond	the	policies	on	paper,	social	change	takes	time	to	happen.	One	interviewee	suggested	that	“it	will	take	a	long	time	for	Kenyans	to	place	people	with	a	degree	from	a	Chinese	university”844	mainly	because	studying	in	China	is	not,	yet,	synonymous	with	high	quality	and	social	status.	Similarly,	another	interviewee	pointed	out	that	“the	Chinese	work	for	 long	hours	but	Africans	do	not	think	they	have	outstanding	intelligence,	vis-à-vis	the	West.	It	is	their	brain	power	that	should	impact	Africa,	but	it	has	not.	They	are	not	admired	for	how	they	think.	They	come	for	their	skills	but	not	for	outstanding	thinking.”845		Understanding	 that	 the	 relative	newness	 of	 the	 Chinese	 in	Kenya	 is	 a	 variable	influencing	 perceptions,	 ideas	 and	 potentially	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 relations	 is	crucial.	China	is	often	defined	as	new,	extraneous	and,	therefore,	requiring	Kenyans	to	be	alert.	Even	in	cases	where	actors	are	positive	about	the	engagement	with	China,	a	 sense	 of	 unfamiliarity	 is	 emphasised,	 especially	 in	 comparison	 to	 traditional	external	actors.	A	number	of	agents	claim	they	lack	understanding	of	the	Chinese	behaviour	and	thus	learn	and	re-learn	mainly	by	engaging	with	them.	This	highlights	the	heuristic	aspect	of	 the	 relations,	 according	 to	which	perceived	successes	and	failures	 in	 the	 engagement	 reorient	 preferences	 and	 thus	 strategies	 for	 the	 next	round.	Although	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 thesis	 has	 been	 on	 Kenyan	 contexts,	 inevitably	 the	analyses	 have	 also	 revealed	 a	 variety	 of	 Chinese	 agents,	 interests,	 structures.	 As	Corkin	 suggests	 “China´s	 foreign	 policy	 towards	 Africa	 is	 far	 from	 the	 “grand	strategy”	 concept	 espoused	 by	 Pehnelt	 and	 Abel 846 .	 Instead,	 it	 is	 developed	incrementally,	 largely	 on	 a	 trial	 and	 error	 basis” 847 .	 The	 Chinese	 became	increasingly	 aware	 of	 the	 context	 within	 which	 they	 operate,	 namely	 the	weaknesses	 and	 strengths	 of	 Kenyan	 governance	 systems.	 While	 in	 some	 cases	
                                                844	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya,	Nairobi,	2014-11-04.		845	Interview	with	a	Kenyan	executive	at	a	Confucius	Institute,	2013-10-31.		846	G.	Pehnelt	&	M.	Abel,	‘China’s	Development	Policy	in	Africa’,	Report	no.1,	The	South	African	Institute	of	International	Affairs,	Johannesburg,	2007,	p.	9.		847	L.	Corkin.,	‘African	agency	in	the	context	of	China-Africa	relations’,	Forum	Issue	1	and	2,	African	East-Asian	Affairs/The	China	Monitor,	Centre	for	Chinese	Studies,	Stellenbosch	University,	2015.			
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better	knowledge	of	the	governance	system	was	used	to	bypass	it	more	easily,	 in	other	cases	it	was	a	catalyst	for	a	change	toward	greater	adherence	to	Kenyan	rules.	In	a	way,	the	exposure	to	Kenyan	norms	of	conduct	has	contributed	to	the	Chinese	socialisation	to	a	more	inclusive	system	of	governance.			Considering	the	rapidity	of	the	relations,	the	cases	analysed	do	show	a	range	of	promptness	in	addressing	change.	Actors	use	known	logics	to	engage	the	Chinese,	with	 some	more	promptly	 responding	 to	 the	newcomer	 and	 some	 less.	 	 Broadly	speaking	Kenyans	seem	quite	aware	of	China’s	presence,	and	are	learning,	by	doing	or	 observing,	 what	 the	 consequences	 of	 these	 new	 engagements	 may	 mean.	Eventually,	this	is,	probably	more	than	anything	else,	a	story	of	a	country	where	a	relatively	sudden	migration	of	foreigners	has	shaken	social,	economic	and	political	bases.	However,	while	the	interaction	may	show	distinctive	features,	it	is	a	story	of	adaptation	and	re-adaptation	between	the	local	environment	and	a	foreign	presence.			
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Annex	I	–	FOCAC	commitments	for	health	
	 Declaration		 Action	plan	 Achievement	after	3	years	
FOCAC	2000	-	Beijing	
		
		
The	last	of	a	10	point	declaration:	"10.	We	decide	to	vigorously	promote	further	China-Africa	co-operation	in	the	economic,	trade,	financial,	agricultural,	medical	care	and	public	health,	scientific	and	technological,	cultural,	educational,	human	resources	development,	transportation,	environmental,	tourism	and	other	areas	on	the	basis	of	the	principles	enshrined	in	this	declaration	and	the	Program	for	China-Africa	Co-operation	in	economic	and	social	Development	adopted	at	the	Forum	so	as	to	promote	the	common	development	of	China	and	Africa."	
14.1	-	the	African	Ministers	welcome	the	commitment	made	by	the	Chinese	side	to	send	more	medical	teams	to	African	countries	and	they	promise	to	create	suitable	working	and	living	conditions	for	these	teams.		
China	has	continued	to	dispatch	medical	teams	to	Africa.	In	the	past	three	years,	53	protocols	have	been	concluded	or	renewed	for	this	purpose;		
		
14.2	-	the	chinese	commit	to	continue	providing	african	countries	with	medical	equipment,	facilities,	medicine	and	more	training	to	local	medical	personnel,	and	promote	co-operation	in	the	use	of	traditional	medicine	and	pharmacy.	
convocation	in	2002	of	the	China-Africa	Forum	on	Traditional	Medicine	and	adoption	of	the	Plan	of	Action	for	the	Cooperation	of	Traditional	Medicine	between	China	and	African	Countries;		
		
	14.3	-	conduct	co-operation	in	such	areas	as	reducing	infant	and	maternal	mortality	rates,	and	preventing	and	treating	HIV/AIDS,	malaria,	tropical	and	other	diseases.		
	China	has	signed	or	renewed	protocols	with	40	African	countries	on	dispatching	Chinese	medical	teams,	pledging	continued	provision	free	of	charge	of	pharmaceutics,	medical	equipment	and	other	hospital	materials,	and	cooperation	with	Africa	in	the	prevention	and	treatment	of	HIV/AIDS,	malaria	and	tuberculosis.	
FOCAC	2003	-	Addis	Ababa	
		
under	section	5	Social	Development:	5.1	Human	Resources	Development	and	Educational	Cooperation,	5.2	-	Cooperation	in	Medical	Care	and	Public	Health,	5.3	Cultural	Exchange	and	Cooperation,	and	5.4	People-to-People	Exchange		
5.2.3	-	China	will	continue	to	send	medical	teams	to	Africa.	China	will	endeavor	to	address	African	countries'	request	about	the	composition	of	the	teams.	.	China	will	continue	to	provide	African	countries	with	some	free	medicine,	medical	instruments	or	materials.	It	will	step	up	the	training	of	local	medical	workers.		
		
		
5.3.4	-	enhance	their	traditional	medicine	R&D	cooperation,	experience-sharing	and	technical	exchanges,	in	particular,	in	the	prevention	and	control	of	HIV/AIDS,	malaria,	tuberculosis,	SARS	and	Ebola,	take	the	training	of	specialized	health	care	personnel	as	a	priority	of	their	cooperation	on	human	resources	development.		
the	Chinese	Government	has	adopted	effective	measures	to	provide	timely	assistance	to	African	countries	in	the	prevention	and	treatment	of	malaria,	HIV/AIDS	and	avian	influenza.		
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FOCAC	2006	
under	section	5	Cooperation	in	Social	Development:	5.1	Development	Assistance	and	Debt	Relief,	5.2	Human	Resources	Development,	5.3	Culture,	5.4	Education,	5.5	Medical	Care	and	Public	Health,	5.6	Environmental	Protection,	5.7	Tourism,	5.8	News	Media,	5.9	People-to-People,	Youth	and	Women	Exchanges	
5.5.2	to	increase	exchanges	and	cooperation	in	the	prevention	and	treatment	of	HIV/AIDS,	malaria,	tuberculosis,	Ebola,	Chikungunya,	avian	influenza	and	other	communicable	diseases	and	in	the	fields	of	quarantine	and	public	health	emergency	response	mechanism.		
		
		
5.5.3	build	30	hospitals,	RMB300	million	of	grant	for	providing	anti-malaria	drugs,	build	30	demonstration	centres	prevention	and	treatment	of	malaria,	send	Chinese	Medical	Teams,	provide	medicines	and	medical	supplies,	help	establish	and	improve	medical	facilities	and	train	medical	workers	
construction	has	been	started	on	26	of	the	hospitals	and	will	start	by	the	end	of	this	year	for	another	2;	30	malaria	prevention	and	treatment	centers	and	provided	anti-malaria	medicine	to	36	African	countries	for	three	consecutive	years;	1,200	medical	workers	to	42	African	countries	and	regions,	including	four	medical	teams	sent	to	Chad,	Senegal,	Angola	and	Malawi;	medical	equipment	to	Mauritius	and	Niger	
		
5.9.3	(people-to-people	exchanges)	300	young	volunteers	to	African	countries	to	work	in	medical,	health,	sports,	agriculture,	education	and	other	fields,	as	part	of	PEOPLES-TO-PEOPLES	exchanges	
		
FOCAC	2009	-	since	FOCAC	
2009	the	Declaration	and	
Action	Plan	were	
complemented	by	a	third	
document	Implementation	
of	FOCAC	2006	(the	
previous	FOCAC)	
Section	5	Cooperation	in	the	field	of	development:	5.1	Assistance	and	Debt	Relief;	5.2	Human	resources	development;	5.3	Education;	5.4	Cooperation	in	Science	and	Technology	and	Technology	Transfer;	5.5	Cooperation	in	Poverty	Reduction;	5.6	Medical	Care	and	Public	Health;	5.7	Climate	Change	and	Environmental	Protection;	5.8	Disaster	Reduction	and	Relief;	5.9	Tourism		
5.2.3	US$1.5	million	contribution	to	support	NEPAD’s	projects	to	train	nurses	and	maternity	assistants	in	Africa;	5.6.4	RMB500	million	yuan	worth	of	medical	equipment	and	malaria-fighting	materials	to	30	hospitals	and	30	malaria	prevention	and	treatment	centers	built	by	China;		China	will	invite	African	professionals	working	in	malaria	prevention	and	treatment	centers	to	training	programs	in	China	in	an	effort	to	ensure	sustainable	development	of	the	project;	train	a	total	of	3,000	doctors,	nurses	and	administrative	personnel;	send	medical	teams	
the	cash	aid	for	the	training	of	nurses	and	midwives	for	NEPAD's	projects	is	being	channelled	in	several	instalments.	China	has	dispatched	42	medical	teams	to	African	countries.	There	are	1,067	Chinese	medical	personnel	in	Africa	now.	China	has	provided	medical	equipment,	materials	and	medicines	to	30	hospitals	and	30	malaria	prevention	centers	in	Africa	and	has	sent	13	malaria	prevention	teams	to	27	African	countries;	China	has	trained	24,000	[this	is	a	big	number	and	the	mention	below	is	only	for	7,500	people.	What	about	the	other	16,500?]	African	professionals	in	various	fields,	including	1,500	headmasters	and	teachers,	3,000	agricultural	experts	and	3,000	doctors	and	nurses.		
FOCAC	2012	
		
		
		
		
		
Section	5	Cooperation	in	the	field	of	development:	5.1	Assistance;	5.2	Human	resources	development;	5.3	Science	and	Technology	Cooperation	and	Knowledge	Sharing;	5.4	Cooperation	in	Poverty	Reduction;	5.5	Medical	Care	and	Public	Health;	5.6	Climate	Change	and	Environmental	Protection	
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5.5.3	expand	their	exchanges	and	cooperation	in	the	prevention,	treatment	and	port	control	of	HIV/AIDS,	malaria,	tuberculosis	and	other	major	communicable	diseases,	health	personnel	training,	maternal	and	child	health,	health	system	building	and	public	health	policies.	
		
		
5.5.4	China	will	continue	to	provide	support	to	the	medical	facilities	it	has	built	in	Africa	to	ensure	their	sustainable	development	and	upgrade	the	modernization	level	of	the	hospitals	and	laboratories.	
		
		 5.5.5	China	will	continue	to	train	doctors,	nurses,	public	health	workers	and	administrative	personnel	for	African	countries.	 		
		 5.5.6	China	will	conduct	the	"Brightness	Action"	campaign	in	Africa	to	provide	free	treatment	for	cataract	patients.	 				 5.5.7	send	1,500	medical	workers	to	Africa	in	the	next	three	years.	 		Source:	FOCAC	declarations,	action	plans	and	follow-up	documents.		
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Annex	II	–	FOCAC	commitments	for	education	
	 	Declaration	 Action	plan	 Achievement	after	3	years	
FOCAC	2000	-	Beijing	
		
the	last	of	a	10	point	declaration:	"10.	We	decide	to	vigorously	promote	further	China-Africa	co-operation	in	the	economic,	trade,	financial,	agricultural,	medical	care	and	public	health,	scientific	and	technological,	cultural,	educational,	human	resources	development,	transportation,	environmental,	tourism	and	other	areas	on	the	basis	of	the	principles	enshrined	in	this	declaration	and	the	Program	for	China-Africa	Co-operation	in	economic	and	social	Development	adopted	at	the	Forum	so	as	to	promote	the	common	development	of	China	and	Africa."	
15.1	-	expand	cooperation	through:	15.1.1	grant	more	scholarships	to	African	students	to	study	in	China,	continue	to	send	teachers	to	Africa	to	help	local	institutions	of	higher	learning	improve	their	disciplines	and	specialties,	and	set	up	channels	of	communications	between	universities	of	the	two	sides	for	the	study	of	the	Chinese	and	African	civilizations,	15.1.2	-	establish	an	African	Human	Resources	Development	Fund	and	gradually	increase	financial	contribution	to	the	Fund	for	the	training	of	professionals	of	different	disciplines	for	African	countries.		
China	has	set	up	an	African	Human	Resources	Development	Fund	exclusively	for	African	personnel	training.	Over	the	past	three	years,	China	has	organized	training	courses	or	programmes	of	diverse	forms	for	Africa	under	this	special	fund.		
		
15.2	-	work	out	country-specific	training	plans	through	appropriate	channels,	identify	specific	co-operation	projects	and	facilitate	their	implementation.		
		
FOCAC	2003	-	Addis	Ababa	
		
		
under	section	5	Social	Development:	5.1	Human	Resources	Development	and	Educational	Cooperation,	5.2	-	Cooperation	in	Medical	Care	and	Public	Health,	5.3	Cultural	Exchange	and	Cooperation,	and	5.4	People-to-People	Exchange		
5.1.3	China	will	further	increase	its	financial	contribution	to	the	African	Human	Resources	Development	Fund	for	the	training	of	up	to	10,000	African	personnel	in	different	fields.		
2006	5.2.1	China	has	trained	over	10,000	African	professionals	in	various	fields	under	the	African	Human	Resources	Development	Fund	(AHRDF).		
		
5.1.4.	cooperation	is	mainly	bilateral	but	in	order	to	make	the	cooperation	on	a	multilateral	basis	more	effective,	Ethiopia,	in	cooperation	with	the	African	diplomatic	corps	in	Beijing,	will	serve	as	a	coordinator	responsible	for	communicating	with	China	on	African	countries'	requests,	proposals	and	specific	arrangements	concerning	human	resources	development	in	the	next	three	years.		
		
		
5.1.5	exchange	teachers	and	new	scholarships	and	set-up	channels	of	communication	for	exchange	of	ideas	between	their	institutions	of	higher	learning	and	Technical	and	Vocational	Education	and	Training	(TVET).		
		
FOCAC	2006	
under	section	5	Cooperation	in	Social	Development:	5.1	Development	Assistance	and	Debt	Relief,	5.2	Human	Resources	Development,	5.3	Culture,	5.4	Education,	5.5	Medical	Care	and	Public	Health,	5.6	Environmental	Protection,	5.7	Tourism,	5.8	News	Media,	5.9	People-to-
5.2.2	based	on	AHRDF,	to	train	15,000	professionals	for	African	countries	in	the	next	three	years.	The	African	side	undertook	to	provide	necessary	support	and	assistance	in	terms	of	selecting	trainees	and	providing	logistical	services.		
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People,	Youth	and	Women	Exchanges	
		
5.3.2	actively	implement	the	bilateral	government	exchange	programs	and	support	and	promote	cultural	exchanges	as	well	as	art	exhibitions	and	performances	at	the	local	level	and	between	the	peoples.	Set	up	the	African	Cultural	Visitors	Program	to	enhance	cultural	exchanges	between	the	two	sides.		
15	African	governmental	cultural	delegations	have	visited	China;	chinese	cultural	centres	were	set	up	in	Egypt,	Mauritius,	Benin;	734	members	of	Chinese	artistic	troupes	from	20	provinces	and	cities	have	visited	Africa	to	stage	performance	and	take	part	in	27	art	festivals	and	celebrations	held	by	African	countries.	The	Chinese	side	has	invited	a	total	of	370	artists	from	21	African	countries	to	perform	in	China	and	participate	in	international	art	festivals	hosted	by	China;	"Culture	in	Focus"	activities		In	October	2008,	the	activity	"African	Culture	in	Focus	2008"	was	successfully	held	in	Shenzhen.	From	April	to	October	2009,	China	staged	the	"Chinese	Culture	in	Focus	2009"	in	more	than	20	African	countries;		Since	2007,	the	African	Cultural	Visitors	Program	launched	by	China's	Ministry	of	Culture	has	been	further	substantiated.	A	total	of	61	African	cultural	officials	and	personages	have	been	invited	to	China	in	six	groups	to	participate	in	activities	like	the	Roundtable	Conference	on	Cultural	Policy,	the	Africa	Guest	Painters	Visit	China	Project,	and	Museum	Professionals	on	Work	Replacement	and	Research,	thus	deepening	the	cultural	exchanges	between	China	and	Africa;	In	2009,	the	monthly	magazine	Africa	was	launched	by	the	Chinese-African	People's	Friendship	Association			 5.4.2	hold	the	the	China-Africa	Forum	of	Ministers	of	Education	on	a	regular	basis	 		
		
5.4.3	more	exchanges	and	closer	cooperation	between	institutions	of	higher	learning	of	the	two	sides,	ensure	the	effectiveness	of	the	bilateral	student	exchange	programs,	carry	out	consultation	on	concluding	agreements	on	mutual	accreditation	of	academic	degrees.		
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5.4.4	set	up	100	rural	schools,	scholarships	(chinese	government)	from	current	2,000	per	year	to	4,000	per	year	by	2009,	annual	training	for	a	number	of	educational	officials	as	well	as	heads	and	leading	teachers	of	universities,	primary,	secondary	and	vocational	schools	in	Africa;	establish	Confucius	Institutes,	encourage	the	teaching	of	African	languages	in	relevant	Chinese	universities	and	colleges.		
teaching	equipment	for	the	30	schools	has	been	delivered	and	the	construction	of	91	out	of	the	96	schools	has	started,	of	which	66	have	been	completed;	scholarships	were	2000	in	2006,	+700	=	2700	in	2007,	+	700	=	3400	in	2008,	+600	=	4000	in	2009;	China	trained	over	15,000	professionals	in	business,	education,	health,	science	and	technology,	culture,	agriculture,	poverty	reduction,	customs,	quality	inspection,	telecommunications,	environmental	protection,	maritime	affairs	and	media;	the	Chinese	side	held	two	MPA	(master	of	public	administration)	programs	for	developing	countries	in	Peking	University	and	Tsinghua	University	with	the	participation	of	42	students	from	16	African	countries.	China	also	worked	vigorously	to	help	African	countries	train	professionals	and	technicians.	A	vocational	school	built	by	China	and	the	Ethiopian	Government	jointly	was	opened	in	September	this	year;	23	Confucius	Institutes	or	classrooms	have	been	opened	in	16	African	countries	including	Egypt,	Benin,	Botswana,	Togo,	Zimbabwe,	Cameroon,	Kenya,	Liberia	and	Rwanda	
		
5.9.3	(people-to-people	exchanges)	300	young	volunteers	to	African	countries	to	work	in	medical,	health,	sports,	agriculture,	education	and	other	fields,	as	part	of	PEOPLES-TO-PEOPLES	exchanges	
total	of	281		young	Chinese	volunteers	have	been	to	such	African	countries	as	Ethiopia,	Zimbabwe,	the	Seychelles,	Tunisia,	Mauritius,	Eritrea,	Liberia	and	Ghana,	to	provide	medical,	health,	sports,	agricultural,	educational	and	other	services	
FOCAC	2009	-	since	FOCAC	
2009	the	Declaration	and	
Action	Plan	were	
complemented	by	a	third	
document	Implementation	
of	FOCAC	2006	(the	
previous	FOCAC)	
Section	5	Cooperation	in	the	field	of	development:	5.1	Assistance	and	Debt	Relief;	5.2	Human	resources	development;	5.3	Education;	5.4	Cooperation	in	Science	and	Technology	and	Technology	Transfer;	5.5	Cooperation	in	Poverty	Reduction;	5.6	Medical	Care	and	Public	Health;	5.7	Climate	Change	and	Environmental	Protection;	5.8	Disaster	Reduction	and	Relief;	5.9	Tourism	AND	Section	6	Cultural	and	People-to-People	Exchanges	and	Cooperation:	6.1	Culture;	6.2.	Press;	6.3	Exchanges	Between	Academia	and	Think	Tanks;	6.4	People-to-People,	Youth	and	Women	Exchanges;	6.5	Sports;	6.6	World	Expo	
		
Over	the	past	three	years,	together	with	NGOs	from	South	Africa,	Zimbabwe,	Malawi	and	Mozambique,	China	launched	public	welfare	campaigns	such	as	cataract	treatment,	HIV/AIDS	prevention	and	treatment	and	in-kind	donations.	Chinese	enterprises	and	expatriates	have	also	been	actively	involved	in	Africa's	social	and	public	welfare	programs,	playing	a	positive	role	in	Africa's	educational	development,	medical	service,	social	relief	and	disaster	prevention	and	control.	
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5.2	Human	resources	development;		
5.2	train	a	total	of	20,000	people	in	various	sectors	for	African	countries	in	the	next	three	years,	US$1.5	million	contribution	to	support	NEPAD’s	projects	to	train	nurses	and	maternity	assistants	in	Africa;		train	a	total	of	3,000	doctors,	nurses	and	administrative	personnel;	
trained	24,000	African	professionals	in	various	fields,	including	1,500	headmasters	and	teachers,	3,000	agricultural	experts	and	3,000	doctors	and	nurses.		
5.3	Education;		
5.3	build	50	China-Africa	friendship	schools;	Propose	implementation	of	the	20+20	Cooperation	Plan	for	Chinese	and	African	Institutions	of	Higher	Education;	Admit	200	middle	and	high	level	African	administrative	personnel	to	MPA	programs	in	China;	increase	number	of	scholarships	to	5,500;	train	teachers	for	primary,	secondary	and	vocational	schools	in	Africa,	and	help	African	countries	train	1,500	school	headmasters	and	teachers;	Continue	to	promote	the	development	of	Confucius	institutes,	increase	the	number	of	scholarships	offered	to	Chinese	language	teachers	to	help	them	study	in	China,	and	double	efforts	to	raise	capacity	of	local	African	teachers	to	teach	the	Chinese	language.		
built	19	new	schools	in	Africa	and	provided	equipment	to	42	schools;	The	China-Africa	Universities	20+20	Cooperation	Program	was	launched,	and	20	pairs	of	Chinese	and	African	universities	conducted	cooperation	projects;	in	2010	China	provided	5,710,	in	2011	6,316	scholarships;	4	new	Confucius	Institutes,	there	are	now	29	Confucius	Institutes	or	Confucius	Classrooms	in	22	African	countries;		
6.1	Culture	
6.1.2	hold	FOCAC	Culture	Forum;	promote	“Cultures	in	Focus”	events;	strengthen	exchanges	and	cooperation	between	cultural	and	art	authorities	and	professionals;	Strengthen	cooperation	and	build	more	Chinese	cultural	centers	in	Africa;	Promote	cultures	of	the	two	sides	through	new	technologies	such	as	the	internet;		
During	the	"2011	Chinese	Culture	in	Focus",	more	than	130	projects	were	conducted	in	over	30	African	countries;	21	exchanges	of	ministerial-level	cultural	delegations	and	China	has	signed	cultural	agreements	or	implementation	plans	with	15	African	countries;	the	FOCAC	Cultural	Ministers'	Forum	marked	the	establishment	of	the	China-Africa	cultural	strategic	dialogue	mechanism;		
6.3	Exchanges	between	Academia	and	Think	Tanks	
6.3.2	to	implement	a	China-Africa	joint	research	and	exchange	plan	through	a	variety	of	ways,	such	as	seminars,	mutual	academic	visits,	and	joint	research	projects.	
China	conducted	88	joint	research	and	demonstration	projects	with	African	countries.	China	received	42	African	post-doctoral	students	and	donated	research	equipment	to	returning	African	researchers	who	have	concluded	their	joint	research	tasks	in	China.	China	has	actively	implemented	the	China-Africa	Joint	Research	and	Exchange	Program.	14	international	seminars,	sponsored	more	than	500	Chinese	and	African	scholars	for	field	trips	and	academic	exchanges,	and	supported	28research	projects.		
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Section	5	Cooperation	in	the	field	of	development:	5.1	Assistance;	5.2	Human	resources	development;	5.3	Science	and	Technology	Cooperation	and	Knowledge	Sharing;	5.4	Cooperation	in	Poverty	Reduction;	5.5	Medical	Care	and	Public	Health;	5.6	Climate	Change	and	Environmental	Protection	AND	Section	6	Cultural	and	People-to-People	Exchanges	and	Cooperation:	6.1.	Culture,	6.2	Education,	6.3	Press,	Publishing	and	Media,	6.4	Exchanges	between	Academia	and	Think	Tanks,	6.5	People-to-People,	Youth	and	Women	Exchanges,	6.6	Sports	
		 		
		
5.2.2	"African	Talents	Program".	In	the	next	three	years,	China	will	train	30,000	African	professionals	in	various	sectors,	offer	18,000	government	scholarships	and	take	measures	to	improve	the	content	and	quality	of	the	training	programs.	
		
		
5.2.3	China	will	provide	assistance	for	Africa's	vocational	skills	training	facilities,	train	professionals	and	technical	personnel	for	African	countries	and,	in	particular,	help	African	young	people	and	women	enhance	their	job	skills.	
		
		 5.3.2	China	will	launch	the	science	and	technology	for	a	better	life	campaign		 		
6.1	Culture	
Maintain	the	momentum	of	high-level	inter-governmental	mutual	visits	and	dialogue	in	the	cultural	field	and	continue	to	follow	through	on	the	implementation	plan	of	the	China-Africa	bilateral	government	cultural	agreements;	Propose	to	implement	a	"China-Africa	Cultural	Cooperation	Partnership	Program"	and	promote	the	building	of	long-term	paired	cooperation	between	100	Chinese	cultural	institutions	and	100	African	cultural	institution;	Raise	the	profile	of	the	"Cultures	in	Focus"	events	in	China-Africa	cultural	exchanges;	Continue	to	implement	the	program	of	China-Africa	mutual	visits	between	cultural	personnel,	and	strengthen	exchanges	and	cooperation	between	the	administrative	personnel	and	professionals	of	the	cultural	and	art	communities;	Speed	up	the	building	of	Chinese	cultural	centers	in	Africa	and	African	cultural	centers	in	China;	strengthen	exchanges	and	cooperation	in	the	preservation	of	cultural	heritage	and	hold	the	"China-
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Africa	Cultural	Heritage	Preservation	Roundtable";	China	will	provide	assistance	for	the	development	of	Africa's	cultural	facilities.	
6.2	Education	 6.2.2	continue	to	implement	the	20+20	Cooperation	Plan	for	Chinese	and	African	Institutions	of	Higher	Education	 		
		
6.2.3	The	two	sides	will	continue	to	promote	the	establishment	and	development	of	the	Confucius	Institute	and	Confucius	Classrooms	in	Africa.	China	will	extend	active	support	in	terms	of	teaching	staff,	personnel	training	and	teaching	materials	and	equipment.		
how	can	it	become	sustainable	if	china	is	increasing	the	provision	of	resources?	
		
6.2.4	US$2	million	annually	under	the	framework	of	the	UNESCO	trust	fund	to	support	education	development	programs	in	Africa,	in	particular	higher	education	
		
		
6.2.5	China	will	continue	to	help	African	countries	build	educational	and	training	facilities	and	provide	more	opportunities	for	short,	medium	and	long-term	training	and	scholarships.	
		
6.4	Echanges	between	academia	and	think	tanks	
6.4.1	Sponsor	100	programs	by	academic	institutions	and	scholars	covering	topical	research,	international	symposiums,	mutual	visits	of	scholars	and	publication	of	works;	Propose	to	implement	the	"China-Africa	Think	Tanks	10+10	Partnership	Plan"	to	select	10	Chinese	think	tanks	and	10	think	tanks	from	African	countries;	Encourage	and	support	scholars	of	the	two	sides	to	conduct	joint	research	and	publish	the	results	of	their	joint	research	in	international	academic	journals	and	other	publications.		
		
		 6.4.2	institutionalize	the	FOCAC	think	tanks	forum	 		
		
6.4.3	The	two	sides	welcome	and	encourage	more	enterprises,	financial	institutions	and	academic	institutions	to	provide	support	for	academic	interactions	and	people-to-people	and	cultural	exchanges	between	China	and	Africa.	CSR?	
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6.5	People-to-people,	youth	and	women	exchanges	
6.5.2	The	two	sides	will	launch	the	China-Africa	people-to-people	friendship	action,	and	encourage	and	support	exchanges	and	cooperation	between	non-governmental	organizations,	women	and	young	people	of	the	two	sides	by	jointly	undertaking	small	and	micro	social	programs	and	promoting	mutual	visits	between	people's	organizations	of	the	two	sides.	
		
		 6.5.3	institutionalize	the	China-Africa	People's	Forum		 		
		 6.5.4	institutionalize	the	China-Africa	Young	Leaders	Forum	 				 6.5.5	send	young	volunteers	to	Africa	 		
		
6.5.6	China	invites	young	people	in	Africa	to	visit	China	for	study	tours	by	such	means	as	holding	workshops	for	young	leaders	of	political	parties	of	African	countries.	
		
		 6.5.7	continue	women	exchanges		 		Source:	FOCAC	declarations,	action	plans	and	follow-up	documents.		
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Annex	III	–	List	of	Interviews			1. 2013-10-03,	Interview	with	a	Chinese	executive	at	a	Confucius	Institute.		2. 2013-10-08,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Embassy	 of	 the	 PRC,	 Culture	Department,	Nairobi.	3. 2013-10-11,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	EcoBuild	Africa,	Nairobi.		4. 2013-10-29,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 and	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Management	Sciences	for	Health	-	Civil	Society	Portal	for	Healthcare,	Nairobi.		5. 2013-10-31,	Interview	with	a	Kenyan	executive	at	a	Confucius	Institute.		6. 2013-11-11,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Inter	Region	Economic	Network,	Nairobi.		7. 2013-11-13,	 Interview	with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 and	International	Trade,	Department	of	External	Trade,	Nairobi.		8. 2013-11-15,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance,	 Treasury,	Nairobi.		9. 2013-11-18,	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Chinese	Economic	and	Commercial	Counsellor’s	Office,	Nairobi.		10. 2013-11-22,	Interview	with	a	Chinese	executive	at	a	Confucius	Institute.		11. 2013-11-22,	Interview	with	a	Kenyan	executive	at	a	Confucius	Institute.	12. 2013-11-27,	 Interview	with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 and	International	Trade,	East	African	Community	Division,	Nairobi.		13. 2013-11-28,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Kenya	 China	 Friendship	Association,	Nairobi.		14. 2013-12-02,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Institute	 of	 Economic	 Affairs,	Economic	Regulation	and	Competition	Policy	Division,	Nairobi.		15. 2013-12-02,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Kenya	 Association	 of	Manufacturers,	Export	Division,	Nairobi.		16. 2013-12-05,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Kenya	 Medical	 Research	Institute	(KEMRI),	Nairobi.	17. 2013-12-05,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Kenya	 Medical	 Research	Institute	(KEMRI),	Nairobi.	18. 2013-12-11,	 Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Overseas	Chinese	Association,	Nairobi.		19. 2014-01-24,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 National	 Economic	 and	 Social	Council,	Nairobi.		20. 2014-01-24,	Interview	with	an	officer	at	a	Kenyan	infrastructure	development	company,	Nairobi.		21. 2014-01-27,	 Interview	with	an	executive	at	 the	Central	Organisation	of	Trade	Unions,	Nairobi.		22. 2014-01-31,	 Interview	with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Kenya	 Investment	 Authority,	Nairobi.		23. 2014-01-31,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Kenya	 Pharmaceutical	Association,	Nairobi.		24. 2014-02-06,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	a	Chinese	company	manufacturing	traditional	medicines,	Nairobi.		25. 2014-02-07,	 Interview	with	an	executive	at	 the	Pharmacy	and	Poisons	Board,	Registrar	Division,	Nairobi.		26. 2014-02-12,	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Chinese	Economic	and	Commercial	Counsellor’s	Office,	Nairobi.	27. 2014-02-12,	Interview	with	an	officer	at	Huawei,	Nairobi.		
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28. 2014-02-13,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	China	WuYi,	Nairobi.		29. 2014-02-16,	Interview	with	an	officer	at	China	Road	and	Bridge,	Nairobi.		30. 2014-02-19,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Kenya	 National	 Highways	Authority,	Nairobi.		31. 2014-02-25,	 Interview	with	 an	 executive	 at	 MCEDO-Beijing	 School,	 Mathare,	Nairobi.		32. 2014-02-26,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Anti-Counterfeits	 Agency,	Nairobi.		33. 2014-02-28,	 Interview	with	an	officer	at	 the	Kenya	 Institute	 for	Public	Policy	Research	and	Analysis,	Trade	and	Foreign	Policy	Division,	Nairobi.		34. 2014-03-19,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Mission	for	Essential	Drugs	and	Supplies	(MEDS),	Operations	Division.	35. 2014-03-21,	Interview	with	an	officer	at	a	Trade	Union	[anonymity	requested],	Nairobi.		36. 2014-03-26,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Kenya	 Chemical	 and	 Allied	Workers	Union,	Nairobi.		37. 2014-03-28,	 Interview	with	 an	officer	 at	 the	 Federation	of	Kenya	Employers,	Nairobi.		38. 2014-03-28,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	National	Construction	Authority,	Nairobi.		39. 2014-03-28,	 Interview	with	an	officer	at	 the	Kenya	 Institute	 for	Public	Policy	Research	and	Analysis,	Counterfeits	Division,	Nairobi.		40. 2014-03-12,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	Kenya	Vision	2030,	Nairobi.		41. 2014-09-14,	 Interview	with	an	executive	at	 the	Kenya	Association	of	Building	And	Engineering	Consultants	(KABCEC),	Nairobi.		42. 2014-09-16,	 Interview	 with	 the	 Roads	 and	 Civil	 Engineering	 Contractors	Association	(RACECA),	Nairobi.		43. 2014-09-17,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Central	 Organisation	 of	 Trade	Unions,	Nairobi.		44. 2014-09-17,	 Interview	with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Kenya	Medical	 Supplies	 Agency	(KEMSA),	Procurement-Donor	Funded	Projects	Division,	Nairobi.		45. 2014-09-19,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Kenya	 Association	 of	Manufacturers,	Anti-Counterfeits	Division,	Nairobi.		46. 2014-09-23,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	National	Construction	Authority,	Nairobi.		47. 2014-09-25,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Kenya	Federation	 of	 Master	Builders,	Nairobi.		48. 2014-09-29,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health,	 Medical	Services,	Nairobi.		49. 2014-09-30,	 Interview	with	an	executive	at	 the	Ministry	of	Health,	Pharmacy	Department,	Nairobi.		50. 2014-09-30,	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Infrastructure	Development	Division,	Nairobi.		51. 2014-10-06,	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Ministry	of	Health,	Malaria	Control	Division,	Nairobi.		52. 2014-10-06,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 Kenya	 Vision	 2030,	 Social	 Pillar	Department,	Nairobi.		53. 2014-10-07,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Consumers	Federation	of	Kenya,	Nairobi.		54. 2014-10-07,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Medical	 Practitioners	 and	Dentists	Board,	Nairobi.		
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55. 2014-10-07,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Pharmacy	 and	 Poisons	 Board,	Pharmacovigilance	Division,	Nairobi.		56. 2014-10-07,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Pharmacy	 and	 Poisons	 Board,	Registrar	Division,	Nairobi.		57. 2014-10-08,	 Interview	with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 National	 AIDS	&	 STI	 Control	Programme	(NASCOP),	Nairobi.		58. 2014-10-08,	Interview	with	an	executive,	Kenya	Healthcare	Federation,	Nairobi.		59. 2014-10-10,	Interview	with	an	executive	and	an	officer	at	the	Kenya	Technical	Trainers	College,	Nairobi.		60. 2014-10-10,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Ministry	of	Culture,	Traditional	Medicine	Department,	Nairobi.		61. 2014-10-14,	 Interview	 with	 a	 professor	 of	 traditional	 medicine	 at	 Kenyatta	University.		62. 2014-10-14,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	Mama	Lucy	Kibaki	Hospital,	Nairobi.		63. 2014-10-15,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 a	 Kenyan-Indian	 company	distributing	medical	products	and	devices.			64. 2014-10-17,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	National	Museums	of	Kenya.		65. 2014-10-22,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	Kenyatta	University.			66. 2014-11-04,	Interview	with	a	professor	of	pharmacy	and	traditional	medicine	at	Kenyatta	University.		67. 2014-11-04,	Interview	with	an	executive	at	the	Technical	University	of	Kenya,	Nairobi.		68. 2014-11-05,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Kenya	 Medical	 Research	Institute	(KEMRI),	Nairobi.	69. 2014-11-05,	 Interview	 with	 professors	 of	 engineering	 at	 the	 Technical	University	of	Kenya,	Nairobi.		70. 2014-11-10,	 Interview	with	an	executive	at	 the	Ministry	of	Health,	 Standards	Division,	Nairobi.		71. 2014-11-11,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Kenya	 Bureau	 of	 Standards	(KEBS),	Nairobi.		72. 2014-11-13,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Kenya	 Building	 Construction	Timber	Furniture	&	Trade's	Employees	Union,	Nairobi.		73. 2014-11-14,	 Interview	 with	 Kenyan	 and	 Chinese	 executives	 at	 a	 Confucius	Institute.		74. 2014-11-17,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health,	 Traditional	Medicine	Division,	Nairobi.		75. 2014-11-18,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health,	 Medical	Engineering	Division,	Nairobi.		76. 2014-11-18,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health,	 Human	Resources	Development	Department,	Nairobi.		77. 2014-11-19,	Interview	with	an	executive	and	officers	at	the	Ministry	of	Labour,	Industrial	Relations	Office,	Nairobi.		78. 2014-11-19,	Interview	with	an	executive,	Ministry	of	Education,	Technical	and	Vocational	Education	and	Training	Division,	Nairobi.		79. 2014-11-19,	 Interview	 with	 an	 officer	 at	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education,	 Higher	Education	Division,	Nairobi.		80. 2014-11-20,	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Export	Promotion	Council,	Nairobi.		81. 2014-11-28,	Interview	with	an	officer	at	the	Nairobi	City	Council,	Nairobi.		82. 2014-12-01,	 Interview	with	an	officer	at	 the	Ministry	of	Finance,	Treasury	E-commerce	Division,	Nairobi.		
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83. 2014-12-05,	 Interview	 with	 an	 executive	 at	 the	 Medical	 Practitioners	 and	Dentists	Board,	Nairobi.							
